

~The Delhi Sultanate

A Political and Military History

The Delhi Sultanate was the first Islamic state to be established in India. In broad-ranging and accessible narrative, Peter Jackson traces the history of the Sultanate from its foundation in 1210 to its demise in around 1400 following the sack of Delhi by the Central Asian conqueror, Temur (Tamerlane). During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Sultanate was the principal bastion of Islam in the subcontinent. While the book focuses on military and political affairs, tracing the Sultanate's expansion, its resistance to formidable Mongol invasions from the northwest and the administrative developments that underpinned these exploits, it also explores the Sultans' relations with their non-Muslim subjects. As a comprehensive treatment of the political history of this period, the book will make a significant contribution to the literature on medieval Indo-Muslim history. Students of Islamic and South Asian history, and those with a general interest in the region, will find it a valuable resource.

PETER JACKSON is Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at Keele University. He is editor of **The Cambridge History of Iran**, volume 6 (1986), and translator and joint editor of *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck* (1990).

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PETER JACKSON

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~For Rebecca

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~preface

This book is designed to be a political and military history of the 'Greater' Delhi Sultanate, which after its creation in 1210 lasted for almost two hundred years and for almost half that period functioned as the sole bastion of Muslim power in the Indian subcontinent. The era from the sack of Delhi by the Central Asian conqueror Temur (Timur-i *Lang*, 'the Lame'; Westernized as 'Tamerlane') in 801/1398 down to the Mughal conquest in 932/ 1526, during which the Sultanate was merely one of several competing Muslim kingdoms in the north, is briefly covered in the Epilogue.

The source materials for the Delhi Sultanate - largely narrative in form and written in Persian, with the addition of descriptions of India by external observers who wrote in Arabic - are markedly less satisfactory than, for instance, either those available for the Mughal empire that followed it or those composed in the contemporary Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria. Much of the general literature on this period of Indian history has tended to adhere, in my view, far too closely to the arrangement in the narrative sources, and accordingly the reader is all too often served up a barely digestible repast of seemingly unconnected events.

I have divided the period into two phases, with the reign of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji (695-715/1296-1316) marking a watershed: his era witnessed the implementation of far-reaching administrative changes, designed in large part to meet both an escalation in Mongol attacks and a more vigorous advance in Rajasthan and the south. Each of the two sections is introduced by a chapter on the sources, and the view they purvey of the sultans; but otherwise, within each section I have tried to approach the task thematically, giving prominence to the formation of the aristocracy, to administrative control and to the perennial warfare against the Sultanate's enemies, whether independent Hindu powers or the Mongols of Afghanistan and Central Asia. In chapters 12-13 and 15 an attempt has been made to bring Political and military affairs into relation with economic developments, although it has to be said that material for the economic history of the Sultanate is relatively meagre. Two chapters, focusing on the reigns of Muhammad bin Tughluq (724-752/1324-51) and of Firuz Shah (752-790/

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1351-88), represent a departure from the framework I have adopted; but it seemed advisable to devote a consolidated study to each of these problematic reigns. It is hoped that chapter 14, on the sultans' relations with the subject Hindu population, fits naturally between them, given Muhammad's favour towards Hindus and his successor's allegedly more rigorous attitudes.

This book has been some years in gestation, and in writing it I have accumulated many debts. It is a pleasure to be able at last to acknowledge an award from the Leverhulme Trust which contributed towards the cost of replacement teaching for two terms in 1990-1, and the generosity of Keele University both in meeting the balance of those costs and in granting me a research award for a further term and funding research expenses. Thanks are also due to my medievalist colleagues in the History department for closing ranks when I was on sabbatical leave. I have benefited greatly from the assistance of the inter-library loans section of Keele University Library, and from the facilities offered by the Cambridge University Library, the Oriental Room of the Bodleian Library and the Indian Institute in Oxford, the John Rylands University Library at Manchester, the India Office Library and the Oriental Students' Room of the British Library (now amalgamated), the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University of London, the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, and the Library of the Rijksuniversiteit Leiden. The forbearance of the Librarian of the Royal Asiatic Society towards a notoriously long-term borrower is also deeply appreciated. I am grateful to the relevant Turkish authorities for permission to consult the manuscript collections in the Suleymaniye and Nuruosmaniye Libraries and the Topkapi Sarayi Muzesi in Istanbul. Dr Renato Traini, librarian at the Biblioteca dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei e Corsiniana in Rome, promptly and courteously supplied me with photocopies of the relevant folios of the manuscript Caetani 21 of al-Safadi's *al-Wafi bi'l-Wafayat*. The Bodleian Library, the British Library and the National Archives of India have also kindly provided me with microfilms of certain manuscripts in their collections.

A number of scholars contributed towards the production of this book. Some years ago, Mr Simon Digby generously lent me a photocopy of most of the manuscript of the first recension of Barani's *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* in his private collection, which has proved invaluable, and more recently gave me permission

to use a text in which he has collated the portion of this manuscript covering the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq with the relevant section of that in the Bodleian Library. In India in 1991, Dr Akbar Ali Khan Arshizade, Officiating Director of the Raza Library at Rampur, extended to my wife and myself a hospitality we still remember with warm gratitude. We had good reason, too, to value the assistance of Vikram, our driver, and Toni, our guide in the old city of Delhi. For the production of the maps I am indebted to my colleague Andrew Lawrence, of the

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Cartographic unit in the Department of Environmental Social Sciences at Keele. At the Cambridge University Press, Marigold Acland has proved an extremely patient and good-natured editor.

It will be obvious in the following pages how much I have profited from the work of other scholars who have made the eastern Islamic world, and in particular Muslim India, very much more their field than I have myself. Dr Peter Hardy and Professor Edmund Bosworth, who jointly examined my PhD thesis in 1976, have continued to sustain me with their friendship, interest and hospitality. I have gained also from the opportunity to meet and argue about the Delhi Sultanate with Dr Khurram Qadir, of the Bahauddin Zakariya University at Multan. Naturally, I enjoy undivided credit for any errors that have crept into the book.

My greatest debt is acknowledged, inadequately, in the dedication. Despite the heavy demands of her own career, my wife has never failed to offer encouragement and moral support to an author who at times appeared to be teetering on the edge of insanity. Without her this book could not have been written.

~Note on transliteration

For the transliteration of Arabic and Persian, I have used the system adopted in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, except that *ch* is employed instead of *c*, *j* for *dj*, and *q* for *k*. For the sake of uniformity, Persian names and terms derived from Arabic are spelled as if they were Arabic: thus Muhaddith rather than Muhaddis, *dhimma* for *zimma*, *hadrat* for *hazrat*, and *waqf* in place of *vaqf*. The Persian *idafa* has been rendered throughout as *-[y]i*. For Turkish and Mongol proper names and terms, I have followed the UNESCO system, as employed in J. A. Boyle, *The successors of Genghis Khan* (New York, 1971). The tentative reconstruction of a proper name is indicated by an asterisk, as in *Altunapa or *Tartaq. Precise readings, as found in manuscripts or printed texts, are reproduced in capitals, with X standing for *kh*, T for *gh*, C for *ch*, S for *sh*, Z for *zh*, ' for *hamza*, and the long vowels represented by A, W and Y (a 'tooth' without diacritical points appears as a dot).

Indian names present a greater problem, and here I have undoubtedly been guilty of inconsistency. The names of those places that found their way into standard Islamic geographical lore are given in Arabic-Persian form, e.g. Qinnawj and Bada'un in place of Kanauj and Budaon; but otherwise a hybrid (if hopefully recognizable) form has been employed, e.g. Kol, Chanderi, Erach, rather than Kul, Chandiri, Irach. Where a European spelling has become established, however, as with Delhi and Lahore, I have given the Persian-Arabic form (*Dilti*, *Dihli*; *Lahawr*) alongside it at first encounter, thereafter adhering to the form in common use.

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~Abbreviations

Periodicals and reference works

AEMA *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*

AOH *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*

ARIE *Archaeological Survey of India. Annual Report on Indian Epigraphy*

BEO *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas*

BI Bibliotheca Indica

BL British Library

BN Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris

BSOFAJS *Bulletin of the School of Oriental [and African] Studies, University of London*

CAJ *Central Asiatic Journal*

CCIM H. Nelson Wright (ed.), *Catalogue of the coins of the Indian Museum, Calcutta*

CMSD H. Nelson Wright (ed.), *The coinage and metrology of the Sultans of Dehli*

DGUP *District gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh* (Allahabad, 1903-22, 48 vols.)

ED Sir Henry Elliot, *A history of India as told by its own historians*, ed. J. Dowson (London, 1867-77, 8 vols.) *El Epigraphia Indica*

EIAPS *Epigraphia Indica. Arabic and Persian Supplement*

EIM *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*

Enc.Ir . E. Yarshater (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (London and Costa Mesa, California, 1982- in progress)

Enc.Isl.² Ch. Pellat *et al.* (eds.), *The encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn (Leiden, 1954- in progress) GMS Gibb Memorial Series

HI *Hamdard Islamicus*

HJAS *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*

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~xviii Abbreviations

HN M. Habib and K. A. Nizami (eds.), *The Delhi Sultanat (A.D.1206-1526)*

HS Hakluyt Society

IA *Indian Antiquary*

IC *Islamic Culture*

IESHR *Indian Economic and Social History Review*

IG W. S. Meyer *et al.* (eds.), *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, new edn. (Oxford, 1907-9, 26 vols.)

IHQ *Indian Historical Quarterly*

IHR *Indian Historical Review*

IOL India Office Library, London

IO[NJS] *Israel Oriental [Notes and] Studies*

Iran *Iran. Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*

- IS* *Islamic Studies*
- IU* Islamkundliche Untersuchungen
- JA* *Journal Asiatique*
- JAH* *Journal of Asian History*
- JAOS* *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
- JAS[B]* *Journal of the Asiatic Society [of Bengal]*
- JASP* *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan*
- JB[O]RS* *Journal of the Bihar [and Orissa] Research Society*
- JCA* *Journal of Central Asia*
- JIH* *Journal of Indian History*
- JIS* *Journal of Islamic Studies*
- JNSI* *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*
- JPHS* *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*
- JRAS* *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*
- JSS* *Journal of Semitic Studies*
- JUPHS* *Journal of the United Provinces Historical Society*
- MA SI* *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*
- MIM* *Medieval India: a miscellany*
- MIQ* *Medieval India Quarterly*
- NIA* *New Indian Antiquary*
- PFEH* *Papers on Far Eastern History*
- PIHC* *Proceedings of the ... Indian History Congress* [numeral refers to the number of the session]
- PL C. A. Storey, Persian literature: a bio-bibliographical survey* (London, 1927- in progress)
- PPV* *Pamiatniki Pis'mennosti Vostoka*
- PSMI* *Proceedings of the Seminar on Medieval Inscriptions (6—8th Feb. 1970)* (Aligarh, 1974)
- PUJ* *Patna University Journal*
- ~**OGIA** Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Kairo. Quellen zur Geschichte des islamischen Ägyptens
- RCEA* Et. Combe, J. Sauvaget and G. Wiet (eds.), *Repertoire chronologique d'epigraphie arabe* (Cairo,

1931- in progress)

RRL Rampur Raza Library

SK Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Istanbul

SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

TMENP G. Doerfer, *Turkische und mongolische Elemente im Neuper- sischen*

TSM Topkapi Sarayi Muzesi, Istanbul

TVOIRAO *Trudy Vostochnago Otdeleniia Imperatorskago Russkago Ar- kheologicheskago Obshestva*

WZKM *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes*

ZS *Zentralasiatische Studien*

Texts

AHG Ulughkhani, *Zafar al- Walih*, ed. Ross, *An Arabic history of Gujarat*

AH Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Adab al-Harb wa'l-Shaja'a Babur-Nama Babur, Bdbur-Nama*

CN Kufi, *Chach-Nama*

DA Ghaznawi, *Dastur al-Albab*

DGK Amir Khusraw, *Dibacha-yi Ghurrat al-Kamal*

DR Amir Khusraw, *Diwal Rdni-yi Khadir Khan*

FFS Sultan Firuz Shah Tughluq, *Futuhdt-i Flruz-Shahi*

FG Yusuf-i Ahl, *Fard'id-i Ghiyathi*

FJ Barani, *Fatawa-yi Jahdnddri*

FS °Isami, *Futuh al-Salatin*

GK Amir Khusraw, *Ghurrat al-Kamal*

IA Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamilfi'l-Ta'rikh*

IB Ibn Battuta, *Tuhfat al-Nuzzar*

IM Ibn Mahru, *Insha-yi Mahru*

JH °Awfi, *Jawami al-Hikdyat*

JT Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah, *Jami al-Tawarikh*

KF Amir Khusraw, *Khazd'in al-Futuh*

MA al-°Umari, *Masalik al-Absar*

MF Amir Khusraw, *Miftah al-Futuh*
NS Amir Khusraw, *Nuh Sipih*
QS Amir Khusraw, *Qiran al-Sa'dayn*
RI Amir Khusraw, *Rasa'il al-I'jaz*
SA Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Shajarat al-Ansab*
SFS Anonymous, *Sirat-i Firuz-Shahi*
Siyar Kirmani (Amir Khwurd), *Siyar al-Awliya'*

~xx Abbreviations

SP Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah, *Shu'ab-i Panjgana*
Taj Hasan-i Nizami, *Taj al-Ma'athir*
TFS Barani, *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi*
TFS' Barani, *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi*, first recension
TJG Juwayni, *Ta'rikh-i Jahan-Gusha*
TMS Sirhindi, *Ta'rikh-i Mubarak-Shahi*
TN Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*
TS Amir Khusraw, *Tuhfat al-Sighar*
Tughluq-Nama Amir Khusraw, *Tughluq-Nama*
WH Amir Khusraw, *Wasat al-Hayat*
Shami, *ZN Shami, Zafar-Nama*
Yazdi, *ZN Yazdi, Zafar-Nama*

~PART I

The thirteenth century

~
~CHAPTER 1

The background

Caliphs, amirs and sultans

The ghosts of two great Muslim conquerors haunted the rulers of the Delhi Sultanate. One was Mahmud of Ghazna (d. 421/1030), whose campaigns had extended Islamic rule into the western Panjab. The other was the Ghurid Sultan Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad b. Sam, whose more recent victories over a number of Hindu states had entrenched Muslim power in the north Gangetic plain, and whose murder in 602/1206 had first propelled Muslim India on its own separate path, distinct from that taken by the lands west of the Indus. Mahmud and Mu'izz al-Din, each in his way, typified the warlords who had been carving out principalities

for themselves within the Islamic world since the ninth century. The universal Caliphate of the 'Abbasids had steadily disintegrated, leaving them with only the titular headship of the orthodox (Sunni) Muslim community. Some provinces had been lost to the heterodox Shi'ites. For almost three centuries (296-567/909-1171) the 'Abbasids were challenged by the Fatimid *Imams* representing the Isma'ili Shi'ite sect. From Egypt and Syria, these counter-caliphs deployed a network of agents and propagandists whose activities extended even as far east as Sind, the region of the middle and lower Indus valley, reduced by the caliphal general Muhammad b. Qasim al-Thaqafi as early as 92/711. From 344/965 the Fatimid Imam's name was mentioned in the prayers at Multan, and by the end of the century at Mansura.¹ But in the majority of caliphal territories power passed into the hands of semi-independent, hereditary governors. Such rulers, who initially bore no title higher than *amir* (literally 'commander'), usually went through the formality of obtaining a patent of authority (*manshur*), a robe (*khil'at*) and a sonorous

For a good introduction to the first centuries of Muslim rule in Sind, see Yohanan Friedmann, 'A contribution to the early history of Islam in India', in M. Rosen-Ayalon (ed.), *Studies in memory of Gas ton Wiet* (Jerusalem, 1977), 309-33; Derryl N. MacLean, *Religion and society in Arab Sind* (Leiden, 1989). On Isma'ili activity, see S. M. Stern, 'Isma'ili Propaganda and Fatimid rule in Sind', *IC* 23 (1949), 298-307; 'Abbas al-Hamdani, *The beginnings of the Isma'ili Da'wa in northern India* (Cairo, 1956).

~4 The thirteenth century

title (*laqab*) from the 'Abbasid Caliph, in return for inserting his name in the public Friday sermon (*khutba*) and on the coinage (*sikka*) and, more notionally, remitting an annual tribute.

To bolster their dubious legitimacy, the provincial amirs had to act (or pose) as champions of Sunni Islam and its caliph against both the infidel and the heretic. These functions were exercised most successfully by rulers of Turkish origin. Most of the regional dynasts imitated the 'Abbasid Caliphs, and buttressed their own power, by maintaining regiments of Turkish slave guards (Arabic sing. *ghulam*, *mamluk*; Persian *banda*) from the pagan steppelands of Central Asia. Ghulam status, it must be emphasized, bore none of the degrading connotations associated with other kinds of slavery. The Turkish peoples enjoyed a particularly high reputation for martial skill and religious orthodoxy, and ghulams were highly prized by their masters, receiving both instruction in the Islamic faith and a rigorous military training.² Nor was such confidence misplaced: as we shall see, the forging and preservation of an independent Muslim power in India were to be in large measure the work of Turkish slave commanders and their own ghulams.

Mahmud's dynasty, the Ghaznawids or Yaminids (352-582/962-1186), was of Turkish stock; its effective founder, Mahmud's father Sebuktegin, had been a Turkish slave commander. At its greatest extent, the Ghaznawid empire embraced an area from Rayy and Isfahan in Persia as far as Hansi in the eastern Panjab. Mahmud himself, who conducted no less than seventeen expeditions against pagan Indian rulers and who also rooted out the Isma'ilis from the cities of Multan and Mansura, was rewarded by the 'Abbasid Caliph for his services to Sunni Islam with the *laqab* of *Yamiin al-Dawla* ('Right Hand of the State').³

Turks did not enter the civilized lands of Islam only through the slave traffic, however. They also came in as free men, in the large-scale migrations or invasions of recently converted nomadic tribal groups from Central Asia; and one such clan, the Seljuks, who originated among the Ghuzz (Oghuz) confederacy north of the Aral Sea, created in the second half of the eleventh

² C. E. Bosworth, 'Barbarian incursions: the coming of the Turks into the Islamic world', in D. S. Richards (ed.), *Islamic civilisation 950-1150* (Oxford, 1973), 1-16 (especially 4-10), and repr. in Bosworth, *The medieval history of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (London, 1977). D. Ayalon, 'The European-Asiatic steppe: a major reservoir of power for the Islamic world', in *Trudy XXV mezhdunarodnogo kongressy vostokovedov, Moskva 1960* (Moscow, 1963, 5 vols.), II, 47-52; *idem*, 'Preliminary remarks on the Mamluk military institution in Islam', in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East* (Oxford and London, 1975), 44-58; both repr. in Ayalon, *The Mamluk military society* (London, 1979).

C. E. Bosworth, 'The imperial policy of the early Ghaznavids', *IS* 1 (1962), part 3, 49-82, repr. in his *Medieval history*. For a brief survey of the dynasty, see B. Spuler, 'Ghaznavids', *Enc.IsI*². The standard works are Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids. Their empire in Afghanistan and eastern Iran 994:1040*, 2nd edn (Beirut, 1973); *idem*, *The later Ghaznavids, splendour and decay: the dynasty in Afghanistan and northern India 1040-1186* (Edinburgh, 1977).

~century an empire that comprised the whole of Persia, Iraq and Syria. In 344/ 1055 the Seljuk leader entered Baghdad and took the caliph under his protection, receiving in return the new and exalted style of *Sultan*. The Seljuks had already defeated the Ghaznavid amir, Mahmud's son Mas'ud I (431/ 1040); and his successors, who assumed the title of sultan as a counterblast to Seljuk pretensions, were gradually driven from their lands in eastern Persia. In 511/1117 the Ghaznavid Bahram Shah was enthroned with the assistance of the great Seljuk Sultan Sanjar, who dominated the eastern Iranian world from his base in Khurasan. The Ghaznavids thereby became tributary to the Seljuks; even so, it was not the Seljuks who would destroy them.

Mu'izz al-Din's family, the Shansabanids, originated among the petty princes (*muluk*; sing. *malik*) of Ghur, the mountainous region east of Herat.⁴ Reduced to tributary status first by Mahmud of Ghazna and later by the Seljuks, they found their opportunity at a time of renewed upheavals in the Iranian world. In the 1120s, by one of the same processes in the eastern Asiatic steppe that would bring conquering Mongol armies westwards in the thirteenth century, the Qara-Khitai (or -Khitai), a semi-nomadic people of probably Mongolian stock and under the leadership of a Buddhist ruling dynasty, moved into Turkestan and Transoxiana (Ma wara' al-Nahr) and established their hegemony over the Muslim rulers there. Sanjar was defeated in 536/1141, and in the middle of the century, under pressure from fresh waves of Ghuzz tribesmen dislodged from their homelands by the Qara-Khitai, his empire collapsed. The Ghuzz also wrested Ghazna from Bahram Shah's son and successor, Khusraw Shah, and obliged him to fall back on Lahore (Lahawr), the administrative centre of his Indian territories. The Shansabanids, who had for some years been embroiled in a feud with the Ghaznavids, were the ultimate beneficiaries of these developments. Already, in c. 544/1150, the Shansabanid prince 'Ala' al-Din Husayn had temporarily expelled Bahram Shah from Ghazna and sacked the city, thereby winning the undying sobriquet of *Jahansuz* ('World-Burner'); and he took for himself the title of sultan and the ceremonial parasol (*chattr*) affected by the Seljuk sovereigns. It was Husayn's nephew, Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad b. Sam (558-599/1163-1203), who expelled the Ghuzz from Ghazna in 569/1173-4 and installed there his younger brother Mu'izz al-Din (formerly Shihab al-Din) Muhammad.

Under Ghiyath al-Din and Mu'izz al-Din, who throughout cooperated more or less harmoniously, the Shansabanids - or Ghurids, as we may now call them, since they had reduced to subordinate status the other maliks of

⁴A. Maricq and G. Wiet, *Le minaret de Djam. La decouverte de la capitale des sultans Ghorides (XIF-XIII^e siecles)* (Paris, 1959): 31-44 contain a historical survey of the dynasty down to c. 1200; more generally, see C. E. Bosworth, 'Ghurids', *Enc.IsI*²; A. D. H. Bivar, 'Ghur', *ibid*. For what follows, see also Bosworth, *Later Ghaznavids*, 111-22; *idem*, 'The political and • dynastic history of the Iranian world (A.D. 1000-1217)', in J. A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge history of Iran, V. The Saljuq and Mongol periods* (Cambridge, 1968), 157-66, 185-92.

~the region - emerged as one of the great powers of the eastern Islamic world. Their principal seat was the fortress of Firuzkuh, identified by Andre Maricq in 1957 with ruins at Jam on the middle Hari Rud, some 200 km. east of Herat; Ghiyath al-Din's authority was recognized by branches of the dynasty which ruled at Bamiyan, Madin and Jurwas. His chief rivals were the rulers of Khwarazm on the lower Oxus (Amudarya), who belonged to a dynasty founded by a Turkish ghulam and who like the Ghurids were erstwhile subordinates of the Seljuk Sultan. But the Khwarazmshahs suffered from two disadvantages that did not afflict the Ghurids. One was the overlordship of the heathen Qara-Khitai to their rear (although their military support could on occasions prove welcome); the other was the hostility of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Nasir li-Dini'llah (575-622/1180-1225). Encouraged by the caliph, from whom he obtained the title *Qasim Amir al-Mu'minin* ('Partner of the Commander of the Faithful'), Ghiyath al-Din engaged in a duel for Khurasan with the Khwarazmshahs, in which, prior to his death in 599/1203, the Ghurids definitely had the

better of it. Mu'izz al-Din, who like Ghiyath al-Din bore the title of sultan, ably seconded his brother's efforts; but he also looked eastwards.

Early Muslim India

For the first few centuries after Muhammad b. Qasim's conquest of Sind, the frontier in India between the Islamic world - the *Dar al-Islam* ('Abode of Islam') - and pagan territory - the war-zone or *Dar al-Harb* - had remained relatively static. The early Muslim governors of Sind engaged in 'holy war' (*jihad*) against their Hindu neighbours, despatching periodic expeditions as far afield as Kashmir or Malwa.⁵ But until the first decades of the tenth century, Muslim expansion eastwards was effectively barred by the powerful Gurjara-Pratihara dynasty, which dominated northern India from its capital at Kanauj (Qinnawj) on the Ganges. Mahmud of Ghazna undoubtedly benefited from the eclipse of this empire and the division of its territories among a number of warring successor-states. Many of his victories in India achieved nothing more than the acquisition of unheard-of quantities of plunder: Hindu cities were sacked, notably the great seaport of Somnath in Gujarat (416/1025-6), their temples looted and golden idols piously smashed to pieces and carried off to Ghazna to replenish Mahmud's treasury. But for all their swashbuckling character, one result of the Ghaznawid amir's activities was the acquisition for Islam of a new foothold in the western Panjab.⁶

⁵ For a convenient list of campaigns, see J. F. Richards, 'The Islamic frontier in the east: expansion into South Asia', *South Asia* 4 (1974), 94-8; and on early Muslim India more generally, Andre Wink, *Al-Hind: the making of the Indo-Islamic world*, I. *Early medieval India and the expansion of Islam, 7th-11th centuries* (Leiden, 1990), esp. chap. 4.

⁶ M. Nazim, *The life and times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna* (Cambridge, 1931), chapter 8.

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Following their expulsion from eastern Persia, the Ghaznawids were increasingly confined to their lands in present-day Afghanistan, Makran and Sind and to their conquests in India. Within the subcontinent they forfeited some of Mahmud's gains. Hansi, for example, was wrested from them by a coalition of Hindu princes in 435/1043; and Multan again passed into the hands of the Isma'ilis.⁷ But the dynasty was by no means moribund. The reigns of Ibrahim (451-492/1059-99) and of his son Mas'ud III (492-508/1099-1115) were characterized by the continuing prosecution of the traditional mission in India. It is in 1090 that we first encounter, in an inscription of the Gahadavala king of Kanauj, the mysterious *Turushka-danda*, a tax designed either to finance the struggle against the Muslims or to meet their demands for tribute. According to the chronicler Juzjani, Mas'ud III's military chamberlain (*hajib*) Toghategin mounted a raid which penetrated beyond the Ganges and further east than any Muslim incursion since the time of Mahmud. The dynasty did not abandon military exploits even in an era of decline. Bahram Shah is said to have conducted holy wars (*ghazuha*) in India, and his grandson Khusraw Malik appears to have fought against Hindu powers not long before the truncated Ghaznawid Sultanate was finally overwhelmed by the Ghurids.⁸

The Ghurid conquests

We possess a number of sources for the Ghurid campaigns of conquest and for the emergence of an autonomous Muslim power in northern India. The *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* of Minhaj al-Din b. Siraj al-Din Juzjani, completed in Delhi in 658/1260, is a general history of the Islamic world in twenty-three sections (*tafaqat*), of which sections 19 and 20 deal with the Ghurids and their immediate successors in India. A precious source for the mid-thirteenth-century Delhi Sultanate, it is of less value for events in India prior to 623/1226 when the author was still resident in Ghur.⁹ Of the earlier works composed in India, Hasan-i Nizami's florid and verbose *Taj al-Ma'athir*, begun in 602/1205-6 but completed after 626/1229, is the nearest thing we have to a narrative of events. This work, which opens with Mu'izz al-Din's great victory at Tara'in in 588/1192, may have drawn upon the victory despatches (*fath-namas*) of Mu'izz al-Din's slave general Aybeg. For

⁷ J. Burton-Page, 'Hansi', *Enc. Isl.*²; Bosworth, *Later Ghaznavids*, 32-3. AH, 252-4.

⁸ Toghategin: *TN*, I, 240 (tr. 107). Bahram Shah: *ibid.*, I, 241 (tr. 110). Khusraw Malik: *AH*, 272; partial tr. I.M. Shafi, 'Fresh light on the Ghaznavids', *IC* 12 (1938), 218. *Turushka-danda*: Bosworth, *Later Ghaznavids*, 67; but for a discussion of the possible meanings, Lallanji Gopal, *The economic life of northern India, c. A.D. 700-1200*, 2nd edn (Delhi, 1989), 48-52. See also Bosworth's comments, *Later Ghaznavids*, 61-7, 84-6, 125-6, on Ghaznavid vigour, together with the evidence accumulated in A. B. M. Habibullah, *The foundation of Muslim*

9 rule in India, 2nd edn (Allahabad, 1961), 57-60.

On the author, see K. A. Nizami, *On history and historians of medieval India* (New Delhi, 1983), 71-93.

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all its defects, it can claim to be the first chronicle written in the Delhi Sultanate.¹⁰ A fairly skeletal outline from 588/1192 down to the events of 602/1206, following Mu'izz al-Din's murder, is to be gleaned from the prologue to Fakhr-i Mudabbir's *Shajara* (or *Bahr*) *al-Ansab*, composed at Lahore shortly afterwards; although it does supply dates for certain events that are not given elsewhere. Regrettably, Fakhr-i Mudabbir's later work, *Adab al-Harb wa'l-Shaja'a*, a military and administrative treatise presented to the first Delhi Sultan, Iltutmish, in c. 630/1232, does not include among its numerous anecdotes any pertaining to more recent decades.¹¹ Similarly, only a small proportion of the material relating to India in the *Jawami' al-Hikayat*, a large collection of historical anecdotes compiled by 'Awfi in Delhi (c. 628/1230-1), dates from the post-Ghaznavid era.¹² It is fortunate that events on this distant frontier made a powerful impression in Islam's heartlands. We should be much less well informed about the Ghurid campaigns were it not for the *al-Kamilfi'l-Ta'rikh*, a general history by Ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1232), who wrote in the Iraqi city of al-Mawsil (Mosul); though where he obtained most of his information was as great a mystery to at least one contemporary as it is to us.¹³

Once installed at Ghazna, Mu'izz al-Din was not slow to appropriate the Ghaznavids' role as the standard-bearer of orthodox Islam in the subcontinent. As Mahmiid had done, he made war on the Isma'ilis, who had reestablished themselves in Multan, and captured the city (571/1175-6); the evidence suggests that although the Sumra princes at Daybul in the Indus delta, whom he attacked in 578/1182-3, were of Indian stock, they too may have been Isma'ili sympathizers. Certainly he is praised for his warfare against the Shfls.¹⁴ But the annexation of the remaining Ghaznavid territories was undoubtedly his principal goal. A series of campaigns from 577/1181-2 onwards secured first tribute from Khusraw Malik and then, in

¹⁰ A critical edition is very much to be desired. Unless otherwise stated, references are to IOL Persian ms. 15 (Ethe, no. 210). The standard version ends in 614/1217, although in the last century Sir Henry Elliot utilized a copy (since lost) that went down to 626/1229: abstract translated in ED, II, 240-2. For a useful summary of the main recension, see S. H. Askari, 'Taj-ul-Maasir of Hasan Nizami', *PUJ* 18 (1963), no. 3, 49-127; on the author, Nizami, *On history and historians*, 55-70.

¹¹ M. S. Khan, 'The life and works of Fakhr-i Mudabbir', *IC* 51 (1977), 127-40. E. Denison Ross, 'The genealogies of Fakhr-ud-din Mubarak Shah', in T. W. Arnold and R. A. Nicholson (eds.), *'Ajab-Nama: a volume of oriental studies presented to Edward G. Browne* (Cambridge, 1922), 392-413.

¹² On the author's life, see M. Nizamu'd-din, *Introduction to the Jawdmfu'l-hikayat*, GMS, ns, VIII (London, 1929), 3-20.

¹³ D.S. Richards, 'Ibn al-Athir and the later parts of the *Kamil*: a study of aims and methods', in D.O. Morgan (ed.), *Medieval historical writing in the Christian and Islamic worlds* (London, 1982), 84-5.

¹⁴ SA, 19-20. Habibullah, *Foundation*, 36-7. S.H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim history* (Bombay, 1939-57, 2 vols.), I, 141. For Daybul, see S. Qudratullah Fatimi, 'The twin ports of Daybul', in Hamida Khuhro (ed.), *Sind through the centuries* (Oxford and Karachi, 1981), 97-105; Wink, *Al-Hind*, I, 181-3.

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582/1186, the capitulation of Lahore. Khusraw Malik was sent to Ghiyath al-Din and later put to death in captivity.

Confronting the Ghurid ruler now were a number of major Hindu powers, for which the designation 'Rajput' (not encountered in the Muslim sources before the sixteenth century) is a well-established anachronism.¹⁵ Chief among them was the Chahamanas (Chauhans) kingdom of Sakambhari (Sambhar), which dominated present-day Rajasthan from its capital at Ajmer; it included much of the territory between the Sutlej and the Yamuna, and under Prthvlraja III (the 'Rai Pithura' of Muslim writers) claimed paramountcy throughout India north of the Vindhya mountains. Junior branches of the dynasty ruled at Nadol and at Jalor, and Delhi (Dilli, Dihli), under its Tomara princes, had been tributary to the Chauhans since the middle of the twelfth century. Chawan supremacy was of relatively recent date, however, having been won in the teeth of strenuous opposition from the Chaulukyas, who reigned over Gujarat from their capital at Anhilwara (Nahrwala; now Patan) and still nurtured designs on southern Rajasthan. To the east, the Chawan state bordered on the 'Gahadavala kingdom of Kanauj (Qinnawj; the ancient Kanyakubja), which dominated much of the modern province of Uttar Pradesh, and the Chandella kingdom of Jejakabhukti (modern Bundelkhand), centred on Kalinjar. In the 1180s the Chandellas were under pressure from both the Gahadavalas and the Chauhans, and forfeited some of their western territories to Prthvlraja III. The Gahadavala kingdom, on the other hand, was also busily expanding into Bihar, where it contested the debris of the defunct Pala empire with the Sena dynasty of western Bengal.¹⁶ In all these states, there existed a quasi-feudal hierarchy in which the kings (*rajas*, called *rais* by the Muslim invaders) received military service, in return for grants of land, from subordinate chieftains, called *ranakas* (or sometimes *thak-kuras*), who in turn conferred estates on their own cavalry commanders, the *rautas* (from Skr. *rajaputras*) or *nayakas*; these two lower levels are the *ranas* and *rawats* respectively of the Muslim sources.¹⁷

¹⁵ For this term, see B. D. Chattopadhyaya, 'Origin of the Rajputs: the political, economic and social processes in early medieval Rajasthan', *IHR* 3 (1976), 59-82, repr. in his *The making of early medieval India* (Oxford and Delhi, 1994), 57-88.

¹⁶ See generally H. C. Ray, *The dynastic history of northern India* (Calcutta, 1931-5, 2 vols.), chaps. 6 (Senas), 8 (Gahadavalas), 11 (Chandellas), 15 (Chaulukyas) and 16 (Chahamanas); also Dasharatha Sharma, *Early Chauhan dynasties*, 2nd edn (Delhi, 1975); R. C. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat* (Bombay, 1956); Roma Niyogi, *The history of the Gahadavala dynasty* (Calcutta, 1959); A. Banerji, 'Eastern expansion of the Gahadavala kingdom', *JAS*, 4th series, 5 (1963), 105-11; N. S. Bose, *History of the Chandellas* (Calcutta, 1956); and R. K.

¹⁷ Dikshit, *The Candellas of Jejakabhukti* (New Delhi, 1977).

R- S. Sharma, *Indian feudalism: c. 300-1200* (Calcutta, 1965), especially chap. 5. Pushpa Prasad (ed.), *Sanskrit inscriptions of Delhi Sultanate 1191-1526* (Delhi, 1992), 56-7 (no. II:5), 58-71 (no. II:6), 78-9 (no. II:9), 80-9 (no. II:11). For examples from Muslim sources, see SA, 33 (with RATGAN in error for RANGAN); *Taj*, fols. 137a, 150a; and *inter alia* the 'celebrated rawats of TN, II, 65 (tr. 828).

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Significant gains at the expense of these Hindu powers were deferred until after Mu^cizz al-Din's annexation of the Ghaznawid territories, which brought him control of the more northerly routes via Peshawar (Parshawar) and the Khyber Pass. Indeed, his earliest incursion into the Dar al-Harb had ended in disaster. An attack in 574/1178-9 on the Chaulukya kingdom by way of lower Sind resulted in a heavy defeat for the Ghurid Sultan near Mount Abu. Subsequently, at a date which is variously given as 583/1187-8 or 587/1191, he invaded the eastern Panjab and established a garrison at Tabarhindh. But he was routed at Tara'in by a large Hindu force under Prthvlraja and his subordinate, Govindaraja of Delhi, and obliged to retire to Ghazna; Tabarhindh was recovered by the Hindus.¹⁸ When Mu^cizz al-Din returned in 588/1192, however, and again offered battle near Tara'in, he won a crushing victory, in which Prthvlraja was captured and Govindaraja killed. The victory at Tara'in seems to have constituted a turning - point

intwo respects. Firstly, the Hindu chiefs of the eastern Panjab undertook to pay tribute to Mu'izz al-Din.¹⁹ And in the second place, it is from this moment that we can date the establishment of a permanent Muslim force in the region, at Indraprastha (Indrapat), near Delhi.²⁰ But direct Muslim rule was not imposed on a uniform basis. While the great Chawhan fortress of Ranthanbor was occupied, Ajmer was left in the possession of Prthviraja, now Mu'izz al-Din's client; and following his execution for some act of duplicity shortly afterwards, it was conferred on his son. Similarly, Delhi was granted to Govindaraja's successor as a tributary prince.²¹ This pattern was to be followed many times in other regions conquered by the Muslims.

Mu'izz al-Din continued to move down from Ghazna into India for each cold season and to take charge of the war against the infidel. In 590/1194 it was the turn of the Gahadavalas, whose king Jayachandra (the 'Jaychand' of Muslim authors) was defeated and slain by Mu'izz al-Din in the vicinity of Chandawar (Chandawal, near Etawa); the Ghurid army looted his treasury at Asi (Asm) and occupied Banaras (now Varanasi). In 592/1196 the sultan headed an expedition which secured the fortress of Thangir (Tahangarh, fifteen miles south of the later city of Bhayana) from the

¹⁸ Habibullah, *Foundation*, 60-1. *TN*, I, 398-400 (tr. 457-64, 466), where this engagement is dated in the year preceding the second battle of Tara'in. *IA*, XI, 113-14/172-3, 371-2/ 561-2, describes the campaign twice (cf. XI, 115/174): in the second account, he dates the episode in the latter half of 583 (ended 1 March 1188), and this is confirmed at XII, 59/91.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XI, 115/174, *wa-iltazamu lahu bi'l-amwal*. *Taj*, fol. 50b, for the chieftains of the Delhi region specifically.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 51a.

²¹ Habibullah, *Foundation*, 61-2. On the coinage believed at one time to reflect Prthviraja's client status, see now P. N. Singh, 'The so-called joint issue of Muhammad bin Sam and Prithviraja III: a reappraisal', *JNSI* 50 (1988), 120-3; John S. Deyell, *Living without silver: the monetary history of early medieval North India* (Oxford and Delhi, 1990), 267-9. That Delhi was thus subjected in two stages may help to explain the conflicting dates given for its capture in the sources, on which see Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, *Political history and institutions of the early Turkish empire of Delhi (1206-1290 A.D.)* (Lahore, 1949), 129 n.1.

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Chandellas, and allowed the rai of Gwaliyor to buy him off with tribute. But otherwise Mu'izz al-Din appears to have played a relatively limited role in the extension of Muslim power. After the death of his brother Ghiyath al-Din (599/1203), his energies were largely absorbed by developments in Khurasan, where the Khwarazmshah 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad b. Tekish sought to recover territories previously lost to the Ghurids. In 601/1204 Mu'izz al-Din invaded Khwarazm itself, only to suffer a decisive defeat by the shah's Qara-Khitan overlords at Andkhud (now Andkhai).²² In these circumstances, the Ghurid Sultan seems to have relied in India increasingly on his Turkish slave lieutenants.

The Ghurids were a people of the hills. Traditionally they fought on foot, and Juzjani has left us a description of their characteristic method of warfare, which involved the use by each soldier of a protective screen called a *karwa*, made of raw bullock-hide and filled with a dense wadding of cotton.²³ It is true that we also encounter mounted Ghuri warriors, like the 1200 horsemen from Tulak who briefly garrisoned Tabarhindh following Mu'izz al-Din's first invasion of the eastern Panjab;²⁴ but they were probably in short supply, and the sultans' expansionist designs required access to larger numbers of cavalry. As the empire expanded to the west, they supplemented their forces with warriors from various parts of Khurasan: Khurasanis are found under Mu'izz al-Din's banner, for instance, in the final thrust against the Ghaznavids and in his assault on Prthviraja, and later among the troops who entered Lahore with Aybeg in 602/1206.²⁵ In addition, Ghuzz warriors appear in the army of Ghazna in the period following Mu'izz al-Din's death, and the Ghurid sultans, like their Ghaz-nawid precursors, recruited tribal cavalry from among the Khalaj, a nomadic people in the *garmsir* ('hot') regions of Bust and Zamindawar, who may have been of Turkish stock but would in time become assimilated to the neighbouring Afghans.²⁶ Only late authors mention the Afghans proper, who were as yet confined to the Sulayman range (consequently known at this time as *kuh-i Afghan*, 'the Afghan mountains') and who had accompanied Ghaznavid campaigns, as serving at Tara'in.²⁷

²² W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion*, 3rd edn by C. E. Bosworth, GMS, ns, V (London, 1968), 349-51. Bosworth, 'Political and dynastic history', 164-5.

23 TN, I, 343 (tr. 352 -3). The *kdrwa* is also listed in AH, 423, among the equipment required to conduct a siege.

24 TN, I, 399 (tr. 458); and for an earlier reference to mounted Ghuris, see I, 355-6 (tr. 372-3).

25 IA,XI, 110/168, 113/172.SA,33.

26 Ghuzz: IA, XII, 144/219. On the ethnicity of the Khalaj, see V. Minorsky, 'The Turkish dialect of the Khalaj', *BSOS* 10 (1940), 426-32, repr. in his *The Turks, Iran and the Caucasus in the middle ages* (London, 1978); C. E. Bosworth, 'Khaladj, i. History', *Enc.Isl.*²; C. E. Bosworth and Sir Gerard Clauson, 'Al-Xwarazmi on the peoples of Central Asia', *JRAS* (1965), 6, 8-9, repr. in Bosworth, *Medieval history*. But for a different view, cf. Irfan Habib, 'Formation of the Sultanate ruling class of the thirteenth century', in Habib (ed.), *Medieval India I*.

²⁷ *Researches in the history of India 1200-1750* (Oxford and Delhi, 1992), 2-3 and n.12. G. Morgenstierne, 'Afghan', *Enc.Isl.*². For Afghan warriors under the Ghaznavids, see

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The Ghurid dynasty grew familiar with the disadvantages of relying exclusively on such forces. The nomads were proverbially volatile. When 'Ala' al-Din Husayn 'Jahansuz' did battle with Sanjar in 547/1152, the issue was decided by some 6000 Khalaj, Ghuzz and other Turkish nomads in his army who went over to the Seljuk Sultan. For Mu'izz al-Din, even the Ghuris did not prove invariably trustworthy. During his first Tara'in campaign, according to Ibn al-Athlir, his Ghuri troops left him in the lurch, for which the commanders were severely disciplined; and he continued to harbour resentment against them for some years.²⁸ Such considerations, as well as the numerous precedents furnished by other Muslim dynasties, may have encouraged the later Ghurids to amass bodies of Turkish ghulams. Turkish slaves appear at Ghiyath al-Din's court at an early date, and JuzjanI tells us that Mu'izz al-Din was especially keen to acquire them.²⁹ Despite insubordination on the part of one or two ghulam officers in India in the wake of the sultan's defeat at Andkhud in 601/1204, his confidence was in large measure justified. At Andkhud Mu'izz al-Din's personal slaves remained with him in the thick of the conflict, and it was one of them who at length virtually carried him from the field for the sultan's own safety.³⁰ Professor Irfan Habib has shown how he took care to promote his ghulams (called 'Mu'izzis', from his own *laqab*) particularly to administrative and military office in his own territories, Ghazna and India, in contrast with the older Ghurid lands.³¹

The principal credit for the Ghurid conquests in the eastern Panjab and beyond is given in the sources to one ghulam lieutenant, Qutb al-Din Aybeg. It was Aybeg who frustrated Chawhan revanchism under Prthvira-ja's brother Hariraja ('Hiraj'); who in 589/1193 took possession of Delhi on the pretext of its ruler's treacherous designs; and who in 593/1197 defeated the Chaulukyas at Mount Abu, thereby avenging his master's humiliation of almost twenty years before. Within the crumbling empire of the Gahada-valas, Aybeg took the fortresses of Mirat (Meerut) in 588/1192, Kol (near modern Aligarh) in 591/1194, Bada'un (Budaon) in 594/1198, and Qinnawj (Kanauj) in 595/1199. Gwaliyor surrendered to him in 597/1200-1, and in 599/1203 he occupied Kalinjar, capital of the Chandella king Pararnardi-deva (Hasan-i Nizami's 'Parmar').³²

During these years other elements were carrying Muslim arms even deeper into India. A Khalaj warrior named Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar had secured a base in Awadh, from where he mounted regular plundering expeditions into the Hindu tracts of Maner and Bihar. He grew strong

Andre Wink, *Al-Hind: the making of the Indo-Islamic world*, II, *The Slave Kings and the Islamic conquest, 11 th-13th centuries* (Leiden, 1997), 116-18.

²⁸ TN, I, 346 (tr. 359). IA, XI, 114/173,371-2/561-2.

²⁹ Ghiyath al-Din: *TN*, I, 354-5, *turkan-i khass* (tr. 371). Mu'izz al-Din: *ibid.*, I, 410 (tr. 497).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 403 (tr. 476-8). ³¹ I. Habib, 'Formation', 4-7. See also Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 141. ³² For these campaigns, see Habibullah, *Foundation*, 62-9; HN, 156-90.

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enough first to take the city of Bihar and then to attack the Sena kingdom in western Bengal. In the middle of Ramadan 601/early May 1205 Nudiya, the capital of king Laksmanasena ('Lakhmaniya'), was captured and sacked, and the king himself put to flight. Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar was murdered in c. 602/1206 following a disastrous campaign somewhere in Assam (Kamrtup). Although he acknowledged the Ghurid Sultan as his master and conveyed a proportion of the plunder to Aybeg, he acted independently, without the benefit of direction - or even, as far as we can tell, reinforcements - from Ghazna.³³ These operations, the fame of which would reach the ears of Ibn al-Athir in Iraq and would cause a later author to give the Khalaj alone the credit for the Muslim conquests, reduced for Islam a considerable tract in the Ganges basin where Mu'izz al-Din's forces had not penetrated.³⁴

The news of Mu'izz al-Din's defeat at Andkhud in 601/1204 provoked a rebellion by one of his lieutenants, who seized Multan, and a more formidable rising by the Hindu Khokhars and the people of the Salt Range (Kuh-i Jud); and his last years were taken up with their suppression. On his murder in 602/1206 (probably by Isma'ilis from Khurasan), his empire fell apart. He left no son, and his vast inheritance was disputed by his relatives and slaves and his enemy the Khwarazmshah 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad, who repudiated Qara-Khitan overlordship and annexed the Ghurid territories in Khurasan. Ghazna was occupied by the late sultan's senior ghulam, Taj al-Din Yildiz; but in the years 611-12/1214-16 he and the various Ghurid princes were alike overwhelmed by the Khwarazmshah, not long before the Khwarazmian empire was destroyed (618-20/1221-3) by the advancing Mongols of Chinggis Khan.³⁵ The Indian provinces meanwhile went their own way. On learning of his master's death in 602/1206, Aybeg advanced from Delhi and took up residence at Lahore, where he established himself as ruler. When Aybeg died in a polo (*chawgan*) accident in 607/1210-11, his ghulam Iltutmish was invited into Delhi from Bada'un by a party in the city, and set himself up as ruler in opposition to Aybeg's her.³⁶ Aybeg's action marks the emergence of an independent Muslim power in India; that of Iltutmish, the creation of the Delhi Sultanate, which will be the subject of the next chapter.

23 *Taj*, fol. 186a-b. *T*, I, 423-7 (tr. 551- 4, 560). For the Nudiya campaign, see Habibullah, *Foundation*, 69-74; and for the date, Parmeshwari Lal Gupta, 'On the date of the Horseman type coin of Muhammad b. Sam', *JNSI*38 (1976), no. 1, 81-7.

34 IA, XI, 115/174. For the role of the 'Qalaj' in the conquest of 'Hindustan', see Ibn Sa'id al-Maghribi (d. 673/1274 or 685/1286), *Kitab al-Jughrafiyya*, ed. Isma'il al-'Arabi (Beirut, 1970), 163: on this author, see Gilles Potiron, 'Un polygraphe andalou du XIII^e siecle', *Arabica* 13 (1966), 142-67.

35 P. Jackson, 'The fall of the Ghurid dynasty', in Carole Hillenbrand (ed.), *Festschrift for Professor Edmund Bosworth* (Edinburgh; forthcoming). 36 Habibullah, *Foundation*, 88-92.

~Reasons for the Ghurid victories

It is easier to chronicle the triumphs of the Ghurid armies in India than to account for them; and certainly no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming in the sources. For the four Muslim writers who notice these events, it is enough that God grants victory to the sultan and his forces. Any analysis of the causes of Muslim success, therefore, rests on fragmentary evidence, and our conclusions can only be speculative.

We must first discuss one hypothesis which has at times been adduced in explanation of the Muslim conquest of northern India at the turn of the twelfth century. Drawing on the observations about the caste system to be found in the work of the eleventh-century Muslim writer al-Biruni, the late Professor Mohammad Habib suggested that the resistance of Hindu rulers, when confronted by the invading Ghurid armies, was undermined in two respects. First, the caste system seriously impaired the military

effectiveness of the Hindu kingdoms. It restricted participation in war to the warrior caste, the *kshatriyas*, and the principle of untouchability required them, on the eve of battle, to perform numerous tasks that would otherwise naturally have fallen to those of menial rank. The second disadvantage allegedly imposed on the Hindu states by the caste system was its effect upon the cohesiveness of the subject population. Islam preaches equality. Faced with this liberating message (the argument runs), the urban masses could not but draw the contrast with the social shackles that bound them and throw in their lot with the newcomers. Habib thus concluded, in words that have attained a certain notoriety, that 'this was not a conquest so-called. This was a turnover of public opinion, a sudden one no doubt, but one which was long overdue.'³⁷

Although these ideas are appealing at first sight, they do not withstand closer scrutiny. As far as military effectiveness is concerned, it has been pointed out both that Hindu armies included members of other castes, such as *vaisyas* and *sudras*, and that al-Biruni's Brahman informants may have exaggerated the effectiveness of the caste regulations.³⁸ Regarding the question of liberation, we need to know far more than we do about the perceptions that the lower-caste Hindu populace had of their situation and the message (if any) preached by the invading Muslim troops. At the risk of stating the obvious, it might be pointed out that a recognition of one's low social status, particularly when sanctioned by religious laws, and an urge to

³⁷ M. Habib, 'Introduction to Elliot and Dowson's *History of India*, vol. II', in K. A. Nizami (ed.), *Politics and society during the early medieval period. Collected works of Professor Mohammad Habib* (New Delhi, 1974, 2 vols.), I, 59-74 (72 for the quotation). See also Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic culture in the Indian environment* (Oxford, 1964), 82.

³⁸ Other warriors: Prabha Dixit, 'Prof. Mohammad Habib's historical fallacies', in Devahuti (ed.), *Bias in Indian historiography* (Delhi, 1980), 205. Caste regulations: S. Digby, review of Habib's collected works, in *BSOAS* 39 (1976), 457.

~improve it do not necessarily - in a society untouched by the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment - go hand in hand.³⁹ Nor can the liberation that the Muslim conquerors offered to those who sought to escape from the caste system be taken for granted. The evidence for widespread conversion to Islam at the turn of the twelfth century simply does not exist. That such deliverance was in fact on offer seems improbable in view of our knowledge of the early centuries of Muslim rule in Sind, which is somewhat fuller than it is for conditions in the newly conquered Indian territories of the Ghurids.

The principal source for the Arab reduction of Sind in the early eighth century is the *Chach-Nama*, a Persian work composed in c. 613/1216-17 but purporting to be a translation of an earlier, Arabic history. It alleges that Muhammad b. Qasim, the conqueror of Sind, learned of the disabilities imposed on a local people, the Jats, in the era of the deposed Brahman dynasty. One was that the Jats were to take dogs with them whenever they went out of doors, in order that they might be recognized. Muhammad b. Qasim ordered that such disabilities continue in force. That they did so emerges from a passage in the *Futuh al-Buldan* of al-Baladhuri (d. 279/892), in which a caliphal governor of Sind in the late 830s is said to have required the Jats, when walking out of doors in future, to be accompanied by a dog. The fact that the dog is an unclean animal to both Hindu and Muslim made it easy for the Muslim conquerors to retain the *status quo* regarding a low-caste tribe. In other words, the new regime in the eighth and ninth centuries did not abrogate discriminatory regulations dating from the period of Hindu sovereignty; rather, it maintained them.⁴⁰ We have no grounds for supposing that the response of the late twelfth-century conquerors to the caste system was any different.

To turn now to other possible explanations for the Ghurid victories, military technology is one sphere in which the Muslims may have enjoyed some limited superiority. Mu'izz al-Din is described in one Hindu source as 'lord of the north-west, where horses abound',⁴¹ and it is accordingly possible that he was able to field a larger cavalry force than his opponents. This question has been examined by Simon Digby for the era of the Delhi Sultanate proper,⁴² and will be considered further in subsequent chapters. For the moment, two other circumstances should be pointed out. One is that Ghur had long been renowned for its metal deposits and its manufac-

39 A point well made by Friedmann, 'A contribution', 320-1.

40 *CN*, 33. Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan*, ed. M. J. De Goeje, *Liber expugnationis regionum* (Leiden, 1866), 445/ed. S. al-Munajjid (Beirut, n.d.), 544. Friedmann, 'A contribution', 331-2. See also the brief remarks in Irfan Habib, 'Economic history of the Delhi Sultanate -an essay in interpretation', *IHR* 4 (1977), 297: There is no evidence of any direct assault

41 from the state or the Muslims upon the caste system; nor even of any revolt from within ...'

42 Har Bilas Sarda, 'The Prithviraja Vijaya', *JRAS* (1913), 279.

s- Digby, *War-horse and elephant in the Delhi Sultanate: a problem of military supplies* (Oxford and Karachi, 1971).

~ ture of weapons and coats of mail, commodities that had at one time formed part of the tribute rendered successively to the Ghaznawids and the Seljuks.⁴³ It is conceivable, therefore, that Mu'izz al-Din drew on a more plentiful supply of armaments for his Indian campaigns than recent Ghaznawid Sultans (or, for that matter, the Delhi Sultans in the next century). The other important consideration is that Hasan-i Nizami, in describing the campaigns of Mu'izz al-Din and Aybeg, refers with remarkable frequency to the Muslims' use of the crossbow (*nawak*) and makes great play of the armour-piercing properties of the crossbow bolt.⁴⁴ It is by no means clear that the Ghurids' Hindu adversaries made such use of the crossbow.⁴⁵ This formidable weapon, which was at this very time giving Latin Christian armies a decisive advantage over their enemies in the Celtic and Slavic worlds,⁴⁶ may well have performed a parallel function for the Muslim invaders of India. But this would hardly explain the victory at Tara'in, gained in the very locality where success had eluded Mu'izz al-Din not long previously.

The particular tactics that the sultan adopted in the second battle of Tara'in may have played a significant role in his victory. An anecdote in 'Awfi's *Jawami" al-Hikayat* suggests that Mu'izz al-Din exploited the proximity of the enemy's elephants to the horses, whose fear of elephants renders it difficult to coordinate bodies of both animals in the field. While campfires were lit to dupe Prthvlraja's men into believing that the entire Ghurid army had bivouacked for the night, the sultan took a division of his troops round to attack the Chawhan rear. At daybreak he fell upon Prthvlraja's baggage. The rear was pushed against the elephants, which got out of control, so that the Chawhan army fell into confusion and Prthviraja was unable even to conduct an orderly retreat.⁴⁷ On the other hand, in the short account of the battle found in Juzjani's *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* and obtained from an eye-witness, Mu'izz al-Din divided his forces.⁴⁸ While the centre,

⁴³ *TN*, I, 335, 346 (tr. 336, 358). See also the tenth-century *Hudud al-'Alam*, tr. V. Minorsky, GMS, ns, XI, 2nd edn (London, 1970), 110. Athar AH, 'Military technology of the Delhi Sultanate (13-14th C.)', in *PIHC* 50 (*Gorakhpur 1989*) (Delhi, 1990), 167.

⁴⁴ See especially *Taj*, fols. 81a, 146b, 201a, 229a; also *AH*, 400, 423 and *passim*. On the possible role of the *nawak*, see Irfan Habib, 'Changes in technology in medieval India', *Studies in History* 2 (Aligarh, 1980), 26-7; and for a fourteenth-century dictionary definition of *nawak*, see Muhammad b. Hindu Shah Nakhchiwani, *Sahah al-Furs*, ed. 'Abd al-'Ali Ta'ati (Tehran, 1341 Sh./1962), 188. The term originally denoted the tubular attachment but was later extended to the weapon as a whole: Kalervo Huuri, *Zur Geschichte des mittelalterlichen Geschutzwesens aus orientalischen Quellen* (Helsinki and Leipzig, 1941), 105; also the review by Cl. Cahen, in *JA* 236 (1946), 169; and Cahen, 'Un traite d'armurerie compose pour Saladin', *BEO* 12 (1947-8), 153-4.

⁴⁵ The occasional reference shows that they did possess the *nawak*: e.g. *Taj*, fols. 40b, 130b; *AH*, 247.

⁴⁶ Robert Bartlett, *The making of Europe: conquest, colonization and cultural change 950-1350* (Harmondsworth, 1993), 63-4, 73-4.

⁴⁷ *JH*, BN ms. Ancien fonds persan 75, fol. 185 (abstract in *ED*, II, 200).

⁴⁸ For what follows, see 7N, I, 400 (tr. 467-8).

~ the baggage and the elephants were kept several miles in the rear, bodies of picked light-armed cavalry (*sawar-i barahna wa-jarlda*), totalling 10,000 men, were ordered to harass the enemy in every direction. These are clearly shown a few lines later to have been mounted archers; and the sultan's instructions to them - to fire from all sides, and then to retreat and maintain a distance between themselves and the enemy when the Hindu army attempted to charge - are strikingly reminiscent of the tactics of nomadic Turkish horse-archers such as the Seljuks when confronted, for instance, by crusading armies in Anatolia and Syria.⁴⁹ Professor Nizami was thereby led to assume that these were the tactics which were instrumental in winning for Islam the north Gangetic plain.⁵⁰

Yet the fact that the victory was won in part by the techniques in which Turkish nomads excelled should not blind us to the rest of the evidence. Mu'izz al-Din's armies did not consist overwhelmingly of Turkish nomads. The force of ten thousand light-armed horsemen was but a fraction of a much greater army comprising, says Juzjani, 120,000 cavalry with horses wearing armour (*bar-gustuwan*).⁵¹ Even if this figure is exaggerated, it seems plain that the Ghurid forces at Tara'in were in large measure made up of heavy cavalry. It is these warriors - and not light-armed horse-archers - who are immortalized on the early Muslim coinage of Bengal as the very symbol of Muslim domination.⁵² The Moroccan traveller Ibn Battuta, who reached the Delhi Sultanate in 734/1333, comments on the fact that heavily armoured cavalrymen still made up the Delhi Sultan's forces.⁵³ It is worth noticing at this juncture that Turkish slave soldiers were employed as heavy cavalry - that their value to their employers, in other words, did not lie in any attempt to replicate the tactics traditionally associated with the steppe.⁵⁴ Such heavily armoured troops would hardly have mounted the kind of attacks from which crusading armies suffered. Indeed, their performance would have been more akin to the tactics of the crusaders themselves: a heavy cavalry charge, whose shock effects on a relatively immobile opponent were renowned throughout the Near East.⁵⁵ If 'Awfi's

⁴⁹ Walter E. Kaegi, Jr, 'The contribution of archery to the Turkish conquest of Anatolia', *Speculum* 39 (1964), 96-108. R. C. Smail, *Crusading warfare 1097-1193* (Cambridge, 1956; 2nd edn, 1995), 75-83.

K. A. Nizami, *Some aspects of religion and politics in India in the thirteenth century* (Aligarh, 1961), 82; and in *HN*, 186.

⁵¹ *TN*, I, 400 (tr. 465-6).

⁵² *CMSD*, 6 (no. 3A), 15 (nos. 49F, 49G), 16 (nos. 49H-J), and illustrations at Pis. XXII-XXIV. See also Richard M. Eaton, *The rise of Islam and the Bengal frontier, 1204-1760* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), 33-5, and the coins there illustrated. The Hindus employed *bar-gustuwan* horsemen as well: *AH*, 272; *SA*, 27.

£ *IB*, II, 374 (tr. Gibb, 479).

See the observations of Cl. Cahen, 'Les changements techniques militaires dans le Proche Orient medieval et leur importance historique', in Parry and Yapp, *War, technology and society*, 121; also Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 89. Smail, *Crusading warfare*, 112-15. Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East*,

~ story embodies authentic detail from the Tara'in campaign, and does not simply describe a stratagem sometimes adopted by Muslim commanders against Hindu armies in the past, it may possibly echo Mu'izz al-Din's success in rolling the core of Prthviraja's host into a solid mass - against which the light archers mentioned by Juzjani would have operated to deadliest effect but which would also have presented the ideal static target for a heavy cavalry attack.

Although we have scarcely any information on numbers, it is conceivable also that Mu'izz al-Din owed his victories to an increase in the size of his army. The figure of 120,000 cited by Juzjani for the Ghurid army at Tara'in is clearly designed to make an impact on the reader, and suggests that the sultan had raised an

unusually large force for the invasion. It may already have been reported in the Near East some decades before Juzjani wrote, and it was to make a sufficiently powerful impression on the Mughal conqueror Babur, three centuries later, to be included in his memoirs.⁵⁶ For the army that attacked the Gahadavalas, the numbers we have are set somewhat lower, at 50,000 heavily armoured cavalry⁵⁷ - still a massive force, if the figure is reliable. Many of these troops were probably volunteers: at an earlier date, Ghaznawid armies operating on the Indian front had been swollen by thousands of men seeking to serve as holy warriors (*ghazis*).⁵⁸ Such immigrants would have comprised both Turks and 'Tajiks', as the non-Turkish population of the Iranian world and Transoxiana were known. The latter category would have included not merely bureaucrats and the military, but descendants of the Prophet (*sadat*, sing, *sayyid*), holy men (*shaykhs*) and scholars ('*ulama*', those well versed in the Holy Law or Qur'anic sciences), like the two learned (*danishmand*) brothers from Farghana, troopers under Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar mentioned by Juzjani, who met one of them at Lakhnawti in 641/1243. One source of recruitment that was certainly available to Mu'izz al-Din was the Khalaj. We know that they were not necessarily light cavalry: the small force with which Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar stormed into the city of Bihar consisted of two hundred heavily armed (*bar-gustuwan*) horsemen. The bands of Khalaj tribesmen, who had flocked to join him only a few years after the overthrow of Prthviraja are expressly said to

1192-1291 (Cambridge, 1992), 158-63. The Hindus do not seem to have deployed mounted shock combat troops: Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 81.

⁵⁶ *Babur-Nama*, 479-80. The figure is found in Ibn al-Dawadari, *Kanz al-Durar* (c. 730/1329), ed. Said Ashur *et al*, VII (Cairo, 1391/1972), 134. For the date, 590, given here Ibn al-Dawadari cites Ibn al-Sa'i (d. 674/1276) and Ibn Wasil, but it is impossible to say which of these authors, if either, transmitted the figure of 120,000. Of Ibn al-Sa'i's *al-Jamf al-Mukhtasar*, only the portion covering the years 595-606/1198-1209 has survived; the work of Ibn Wasil cited is not *Mufarrij al-Kurub* and must therefore be his *Ta'nikh Sdliln* (c. 636/ 1239), found only in an Istanbul ms. which is inaccessible to me.

⁵⁷ *Taj*, fol. 119b. ⁵⁸ See Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 114; Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 91-2 n.57.

~ have come 'from the direction of Hindustan' (i.e. the Doab and Awadh), indicating at least that they were not newcomers to India.⁵⁹

Holy war, conquest and the infidel

In the space of little more than a decade, the Ghurid armies in India had made striking progress; the Muslims now held a string of fortresses from which they more or less dominated the north Gangetic plain. It is important, on the other hand, to recognize the limits of Muslim success. Victory did not necessarily entail the displacement of Hindu rulers. As we have seen, prthviraja's son was installed as his father's successor at Ajmer, and Govindaraja's son ruled briefly at Delhi, both as the sultan's subordinates; and following the victory over Jayachandra Aybeg is said to have installed 'a *rana* in every direction'.⁶⁰ The Ghurid Sultan's position was that of an over-king presiding over a number of tributary princes, the *rais* and *ranas* who came, in Hasan-i Nizami's words, 'to rub the ground of the exalted court of Aybeg'.⁶¹

Some Muslim triumphs had been merely temporary in character. Aybeg's sack of Nahrwala in 593/1197, for instance, though dignified by JuzjanI as 'the conquest of Gujarat', had not led, as far as we can tell, to any acquisition of territory. The consequences of his raid on Malwa in 596/1200 were doubtless equally ephemeral.⁶² In the eastern parts of what is now Uttar Pradesh, the Gahadavala kingdom still held out.⁶³ Moreover, although our sources are reluctant to inform us of Muslim reverses, it is clear that of the strongholds taken by Aybeg some certainly passed back into the hands of Hindu princes, perhaps after his death, since they had to be retaken by Iltutmish. Further east, Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar's exploits had secured only the north-western part of Bengal, where Muslim authority now centred on the town of Gawr, renamed Lakhnawti: eastern Bengal, the region called 'Bang' by the Muslims, remained in the hands of the Sena dynasty.⁶⁴

Even within the areas over which the Muslims ruled more or less directly, the intensity of their control is open to question, and it is necessary to

59 TN, I, 423 (tr. 551-2). For this restricted meaning of 'Hindustan', see below, p. 86.

⁶⁰ *Taj*, fol. 137a. ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 150a.

⁶² Gujarat: *ibid.*, fol. 173a, and TN, I, 417 (tr. 516). Malwa: SA, 24, and TN, I, 407 (tr. 491): at I, 417 (tr. 516-17), Juzjani refers to the conquest of Hindustan as far east as the borders of Ujjain (Habibi's edn reads CYN in error), i.e. Malwa.

Machchlishahr copper-plate inscription, dated Vikrama samvat 1253/1197: P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 58-70 (no. 11:6). Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala dynasty*, 113ff. TN, I, 426-7 (tr. 558). The name 'Bangala' is not found prior to Barani: Ahmad Hasan Dani, 'Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah, Shah-i Bangalah', in Hari Ram Gupta *et al.* (eds.), *Essays presented to Sir Jadunath Sarkar*, Sir Jadunath Sarkar commemoration volume, II (Hoshiarpur, 1958), 50-8.

~ disentangle plausibility from the hyperbole of our sources. At one extreme stand the enthusiastic claims of Fakhr-i Mudabbir:

Infidel towns have become cities of Islam. In place of images, they worship the Most High. Idol temples have become mosques, colleges (*madrasha*) and hospices (*khanaqah*). Every year several thousand infidel men and women are being brought to Islam ...⁶⁵

We might be more inclined to accept Hasan-i Nizami's statements that Aybeg 'uprooted idolatry' and 'destroyed temples' at Kuhram, and that at Mirat, Banaras (a thousand temples here) and Kalinjar idol temples were converted into mosques.⁶⁶ Such thorough-going tactics are conceivable as far as the respective urban centres were concerned. In some cases, too, architectural remains endorse Hasan-i Nizami's claim that the stone from demolished Hindu temples was used in the erection of mosques, as for example at Delhi and for the Arhai Din ke Jhompra mosque at Ajmer.⁶⁷ But other assertions elicit a greater degree of scepticism: that Aybeg freed the whole region (*diyar*) of Kol, rather than just the town, from idols and idol worship is doubtful.⁶⁸ Moreover, the treatment of Hindu temples by the eighth-century Muslim conquerors of Sind had varied with the circumstances,⁶⁹ and we might reasonably assume that this was true of the early thirteenth century also. Cities which capitulated - as for instance did Gwaliyor in 597/1200-1 - presumably obtained a better deal for their temples than did places which had to be taken by storm. Whatever the Muslim *literati* wanted people to think, the hallmark of these years was not uncompromising iconoclasm.

The language of our sources has served to distort the character of these and later campaigns, so that they have taken on the hue of a conflict that was religiously inspired - a development in turn nurtured by more modern communalistic attitudes.⁷⁰ For Juzjani, Mu'izz al-Din is always 'the holy warrior sultan' (*sultan-i ghazi*), and Muslim writers designate his forces as 'the army of Islam'. When recounting the Ghurid triumphs over the Indian infidel, Juzjani likens them to the victories of Mu'izz al-Din's contemporary Saladin over the Christian Franks - of Syria and Palestine.⁷¹ Yet it is important not to overstate the significance of holy war in the Ghurid campaigns, at least as far as the sultan's motives were concerned. Booty, to pay for the conflict with the Khwarazmshah, was undoubtedly a major

⁶⁵ SA, 26. ⁶⁶ *Taj*, fols. 53a, 74b, 134b, 185a.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, fols. 48a, 114. See Robert Hillenbrand, 'Political symbolism in early Indo-Islamic mosque architecture: the case of Ajmir', *Iran* 26 (1988), 105-17.

⁶⁸ *Taj*, fol. 138a.

⁶⁹ Friedmann, 'A contribution', 328-9; *idem*, 'The temple of Multan: a note on early Muslim attitudes to idolatry', *IOS* 2 (1972), 176-82.

⁷⁰ For a judicious treatment of this theme, see Carl W. Ernst, *Eternal garden, Mysticism, history, and*

politics at a South Asian sufi center (Albany, New York, 1992), 18-29 *passim*.

⁷¹ *TN*, I, 290 (tr. 214).

~ incentive; and the distribution of find-spots for the coins minted in India by the conquerors is significant, showing that a good proportion found their way back to the homeland.⁷² Muslim authors make great play of the golden artefacts from Ajmer which formed part of the Chawhan tribute, were forwarded to Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad b. Sam and came to decorate the royal palace at Firuzkuh and the congregational mosque at Herat.⁷³ Both his successful attack on Daybul and his ill-fated Nahrwala campaign surely represent bids by Mu'izz al-Din to restock his treasury by looting regions whose princes enjoyed a notoriously large income from the proceeds of commerce; and there can be little doubt that the Daybul expedition, which yielded great quantities of plunder,⁷⁴ lubricated his subsequent war efforts against the Ghaznavids. Juzjani would later hear from Mu'izz al-Din's treasurer extraordinary figures for the weight of the gems obtained in plunder from India and stored at Ghazna at the time of the sultan's death.⁷⁵

Nor was the long-drawn conflict that marked the advance of Muslim power necessarily one that simply pitted Hindu troops against Muslims. In the final assault on his co-religionist Khusraw Malik, Mu'izz al-Din had cooperated with the Hindu prince of Jammu, while the Ghaznavid Sultan had in turn been allied with the infidel Khokhars of the Panjab.⁷⁶ We do not know at what point Mu'izz al-Din and his generals followed the Ghaznavid example in employing contingents of Hindu troops. Aybeg's army at the siege of Mirat certainly included Hindu soldiers; and when he advanced on Lahore in 602/1206, the 'Hindustan forces' (*hasham-i Hindustan*) that accompanied him contained, we are told, '*ranas* and *thakurs*' -Hindu chiefs at the head of their own retinues, in the service of the Muslim warlord.⁷⁷

For all these qualifications, however, the Delhi Sultanate was firmly rooted in a long tradition of Muslim military activity within the subcontinent, and its rulers could be excused for seeing themselves as the latest in a line of Muslim holy warriors. Pride of place among these undoubtedly went to Mahmud of Ghazna. It is no accident that in his *Fatawa-yi Jahdndari*, a mirror for princes, the mid-fourteenth-century author Barani produced what purported to be a political testament from Mahmud to posterity; or that his contemporary 'Isami, modelling his epic *Futuh al-Salatin* on Firdawsī's *Shah-Nama* (which had been dedicated to Mahmud), chose effectively to begin the work with Mahmud's own campaigns, and credited him with the establishment of Islam in the subcontinent; or that Shams-i Siraj 'Afif, describing Sultan Firuz Shah's iconoclastic activities in Jajnagar

⁷² Deyell, *Living without silver*, 195, 203-6. ⁷³ *TN*, I, 375 (tr. 404). *SA*, 22-3. *Taj*, fol. 80b.

⁷⁴ *TN*, I, 397 (tr. 451-3). ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 404 (tr. 487-8).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 398 (tr. 454-5). Bosworth, *Later Ghaznavids*, 129-30.

⁷⁷ Mirat: *Taj*, fol. 74a. Lahore: *SA*, 33 (reading RANGAN for the RATGAN of the text). For Indian troops in the Ghaznavid armies, see Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 110; also verses attributed to the Ghurid 'Ala' al-Din Husayn, cited in *TN*, I, 346 (tr. 357).

~ (Orissa) in 762/1361, likens him to Mahmud.⁷⁸ Admittedly the great Ghaznavid 'amir was *sui generis*. 'The Almighty', wrote Juzjani, 'had conferred upon that ruler many superior characteristics (*'alamat*) and miraculous" signs (*karamat*), which in their number and magnificence have not been combined since in any other sovereign.'⁷⁹ But this hardly rendered Mahmud any less worthy of emulation; the Delhi Sultans had no more distinguished ideological forebear.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ *FS*, 28-9, 30, 609 (tr. 66-7, 68, 907). Shams-i Siraj 'Afif, *Ta'rlkh-i Firuz-Shahl*, ed. Maulavi Vilayat Hosain (Calcutta, 1888-91), 170.

⁷⁹ *TN*, I, 230 (tr. 83 modified); cf. also I, 229 (tr. 77-80).

⁸⁰ Nizami, *Some aspects*, 107-9, and *On history and historians*, 107-9; C. E. Bosworth, 'Mahmud of Ghazna

in contemporary eyes and in later Persian literature', *Iran* 4 (1966), 89-90, repr. in his *Medieval history*. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, 79.

~Map 1: The eastern Islamic world in 1206

~CHAPTER 2

From Ghurid province to Delhi Sultanate

Ghurid government

The conquerors brought with them the institutions to which they were accustomed in the Ghurid homelands. Chief among these was the *iqta'* (frequently and misleadingly rendered as 'fief'), the transferable revenue assignment in lieu of salary for service (usually military service), which by 1200 already had a long history in the eastern Islamic territories, having been adopted by the Ghaznavids and having reached its highest expression under the Seljuks; imported into India by the Ghurids, it would form one of the characteristic institutions of the early Delhi Sultanate. Various developments had occurred in twelfth-century Persia to blur the nature of the *iqta'* and to assimilate it to an administrative command.¹ Hence our sources, in the terminology they employ for the grants made by Mu'izz al-Din, are often less than helpful. Aybeg's earliest assignment, at Kuhram, is described by Juzjani as *iqta'*, whereas Fakhr-i Mudabbir speaks of it simply as the 'command' (*sipahsalari*) there and Hasan-i Nizami says that he was given the governorship (*ayalat*) of Kuhram and Samana.² Yet we are left in no doubt that the *iqta'* was widespread in northern India by the time of the creation of the independent Delhi Sultanate. Iltutmish became *iqta'*-holder (*muqta'*) of Baran under Ay beg; and we find *iqta'*s in Awadh before 1200 and in west Bengal following its conquest by Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar. The term was also used of the holdings of ordinary troopers: Ibn al-Athir refers to such men as holding *iqta'*s from Aybeg in 602/1206.³

¹ See Claude Cahen, 'L'evolution de l'*iqta'* du ix^e au xiii^e siecle', *Annales, Economies, Societe's, Civilisations* 8 (1953), 25-52, repr. in his *Les peuples musulmans dans l'histoire medievale* (Damascus, 1977), 231-69; *idem*, 'Ikta⁰, Enc.M²'; A. K. S. Lambton, 'Reflections on the *iqta'*', in G. Makdisi (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), 358-76; *eadem*, *Continuity and change in medieval Persia* (London, 1988), 99-113. There is a succinct account in D.O. Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040-1797* (London, 1988), 37-40.

² *Taj*, fol. 51b. *TN*, I, 417 (tr. 515).

³ *IA*, XII, 140/214. Bengal: *TN*, I, 422, 423, 432, 433 (tr. 549-50, 572, 574, 575). Baran: *ibid.*, I, 443, and II, 19 (tr. 604, 745).

~ As far as we can tell from the exiguous material in our sources, the hierarchy of Ghurid officials at Flruzkuh and Ghazna did not differ appreciably in its outlines from those maintained by other eastern Islamic dynasties. The *wazir* ('minister'), as elsewhere, headed the civil administration at Ghazna; we also read of the treasurer (*khazin*) and the overseer of public morality/inspector of the markets (*muhtasib*). The appointment of judges (*quddat*, sing, *qadi*) who enforced the religious law, the SharFa, was also in the sultan's hands. The army had its own SharFa court under its own judge (*qdai-yi lashgar*), though the two offices could evidently be combined.⁴ It is possible to draw too sharp a line between the civil and the military. Mu'ayyad al-Mulk Sajzi, who served first Mu'izz al-Din and then Yildiz as *wazir* at Ghazna, also acted on occasions as a military commander, as would the *wazirs* of the early Delhi Sultans; and we find a contingent (*khayl*) of horsemen from Tulak in Mu'izz al-Din's service led by its *qadi*, Juzjani's kinsman Diya' al-Din.⁵ The distinction between 'men of the sword' and 'men of the pen' (*arbab-i tigh-u qalam*), to borrow the widespread term used by our sources,⁶ or that between Turkish military and Persian ('Tajik') bureaucrats, was evidently in practice sometimes rather blurred.

Most of the offices of which we read are essentially military: the commander of the sultan's guards or executioners (*sar-i jandar*); the chief armour-bearer (*sar-i sildhdar*); the muster-master ('*arid*'), who seems to have performed the functions of a minister of war; the military chamberlain (*amir-hdjib*), often entrusted

with command in the field; the military justiciar (*amir-i dad*), who at Ghazna, if Ibn al-Athir is to be believed, commanded the citadel; the intendant of the sultan's stables (*amir-i akhur*), an office held by Qutb al-Din Aybeg himself prior to his appointment in India; and the intendant of the hunt (*amir-i shikar*), a position of some importance under a regime in which the chase constituted both the monarch's chief recreation and a valuable form of military exercise for the troops.⁷

Our knowledge of the administration of Mu'izz al-Din's conquests in northern India is patchy. Aybeg clearly had his own staff which mirrored that of the sultan at Ghazna, including a *sar-i jandar* and an *amir-i shikar*;⁸ and there was an *'arid* at Delhi, of whom we know only that he rejected Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar as unfit for service and thereby unwittingly launched him on a more dazzling career.⁹ At certain centres, the local

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 367, 389,405 (tr. 389, 430, 489).

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 380-1, 419 (tr. 415, 534), for Mu'ayyad al-Mulk; I, 398-9, 400 (tr. 457-8, 464), for the qadi of Tulak. On Iltutmish's wazir Junaydi, see below, p. 35.

⁶ *Taj*, fols. 106b, 135b, 218a; and cf. *AH*, 138.

For these offices, see generally Heribert Horst, *Die Staatsverwaltung der Grosselguken und Uorazmsahs* (Wiesbaden, 1964), *passim*. *Amir-i dad* at Ghazna: IA, XII, 143/217, 145/221. Aybeg as *amir-i akhur*. *TN*, I, 303, 416 (tr. 248, 514). On the passion of the Ghurid Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad b. Sam for the chase, see *ibid.*, I, 364-5 (tr. 385-7).⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 443 (tr. 603).⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 422 (tr. 549).

~ military justiciar (*amir-i dad*) seems to have enjoyed a pivotal position; perhaps, like his counterpart at Ghazna, he was in command of the citadel. Examples are the officer at Multan, treacherously killed at the onset of a rebellion in 601/1204, and °Ali-yi Ismail at Delhi, instigator of the coup that conferred power on Iltutmish in 607/1210-11.¹⁰

The emergence of an autonomous Muslim power in India

The events that followed Mu'izz al-Din's death represented a disjunction from previous developments. Hitherto Delhi had been merely one of the Muslims' forward bases, and Lahore had remained the capital of Mu'izz al-Din's Indian province just as it had been of the Ghaznawid territories in India. For Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Lahore was 'the centre of Islam in India' (*markaz-i Islam-i Hind*); while Hasan-i Nizami, describing how the city was conferred on Iltutmish's eldest son in 614/1217, could still observe, wistfully perhaps, how Lahore had 'ever been the residence of celebrated maliks and the seat of powerful rulers'.¹¹ Within a few decades of Iltutmish's seizure of power at Delhi and the creation of the independent Sultanate, the steady build-up of Mongol pressure made Delhi appear a far more suitable residence for its rulers than was Lahore, a circumstance incidentally emphasized by the Mongols themselves when they took and sacked Lahore in 639/1241. But that Delhi had become the capital of Muslim India and the seat of independent monarchs was in some measure a historical accident, though our principal sources are by no means anxious to acknowledge it.

In view of his subsequent rise, it is easily forgotten that when in 588/1192 Qutb al-Din Aybeg was stationed at Kuhram he was one of Mu'izz al-Din's more junior slaves, in contrast, for example, with Taj al-Din Yildiz, who seems to have been among the most senior and is said to have been made their commander (*sarwar*).¹² Aybeg's precise status within the Ghurid conquests is obscure. We find him appointing amirs to certain strongpoints: his own ghulams Iltutmish first to Gwaliyor and later to Baran and Bada'un, and Aybeg-i Tamghaj to Tabarhindh; and other Turkish officers like Hasan-i Arnab to Kalinjar and Husam al-Din Oghulbeg to Kol.¹³ The Khalaj freebooter Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar waited upon Aybeg at Bada'un

¹⁰ *Taj*, fols. 188a, 189a. *TN*, I, 444 (tr. 605).

¹¹ *SA*, 30. *Taj*, fol. 259a; see also fol. 211a, *mustaqarr-i sarlr-i salatin*.

¹² *TN*, I, 411 (tr. 498); cf. also *IA*, XII, 141/215. A later tradition made Yildiz Mu'izz al-Din's adopted son: *TFS*, 550. Both names are Turkish: for *yildiz*/*yulduz*, 'star', see Sir Gerard Clauson, *An etymological dictionary of pre-thirteenth-century Turkish* (Oxford, 1972), 922-3; for *ay*, 'moon', and *beg*, 'prince', 'lord', Jean Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms de Mamelouks', *JA*238(1950), 31-58 (no. 37).

¹³ *TN*, I, 443 (tr. 603-4). *Taj*, fols. 138a, for Oghulbeg, and 185a, for Hasan-i Arnab. The second element in the latter name, usually read as 'Arnab', is clearly 'RNB in the best mss.; see also Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 53-4. Oghulbeg's name is Tu. *oghul*, 'son', 'boy' (Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 83-4), + *beg*, 'prince'.

~and accepted from him the privilege of maintaining a band (*nawbat*) outside his residence, together with a kettle-drum and standard and a diploma that confirmed and, according to Hasan-i Nizami, extended the territory under his control.¹⁴ Such attentions indicate that he acknowledged Aybeg's authority as the sultan's representative.

Yet there clearly existed other commanders in India who were independent of Ay beg. It must be remembered that the sources tell us only of the operations conducted by Mu'izz al-Din and by Aybeg as his lieutenant, together with (in the case of Juzjanl and Ibn al-Athir) the activities of the Khalaj forces in Bihar and Bengal. Of other campaigns, led by other Ghurid officers, which must have taken place in these years, we learn little. Baha' al-Din Toghril, a senior ghulam of the sultan, had received from Mu'izz al-Din in person his command at Thangir and the task of reducing the great fortress of Gwaliyor, so that he deeply resented the surrender of Gwaliyor to Aybeg in 597/1200-1. His inscriptions suggest that he proclaimed himself sultan at some point following Mu'izz al-Din's murder.¹⁵ We do not know in what relationship Aybeg stood to 'Izz al-Din 'All at Nagawr or to Nasir al-Din Aytemur at Uchch.¹⁶ Nor are we told whether prior to 602/1206 his writ extended to Lahore, which seems to have constituted a joint command with Multan.¹⁷ It is indeed possible that he wielded no authority in those tracts which had formed part of the Ghaznawid state at the time of its conquest in 582/1186.

The evidence does not, in other words, sustain the belief of modern historians that Aybeg was left as the sultan's deputy in the Indian provinces in the wake of the Tara'in victory: he is admittedly so designated by Ibn al-Athir, but only in the context of the events following the sultan's assassination.¹⁸ Earlier the same author describes him simply as commander of the sultan's forces in India.¹⁹ Even on the testimony of his panegyrist Fakhr-i Mudabbir (writing soon after Aybeg's assumption of the royal dignity at Lahore), his promotion to the status of viceroy of the entire province 'from the gates of Peshawar to the furthest parts of India' had occurred only a few weeks prior to Mu'izz al-Din's death.²⁰

¹⁴ *Taj*, fol. 186. *TN*, I, 423-7 (tr. 551-4, 560).

¹⁵ Mehrdad and Natalie H. Shokoohy, 'The architecture of Baha' al-Din Tughril in the region of Bayana, Rajasthan', *Muqarnas* 4 (1987), 114-32 (esp. 115); see also Mehrdad Shokoohy, *Rajasthan I* (London, 1986), 51-3; *TN*, I, 421-2 (tr. 544-7), for his earlier career. The name is Tu. *toghril*, 'bird of prey': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 472; *TMENP*, III, 346-8 (no. 1345).

¹⁶ *TN*, I, 419 (tr. 531-2), for Aytemiir ('YTM in Habibi's edition): *ay*, 'moon', and *temur*, 'iron', see Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 42. The reference to 'Ali-yi Nagawri is omitted in Habibi's text (I, 422), but cf. his apparatus and Raverty's tr., 549.

¹⁷ *IA*, XII, 136/209, 137/210; and cf. *TN*, I, 398 (tr. 456). I cannot agree with I. Habib, 'Formation', 6, that Aybeg had charge of Lahore prior to 1206.

¹⁸ *IA*, XII, 164/248. Habibullah, *Foundation*, 63, wrongly describes Delhi as 'the capital of Muizzuddin's Indian dominion'.

¹⁹ *IA*, XII, 136/209, *muqaddam 'asakiri'l-Hind*. ²⁰ *SA*, 28.

~ Whatever his position when the sultan was murdered, Aybeg was able to move from Delhi to Lahore and to take up his quarters as ruler there on 18 Dhu'l-Qa'da 602/26 June 1206. Juzjani at one point claims that

he did so following the arrival of a diploma from the new sultan, Mu'izz al-Din's nephew Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud b. Muhammad.²¹ Yet this is unlikely on chronological grounds. More probably Aybeg was encouraged to do so by a sudden access of manpower, since soon after Mu'izz al-Din's assassination his wazir sent back to India all those troopers currently with the late monarch's army who held iqta's from Aybeg.²² Nevertheless, in contrast with Yildiz, who at Ghazna ignored the rights of the new Ghurid sovereign, Aybeg maintained the khutba for Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud and struck coins in his name, gestures that were rewarded in 605/1208-9 with the gift of a ceremonial parasol (*chatr*) and, allegedly, with the style of sultan.²³ He is called sultan by Hasan-i Nizami, though no coins of his have come down to us bearing that title.²⁴

Aybeg also secured recognition of his authority in Bengal after the assassination of Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar by one of his Khalaj officers, 'Ali-yi Mardan, in c. 602/1205-6. He first sent an army from Awadh under Qaymaz-i Rumi, who defeated and killed the new Khalaj ruler, Muhammad-i Shiran, and installed at Deokot, one of the principal Muslim-held towns, another of Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar's Khalaj lieutenants, Husam al-Din Twad. Subsequently Aybeg conferred a robe of honour on 'Ali-yi Mardan, who had taken refuge at Lahore, and despatched him eastwards as his subordinate. On his arrival at Deokot, 'Ali-yi Mardan was received submissively by Twad, and established himself as ruler of the entire Muslim territory in Bengal.²⁵ Thus for most of his reign Aybeg was represented in the east by his own nominee, and had emerged as the paramount ruler in Muslim India.

Aybeg's most dangerous rival was Taj al-Din Yildiz, with whom he engaged in a struggle for possession of Ghazna, first inciting one of Yildiz's officers to seize the place in 603/1207 and briefly occupying Ghazna in person two years later. Juzjani's description of this conflict as originating over Lahore suggests that Yildiz claimed to rule all Mu'izz al-Din's eastern territories.²⁶ Their rivalry seems to have kept Aybeg at Lahore during his

²¹ TN, I, 417 (tr. 521-5). ²² IA, XII, 140/214.

²³ TN, I, 373 (Ghur and Ghazna, erroneously included among the territories covered by the mandate in Habibi's text, are omitted in BL m., fol. 152a, and Raverty's tr. 398). IA, XII, 165/249.

²⁴ *Taj*, fols. 211a, 217a. P. Jackson, 'Kutb al-Din Aybak', *Enc. Isl.*²

²⁵ TN, I, 432-3, 434 (tr. 572-6, 577-8). The name of Aybeg's general is Tu. *qaymaz*, 'he who does not turn back': Sauvaget, 'Noras et surnoms', no. 150. For Deokot, at 25° 11' N., 88° 31' E., see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 209, and II, 57.

²⁶ TN, I, 417 (tr. 526); I, 412, 413-14, 417 (tr. 503, 506, 526-8), for the later struggle over Ghazna. For the earlier episode, in 603/1206-7, see I A, XII, 165-6/249-50. See generally Jackson, 'Fall of the Ghurid dynasty'.

~ four-year reign, either guarding against an invasion of the Panjab or seeking yet another opportunity to take Ghazna. The dearth of evidence for military operations against independent Hindu states at this time presents a marked contrast with the era of his lieutenancy on behalf of Mu'izz al-Din.²⁷

When Aybeg died in a polo (*chawgan*) accident in 607/1210-11, his ghulam Iltutmish was invited into Delhi from Bada'un by a party in the city, headed by the military justiciar (*ami-i dad*) 'Ali-yi Ismail, and set himself up as ruler. A certain obscurity surrounds his rival Aram Shah, who at one point is called Aybeg's son.²⁸ He seems, however, to have reacted sharply to Iltutmish's seizure of power at Delhi. His supporters included some of the Mu'izzi amirs, i.e. former officers of Mu'izz al-Din, who left Delhi to join the opposition to Iltutmish; the latter, on the other hand, had the backing of the Qutbi amirs, namely the servitors of Aybeg. Hasan-i Nizami, who ignores Aram Shah and for whom all this is simply a rising against his patron Iltutmish by a group of recalcitrant Turks, names as their leader the *sar-ijandar*, *Berki. They advanced from Lahore to Delhi, where Iltutmish met and defeated them in the Bagh-i Jud. Aram Shah is alleged to have been 'martyred'; but whether he was killed in the engagement or put to death as a prisoner, we are not told.²⁹

Shams al-Din Iltutmish³⁰ was at first only one of a number of Muslim rulers in the subcontinent, and his position was highly precarious, even after the overthrow of Aram Shah. In the following century it was remembered that he had been obliged to dispute his new kingdom with amirs who held iqta's in 'Hindustan' by grant from Mu'izz al-Din.³¹ Juzjani speaks of campaigns by which Iltutmish brought under his control 'the outlying regions which were dependent on Delhi' (*atraf-i mamalik-i madafat-i hadrat-i Dihli*), singling out for particular mention Bada'un, Awadh, Banaras and the Siwalik; elsewhere he alludes briefly, in his list of Iltutmish's conquests, to the capture of Banaras and the flight of Qaymaz, presumably Aybeg's former officer whom we have already encountered.³²

Further afield, Iltutmish could command no allegiance whatever. On the news of Aybeg's death, his client in Bengal, 'AH-yi Mardan, assumed

²⁷ P. Hardy, 'Dihli Sultanate', *Enc. Isl.*², III, 269a. Jackson, 'Kutb al-Din Aybak'.

²⁸ Only in a chapter heading: *TN*, I, 418 (tr. 528).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 418, has simply *Aram Shahra qada-yi ajal dar rasid*; but cf. BL ms., fol. 168b, *Aram Shahra ... shahld kardand* (also Raverty's tr. 530). The 'revolt' is described in *TN*, I, 444 (for the translation, which is garbled by Raverty, see I. Habib, 'Formation', 9 and n.50), and in *Taj*, fols. 219b-224a. Modern authors have usually rendered the *sar-i jandar* name as Turki', but the mss. read .YRKY and TYRKY. The name is possibly connected with Tu. *berk*, 'firm', 'solid': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 361-2.

³⁰ The correct form of his name has been established by Simon Digby, 'Iltutmish or Iltutmish? A reconsideration of the name of the Delhi Sultan', *Iran* 8 (1970), 57-64.

³¹ *TFS*, 550.

³² Conquests: *TN*, I, 444-5 (tr. 607-8). Qaymaz: I, 452 (to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 179b; cf. also Raverty's tr., 627).

~ overeign status, entitling himself Sultan 'Ala' al-Din.³³ In Sind, Multan was seized by Nasir al-Din Qubacha, a former ghulam of Mu'izz al-Din w'ho had been muqta' of Uchch since 601/1204 and who now proclaimed his independence with the adoption of two chatrs. Lahore was disputed between Qubacha and Yildiz.³⁴ Iltutmish secured his position at first by icknowledging Yildiz's sovereignty, receiving in return the insignia of royal power, a chatr and a *durbash* or ceremonial baton. His earliest inscription, dated Jumada I 608/October 1211, styles him not sultan but only king (*al-Malik al-Mu'azzam*)?³⁵ We cannot fail to be struck, again, by the relative absence of campaigns against the Hindu powers. During the first sixteen years of his reign, Iltutmish is known to have conducted only one such expedition, against the Chawhan ruler of Jalor, which is described by Hasan-i Nizami but is undated; it may have occurred not long after the suppression of Aram Shah's attempt on Delhi. That other major undertakings were deferred until the attacks on Ranthanbor (623/1226) and Mandor (624/1227) was clearly due to pressing concerns elsewhere.

Iltutmish's first opportunity came in 612/1215-16, when Yildiz was forced out of Ghazna by the Khwarazmshah and fell back on the Panjab. Having wrested Lahore from Qubacha, he then pushed into Delhi territory in an effort to make good his rights over his subordinate Iltutmish, issuing demands of the kind, says Hasan-i Nizami, that no sovereign could demean himself to answer. Iltutmish met him on 3 Shawwal 612/25 January 1216 on the historic battlefield of Tara'in, near Samana: Yildiz was defeated and incarcerated in Bada'un, where he was later put to death.³⁶ But if the elimination of Yildiz conferred independence on the Delhi ruler, it did not immediately result in any significant addition to his territory. Lahore was reoccupied by Qubacha, whose empire now stretched from the Arabian Sea and the Indus delta as far north as Nandana and Peshawar. Iltutmish seized Aybeg's old capital late in 613/in the winter of 1216-17, conferring it on his eldest son Nasir al-Din Mahmud; but it continued to change hands thereafter, while the two rulers disputed possession of Tabarhindh, Kuhram and Sarsati in the eastern Panjab.³⁷ And that Qubacha did not lack partisans in Delhi territory emerges from the account of Baha' al-Din 'Ali b. Ahmad

³³ *Ibid.*, I, 434 (tr. 578). M. Nizamuddin, 'A rare coin of Ali Mardan Khalji - a medieval Muslim ruler of Bengal', *JNSI*49 (1987), 50-5.

³⁴ *TN*, I, 418, 419 (tr. 530, 532); for Yildiz at Lahore, see I, 444 (tr. 607). Qubacha's appointment to Uchch dated from the death of its muqta^c, Aytemur, in battle at Andkhud. His name is a derivative of Tu. *quba*, 'pale', 'pale yellow': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 581.

³⁵ M. M. Shu'aib, 'Inscriptions from Palwal', *EIM* (1911-12), 2-3; *RCEA*, X (Cairo, 1939), 72-3 (no. 3703). *TN*, I, 444 (tr. 607).

³⁶ *IA*, XII, 203/311-12. *TN*, I, 413, 445 (tr. 505, 608). *Taj*, fols. 238b-247b, with the precise date.

³⁷ *TN*, I, 419, 444 (tr. 534, 607). *Taj*, fols. 253a-259b, for Iltutmish's first occupation of Lahore. But at the advent of the Khwarazmians (below), it was held by Qubacha's son. Nandana: Nasawi, *Sir at al-Sultan Jalal al-Din*, ed. O. Houdas (Paris, 1891), 86, and tr.

~ Jamaji in 'Awfi's biographical dictionary *Lubab al-Albab*. Jamajl, whom Iltutmish had put in command of Bahraich, declared for Qubacha and in 617/1220 sent to Uchch offering his submission. Writing at this very moment, 'Awfi is unaware of the sequel (as, regrettably, are we), though he expresses the hope that his master Qubacha will soon acquire dominion over the whole of Hindustan.³⁸ The episode suggests that Qubacha may have constituted a formidable threat to the Delhi ruler on the eve of the Khwarazmian invasion.

As usurpers, Aybeg and Iltutmish stood in need of legitimation, and obtained it, on one level, from their panegyrists. The sources for this era, with the exception of Ibn al-Athir, all emanate from within India. They also date from the period following Mu'izz al-Din's death, and their accounts read as though there were a continuity between their new masters and the Ghurid dynasty. Thus Fakhr-i Mudabbir - writing, it will be recalled, at Aybeg's court soon after 602/1206 - has Aybeg taking over at Lahore in that year by virtue of his status as Mu'izz al-Din's deputy (*qa'im-i maqam-u wali-'ahd*) throughout his Indian dominions.³⁹ Juzjani, who composed his *Jabaqdt-i Nasiri* in Delhi when the Sultanate had been in existence for five decades, clearly sought to gloss over Iltutmish's struggles with other former Ghurid lieutenants and to portray him and his dynasty likewise as Mu'izz al-Din's true successors in India. Hence in the introduction to his section on the Ghurids, the current sultan of Delhi, Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah b. Iltutmish, becomes 'the heir to that sovereignty and duly appointed successor (*qa'im-i ma'mur*) to that kingdom'.⁴⁰ That this is not intended merely as a figure of speech is clear from what Juzjani says later. Approached by a courtier, who lamented the sultan's lack of sons to inherit his dominions, Mu'izz al-Din replied:

'Let other sultans have one son or two. I have several thousand sons - Turkish slaves - whose inheritance will be my kingdom: after me, they will maintain the khutba in [my] empire in my name.' And it transpired as that *ghazi* monarch pronounced. Since his time, right down until these lines are being written, they have preserved the whole empire of Hindustan and are still preserving it..⁴¹

Although some modern commentators have adopted this perspective on

Z. M. Buniatov, *Zhizneopisanie Sultana Dzhalal ad-Dina Mankburny* (Baku, 1973), 131. Peshawar: *TJG*, I, 61 (tr. Boyle, 328).

³⁸ 'Awfi, *Lubab al-Albab*, ed. E. G. Browne and M. M. Qazwini (Leiden and London, 1903-6, 2 vols.), I, 115. The summary of Jamaji's career in Nizamu'd-din, *Introduction*, 13-14, is inaccurate.

³⁹ *SA*, 28; cf. also 33, *in wall-'ahdi*.

⁴⁰ *TN*, I, 323 (tr. 310 modified). Peter Hardy, 'Force and violence in Indo-Persian writing on history and government in medieval South Asia', in Milton Israel and N. K. Wagle (eds.), *Islamic society and culture*.

Essays in honour of Professor Aziz Ahmad (Delhi, 1983), 180-1.

⁴¹ TN, I, 410-11 (tr. 497-8 modified); cf. I, 415 (tr. 508-12), where the Mu'izzi sultans, i.e. Aybeg and Yildiz and their contemporaries, are described as the late sovereign's heirs, and I, 393 (tr. 438), where Mu'izz al-Din is said to have entrusted (*sipurd*) Ghazna to Yildiz.

~ events,⁴² it is in fact highly dubious and smacks of *ex post facto* justification: in Islamic law it was the master who inherited from the slave and not *vice versa*.⁴³ But evidently the sovereignty of the early Delhi Sultans, in the eyes of certain of the Muslim intelligentsia, required the sanction of Mu'izz al-Din.

The Khwarazmian and Mongol invasions

In Ilutmish's early years, there was no guarantee that the former territories of the Ghurids in Sind and the Panjab would not share the fate of the regions beyond the Indus and be absorbed into the Khwarazmian empire. Following his seizure of Ghazna, the Khwarazmshah 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad created for his son Jalal al-Din *Mingbarni a large appanage that stretched as far as the Indus. At some point his forces wrested Peshawar from Qubacha.⁴⁴ A casual observer might have been forgiven for supposing that the Ghurids' erstwhile lieutenants were similarly destined for political oblivion. It was fortunate for the fledgling Delhi Sultanate, as indeed for the other powers which had inherited the Ghurid mantle in northern India, that when the Khwarazmians appeared in force in the Panjab they came not as conquerors supported by the resources of an extensive Central Asian empire, but as fugitives. At the height of his power, the Khwarazmshah clashed with his new and formidable neighbours, the Mongols led by Chinggis Khan, whose great westward campaign of 615-622/1218-1225 destroyed the Khwarazmian polity and devastated eastern Persia. Muhammad died in misery on the coast of the Caspian Sea in 618/1221.⁴⁵ At an early stage in this crisis, it seems, India was being advocated as a refuge for the dynasty, possibly because its rulers were deemed inadequate to resist.⁴⁶ Some of the Khwarazmshah's advisers urged him to make a stand at Ghazna and to retreat into India if this failed; their counsel was rejected.⁴⁷ In the event, it was the shah's son and effective successor, Jalal al-Din, who entered India following a crushing defeat by Chinggis Khan on the banks of the Indus in Rajab 618/November 1221 and began a career of aggression in northern India that was to last for almost three years.

⁴² Aziz Ahmad, *Political history*, 99; see also 6, 84, 97, 118, 146, 149 (though at 13 he is prepared to consider the possibility that Mu'izz al-Din's dominions were misappropriated).

⁴³ Patricia Crone, *Roman, provincial and Islamic law* (Cambridge, 1987), 36-8. P. G. Forand, 'The relation of the slave and the client to the master or patron in medieval Islam', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971), 61.

⁴⁴ P. Jackson, 'Jalal al-Din, the Mongols and the Khwarazmian conquest of the Panjab and Sind', *Iran* 28 (1990), 48; the form ('Mingirini') adopted there for the prince's name must now be discarded on the basis of numismatic evidence (unpublished paper by Mr William Spengler).

⁴⁵ Barthold, *Turkestan*, 393-439, 446 ff. J. A. Boyle, 'Dynastic and political history of the II-khans', in Boyle (ed.), *Cambridge history of Iran*, V, 303-17.

⁴⁶ See, for instance, the advice later given to Jalal al-Din in India by one of his lieutenants, as reported by Nasawi, 91 (tr. Buniatov, 136).

⁴⁷ *TJG*, II, 106 (tr. Boyle, 376).

~ Juzjani, regrettably, says very little about the Khwarazmian invasion of the Panjab, perhaps because the episode reflected no credit on Ilutmish, who failed to collaborate with a fellow-Muslim against the pagan Mongols. Ibn al-Athir's information on India, too, seems suddenly to dry up after the downfall of Yildiz. Jalal al-Din's exile in the Panjab and Sind is dismissed in a couple of lines; he is lost to sight until his emergence from the Makran desert in 620/1223.⁴⁸ We are therefore fortunate that the prince's biographer Nasawi, writing in 639/1242, and the later writer Juwayni, whose history of the Mongols dates from c.

658/1260, supply numerous (if sometimes conflicting) details which enable us tentatively to reconstruct events.⁴⁹ Jalal al-Din was soon reinforced by fresh refugees from Persia and made war upon Qubacha, who was defeated near Uchch and obliged to become tributary to the Khwarazmians: his son, who had rebelled against him at Lahore, likewise yielded and became Jalal al-Din's lieutenant there. Subsequently, when Qubacha refused to assist him against the pursuing Mongols, Jalal al-Din ravaged the neighbourhood of Uchch before moving south into the lower Indus region. Here he received the submission of Siwistan (now Sehvan), occupied Daybul, and despatched a plundering expedition to Nahrwala in Gujarat. At this juncture he heard reports of the eagerness with which the subjects of his surviving brother in Persia desired his return, and chose to make his way to western Persia by way of the Makran desert late in 620/1223, in the hope of rebuilding his father's empire. He was eventually killed in Azerbaijan while in flight, again, from the Mongols in 628/1231.

The Delhi Sultan was inevitably drawn into the conflicts between his neighbours and the Khwarazmians. When Jalal al-Din at some stage advanced to within a few days' journey of Delhi, requesting asylum and proposing an alliance against the Mongols, Iltutmish - not unnaturally reluctant to jeopardize his new-found autonomy by installing the Khwar-azmshah close at hand - had the envoy murdered and returned an evasive answer. Iltutmish then sent troops to aid Qubacha prior to the battle near Uchch, and subsequently moved against Jalal al-Din in person: on this occasion the vanguards clashed but the two sovereigns exchanged friendly messages and withdrew. Whether Iltutmish, at least, was sincere is open to doubt. One of the reasons underlying the Khwarazmshah's departure from India, according to Nasawi, was the news that a coalition had been formed against him by Iltutmish, Qubacha and a number of Hindu chiefs (*rayat wa-takakirat*, 'rais and thakurs'), who had occupied the banks of the Jajner river (presumably the Sutlej) in order to cut off his retreat.

The Mongols who pursued the Khwarazmshah into India do not appear

⁴⁸ IA, XII, 276/425-6.

⁴⁹ For what follows, see Jackson, 'Jalal al-Din', which also discusses the sources, including the large anonymous fragment (hitherto little used), Bodleian ms. Th. Hyde 31. Brief biography of Jalal al-Din in J. A. Boyle, 'Djalal al-Din Kh^warazm-Shah', *Enc. Isl.*²

~ to have encroached upon Iltutmish's territory.⁵⁰ Chinggis Khan, who briefly contemplated returning to Mongolia by way of a more direct route through the Himalayan foothills, sent envoys to the sultan asking his permission to move through his dominions. We are not told the fate of this embassy - simply that Chinggis Khan abandoned his intention in the face of unfavourable auguries. Juwayni, however, alleges that he advanced several stages before turning back because there was no way through, and only then withdrew through Peshawar.⁵¹ His general Dorbei sacked Nandana, currently held by one of Jalal al-Din's lieutenants, and in the late winter of 621/ 1224 laid siege to Multan, where a spirited defence was conducted by Qubacha himself. But after an investment which according to Juzjani lasted for forty days (or three months if we accept the testimony of another source), he abandoned the attempt in view of the onset of the hot weather. As they retreated, the Mongols ravaged the regions of Multan and Lahore. Almost another two decades were to elapse before they entered the territory of the Delhi Sultanate.

Jalal al-Din's departure from India did not mean the end of the Khwarazmian occupation. His lieutenant, Jahan-Pahlawan Ozbeg-bei, was entrusted with the Khwarazmshah's Indian conquests, while those parts of Ghur and Ghazna which had not so far been ravaged by the Mongols were conferred upon Sayf al-Din Hasan Qarluq, surnamed Wafa Malik.⁵² But as Mongol pressure was maintained by the forces left behind by Chinggis Khan, so the residue of Khwarazmian dominion west of the Indus began to crumble. Ghur seems finally to have been overrun in 623/1226, and in that same year Qubacha was called upon to repulse a band of Khalaj tribesmen previously in the Khwarazmshah's service - arid presumably, therefore, under the nominal authority of Hasan Qarluq - who had entrenched themselves in lower Sind.⁵³

Iltutmish's conquest of Muslim India

Qubacha's empire in the Indus valley had in all probability been gravely weakened already prior to this

intrusion, for it had borne the brunt both of Jalal al-Din's attacks and of the Mongol devastation. In the event, however, it was to receive the coup de grace not from the north-west but from Delhi.

⁵⁰ Mongol operations in India in 618-621/1222-4 are surveyed in Jackson, 'Jalal al-Din', 47-8, 50; see also Paul Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: his life and legacy*, tr. T. N. Haining (Oxford, 1991), 134. For the general's name (Raverty's 'Turti'), see J. A. Boyle, 'The Mongol commanders in Afghanistan and India according to the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* of Juzjani', 75 2(1963), 238-9.

⁵¹ *TN*, II, 126-7, 146 (tr. 1045-7, 1081-4). *TJG*, I, 109-10 (tr. Boyle, 137-9).

⁵² Nasawi, 92 (tr. Buniatov, 136). Sayfi, *Ta'rikh-Nama-yi Harat* (c.1322), ed. M. Z. as-Siddiqui (Calcutta, 1944), 198, says that the rule of 'Malik Wafa' was later remembered in the Mastung region.

⁵³ *TN*, 1,420 (tr. 539-41).

~ Both Hasan-i Nizami, speaking in the context of the Delhi forces' campaign against Lahore in 613/1216-17, and Awfi, introducing Qubacha's overthrow twelve years later, allude to 'undertakings', 'promises' and 'treaties' of which Qubacha was unmindful.⁵⁴ This suggests that the alliance with Iltutmish had its price. It is possible that in order to secure assistance from Delhi against the Khwarazmians - and perhaps also against Yildiz earlier - Qubacha had either made some gesture in recognition of Iltutmish's sovereignty or had promised to surrender territory to Delhi, and that his failure to abide by his obligations served as a *casus belli*. There may well be some connection with a campaign by Iltutmish's forces to which Juzjani refers obscurely, some years before the final conquest of Sind and resulting, apparently, in the capture of Qubacha and the occupation of the district of Ganjrut (or Wanjrut) in the Multan province.⁵⁵

Whatever the case, Qubacha had by 625/1228 finally lost the disputed regions of Tabarhindh, Kuhram and Sarsati, which are found at that date in the hands of officers appointed by his rival. Lahore had also been wrested from him, since Iltutmish's muqta there, Nasir al-Din Aytemur al-Baha'i, now presided over the surrender of Multan.⁵⁶ Another army appeared before Uchch, where it was soon joined by Iltutmish in person: the city capitulated at the end of Jumada I 625/early in May 1228. Qubacha had meanwhile fled to the island stronghold of Bhakkar, pursued by a force under Iltutmish's wazir, Nizam al-Mulk Junaydi, and on the night of 19 Jumada II 626/26 May threw himself into the Indus to avoid being taken alive. From Daybul Iltutmish received the submission of its prince, Chanisar, with the result that his sovereignty was acknowledged as far as the Arabian Sea.⁵⁷

The conquest of Sind left Iltutmish free to move against Jalal al-Din's

⁵⁴ *Taj*, fol. 251b. *JH*, I, 10, and BL ms. Or. 2676, fol. 232a.

⁵⁵ *TN*, II, 4 (tr. 723), with the impossible year 628 - perhaps an error for 618 or, given the similarity of *thaman*ⁿ and *thalath* in the Arabic script, for 623. The printed text has WNRWT, and Raverty identified the place with Bijnot (Vijnot), on the fringes of the Bikaner desert and well to the south of Uchch; but BL ms., fol. 197a, and IOL ms. 3745, fol. 268b, have KNJRWT. Ganjrut is mentioned in the fourteenth century as a township (*qasaba*) in the Multan province: *IM*, 77, 93. For a brief allusion to Qubacha's defeat and capture (clearly, therefore, not the campaign of 625/1228), see *TN*, I, 452, and BL ms., fol. 180a. According to a doubtless anachronistic reference by Nasawi, 90 (tr. Buniatov, 134), Sinan al-Din Chanisar, the Sumra ruler of Daybul, was already subordinate to Iltutmish at the time of its seizure by Jalal al-Din's forces; for his name, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 214-15.

⁵⁶ *TN*, I, 446, and II, 4, 7, 9 (tr. 613, 723, 728, 731). For Aytemiir, cf. the spelling 'YTMR in *JH*,

I, 13; also p. 27, n.16 above.

⁵⁷ For the attack on Qubacha, see Habibullah, *Foundation*, 95-6. The year 624 given at one point by Juzjani for these events is an error for 625, as is clear from the context and from *JH*. see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 205-6. *Taj* (in ED, II, 242), which dates them in 624, is therefore wrong. Juzjani's month for the fall of Uchch

varies between Jumada I and Jumada

II, but I have adopted 27 Jumada 1/4 May 1228, since Iltutmish arrived outside the city on 1 Rabi' al-Thani and the siege lasted 2 months and 27 days: *TN*, I, 420, 446 (tr. 544, 612); *JH*, I, 10. 'Awfi, *ibid.*, 10-22, gives a more detailed account of the campaign. For Chanisar, see above, n.55.

~ legates in the north-west. In 627/1229-30 the Delhi forces fell upon Ozbeg-bei, who fled to his master in Iraq; whereupon Hasan Qarluq, among other local commanders, submitted to the sultan.⁵⁸ The territory controlled by these rulers is not known precisely. Numismatic evidence shows that Ozbeg-bei ruled for a time in Binban, where he was succeeded by Qarluq. His principality must also have included Nandana, Kujah (Gujrat), Sodra and Siyalkot, all lying in a tract where Jalal al-Din is known to have operated and listed by Juzjani among Iltutmish's conquests.⁵⁹ Qarluq is later found in control of Ghazna, Binban and Kurraman. Nasawi describes the Delhi Sultan, on the eve of his attack on Ozbeg-bei, as master of the territory 'up to the neighbourhood of the gates of Kashmir',⁶⁰ suggesting that his frontier already stood on the Jhelam. Iltutmish's last, abortive campaign, from which he returned a dying man in 633/1235-6, was directed towards Binban, and may well have been intended to dislodge Qarluq, who had recently submitted to the Mongols (see below, p. 105).⁶¹

While Iltutmish showed himself so attentive to his western frontier, he did not forget Bengal. Here the bloodthirsty reign of 'Ali-yi Mardan, who had exhibited growing signs of insanity, ended with his murder in c. 609/1212-13. His successor, the more humane Husam al-Din 'Iwad, who assumed the style of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din, lost Bihar to the Delhi forces.⁶² Some confusion exists regarding the history of the Lakhnawti polity during these years, since from 616/1219 onwards we encounter a sultan named Mu'izz al-Din 'Ali-yi 'Iwad, who was evidently Ghiyath al-Din's son and who was ruling either jointly with his father or in succession to him.⁶³ He is unfortunately not mentioned by Juzjani, who did not enter India, however, until a few years later and hence is hardly a contemporary witness. According to that author, it was Ghiyath al-Din who in 622/1225 fended off an invasion of Bengal by Iltutmish in person with an offer of tribute and the recognition of his suzerainty. But shortly afterwards he reneged upon the agreement and once more occupied Bihar. Iltutmish's eldest son and heir,

⁵⁸ Nasawi, 92, 217 (tr. Buniatov, 136, 267). For what follows, see Jackson, 'Jalal al-Din', 51.

⁵⁹ *TN*, I, 452, to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 180a (KWJ RAT), and IOL ms., fol. 243a (KJRAT): the two mss. have respectively MWDWDH and MWDDH, clearly errors for SWDRH (cf. also Raverty's tr. 627). The Mongol occupation of Nandana had, of course, been shortlived.

⁶⁰ Nasawi, 217, *ild mayalidarb Kashmir* (tr. Buniatov, 267).

⁶¹ *TN*, I, 449 (tr. 623); and cf. also I, 454-5 (tr. 631). On Hasan Qarluq's rule in Ghazna, Kurraman and Binban, see *ibid.*, II, 162 (tr. 1128-9); I. H. Siddiqui, 'The Qarlugh kingdom in north-western India during the thirteenth century', *IC* 54 (1980), 75-91.

⁶² *TN*, I, 434-5, 437-8 (tr. 578-80, 590-1).

⁶³ A Sanskrit epigraph of Vikrama samvat 1277, Jyastha ba. 15, Thursday (13 June 1219), from the Gaya district of Bihar, refers to a Sultan 'Mojadina': *ARIE* (1962-3), 24, 80 (no. 261). For an inscription of 'AH Shlr-i 'Iwad dated 618/1221, see Z. A. Desai, 'An early thirteenth century inscription from West Bengal', *EIAPS* (1975), 6-12. That they refer to the same person is clear from coins of 620-1/1223-4 in the name of Mu'izz al-Din 'Ali-yi 'Iwad: *CCIM*, II, 145-6 (nos. 3, 5). Nicholas W. Lowick, 'The Horseman type of Bengal and the question of commemorative issues', *JNSI35* (1973), 205-8, correctly argued for the name 'Ali here, though he wrongly assumed it represented 'Ali-yi Mardan.

~ Nasir al-Din Mahmud, who had at one time governed Lahore, as we have seen, and who now held the iqta' of Awadh, thereupon led an army into Bengal. Taking advantage of 'Iwad's absence on a plundering campaign in Kamrup (Assam), he was able in 624/1227 to seize Lakhnawti and then defeated and executed 'Iwad on his return. Iltutmish dispatched a chatr to his son, who acted as the sultan's viceroy for less than

two years, dying in the first months of 626/the winter of 1228-9. Authority in the province was then usurped by Ikhtiyar al-Din Dawlat Shah, also known as Bilge Malik, apparently a former officer of the Delhi Sultan, until Iltutmish invaded Bengal and overthrew him in 628/1230-1.⁶⁴ For the next twelve years, at least, those regions of Bengal in Muslim hands were to remain subject to Delhi.

With the reoccupation of Lakhnawi, the Delhi Sultan became the only Muslim sovereign in India. His conquests enabled him to launch a new coinage, based on the pure silver *tanga*, which would in time replace the *dihliwals*, imitations of the billon coins formerly minted by Hindu rulers at Delhi.⁶⁵ Prior to this, moreover, he had achieved an objective by which the majority of Muslim rulers set great store: recognition from the 'Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad. It is now accepted that Iltutmish was the only Indian Muslim ruler who received such recognition and that the titles borne by the Lakhnawi rulers were assumed unilaterally: indeed, Iwad's assumption of the style *Nasir Amir al-Mu'minin* ('Auxiliary of the Commander of the Faithful') may have been one incentive for Iltutmish to take the title himself.⁶⁶ Who initiated the negotiations between Delhi and Baghdad, and at what point, is uncertain; but such information as we have suggests that it may have been the caliph. We saw how al-Nasir endeavoured to incite the Ghurid Sultans against his enemy the Khwarazmshah (p. 6); and two decades or so later Iltutmish, among others, might have seemed similarly worth cultivating as a possible rival on the Khwarazmshah's southern flank.

For glimpses of the earliest diplomatic contacts with the 'king of India' we are indebted to Arabic chroniclers writing in the west. The caliph sent out as his ambassador in 617/1220-1 the shaykh Radf al-Din Abu'l-Fada'il al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Saghani (d. 650/1252-3), who returned to Baghdad only in 624/1227, during the reign of al-Nasir's son al-Mustansir

⁶⁴ On his coins he is called 'Ala' al-Dunya wa'l-Din Dawlat Shah b. Mawdud: *CMSD*, 21 (no. 53A). The Berlin ms. of *TN*, fol. 99b, confirms that Dawlat Shah and Bilge Malik were identical. Fullest reference to the campaign of 628/1230-1 in *JH*, BL ms. Or. 2676, fol. 260. For events in Bengal, see Habibullah, *Foundation*, 97-100, who was, however, unaware of the evidence cited in the previous note.

⁶⁵ Simon Digby, 'The currency system', in T. Raychaudhuri and I. Habib (eds.), *The Cambridge economic history of India*, I (Cambridge, 1982), 95-6; Deyell, *Living without silver*, 179-80, 199-203, 213-19.

⁶⁶ A. H. Dani, 'Did Ghiyath-al-Din 'Iwad. Khalji of Bengal receive investiture from the Khalifah?', *JPHS* 3 (1955), 105-17; Roma Niyogi, 'A unique coin from Bengal and a review of 'Iwad's career', *JNSI*40 (1978-9), 42-52.

~ (623-640/1226-1242). The new caliph sent him back to Delhi, and it is this latter mission which is noticed by Juzjani, who in his brief survey of the 'Abbasids refers to the despatch of a mandate (*ahd*) and a banner (*liwa'*) to Iltutmish in 625/1228, the very year of his own arrival at court, and says that he was present at the celebratory banquet. Elsewhere he gives a fuller description of the embassy, which arrived in Rabi I 626/February 1229 and brought Iltutmish robes of honour and a diploma confirming his authority over all the territories he had conquered.⁶⁷ Al-Mustansir also bestowed on the sultan - we must presume - the titles *Yamin Khalifat Allah* ('Right Hand, of God's Deputy') and *Nasir Amir al-Mu'minin* under which he is exalted by a number of writers.⁶⁸ For 'Awfi, he had become *Khalifa-yi Amir al-Mu'minin* ('Deputy of the Commander of the Faithful').⁶⁹ The usurper Iltutmish had thus attained respectability as one of the family of orthodox Muslim princes whose rule enjoyed the highest possible sanction. That he was no more impervious to such honours than the Ghurids had been is clear from his assumption in 630/1233, following the capture of Gwalior, of the quintuple *nawbat*, one of the attributes of full sovereign authority.⁷⁰

Reasons for Iltutmish's triumph

Our survey of events has brought us to a point where the newly created Delhi Sultanate embraced a larger territory than at any time prior to the last decade of the thirteenth century. There was nothing inevitable about this process. Much of it was the result of fortuitous circumstances over which Iltutmish had no control. The Sultanate's survival was by no means guaranteed. Had it not been for the Mongols, Delhi, Sind and the Panjab might have been swallowed up in the empire of the Khwarazmshah Muhammad. When he destroyed that empire, Chinggis Khan inadvertently ensured that Muslim India would go its own way. In

establishing his own principality as the sole protagonist of Islam in the subcontinent, Iltutmish followed, perhaps, a deliberate policy. Allowing his neighbours to weaken one another and intervening - as he did on Qubacha's behalf against Jalal al-Din - only when it was absolutely necessary, he was then able to eliminate these competitors one by one.

⁶⁷ *TN*, I, 129 (section abridged in Raverty's tr.), 447, 454 (tr. 616, 629). *Taj*, in *ED*, II, 243. *JH*, BL ms. Or. 4392, fol. 128a. For the role of Saghani, who is not named in the Indian sources, see al-Safadl, *al-Wafī bi'l-Wafayat*, ed. H.Ritter *et al.* (Damascus, 1931-), XII, 241; *al-Hawadith al-Jamia* (early fourteenth century; wrongly attributed to Ibn al-Fuwati), ed. Mustafa Jawad (Baghdad, 1351/1932), 262.

⁶⁸ *TN*, I, 440, 450 (tr. 597, 624). *Taj*, fol. 217b. *JH*, I, 5. Jajarmi, preface to his tr. of Ghazali's *Ihya' 'Ulumi'l-Din*, BL ms. Or. 8194, fol. 3a (with *Mu'ln* for *Yarriin*). Anonymous tr. of Razi's *Sirr al-Makhtuma*, BN ms. Suppl. persan 384, fol. 2a.

⁶⁹ *JH*, BL ms. Or. 2676, fols. 68a, 247b.

⁷⁰ *TN*, I, 449 (tr. 620-1). Significantly, the Ghurid Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad b. Sam had likewise assumed the quintuple *nawbat* after the arrival of honorary robes from the caliph: *ibid*, I, 361 (tr. 383). For the *nawbat*, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 216-17.

~ This does not, of course, tell us what enabled Iltutmish to defeat his various rivals. The answer can only be tentative, and must be based in large measure on developments on the Sultanate's western frontier, where the information at our disposal, if not plentiful, is at least fuller than that pertaining to Bengal. In 612/1215, if we are to believe Ibn al-Athir, Qubacha had encountered Yildiz's invading army with 15,000 men; against Jalal al-Din seven years later he mustered a force that was certainly no greater than 20,000 and may well have been half that size.⁷¹ These numbers stand in sharp contrast with the (doubtless exaggerated) figure of 130,000 for the army which Iltutmish is said to have raised for his own campaign against the Khwarazmians.⁷² Such statistics are notoriously hazardous guides to the size of medieval armies, and perhaps they are in the last analysis unusable. Yet we cannot discount the possibility that the Delhi ruler presided over a significantly larger military establishment than did his neighbour and rival, who had been obliged to disburse considerable quantities of treasure during the Mongol siege of Multan.⁷³ It is hardly coincidental that Iltutmish embarked on the reduction of Qubacha in the immediate wake of three highly successful campaigns: that of 622/1225 against 'Iwad in Bengal, yielding the substantial sum of eighty *laks* (8,000,000) of silver (presumably *dirhams*) in tribute,⁷⁴ and the expeditions of 623-4/1226-7 which resulted in the capture of the Hindu fortresses of Ranthanbor and Mandor. The specie obtained by such victories would surely have enhanced Iltutmish's capacity to recruit more formidable armies.

Of the fact that a ready pool of military support lay to hand for the ruler whose resources enabled him to pay for it, there can be little doubt. We have seen how prior to this, in the era of Mu'izz al-Din, soldiers of fortune such as Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar hired themselves out to the highest bidder and launched initiatives of their own. Although Fakhr-i Mudabbir undoubtedly exaggerates the enhancement in their material prosperity awaiting those who migrated to Muslim India,⁷⁵ it is likely that the region was coming to be seen as some sort of El Dorado. The irruption of the Mongols into the eastern Islamic lands after 617/1220 must have considerably increased the number of adventurers - both Turks and 'Tajiks' - eager for whatever enterprise was on offer. We may imagine a veritable reservoir of unattached warriors and officials in north-western India in the 1220s. Many of 'the chief men of Khurasan, Ghur and Ghazna' secured a refuge in the first instance at the court of Qubacha, according to Juzjani, who himself arrived at Uchch in 624/1227 and was made *qadi-yi lashgar* to Qubacha's

⁷¹ *IA*, XII, 203/311, for the battle with Yildiz. Nasawi, 88 (tr. Buniatov, 133), for the Khwarazmians, with 10,000; *TJG*, II, 146 (tr. Boyle, 414), has 20,000, but this perhaps includes the reinforcements sent by Iltutmish (above, p. 33).

⁷² Nasawi, 90 (tr. Buniatov, 134): 30,000 horse and 100,000 foot.

⁷³ *TN*, I, 420 (tr. 537-8). ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 438, 445 (tr. 593, 610). ⁷⁵ *SA*, 20.

~ son.⁷⁶ In the previous year the maliks of Ghur had finally abandoned their homeland to the Mongols and fled to join Qubacha.⁷⁷ But others among these distinguished *condottieri* made for Delhi: they included one of the few surviving members of the Ghurid dynasty, Nasir al-Din Abu Bakr b. Suri, who became one of Ilutmish's maliks and died at Delhi in 620/1223.⁷⁸

There were also not a few whose loyalties shifted. It was a time for highly volatile allegiances. In the course of Jalal al-Din's negotiations with Ilutmish, two of his envoys, weary of the hardships they had been required to undergo, deserted their master and entered the service of the Delhi Sultan.⁷⁹ Qubacha in particular seems often to have been the victim of such transfers. Early in the confrontation with Jalal al-Din, two important maliks - Nusrat al-Din Muhammad b. Husayn b. Kharmil and Taj al-Din Yinaltegin (the future ruler of Sistan) - left him for the Khwarazmians.⁸⁰ What became of the maliks of Ghur who flocked to Qubacha's court in 623/1226, we are not told; but Qutb al-Din Hasan b. 'Ali, who may have been one of their number,⁸¹ is subsequently found at Ilutmish's court. Even Qubacha's wazir, 'Ayn al-Mulk Husayn al-Ash'ari, was within a short time appointed to a similar position at the court of Ilutmish's son Rukn al-Din Firuz, then muqta' of Bada'un.⁸²

It may well be that in time the Delhi Sultan appeared to offer better prospects to adventurers, whether military men or those of a more scholarly persuasion, than did his neighbours. Not the least attractive features of the Sultanate to immigrants would have been its geographical location, making possible lucrative raids into Hindu territory, like those on Ranthanbor and Mandor, which provided booty for the mercenary, and its need of experienced officials, which afforded employment for the savant. Juzjani doubtless made some such calculation when he quitted Uchch in Safar 625/January 1228 to join the Delhi forces under Kezlik Khan outside the walls three months before the citadel surrendered, and took care to wait upon Ilutmish on the very day of his arrival with the

⁷⁶ *TN*, I, 420 (tr. 541-2), with the month Jumada I/May for his arrival, whereas at I, 446 (tr. 611-12), he gives Rajab/June-July; for his emigration from Ghur, see also II, 184-5 (tr. 1203-4). On the distinguished immigrants from Khurasan, see I, 419 (tr. 534).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 420 (tr. 539-41): a year and a half after the Mongol investment of Multan, i.e. early in 623/1226.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 340 (tr. 345); he is listed among Ilutmish's maliks at I, 451 (tr. 626). He belonged to the branch that ruled the petty principality of Madin.

⁷⁹ Nasawi, 91 (tr. Buniatov, 135).

⁸⁰ Nusrat al-Din: *ibid.*, 88, 140, 141 (tr. Buniatov, 132, 186, 188). Yinaltegin: *TN*, I, 284 (tr. 200); and for his subsequent career, C. E. Bosworth, *The history of the Saffarids of Sistan and the maliks of Nimruz (247/861 to 949/1542-3)* (Costa Mesa, California, 1994), 407-10.

⁸¹ *TN*, II, 135, 140-1 (tr. 1061, 1070-1): Qutb al-Din set out for 'Hindustan' in 620/1223 along with other maliks, though his companions were allegedly all slain by the Mongols en route. For the 'Husayn' of the printed text, BL ms. reads 'Hasan' throughout (fols. 183a, 185b, 193a, 220a, 240).

⁸² *TN*, I, 454 (tr. 631).

~main army soon afterwards.⁸³ Awfi too seems to have been ready enough to abandon his benefactor Qubacha. A scholar who himself reached Delhi in 620/1223 speaks of the flight from the Mongols to Ilutmish's court of 'Muslims of Khurasan, of Transoxiana (Ma wara' al-Nahr), of Ghur, of Ghazna, nay all the Muslims of the east (*bed kaffa-yi musulmdndn-i mashriq*).⁸⁴ In this context, Juzjan's encomium on the sultan - that he was ever generous in his gifts to landowners (*dahaqin*) and strangers from great cities (*ghuraba-yi amsdr*), and that he made his capital a haven for those escaping from the Mongol deluge⁸⁵ - is not without significance. And his verdict is echoed by authors of the following century, notably 'Isami, who speaks of the arrival of 'sayyids from the Arab lands and 'ulama' from Bukhara.⁸⁶ Ilutmish is the only Delhi monarch, other than Muhammad b. Tughluq in the fourteenth century, who is known to have sought

deliberately to attract immigrant notables in this fashion. It is an intriguing possibility that he benefited from widespread desertions by many of those who had only recently obtained asylum in Sind and who judged that Qubacha was not the power most likely to guarantee their future security or, indeed, prosperity.

The immigrant nobility under Iltutmish

At the end of his chapter on Iltutmish, Juzjani furnishes a list of his nobles, including Ghuris, Turks and 'Tajiks'. The great majority are merely names to us; they are mentioned neither elsewhere in the *Tabaqat-i Ndsiri* nor in any other source. Some, however, are met with in the body of the chapter, and others, who were the sultan's own ghulams, are also accorded biographies in *tabaqa* 22: to these we shall return shortly. A few correspond to amirs specified by Hasan-i Nizami as having supported Iltutmish in the fight against Aram Shah's party or having not long afterwards accompanied him on his Jalor campaign: 'Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar, commemorated in one of the very earliest epitaphs so far discovered in the Sultanate's territories; Nasir al-Din Mardan Shah; and Iftikhar al-Din Muhammad-i 'Umar, described by Juzjani as the chief amir (*malik al-umara*) and commander at Kara.⁸⁷ We can even detect a certain continuity with the era of the Ghurid conquests. Rukn al-Din Hamza, named by both authors as one of

⁸³ *Ibid.*, I, 447, and II, 3 (tr. 615, 722-3). For Kezlik Khan's title (Tu. *kezklik*, 'small knife'), see Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 760; *TMENP*, IV, 3-4 (no. 1714).

⁸⁴ Jajarmi, BL ms. Or. 8194, fol. 3b. See also the Persian translation of Birum's *al-Saydanafi'l-Tibb*, BL ms. Or. 5849, fol. 4a; Nazir Ahmad, 'Beruni's Kitab-as-Saydana and its Persian translation', *Indo-Iranica* 14, part 3 (1961), 17.

⁸⁵ *TN*, I, 440-1 (tr. 598-9). ⁸⁶ *FS*, 114-15 (tr. 226-7). *TFS*, 27.

⁷ *Taj*, fols. 221b, 229a. Juzjani's list of maliks is at *TN*, I, 452 (reading KWH for KRH, but cf. Raverty's tr., 627). For 'Izz al-Din Bakhtiyar (d. 616/1219), see Iqtidar Husain Siddiqi, 'Historical information in the thirteenth century collections of Persian poems', *Studies in Islam* 19 (1982), 57-8.

~ Qututmish's amirs, is possibly identical with the homonymous figure active in Mu'izz al-Din's service and employed on an embassy to Prthvlraja III in 587/1191.⁸⁸ It is more certain that both 'Izz al-Din 'AlI, at one time muqta' of Nagawr, and Husam al-Din Oghulbeg in Awadh had held office since Mu'izz al-Din's reign.⁸⁹

What became of most of the old nobility is obscure. As we have seen, Qutbi amirs had supported Iltutmish at the outset, and Juzjani's list includes two amirs with the sobriquet 'Qutbi', presumably former ghulams of Aybeg. But the Mu'izzi amirs had rallied to Aram Shah, which is why the Mu'izzis mentioned by Fakhr-i Mudabbir as among Aybeg's entourage at Lahore in 602/1206 are lost to sight thereafter.⁹⁰ It is accordingly possible that Iltutmish was obliged to constitute in effect a new class of high-ranking officers. Immigrant notables would in time have furnished him with the means of doing so. Some were Turkish grantees of free status. Hasan-i Nizami indicates that in meeting *Berki's attack Iltutmish benefited from the support of Sayf al-Din Flruz, who is to be identified with a cousin of Yinaltegin called by Juzjam Firuz-i Iltutmish and Flruz b. Salar, and who was apparently a warlord originating from the Qangli confederacy in the steppes north of Khwarazm.⁹¹ 'Ala' al-Din J-ani, bombastically described by Juzjani as a 'prince of Turkistan', received La'khnawti as his iqta' following Iltutmish's victorious campaign of 628/1230-1 and is subsequently found at Lahore.⁹² The Ghurl malik Qutb al-Din Hasan became comptroller of Iltutmish's household (*wakil-i dar*); and 'Izz al-Din Muhammad Salar, who was also probably a Ghuri, served as *barbeg* (i.e. *amir-hajib*).⁹³ We have seen how bureaucrats as well as soldiers sought asylum in India from the Mongol onslaught, and among those in office at Iltutmish's death are men with *cognomina* from Khurasan like Shafurqani and Tayaqani;⁹⁴ though whether they were first-generation immigrants is unknown. A similar

⁸⁸ Rukn al-Din does not appear in the list of maliks as given in Hablbi's text of 77V, but cf. IOL ms., fol. 242b, and Raverty's tr., 626. *Taj*, fols. 77b-78a, 229a; for the embassy to Prthvlraja, see fol. 38a.

⁸⁹ For 'AII and Oghulbeg in Mu'izz al-Din's reign, see *TN*, I, 422-3 (tr. 549), and pp. 26-7 above. For 'AII among Iltutmish's maliks, *TN*, I, 452; and for Oghulbeg, *ibid.*, I, 451 note, and cf. BL ms., fol. 179a (tr. 627); also *JH*, BL ms. Or. 2676, fols. 263b-264a (Nizamud-din, *Introduction*, no. 1729). By 620/1223 Nagawr was held by the otherwise unknown Karim al-Din Hamza: *TN*, I, 284 (tr. 200; but BL ms., fol. 179b, reads Najlb al-Din).

⁹⁰ *SA*, 25, 73. They are the *sipahsalar*s Husam al-Dawla wa'l-Din Ahmad (-i ?) 'AH Shah, Mubariz al-Dawla wa'l-Din Toghriltegin 'AII (-yi ?) Hasan, and Asad al-Dawla wa'l-Din 'AII (-yi ?) Muhammad Abu'l-Hasan. The last two are both entitled *ulugh* ('great') *dadbeg* (i.e. *amir-i dad*).

⁹¹ *Taj*, fol. 221b. For Firuz, see also *TN*, I, 284, 299 (text reads 'Nimrtiz' in error), 452 (tr. 199, 235, 625). His father's sister was the wife of the Khwarazmshah II-Arslan and hence grandmother to the Ghurid Sultans' enemy 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad? Nasawi, 36 (tr. Buniatov, 81), confirms the relationship. *TN*, I, 298 (tr. 235), gives a garbled account of this family.

⁹² *Ibid.*, I, 448, 452, 455, and II, 9 (tr. 618, 626, 634, 731-2).

⁹³ *TFS*, 39. For Salari, see *TN*, I, 446 (tr. 613), and *JH*, I, 12; also Habib, 'Formation', 13.

⁹⁴ *TN*, I, 456, and II, 30 (with SRQANY in error; cf. tr. 635, 761).

~ obscurity shrouds the antecedents of Iltutmish's wazir, Mu'ayyad al-Mulk (later Nizam al-Mulk) Qiwam al-Dawla wa'l-Din Muhammad b. Fakhr al-Mulk Sharaf Abi Sa'd Junaydi, and the sultan's '*arid*', 'Imad al-Mulk Sharaf al-Dawla wa'l-Din Abu Bakr, of whom we learn only that he was of illustrious lineage and was not a Turk.⁹⁵ But whatever their origins or talents, no Muslim ruler would have felt easy in relying exclusively on adherents of free status. Like Mu'izz al-Din, Iltutmish took care to build up a corps of Turkish slaves (Persian *bandagdn*; sing, *banda*), known as the 'Shamsis', whose loyalty was focused on him alone. Under his successors, they would come to play a more prominent role in the government of the Sultanate.

⁹⁵ For the wazir's full name and style, see *JH*, BL ms. Or. 4392, fol. 128a (cf. also ms. Or. 2676, fol. 68a); Jajarmi, BL ms. Or. 8194, fol. 3a. Barani later heard that Junaydi was of plebeian origin, the grandson of a weaver (*julaha*): *TFS*, 39. 'Imad al-Mulk: *JH*, BL ms. Or. 2676, fols. 263b-264a.

~CHAPTER 3

Sultans and sources

Shams al-Din Iltutmish died on 20 Sha'ban 633/29 April 1236. In contrast with Aybeg, he founded a dynasty, which ruled until Iltutmish's own slave Balaban,¹ hitherto viceroy (*na'ib*) to Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah b. Iltutmish, usurped the throne in 664/1266 and reigned as Sultan Ghiyath al-Din. Balaban's dynasty too was shortlived. After the brief reigns of his grandson Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad and the latter's infant son Shams al-Din Kayumarth, its life was snuffed out in 689/1290 by the Khalaj officer Jalal al-Din Firuz, the first of the Khalji Sultans. Designations like 'Slave kings' and 'Slave dynasty', traditionally applied to the thirteenth-century Delhi Sultans, are misnomers. Only Iltutmish and Balaban were ghulams; the majority of the rulers, their respective descendants, had at no time been slaves. In this book, therefore, the two dynasties will be termed 'Shamsids' and 'Ghiyathids' in the interests of greater accuracy.

Juzjani and the Shamsids

The historian of the thirteenth-century Delhi Sultanate is not embarrassed by a wealth of literary sources. With the exception of the accounts of the Khwarazmian and Mongol operations in India given by Juwayni and Nasawi, no external source has survived from the period between Ibn al-Athir and the end of the thirteenth century which refers to contemporary events in the subcontinent. One reason may well be the lack of contact with the Caliphate. That the reigns of Iltutmish's first two successors were noticed in the lost work of the Baghdad historian Ibn al-Sa'i (d. 674/1276), we learn from a citation by a mid-fourteenth-

century chronicler writing in Mamluk Syria.² Ibn al-Sa'i had presumably derived his information from the caliphal envoy Saghani, who left India for Baghdad in 637/1239 after a

¹ For *balaban*, 'sparrow-hawk', see Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 61.

² (al-Mufaddal) Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il (c. 1350), *al-Nahj al-Sadid*, partial edn and tr. Samira Kortantamer, *Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341*, IU 23 (Freiburg i. Br., 1973), Ar. text 28-9 (German tr. 107). There is a virtually identical passage in the fourteenth-century Baghdad chronicle *al-Hawddith al-Jdmi'a*, 104. On Ibn al-Sa'i, see above, p. 18, n.56.

~ stay of eleven years.³ Whether the last 'Abbasid Caliphs exchanged embassies with Iltutmish's successors, we are not told. The Delhi monarchs continued to employ the style 'Auxiliary of the Commander of the Faithful' (*Nasir Amir al-Mu'miriin*) on their coins down to the extinction of the Baghdad Caliphate by the Mongols in 656/1258 and even beyond.⁴ But it is unlikely that this rested on official conferment: had his patron Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, at least, received confirmation of his title from Baghdad, Juzjani would assuredly have told us. It is a measure of the Sultanate's isolation during this period that chroniclers in Mamluk Egypt, who periodically listed contemporary foreign rulers at the head of an annal, named the Delhi Sultan correctly only once (in 662/1264) in the course of the period from 635/1237 onwards.⁵ Not until 700/1300-1, after the invasion of Gujarat by the forces of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji had opened up a new channel of communication with the Mamluk empire, did its chroniclers again include the sultan's name at regular intervals in lists of contemporary sovereigns.⁶

Although a number of references to major figures and historical events can be gleaned from the works of Persian poets such as Siraji and 'Amid Sunnami, who graced the sultan's court or those of his Muslim neighbours in India around the middle of the century,⁷ for the era of Iltutmish's progeny down to 658/1260 we are overwhelmingly dependent on a single narrative source, the final three sections of Juzjani's *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*. Of all the historians of the Sultanate, Juzjani had the best vantage-point from which to observe events, since he occupied on three occasions one of the highest civil offices, that of grand qadi (*qadl al-quddat*) of the empire. Yet though comparatively rich in data for this period, the *Tabaqat* is not an easy work to use. Some events are recounted in such opaque terms that their significance is almost completely lost. The arrangement of the material is also extraordinarily confused: the same episode may be described twice at different points - both under the relevant reign in *tabaqa* 21 and in one or more of the biographies of Shamsi slaves that make up *tabaqa* 22 - but with varying and indeed conflicting details. It is as if the chronicler's aim was to camouflage rather than to illuminate events. This is all the more regrettable given the absence of any alternative sources. Juzjani's work was quarried by

³ al-Safadl, wafi; XII, 241.

⁴ The caliph's name was first omitted on the coins of the Khalji Sultan Rukn al-Din Ibrahim (695/1296): Edward Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathan kings of Delhi* (Delhi, 1871), 255.

⁵ Ibn al-Dawadari, VIII, 102. Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, *al-Nahj al-Sadid*, partial edn and tr. E. Blochet, 'Moufazzal Ibn Abil-Fazail. Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks', *Patrologia Orient-talis* 12-20(1919-29), 123.

⁶ Al-Yunini (d."726/1326), *al-Dhayl 'ala Mir'ati'l-Zaman*, TSM ms. III Ahmet 2907/e.3, fols. 196a (700; with incorrect name), 210b (701); III Ahmet 2907/e.4, fols. 25b, 36a, 43b, 157b, 179a, 212b (with varying degrees of inaccuracy). Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Blochet, 534-5, 556, also begins naming the Delhi Sultan (incorrectly) in 700.

⁷ Siddiqi, 'Historical information'. *TFS*, 113, mentions Khwaja Shams-i Mu'in, who wrote 'volumes' (*mujalladat*) in praise of Qutb al-Din Hasan Ghuri, but his work has not survived.

~ 11 the later authors who cover these years, and it is only rarely that one of them - 'Isami, for instance, or the fifteenth-century chronicler Sirhindi - supplies any additional information, its provenance and reliability alike far from certain.

This tendency towards obfuscation is illustrated by Juzjani's treatment of the succession to Iltutmish. The sultan's eldest son, Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, who died in Lakhnawti in 626/1229, had been widely expected to succeed him. Following the Gwalior expedition in 630/1233, Rukn al-Din Firuz Shah, as the next son, had been appointed muqta' of Lahore, a position once occupied by Nasir al-Din Mahmud. Firuz Shah accompanied [Iltutmish back to Delhi not long before the sultan's death, as if he was being groomed for the throne, and Juzjani confirms that the eyes of the people were on the prince.⁸ A work composed in Iltutmish's last years appears to corroborate this, since it is dedicated to the sultan and Firuz Shah jointly, as if the latter were heir-apparent.⁹ Firuz Shah duly ascended the throne within a few days of his father's death. But Juzjani at one point alleges that in the wake of the Gwalior expedition Iltutmish had marked out for the succession his eldest daughter Radiyya, who may thus have been his firstborn child and whose mother was his chief wife, and had caused a diploma to be drawn up in her favour. When certain officials objected, he allegedly predicted that none of his sons would be found fit to rule.¹⁰ It is noteworthy, however, that Juzjani was at Gwalior at this time and did not return to Delhi until 635/1238 (i.e. during Radiyya's reign):¹¹ he could not have been present, and he does not in fact claim to have seen the diploma. In these circumstances, the story may well be apocryphal and have been circulated by those who enthroned her: according to the fourteenth-century Moroccan visitor Ibn Battuta, her tomb had become an object of pilgrimage,¹² and it is noteworthy that, as we shall see (pp. 69-70), Balaban himself was indebted to her for his first promotion to office. Subsequently, in view of its disparagement of Iltutmish's sons (including, of course, the reigning sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah),¹³ the tale could have acquired a new significance at the time Juzjani was writing, when the displacement of the Shamsid dynasty was perhaps already on the horizon. .

Juzjani's own views of Iltutmish's first four successors can be gleaned from the *Tabaqat*. Firuz Shah (633-634/1236) was a pleasure-loving youth who left the reins of government to his mother, the energetic and vindictive Shah Terken. His brief reign was dominated by a revolt on the part of a

⁸ TN, I, 454-5 (tr. 630, 631).

⁹ Anonymous, tr. of Razi's *Sirr al-Makhtuma*, BN ms. Suppl. persan 384, fol. 2a.

¹⁰ TN, I, 458 (tr. 638-9). Nizami (in HN, 230-1) believes that Iltutmish originally designated Radiyya, but then changed his mind and groomed Firuz Shah instead.

¹¹ TN, I, 448-9, 460 (tr. 620, 643-4). ¹² IB, III, 169 (tr. Gibb, 632).

¹³ As Nizami points out, in HN, 230-1 n.84; cf. also his *On history and historians*, 84. It is unfortunate that elsewhere (HN, 253, 256) Nizami's insight is impaired by his acceptance of 'Isami's testimony that Mahmud Shah was not Iltutmish's son but his grandson.

~group among Iltutmish's senior amirs, including the wazir Junaydi, who may have supported Firuz Shah's brother Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad as a candidate for the throne.¹⁴ The rebellion was eventually put down by Radiyya, who had been enthroned in his place. We are clearly intended to draw a contrast both with Firuz Shah's elder brother, the 'wise and prudent' (*farzana-u 'aqil-u bikhrad*) Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, whose premature death can be seen as a heavy blow to the Sultanate,¹⁵ and with his successor. Radiyya (634-7/1236-1240) is credited with all the attributes of a successful ruler except one, namely that she was not a man; she is the only Shamsid sultan whom Juzjani describes as a war leader (*lashgarkash*).¹⁶ Tradition makes much of Radiyya's adoption of masculine garb and her public appearances riding on an elephant.¹⁷ But whatever the 'ulama' thought of this, it is clear that Radiyya's backers had intended her to be a figurehead and that her offence lay in her growing self-assertiveness. Initially her coinage, on which her father's name was associated with her own, had testified to her insecurity; but in c. 635/1237-8 Iltutmish's name was dropped.¹⁸ Deposed in favour of her brother Bahrain Shah, she was imprisoned in Tabarhindh and killed in 638/1240 in a vain bid to recover the throne.

Of Mu'izz al-Din Bahrain Shah (637-9/1240-2) we are told that he was a courageous sovereign who had a penchant, however, for shedding blood.¹⁹ He was overthrown when many of his commanders mutinied and stormed Delhi. Bahrain Shah had become highly unpopular with the 'ulama', one of whose number he had

executed and who participated in an abortive conspiracy to dethrone him; the *shaykh al-islam*, whom he sent out to negotiate with the rebel amirs, went over to the enemy.²⁰ In these circumstances, Juzjani's partiality for the sultan is difficult to understand; but the reason may be nothing more complex than that he owed to Bahrain Shah his first appointment as grand qadi.²¹ The events culminating in Bahram Shah's overthrow appear to have sickened him, since he resigned his office and left Delhi for Lakhnawti, where he remained for over two years. He was thus absent during the early years of Firuz Shah's son 'Ala' al-Din Mas'ud Shah (639-44/1242-6), who; 'we are blandly assured, was generous, right-thinking and endowed with every laudable quality. But the new sultan in turn¹ fell under evil influences and took to executing his maliks and amirs,²² so that his uncle, Iltutmish's youngest son Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, was secretly invited to supplant him.

Of the various changes of sovereign noticed in the *Tabaqat*, this particular

¹⁴ Siddiqi, 'Historical information', 56-7. ¹⁵ *TN*, I 453, 454 (tr. 628, 630).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 457 (tr. 637-8). ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 460 (tr. 643). *IB*, III, 167 (tr. Gibb, 631).

¹⁸ *CMSD*, 40 (nos 161, 161 A): apparently coins struck in Lakhnawti, however, bore Radiyya's name alone throughout, *ibid.*, 41 (nos 161B-D).

¹⁹ *TN*, I, 462 (tr. 649). ²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 464, 466, 467 (tr. 652, 657, 658-9).

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 466 (tr. 657-8). ²² *Ibid.*, I, 468, 471 (tr. 660, 668-9).

~ oup is the most obscure - not surprisingly, perhaps, since the monarch who now ascended the throne is the one to whom Juzjani dedicates his history. Mahmud Shah (644-664/1246-1266) is the most shadowy of all the thirteenth-century sultans.²³ The era appears to be dominated by Juzjani's patron, Baha' al-Din Balaban-i Khwurd ('the Lesser'), entitled Ulugh Khan, the future sultan. Balaban, whose daughter the sultan married and who acted as viceroy (na'ib), with a brief interval of about one year, from 547/1249 until Mahmud Shah's death, seems to play Earl Godwin to Mahmud Shah's Edward the Confessor. Juzjani says that the sultan possessed 'the qualities of saints and the characteristics of prophets' (*awsaf-i awliya wa-akhlaq-i anbiya*), and includes among his many virtues piety, faith, asceticism and continence (*taqwa-u diyanat-u zahadat-u siyanat*).²⁴ Professor Nizami has suggested that Juzjani constructed this picture in order to justify Balaban's dominance.²⁵ Mahmud Shah's image was undoubtedly persistent. Tales circulated in the following century that he had found an outlet for both his energies and his piety in calligraphy: he copied Qur'ans and purchased his food with the proceeds.²⁶ His austere lifestyle even attracts comment from a later chronicler writing outside India.²⁷ It is accordingly difficult to avoid the impression of a monarch who was somewhat detached from his own-court. Factions jostle for power at the centre and for the most desirable iqta's; leading grandees are ruthlessly cut down or sent into exile in the provinces; behind a facade of military expeditions and conspiratorial intrigues the figure of Balaban, as the sultan's deputy, is never far away. But what Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah thought of all this - whether, for instance, he welcomed or deplored either Balaban's fall from power in 651/1253 or his reinstatement in the following year - we cannot discern.

Juzjani wrote only a few years prior to Balaban's accession. It is Balaban who receives by far the longest biography of the twenty-five Shamsi ghulams, and Juzjani's expressions of gratitude to him for gifts and pensions recur frequently¹ in the book.²⁸ Even if we accept the tradition attributed to Balaban, and found in the hagiographical *Sarulr al Sudur*, that Juzjani the qadi did not fear him,²⁹ Juzjani the chronicler seems, nevertheless, to have felt inhibited from revealing circumstances which cast his benefactor in a poor light. Nor is he able or willing to do full justice to Balaban's enemies: although Kushlu Khan ('Izz al-Din Balaban) is the subject of a biography in *tabaqa* 22 and is praised for his favour towards the 'ulama' and ascetics,³⁰

²³ For a survey of the reign, see Mohibbul Hasan, 'Mahmud I, Nasir al-Din', *Enc. Isl.*².

²⁴ *TN*, I, 477 (tr. 674). ²⁵ Nizami, *On history and historians*, 82-3.

²⁶ *TFS*, 26. *FS*, 156 (tr. 280-2). *IB*, III, 169 (tr. Gibb, 632). *DR*, 50, describes Mahmud Shah as 'immersed in the affairs of God'.

²⁷ Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Kortantamer, *Ar. text* 29 (German tr. 107).

²⁸ *TN*, I, 481, and II, 2, 52-3, 61, 62, 69 (tr. 681, 720, 808, 821-2, 823, 835).

²⁹ Cited in Nizami, *On history and historians*, 93. ³⁰ *TN*, II, 36 (tr. 775-6).

~ the na'ib's other great rival, Qutluğ Khan, is accorded no such distinction and is referred to only in passing. At this time, moreover, the proximity of the pagan Mongols both threatened the integrity of the Sultanate and afforded an incentive to refractory grandees to defy the Delhi government. Balaban was restored to power in 652/1254 as a result of manoeuvres in which certain of his confederates were in league with the Mongols. But Juzjani's own account is noticeably coy on the subject, and were it not for the details on India furnished by authors, like Wassaf and Rashid al-Din, writing in the dominions of the Mongol Ilkhan in Persia, we should have little idea of the complexity of these events.

Sources after 658/1260

After 658/1260 Juzjani's voice falls silent, and we enter upon an era for which genuinely primary source material is extremely meagre. To write a connected account of the reigns of Balaban (664-85/1266-87), of his grandson Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad (685-9/1287-90) or of Jalal al-Din Firuz Shah Khalji (689-95/1290-6) is even more difficult than for the fourteenth-century sultans, since there are no contemporary narrative sources.³¹ In large measure we are dependent either on authors who cover a considerable period but who wrote in the middle of the fourteenth century, or on those who composed shorter works to commemorate specific events. The exception is a historical tradition that was current in Persia by the end of the century. This, the earliest survey of the period down to 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's reign which has survived, is found in the brief history of the Sultanate which Wassaf inserted in his *Tajziyat al-Amsar* (designed as a sequel to Juwayni's work) in or just before 702/1303 and presented to the Ilkhan Ghazan. This part of Wassaf's work was copied within the next year or so into the Indian section of the great historical encyclopaedia, *Jami' al-Tawarikh*, of the Ilkhanid wazir Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah al-Hamadani.³² Rashid al-Din added the odd detail of his own; though his statement that Uchch and Multan are governed by the sultan's son indicates that some of his information dated from the reign of Jalal al-Din Khalji or perhaps even that of Balaban.³³

It was under Balaban that the celebrated poet Yamin al-Din Abu'l-Hasan, better known as Amir Khusraw Dihlawi (b. 651/1253; d. 725/1325),

³¹ For these reigns, see HN, 277-325; Habibullah, *Foundation*, chaps. 7-8; K. S. Lai, *History of the Khaljis AD. 1290-1320*, 3rd edn (Delhi, 1980), chap. 2.

³² For the date at which this section of his work was presented to the Ilkhan, see Wassaf, *Tajziyat al-Amsar wa-Tazjiyat al-A'sar*, lithograph edn (Bombay, 1269/1853), 405. Rashid al-Din's Indian chapters were composed over the years 702-3/1302-4: see JT, ed. Karl Jahn, *Die Indiangeschichte des Rasid ad-Din* (Vienna, 1980), introduction, 9.

³³ *Ibid.*, Pers. text Taf. 13, Ar. text Taf. 51 (German tr. 36). Rashid al-Din also states that Bengal is under the rule of a cousin of the Delhi Sultan who has repudiated his authority: Pers. text Taf. 15-16, Ar. text Taf. 52 (tr. 39).

~ Who was the son of one of Iltutmish's ghulam troopers, began work on his first *diwans*, *Tuhfat al-Sighar* (c. 671/1272-3) and *Wasat al-Hayat* (although his was not completed perhaps until c. 690/1291). These and his third *Iwdn*, *Ghurrat al-Kamal* (693/1294) occasionally allude to contemporary vents, and the preface (*dibacha*) to the last-named work contains a valuable utobiographical sketch. During the reigns of Kayqubad and Jalal al-Din Chalji, Khusraw composed his earliest epic narrative poems (*mathnawis*), respectively *Qiran al-Sa'dayn*, centred on the reconciliation between Kay-qubad and his father Bughra

Khan in 686/1287, and *Miftah al-Futuh*, commemorating the victories of Jalal al-Din in 690/1291. Khusraw's principal defect - excessive adulation of the reigning sultan - is amply illustrated in the opening of his one prose work, the *Ta'rikh-i 'Ala'* or *Khaza'in al-Futuh* (711/1311-12), where a bland account of the accession of Jalal al-Din's nephew 'Ala' al-Din Khalji in 695/1296 omits all mention of the old sultan's murder. In the short but occasionally useful sketch of the Sultanate's history from Ilutmish onwards, with which he prefaces his *Diwal Rani* or *'Ashiqa* (centred on the love between 'Ala' al-Din's son Khidr Khan and a Hindu princess), he could afford to be more forthright, since by the time he completed the poem, in 720/1320, 'Ala' al-Din and his sons were all dead.³⁴

These works apart, we are thrown back on the *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* of Diya'-yi Barani³⁵ (completed in 758/1357) and the epic *Futuh al-Salatin* of Isami (750/1349), together with the baldly annalistic *Ta'nkh-i Mubarak-Shahi* of Yahya b. Ahmad Sirhindl, who wrote as late as 838/1434. The sources available to 'Isami and Sirhindl are unknown; the latter may possibly have used the now lost continuation (*mulhaqat*) of the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, attributed by the seventeenth-century compiler Firishta to 'Ayn al-Din Bljapuri (d. 795/1393), who like 'Isami was a subject of the breakaway Deccan Sultanate.³⁶ About Barani's sources we are better informed. He claims for the period prior to Jalal al-Din Khalji's accession that he is relying on hearsay from his father and uncle, who were officers in the service of the first two Khalji sovereigns, and his maternal grandfather, Husam al-Din, who had been comptroller of the household (*wakil-i dar*) of Balaban's *barbeg* (*amir-hajib*) and whom that sultan subsequently appointed as governor (*shihna*) of Lakhnawti.³⁷ Sometimes he attributes his informa-

³⁴ On these works, see M. Wahid Mirza, *The life and works of Amir Khusrau* (Calcutta, 1935).

³⁵ He is called Diya' al-Din Barani by later authors: Irfan Habib, 'Barani's theory of the history of the Delhi Sultanate', *IHR* 1 (1980-1), 99 n.1; Muhammad Bihamadkhanl. *Ta'rikh-i Muhammadi* (fifteenth century), BL ms. Or. 137, fol. 409b.

³⁶ Firishta, *Gulshan-i Ibrahimi*, lithograph edn (Bombay, 1247/1831-2, 2 vols.), I, 5, 131, 165. On Bljapuri, see A. T. M. 'Abd al-Jabbar, *Mahbub dhi'l-Manan Tadhkhira Awliya Dakkan* (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1332/1914), 538-41, who claimed to have possessed a ms. of the *Mulhaqat* which was subsequently lost.

³⁷ Husam al-Din: *TFS*, 32, 41, 61, 119; and see also 87. Barani's father and uncle: *ibid.*, 25, 39, 60, 127.

tion to Amir Khusraw and to the latter's friend and fellow-poet Amir Hasan Dihlawi, with both of whom he claims to have been on close terms.³⁸ Occasionally he also cites other informants, including otherwise unknown notables who had served Balaban.³⁹ But the assertion of this seventy-four-year-old author that from the reign of Jalal al-Din Khalji onwards he is reliant on what he himself had witnessed (he would have been six at Jalal al-Din's accession and twelve when the sultan died) hardly inspires confidence.⁴⁰ He possibly drew some of his information from the boon-companions (*nudama'*) of Jalal al-Din, including Amir Arslan *Kalahi, whom he describes as expert in history and in the practices of kings (*adab-i muluk*);⁴¹ but this is by no means certain. In the circumstances, it is reassuring that Barani and 'Isami, who wrote independently of each other, frequently agree in their outline of events, so that they may at least have drawn on a common folk memory. Shades of similar traditions also appear in the brief history of Delhi which Ibn Battuta incorporated in his travelogue.

If Juzjani has a tendency to bemuse the reader through a wealth of sometimes contradictory detail, the problems attached to Barani's work are of a different order. Although the *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* was intended as a sequel to Juzjani's *Tabaqat*⁴² it is in some respects inferior to it, containing as it does relatively few dates (and some of those inaccurate) and at times describing events in a vague and impressionistic fashion. The author himself calls his work an epitome (*ijaz-u ikhtisar*) and denies aiming at completeness.⁴³ On the other hand, he attempts what none of our other sources remotely approaches, namely an explanation of events and policies, which in itself has raised acute problems of interpretation.⁴⁴ With regard to Balaban's reign, for example, the reader is struck by a laudable attention to analysis and characterization. The former ghulam of Ilutmish who now supplanted his master's dynasty is portrayed by Barani as a grim ruler who was determined to be more than merely *primus inter pares*.⁴⁵ He consciously sought to distance the sovereign behind a screen of increased pomp and ceremony, employed a network of

spies and informers to monitor the activities of his amirs, and destroyed a number of his former colleagues among the aristocracy. This stickler for etiquette would not even allow his private attendants to see him without his jacket (*yakta*).⁴⁶ Himself a parvenu, Balaban is said to have refused to promote men of low origins

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 67, 68, 113, 183, 360.

³⁹ Khwaja Taj al-Din Makrani: *ibid.*, 36. Khwaja Dhaki, a nephew of Balaban's wazir Basri: *ibid.*, 114. Qadi Sharaf al-Din *Barmas (?): *ibid.*, 168 (printed text has SRPA'YN, but cf. BL ms., fol. 90b).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 175. For Barani's age when writing, see *ibid.*, 573.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 199. ⁴² *Ibid.*, 20-1. ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 361.

⁴⁴ See, for instance, P. Hardy, *Historians of medieval India* (London, 1960), chap. 2; Harbans Mukhia, *Historians and historiography during the reign of Akbar* (New Delhi, 1976), 3-5, 10-11, 19-26; I. Habib, 'Baran's theory'.

⁴⁵ *TFS*, 30, 34-5. ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 33, 34-5, 40.

~ and constantly to have stressed the need to restrict the ranks of the aristocracy to those of noble birth. The impression of an intimate portrait that is all too seldom found in medieval chronicles is reinforced by a number of speeches reportedly made by the sultan in conversation with his maliks or his sons. We might feel ourselves to be holding the keys to a veritable treasure-house of Balaban's own policies and political theory, and this is reflected in modern historiography. Indeed, Balaban has been hailed as 'perhaps the only sultan of Delhi who is reported to have discussed at length his views about kingship'.⁴⁷ There are grounds, however, for approaching such reported speech with considerable reserve. Dr Peter Hardy has demonstrated that the views expressed in these sections are those of Barani himself and are to be found also, but more conspicuously, in his *Fatawa-yi Jahandari* (written some time in the 1350s), a handbook of advice for sultans set squarely in the Persian *Furstenspiegel* tradition.⁴⁸

The Ghiyathid era

The circumstances surrounding Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah's fate in 664/ 1266⁴⁹ are especially problematic. The earliest report that Balaban murdered Mahmud Shah occurs, in fact, in Wassaf's history of India; Ibn Battuta heard a similar story three or four decades later, and it is found also in 'Isami's *Futuh al-Salatn*.⁵⁰ On the other hand, Barani makes no reference to foul play, and Sirhindi expressly claims that Mahmud Shah died a natural death.⁵¹ It may well be, therefore, that Balaban has been unjustly maligned; although it must be said that none of these sources - whether or not it charges Balaban with regicide - tells us what became of the sons Mahmud Shah is known to have fathered. The prince whose birth to Balaban's daughter in 657/1259 is greeted in such effusive terms by Juzjani would surely have been regarded as the future sultan.⁵² It is possible that the na'ib

⁴⁷ Nizami, *Some aspects*, 280. For similar views, see Sir Wolseley Haig, in *The Cambridge history of India*, III, *Turks and Afghans* (Cambridge, 1928), 74-5; Habibullah, *Foundation*, 162-3, 179; Aziz Ahmad, *Political history*, 259-63, 267-71.

⁴⁸ P. Hardy, 'The *oratio recta* of Baran's *Ta'nkh-i Firuz Shahi* - fact or fiction?', *BSOAS* 20 (1957), 315-21.

⁴⁹ The date 11 Jumada I 664/18 February 1266 is given in *TMS*, 39, and supported by Mahmud Shah's coins, which go down to 664. But it should be noted that Sirhindi gives the duration of the reign as 19 years, 3 months and 16 days: this would place the sultan's death in 663/1265. In any event, the years 662 and 665 supplied respectively by *TFS*, 25, and by *FS*, 163, 164 (tr. 290, 291), are wrong.

⁵⁰ Wassaf, 310; *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Pers. text Taf. 22, Ar. text Taf. 57 (German tr. 48). *FS*, 163 (tr. 289-90). *IB*, III, 170, 174 (tr. Gibb, 632, 635).

⁵¹ *TMS*, 39. For two opposing views on Mahmud Shah's death, see Habibullah, *Foundation*, 161, who argues that murder is improbable, given Balaban's position and his previous relations with the sultan; and K. A. Nizami, 'Balaban the regicide', in his *Studies in medieval Indian history* (Aligarh, 1956), 48-62, and in *HN*, 274-5.

⁵² *TN*, I, 496 (tr. 714). As he is not named, we do not know which of the four sons listed at I. 475 (tr. 672), was Balaban's grandson. Raverty's insertion of 'the late' after each name is not justified on the evidence of the best mss.

~ was satisfied with the prospect of his grandson's succession but that the boy died in infancy, precipitating a crisis which was resolved by the elimination of Mahmud Shah and his issue by other unions. We can only speculate.

In contrast with Iltutmish, Balaban was blest with two able adult sons: Muhammad, who held Sind until his untimely death in battle with the Mongols in 683/1285 (and hence was known as *Khan-i Shahid*, 'the Martyr Prince'); and Mahmud, entitled Bughra Khan, who was appointed governor of Lakhnawti. But like his old master he lost a promising heir and was followed by a frivolous youth. On the old sultan's death in 685/1287, a party headed by the influential castellan (*kotwal*) of Delhi, Fakhr al-Din, who had been on bad terms with the 'Martyr Prince', ignored the claims both of Muhammad's son Kaykhusraw and of Bughra Khan in the east, and enthroned the latter's hedonistic son Kayqubad. Their opponents, such as the wazir Basri, suffered dismissal and exile.⁵³ Kaykhusraw was subsequently murdered; Bughra Khan, who assumed the style of Sultan Nasir al-Din and advanced westwards to challenge Kayqubad, was reconciled with his son at a meeting on the banks of the river Sarju (the episode commemorated in Khusraw's *Qiran al-Sa'dayn*). Accepting the fait accompli, he restricted his ambitions to Bengal, which remained an independent sultanate until 724/1324.

The young sultan, who moved his residence to Kilokhri, a few miles away, celebrated his freedom from the restraint of his grandfather's reign by giving himself up to pleasure and leaving the affairs of state to the powerful *dadbeq* (*arnir-i dad*) Nizam al-Din. An able but unscrupulous man, Nizam al-Din profited from Kayqubad's unconcern about the affairs of state to bring down the wazir and the great nobles of the previous reign, and then induced the sultan to sanction the murder of his cousin Kaykhusraw, who had made the elementary mistake of seeking Mongol assistance. Eventually Kayqubad tired of the *dadbeq* and had him poisoned.⁵⁴ Nizam al-Din's role is a difficult one to assess; it is noteworthy that Sirhindi's account mentions him only in passing and makes no allusion to his paramountcy. But for Barani the execution or exile of the chief men of Balaban's reign, followed by the sultan's illness and deposition in favour of his son Kayumarth, undermined the regime: there was rivalry among the maliks, with none strong enough to triumph. The Khalaj amir Jalal al-Din rallied his followers, seized control of Kayumarth and became na'ib; after a short interval he set aside the infant sultan and occupied the throne himself in Rabf II 689/April-May 1290. The helpless

⁵³ *TFS*, 122 (and cf. 107). *TMS*, 52. *FS*, 184-6, 196 (tr. 315-16, 328). An echo of Fakhr al-Din's role is found in the slightly garbled tale picked up by IB, III, 175-6 (tr. Gibb, 635-6), where he is referred to correctly as *malik al-umara* but also, in error, as na'ib.

⁵⁴ *TFS*, 170. The account in *FS*, 198-200 (tr. 330-2), where Nizam al-Din is made to drink poison he had prepared for Kayqubad, reads like the stuff of romance. For Kaykhusraw, see *ibid.*, 196-8 (tr. 328-30).

~ Kayqubad had not long survived his deposition, dying on 19 Muharram 689/1 February 1290. In Sirhindi's version, he simply perishes of starvation and neglect; according to another tradition, however, Kayqubad was murdered on Jalal al-Din's orders by an officer whose father he had executed. In the *Ta'nikh-i Firuz-Shahi* events move inexorably towards the overthrow of the Ghiyathids and the transfer of power to the Khaljis. Thus Bughra Khan, after the reconciliation, is said to have told his attendants that he would never see his son again and to have prophesied the imminent downfall of Balaban's dynasty.⁵⁵

Given these forebodings, the portrayal of Jalal al-Din Firuz Shah Khalji (689-95/1290-6) comes as

something of a surprise - indeed, an anti-climax. In Baram's view, kings had to balance the opposing qualities of benevolence and severity that are necessary if kingship is truly to be a lieutenancy (*khilafat, niyabai*) on behalf of God.⁵⁶ It is clear that, for him, Jalal al-Din did not embody this balance. This seasoned warrior, who prior to his accession had spent many years fighting the Mongols on the western frontiers of the Sultanate, is written off as a pious, mild and merciful ruler who shrank from conflict that would cost the lives of Muslim soldiers and was reluctant to shed the blood of his opponents; even *thags* ('thugs') captured in Delhi were shipped off down the Ganges towards Lakhnawi.⁵⁷ The sultan pardoned alike Balaban's nephew, Malik Chhajju, who rose in revolt against him in 689/1290, and a group of nobles who had engaged in a half-hearted plot against him slightly later.⁵⁸ In the speeches put into the conspirators' mouths by Barani, they are made to criticize Jalal al-Din as unworthy of the sovereignty; it is not unlikely that his clemency towards Chhajju's adherents outraged those who had severed their ties with the old dynasty. But Jalal al-Din reacted differently towards the dervish Sidi Muwallih, whose hospice (*khanaqah*) had become the centre of another aristocratic conspiracy and whose death at the sultan's instigation is seen by both Barani and Tsami as presaging the collapse of the regime.⁵⁹ If Jalal al-Din's downfall, however, was divine retribution for his treatment of a Muslim holy man, it came about more immediately because of his childlike trust in, and indulgence towards, his scheming nephew 'Ala' al-Din, who murdered him at a meeting on the banks of the Ganges on 16 Ramadan 695/18 July 1296 and seized the throne. Yet the old sultan was not altogether negligible. On Barani's own testimony, Jalal al-Din headed expeditions against the Hindu kingdoms of Rajasthan, and halted an

⁵⁵ *TFS*, 150, 156.

⁵⁶ For a summary of Barani's views, see Peter Hardy, 'Didactic historical writing in Indian Islam: Ziya al-Din Barani's treatment of the reign of Sultan Muhammad Tughluq (1324-1351)', in Yohanan Friedmann (ed.), *Islam in Asia, I, South Asia* (Jerusalem, 1984). 41-4.

⁵⁷ *TFS*, 186, 213; 189 for the *thags*, on whom see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 266-7.

⁵⁸ *TFS*, 190-2. *TMS*, 64-5. ⁵⁹ *TFS*, 208, 212. *FS*, 217 (tr. 382).

~ invasion by a Mongol prince who withdrew without a battle. Khusraw's *Miftah al-Futuh*, written only twelve months into the reign, reveals that even within that time Jalal al-Din also campaigned in the sub-Himalaya against both the Mongols and the Hindus, in addition to suppressing a major insurrection by adherents of the Ghiyathid dynasty. He conveys the impression of remarkable energy on the part of the sultan.

It is worth comparing Barani's view of Jalal al-Din with his perspective on Balaban. During the first few years of his reign, Balaban led an expedition to Lahore and the Salt Range (Kuh-i Jud) and engaged in campaigns against both the turbulent Meos (Mlwat) in the vicinity of the capital and the unsubdued infidels of Katehr, east of Bada'un. Thereafter, apart from his long march to Bengal to crush its rebellious governor, Toghril, he does not seem to have taken the field in person. It is noteworthy that the task of repelling the Mongols was left to his sons and other lieutenants. There are hints that such apparent sluggishness underlay the widespread desertions to Toghril not only in Bengal but even from Delhi following the early defeat of Balaban's generals.⁶⁰ Barani evidently sees it as his duty to explain Balaban's failure to prosecute the war against the infidel, and he does so by staging an exchange between the sultan and some of his fellow Shamsis. Urged to undertake plundering campaigns far afield in Hindu territory in the manner of Aybeg and Iltutmish, Balaban is made to justify his policy: caution was vital because the Mongols were now launching annual raids on India and it was no longer possible, as it had been in bygone days, to leave the capital and embark on distant enterprises.⁶¹ At first sight, this might appear to furnish a persuasive rationale for the sultan's relatively unadventurous policy after c. 1270; but whether we can in fact take it as a reflection of Balaban's own views is open to serious doubt (see below, p. 253). Thus the contrast between Balaban, the 'strong' ruler whose energies were somewhat muted, and Jalal al-Din, the weakling who was nevertheless strikingly active, presents us with something of a paradox.

Kingship, stability and hereditary succession

The period of sixty-two lunar years that separates the death of Iltutmish on 20 Sha'ban 633/29 April 1236 from the accession of 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad Shah Khalji in 695/1296 witnessed the reigns of ten sultans. Those of Iltutmish's immediate successors - Firuz Shah (633-4/1236), Radiyya (634-7/1236-40), Bahram Shah (637-9/1240-2) and Mas'ud Shah (639-44/ 1242-6) - were particularly ephemeral; Kayqubad (685-9/1287-90), the latter's son Kayumarth (689/1290), Jalal al-Din Khalji (689-95/1290-6) and his son Rukn al-Din Ibrahim (695/1296) each alike enjoyed authority

⁶⁰*TFS*, 83, 84. ⁶¹*Ibid.*, 50-1.

~ for only a brief period. The longest reign is that of Balaban himself (664-85/1266-87), closely followed by that of the last Shamsid, Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah (644-64/1246-66): when these are subtracted from the total, the average reign occupies less than three lunar years. Of the ten sovereigns, only Balaban is known with certainty to have died a natural death. His predecessor's fate is obscure (above, p. 52), but the others died violently, in all cases but one at the instigation, or at least following the accession, of the ruler who replaced them; the exception, Radiyya, at the hands of Hindus in the wake of a failed bid to oust her successor.

There does not appear to have been an accepted rule of succession, and the role played by designation was extremely limited: in fact, with the possible exception of the founder of the Sultanate (above, p. 46), no sultan prior to Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq Shah (d. 724/1324) was succeeded by his designated heir. As far as we can tell, none of the Shamsids was given the opportunity to nominate a successor: it is not even known whether Radiyya, Bahram Shah or Mas'tid Shah left any issue or whether Mahmud Shah was survived by any of his sons. Nor were Balaban's preparations for the succession attended by better fortune than those of his Shamsid predecessors, since Kayqubad, as we have seen, was not his heir. Kayqubad and his child were within a few years supplanted by Jalal al-Din, whose own sons were disinherited in 695/1296 by his nephew and murderer, 'Ala' al-Din.

For much of the thirteenth century, therefore, the history of the Sultanate hardly seems to be characterized by the essentials of stable government and might not suggest that the hereditary principle carried much weight. But if the succession failed to observe any logical pattern, it cannot be said, even so, that heredity was immaterial. On the contrary: connections both with the present and with past ruling dynasties seem to have been of some moment. The attempt by Iltutmish's ghulam 'Izz al-Din Balaban (later Kiishlu Khan) to have himself proclaimed sultan following Bahram Shah's overthrow in 639/1242 was thwarted by the prompt action of a group of his colleagues, who gathered solemnly at their master's tomb and ensured that the throne stayed within Iltutmish's family: 'Izz al-Din had to acquiesce, and the choice fell on 'Ala' al-Din Mas'ud Shah.⁶² It might well be asked how, if loyalty to Iltutmish's dynasty was so strong, Ulugh Khan Balaban was able to justify his displacement of Iltutmish's heirs. To this we can return no sure answer. What Balaban did in 664/1266 was essentially what 'Izz al-Din had attempted to do, but he had undoubtedly spent a longer time entrenching himself at the centre. There are grounds for believing that Balaban was married to a daughter of Iltutmish (below). He had, moreover, a claim which was denied to 'Izz al-Din. It was thought - or Juzjani, writing in 658/1260, Wanted it to be thought - that Balaban sprang from the ruling

⁶² *TN*, II, 36 (tr. 780).

~ line of khans of Iltutmish's own clan, the Olberli (p. 63 below).⁶³ This conceivably formed part of the propaganda deployed in Balaban's interest when the time came to supplant the Shamsids only a few years later.

Yet the legitimizing properties of Shamsid blood did not fade even under subsequent dynasties. Amir Khusraw makes Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad boast to his father of his descent not only from Sultan Balaban but from Iltutmish and from Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah (whose daughter was his mother).⁶⁴ The sultans were naturally unwilling to tolerate the forging of such links by others. One reason why Jalal al-Din Khalji reacted so harshly to the conspiracy to enthrone the dervish Sidi Muwallih may have been that the latter's supporters planned to marry him to a daughter of 'Sultan Nasir al-Din' (whether the Shamsid Mahmud Shah or the Ghiyathid Bughra Khan is not made clear).⁶⁵ And when, a few years later, during the

absence of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji on campaign at Ranthanbor (700/1301), a party in Delhi seized their opportunity to revolt and instal a dervish as sultan, Barani considers it worthy of notice that this cipher was Ilutmish's maternal grandson.⁶⁶ One of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's concerns when he forbade his maliks to form relationships (*qarabatha*) without his consent was surely to prevent them cementing unions with older royal lines.⁶⁷

What, at a juridical level, constituted a sultan's title to rule? Sources for the thirteenth century give some prominence to the inauguration of a new reign by a pledge of allegiance (*bay'at*).⁶⁸ This is first mentioned in 634/ 1236, when according to JuzjanI the Turkish amirs who abandoned Firuz Shah entered the capital and performed the *bay'at* to Radiyya. On her deposition in 637/1240 the maliks and amirs made a 'general act of allegiance' (*bay'at-i 'dmm*) to Bahrain Shah and to the newly created viceroy (na'ib) Aytegin in the royal quarter (*dawlatkhana*) in Delhi. Juzjani, whose phrasing suggests that he may himself have participated in the ceremony, says that it was attended by 'the maliks, amirs, 'ulama', sadrs and the leading figures both in the military and the capital (*akabir-i lashgar-u hadrat*). On the news that Lahore had fallen to the Mongols in 639/1241, Bahrain Shah took the precaution of having the *bay'at* repeated by 'the

⁶³ *Ibid.*, II, 43, 45, 47-8 (tr. 791, 796, 799-800), and Juzjani's verses in praise of Balaban, calling him 'khan of the Ilbari and king (*shah*) of the Yemek', at II, 220-1 (tr. 1295); cf. the information about Ilutmish's father at I, 441 (tr. 599). P. B. Golden, 'Cumanica II. The Olberli (Olperli): the fortunes and misfortunes of an Inner Asian nomadic clan', *AEMA* 6 (1986 [1988]), 27-8. On the Yemek or Kimek, a Turkish people who had presided over a loose confederacy of tribes in the Irtysh region until its disintegration in the eleventh century under pressure from the Qipchaq, see *Hudud al-Alam*, tr. Minorsky, 99-100 and notes at 304-10; P. Pelliot and L. Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan. Cheng-wou Ts'in-tcheng-lou* (Leiden, 1951, vol. I only), 95-6; Golden, 'The peoples of the south Russian steppe', in D. Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge history of early Inner Asia* (Cambridge, 1990), 277-80. Nizami (HN, 251-2 n.40) is (no doubt rightly) dismissive of the story of Balaban's royal ancestry.

⁶⁴ *QS*, 22, 118. HN, 307. ⁶⁵ *TFS*, 210-11. ⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 279.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 286. ⁶⁸ E. Tyan, 'Bay'a', *Enc.Isl*²

~ people of the city' (*khalq-i shahr*). The oath must therefore have been taken by the leading Muslim citizens of Delhi, who, as we shall see, were still being termed *khalq* ('the people' *par excellence*) by Barani, over a century later. This widening of the circle of persons from whom the pledge was required set a precedent for the following reign, for at the accession of 'Ala' al-Din Mas'ud Shah, the amirs, we are told, 'administered to the people a public act of homage' (*khalqra bay'at-i 'amm dadand*).⁶⁹

JuzjanI provides the fullest description of the *bay'at* in connection with the accession of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah in 644/1246, and shows that here were in fact two ceremonies, involving respectively the grandees and the citizens of Delhi:

The maliks, amirs, sadrs, grandees (*kubra'*), sayyids (*sadat*) and 'ulama' hastened to the exalted court and attained the kissing of the blessed hand of that emperor *shahanshah* ... Each, as befitted his status (*hal*), offered congratulations on his accession. And on Tuesday the 25th [of Muharram] he held a general audience in the ball of the Kushk-i Firuzi in the fort (*qasr*) of the Dawlatkhana; and they administered to all the people (*khalq*) a general oath of allegiance (*bay'at-i 'amm*) to recognize] the sovereignty and to obey the edicts of that... monarch.⁷⁰

Although we have less information about the *bay'at* given to Mahmud Shah's successors, it appears to have followed a similar pattern, for Ibn Battuta was told that the oath to Kayqubad was taken first of all by the Malik al-Umara' (the kotwal Fakhr al-Din), then by the amirs and principal officers, and the next morning by 'the rest of the people' (i.e. of Delhi).⁷¹ From Balaban's reign, at least, a new sultan was expected to order the release of prisoners, a practice still observed at the time of Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah's accession in 716/1316.⁷²

The extension of the *bay'at* reflects the growing importance of the leading Muslim citizens of old Delhi, who had played some part in the accession of Radiyya and who must have given Bahram Shah considerable support to enable him to withstand a siege in the capital for almost three months in 639/1242.⁷³ Nor did their capacity to influence events cease when Kayqubad transferred his residence to Kilokhri, a few miles closer to the Yamuna and referred to as 'the new town' (*shahr-i naw*) in 658/1260.⁷⁴ In 689/1290 their attachment to the Ghiyathid dynasty and hostility to the new regime would prevent Jalal al-Din Khalji from installing himself in Delhi

⁶⁹ *TN*, I, 456, 463, 466, 468, and II, 23 (tr. 636, 649, 656, 661, 750-1).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 477 (tr. 675-6 modified).

⁷¹ *IB*, III, 176-7 (tr. Gibb, 636). *TMS*, 39-40, 53. For the *bav'at* to Jalal al-Din at Kilokhri, see *TFS*, 181.

⁷² Amir Hasan Dihlawi, '*Ishq-Nama* (700/1301), tr. M. I. Borah, 'A short account of an unpublished romantic masnavi of Amir Hasan Dihlavi', *NIA* 2 (1939-40), 260. *TFS*, 339, 382. *FS*, 354 (tr. 551-2).

⁷³ *7W*, I, 456, 467 (tr. 635-6, 659). *IB*, III, 166-7 (tr. Gibb, 631). *HN*, 241-2.

⁷⁴ For Kilokhri, see *TN*, II, 83 (tr. 856-7); the earliest mention is at I, 456 (tr. 634, 636).

~for some time.⁷⁵ At times, too, they would fall foul of their sultan. Following an abortive revolt in 700/1301, 'Ala' al-Din Khalji conceived an aversion for the notables of Delhi. Many sadrs were banished, and the sultan would not enter the city but took up residence instead in the suburbs (*'imranat*); it may have been partly for this reason that he afterwards fortified Siri and made it his headquarters.⁷⁶ Later there are reports of antipathy between the people of Delhi and Muhammad b. Tughluq (p. 165 below).

The historians of the Delhi Sultanate still await as yet the techniques of literary analysis adopted by Marilyn Robinson Waldman in her monograph on the Ghaznawid chronicler Bayhaqi.⁷⁷ But it has been pointed out that they move on a different plane from those who now use their writings. They (and perhaps Barani in particular) sought to reflect an ideal temporal order, in which the world is governed jointly by pious scholars and pious sultans, and one in which change is intelligible in terms not of the human actions the historians themselves narrate, but of divine providence.⁷⁸ Certainly the verdicts of a Juzjani or a Barani may reveal as much about what was expected of a ruler as about real personalities. It was necessary to dispense justice to one's subjects and to supervise the affairs of state in person; to endow charitable Islamic foundations and to treat with respect the 'ulama' and other members of the religious class, virtues for which even the tyrannical Shah Terken is praised⁷⁹ and in which Bahrain Shah was notably deficient. Nor was mildness necessarily a virtue in a sultan. Rukn al-Din Firuz Shah's clemency and humanity (*hilm-u muruwwa*) attract favourable comment, but his reluctance to injure another human being is expressly presented as the cause of his downfall; and Mas'ud Shah's merciful treatment of his uncles, whom he released from confinement, ultimately provided the amirs with a serviceable alternative to his rule.⁸⁰ The monarch had to know when to act harshly and when to show mercy, thus avoiding the extremes of either Balaban or Jalal al-Din. A sultan's addiction to pleasure is frequently depicted as conducive to chaos, and an antipathy towards luxury, pomp and display, as evinced by Bahrain Shah, was

⁷⁵ *TFS*, 172, 173.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 283. *FS*, 277 (tr. 453), confirms his resentment. For 'Ala' al-Din and Siri, see Lai, *History of the Khaljis*, 326.

⁷⁷ M. W. Waldman, *Towards a theory of historical narrative: a case-study of Perso-Islamicate historiography* (Columbus, Ohio, 1980) (cf. also E. A. Poliakova, 'The development of a literary canon in medieval Persian chronicles', the triumph of etiquette', *Iranian Studies* 17 (1984), 237-56). But see Peter Hardy, 'Approaches to pre-modern Indo-Muslim historical writing: some reconsiderations in 1990-1', in Peter Robb (ed.), *Society and ideology. Essays in South Asian history presented to Professor K. A. Ballhatchet* (Oxford and Delhi, 1993), 49-71.

⁷⁸ Peter Hardy, 'The Muslim historians of the Delhi Sultanate: is what they say really what they mean?', *JASP* 9 (1964), part 1, 59-63; also his 'Force and violence', esp. 196-204.

⁷⁹ *TN*, I, 454 (tr. 630-1). ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 454, 457, 470 (tr. 630, 637, 664-5).

~ praiseworthy.⁸¹ So was generosity, provided that it was directed towards those who mattered (and not to lowborn favourites, as was the munificence of Firuz Shah, Mas'ud Shah and Kayqubad). We might also observe, perhaps, that it was vital to cherish the maliks and amirs, including those inherited from one's predecessor: the Shamsid era and the reign of Kayqubad both furnished cautionary tales about the fate of sultans who disregarded this last precept.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I, 462 (tr. 649).

~CHAPTER 4

Turks, Tajiks and Khalaj¹

Turks and military slavery

Tabaqa 22 of Juzjani's work comprises biographies of twenty-five Shamsi ghulams. Although the chronicler does not specify slave status in every case, his usage of the word 'Turk' suggests that for him it had come to denote simply a Turkish slave (see appendix I). Already, during Iltutmish's reign, a few of these amirs had been granted Turkish titles that included the element *khan* - not borne, it should be noted, by Ghuri or Tajik notables and thus representing an innovation.² But a significant proportion of the twenty-five attained high office only some time after their master's death. The future Sultan Balaban, as Juzjani's own patron and viceroy (na'ib) to the reigning monarch, receives the longest biography. The list of ghulams represented by the biographies is also, of course, far from exhaustive; both here and elsewhere in the *Tabaqat* other slaves of Ututmish, who are not accorded biographies of their own, are brought to our notice.

The pronounced slant of tabaqa 22 towards Turkish slave officers serves to obscure an important fact. At no point did Turkish ghulams enjoy the monopoly of rank and office that they seem to have exercised in Mamluk Egypt. One important difference was the opportunities for advancement available to the offspring of ghulams in the Delhi Sultanate. This was not the case in Egypt, where the sons of mamluks - the *awlad al-nas* - were deliberately excluded from the highest positions in the state.³ In India Turkish ghulams also had to share power with other, non-servile groups. These included not only free Turkish nobles, Khalaj, Ghuris, Tajiks and (from Balaban's reign) Mongols, but also other slave elements, both black

¹ This chapter is a greatly expanded version of my 'The *Mamluk* institution in early Muslim India', *JRAS* (1990), 340-58.

² I. Habib, 'Formation', 11 and n.62.

³ D. Ayalon, 'Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army - II', *BSOAS* 15 (1953), 456-8, repr. in his *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt (1250-1517)* (London, 1977); see also his 'Awlad al-nas', *Enc. Isl.*²

~African (*Habashi*, literally 'Abyssinian')⁴ and Indian. Although Juzjani mentions Hindu infantrymen, *palks*,⁵ as serving in Muslim campaigns, it is not until Balaban's reign that we read of them forming a royal guard; and they came to play a more prominent role only in the Khalji era. Afghan troops, lastly, were part of the military establishment of the thirteenth-century Sultanate, though appearing only fitfully in the sources.⁶

It is impossible to document the training of the Sultanate's Turkish slaves, as has been done for Mamluk Egypt, or to compose a survey of the slave contingents, of the kind that Professor Edmund Bosworth has produced for the Ghaznawids.⁷ As we might guess even without Juzjani's occasional

references, the accomplishments especially valued were equestrian skills and marksmanship.⁸ But other skills were not unknown, for Aybeg had received instruction from his first master in reciting the Qur'an and was accordingly known as *Qur'an-khwan*.⁹ The sources do not usually tell us at what point a slave was manumitted. JuzjanI alleges that on Mu'izz al-Din's death both Aybeg and Yildiz requested manumission from the new sultan of Ghur. According to the same author Ilutmish had even prior to this been freed by Aybeg on Mu'izz al-Din's express instructions, and Ibn Battuta later heard a story that he showed his deed of manumission to the jurists of Delhi when he became sultan.¹⁰ We learn from Barani alone that Balaban had been freed at some point prior to his accession.¹¹ Slaves of the reigning sultan bore the designation 'Sultani'.¹² Whether or not there was a recognizable *cursus honorum* is unclear.

The information we are given concerning the twenty-five Shamsi slaves reveals diverse ethnic and geographical origins. Only one was apparently an Indian - Hindu Khan, who may have ranked as the major-domo in overall charge of the sultan's ghulams, since JuzjanI says that he bore the style of *mihtar-i mubdrak* and that he stood in the relation of a father to his fellow-Shamsis.¹³ The Turkish ghulams included Rumis (presumably Greeks or Slavs from Byzantine territory)¹⁴ and 'Khita'Is' (Khitans from northern

⁴ C. F. Beckingham, 'Habash, Habasha, iii', *Enc.Is*².

⁵ Sir Henry Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson: a glossary of colloquial Anglo-Indian words and phrases*, new edn W. Crooke (London, 1903), 748-9, 'pyke, paik .

⁶ *TN*, II, 80 (tr. 852). *TS*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 52 (extracts tr. in Mirza, *Life and works*, 51-2). gS, 47. *TFS*, 58.

⁷ Hassanein Rabie, 'The training of the Mamluk Faris', in Parry and Yapp, *War, technology and society*, 153-63. C. E. Bosworth, 'Ghaznevid military organization', *Der Islam* 36 (1960), 40-50; also *idem*, *Ghaznavids*, 101-6.

⁸ *TN*, I, 416 (tr. 513), for Aybeg; I, 443 (tr. 604-5), on the exploits of Ilutmish in battle with the Khokhars; II, 27 (tr. 756), for *Kirit Khan.

⁹ *SA*, 21. ¹⁰ *TN*, I, 373, 444 (tr. 398, 605). *IB*, III, 164 (tr. Gibb, 629-30). ¹¹ *TFS*, 25, *azad shuda* (and *pace* Nizami, in *HN*, 281).

¹² *HN*, 224. Aziz Ahmad, 'The early Turkish nucleus in India', *Turcica* 9 (1977), 101, 102. wrongly assumes that the suffix denotes immigrants of free status.

¹³ *TN*, II, 18-19 (tr. 744-6). For the position of *mihtar-i saral* at the Ghaznawid court, see Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 104.

¹⁴ 'Izz al-Din Kablr Khan Ayaz (*ayaz*, 'clear', 'cloudless': Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no

~ China), whose ethnic background may or may not distinguish them from the Qarakhita'is (i.e. Qara-Khitans).¹⁵ Several of the Shamsis belonged to the Qipchaq, the group of tribes which occupied the steppes north of the Black Sea and the Caspian.¹⁶ And particular mention should be made, lastly, of those who belonged to Ilutmish's own people, the Olberli, a subgroup of the Qipchaq (or possibly of the Qangli, who were closely related to them): they included Baha' al-Din Balaban, the future sultan, known as Balaban-i Khwurd ('the Lesser').¹⁷

Although the Shamsis included a few former ghulams of other rulers,¹⁸ most were obtained direct from slave traders: Ibn Battuta heard much later that Ilutmish as sultan sent merchants to Samarqand, Bukhara and Tirmid to buy Turkish slaves on his behalf.¹⁹ The date of purchase ranged over a considerable period, beginning when Ilutmish was muqta^c of Baran.²⁰ The avenues varied by which Turkish youths destined for Egypt and Syria came into the hands of slave traders,²¹ and the same must be true of Muslim India. Ilutmish himself had allegedly been sold into slavery by his envious brothers, which enabled Juzjani to liken him to the Patriarch Yusuf (Qur'an, *sura* 12:7-20).²² Of Sayf al-Din Aybeg (later *dadbeg*), it is said

that he was- enslaved 'through the perversity of kindred'. Two others were

36), Badr al-Din Sonqur (*sonqur*, 'gerfalcon': *ibid.*, no. 22), and another Badr al-Din Sonqur who would later obtain the title Nusrat Khan: *TN*, II, 5, 24, 42 (tr. 724, 752, 787).

¹⁵ KhitaiIs: Sayf al-Din Aybeg, nicknamed *Yagbantut* ('seize elephant[s]'), and Sayf al-Din Ikit Khan Aybeg-i Khita'i, *ibid.*, II, 9, 28 (tr. 731, 757). Qarakhita'is: 'Izz al-Din Toghril toghan Khan (*toghan*, 'falcon': Sauvaget, no. 140), Ikhtiyar al-Din Aytegin Qaraqush Khan (*aytegin*, 'moon-prince': *ibid.*, no. 41; *qaraqush*, 'eagle': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 670) and another Ikhtiyar al-Din Aytegin (later the first ghulam to hold the office of na'ib): *TN*, II, 13, 19, 22 (tr. 736, 746, 749). For the title Ikit Khan, see below, p. 73, n.76.

¹⁶ Qamar al-Din Qiran Temiir Khan (*qiran*, 'one who slaughters': Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 182); Taj al-Din Sanjar (*sanjar*, 'one who pierces': *ibid.*, no. 107), nicknamed *qabaqulaq* ('of the protruding ears': see Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 580-1, 621, and Jackson, 'Mamluk institution', 342 n.7); Taj al-Din Sanjar *Kirit Khan; Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg Toghril Khan; 'Izz al-Din Balaban (later to be styled Kiishlti Khan); and Sayf al-Din Aybeg Shamsi-yi 'Ajami: *7W*, II, 17, 25, 27, 30, 36, 40 (tr. 742, 754, 756, 761, 775, 788-9).

¹⁷ To distinguish him from 'Izz al-Din Balaban (see preceding note, and below). The others were his brother Sayf al-Din Aybeg (later entitled Kishli Khan); and their cousin Nusrat al-Din Sanjar (Shir Khan): Raverty read Shir Khan's personal name as Sonqur, but BL ms., fol. 211a, and IOL ms., fol. 291b, read SNJR. For the ascription of Iltutmish and these ghumams to the Olberli ('LBRY in Hablbi's edition), see *TN*, I, 440, 441, and II, 43, 45, 47 (tr. 598, 599, 791, 796, 800); also Golden, 'Cumanica II. The Olberli'. On the Qipchaq-Qangli relationship, see Pelliot and Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes*, 95-116; *Hudud al- Alam*, tr. Minorsky, 304-10; C. E. Bosworth, 'Kanghli', *Enc.hr.*

¹⁸ 'Izz al-Din Kablr Khan Ayaz, bought from the family of Yildiz's *amir-i shikar*, Nasr al-Din Aytemur al-Baha'i, so called because he had belonged to Baha' al-Din Toghril; and Nusrat al-Din *Taisi, the one-time slave of Mu'izz al-Din himself: *TN*, II, 5, 7, 10 (tr. 724-5, 727, 732). The meaning of Taisi's name, given consistently as TAYSY in BL ms. (fols. 182b, 199b, 200b, 202a, 218a), is unknown.

¹⁹ IB, III, 171 (tr. Gibb, 633). ²⁰ *TN*, II, 4 (tr. 723).

²¹ D. Ayalon, 'Mamluk', *Enc.Isr*², VI, 314.

²² *TN*, I, 441 (tr. 599-600); and cf. the remarks about Yusuf (Joseph) at I, 439 (tr. 596-7).

~ rumoured to be of Muslim parentage and thus unlawfully enslaved.²³ Kishli Khan is said to have been enslaved when young, having fallen into Mongol hands.²⁴ From the 1220s the westward advance of the Mongols gave rise to a sharp increase in the supply of Turkish slaves, particularly from the Caspian and Pontic steppes. Unscrupulous rulers seized on those who sought asylum with them, like the Turkish chieftain in the Crimea who in 640/1242-3 sold the future Mamluk Sultan Baybars into slavery;²⁵ desperate fugitives exchanged their own offspring for the necessities of life; and the conquerors themselves converted human booty into more liquid assets by unloading their able-bodied captives onto the market. Iltutmish may also have profited from internal convulsions among the stricken Olberli.²⁶

The attractions of an elite corps of military slaves who possessed no local ties and whose sole loyalty was to the master who had bought, nurtured and trained (and sometimes manumitted) them are obvious. A number of authors, including the *litterateurs* Jahiz in the ninth century and Ibn Hassul in the eleventh, and the Seljukid wazir Nizam al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), had sung the praises of Turkish ghumams.²⁷ At the beginning of the thirteenth century Fakhr-i Mudabbir (admittedly writing for a monarch who was himself a ghulam) was the latest in a long line of authors to do so. There is no kind of infidel people, he says,

which is brought over to Islam and does not look with longing at home, mother, father, and kindred: for a

time they are bound to adopt Islam, but in most cases they apostatize and relapse into paganism. The exception is the Turkish race, who, when they are brought over to Islam, fix their hearts in Islam so firmly that they no longer remember home or region or kinsfolk ... The Turk is like a pearl that lies in the oyster in the sea. For as long as it is in its habitat, it is devoid of power and worth;

²³ Sayf al-Din: phrase omitted in Habibi's edition, *ibid.*, II, 41, but cf. BL ms., fol. 211a, *ba- inad-i aqriba* (also Raverty's tr., 790). Muslim parentage: *TN*, II, 24, 33-4 (tr. 752, 766).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 45 (tr. 796).

²⁵ Peter Thorau, *The lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the thirteenth century*, tr. P. M. Holt (London, 1992), 28. Al-Yunini, *al-Dhayl 'ala Mir'ati'l-Zaman* (Hyderabad, AP, 1374-81/1954-61, 4 vols.), III, 240.

²⁶ *TN*, II, 45 (tr. 796), Golden, 'Cumanica II. The Olberli', 28; and Thomas T. Allsen, 'Prelude to the Western campaigns: Mongol military operations in the Volga-Ural region, 1217-1237', *AEMA* 3 (1983), 5-24 (esp. 16).

²⁷ C. T. Harley Walker, 'Jahiz of Basra to al-Fath ibn Khaqan on the "Exploits of the Turks and the army of the Khalifate in general"', *JRAS* (1915), 631-97 (esp. 662 ff., 682, 685). Ibn Hassul, *Risala*, ed. Abbas Azzawi and tr. serefeddin Yaltkaya, 'Ibni Hassul'un Turkler hakkinda bir eseri', *Bellesten* 4 (1940), Ar. text 40-3, Tu. tr. 259-61 (I owe this reference to the kindness of Dr Carole Hillenbrand). Extracts from this last passage are translated in D. Ayalon, 'The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's military might at the crossroads', *JRAS*, 3rd series, 6 (1996), 314-15. See further *ibid.*, 316-19; and for further references, *idem.* 'Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon, I. The importance of the Mamluk institution', *Der Islam* 53 (1976), 212-16, repr. in his *Mamluk military society*; Andre Wink, 'India and Central Asia: the coming of the Turks in the eleventh century', in A. W. Van den Hoek *et al.* (eds.), *Ritual, state and history in South Asia. Essays in honour of J. C. Heesterman* (Leiden, 1992), 764-5.

~ but when it emerges from the oyster and from the sea, it acquires value and becomes precious, decorating the crown of kings and adorning the neck and ears of brides.²⁸

This is not to say, however, that contemporaries were oblivious of the Turk's limitations. In one of 'Awfi's anecdotes Ilutmish deliberately chooses a Tajik to investigate an officer's financial interests, a delicate task for which, we are told, the 'impetuosity' (*tahawwur*) of a Turk would have disqualified him.²⁹ And it is a moot question how deeply Islam was ingrained in these first-generation converts. If Turkish slaves may have enjoyed the benefits of being reared as orthodox Muslims, their origins lay, nevertheless, in the pagan steppelands of Central and Western Asia. This is not the place to examine the question of pagan survivals within Muslim Turkish societies.³⁰ But Radiyya's enthronement may be symptomatic. Although the accession of a female monarch (as opposed to a regent) was without precedent in the Islamic world, the list of Qara-Khitans in the twelfth century furnishes two examples. Some of Ilutmish's ghulams belonged, as we saw, to the Khitan or the Qara-Khitans, and in general women in the eastern steppe enjoyed greater freedom.³¹ It may well be that in raising up their master's daughter Turkish officers were strongly influenced by their pagan background.

The problem of the Chihilganis

Although Barani's *Ta'nikh-i Firuz-Shahi* opens with Sultan Balaban's accession, he prefaces his account of the reign with some remarks about Balaban's predecessors. They are very brief, but they do at least endeavour to make sense of the Shamsid era. In Ilutmish's time, he says,

illustrious maliks and amirs ... and many wazirs and notables (*ma'arif*) came to the court of Sultan Shams al-Din [Ilutmish] from fear of the slaughter and terror of the accursed Mongol Chingiz Khan ... But after the death of Sultan Shams al-Din his Turkish *chihilgani* slaves grew powerful. The sons of Sultan Shams al-Din ... were unable to fulfil the duties of kingship ... and as a consequence of the ascendancy of the Turkish Shamsi slaves all those great men of high birth ... were destroyed on every pretext during the reigns

of Sultan Shams al-Din's sons, who had no notion of the world or about rulership. And following the elimination of those grandees and commanders, the Shamsi slaves rose and became khans. Every one of them attained

²⁸ SA, 35-7. ²⁹ JH, BL ms. Or. 2676, fol. 263b.

³⁰ J. P. Roux, 'Recherche des survivances pre-islamiques dans les textes turcs musulmans: le *Babar-Name*', JA 256 (1968), 247-61, and 'Recherche des survivances pre-islamiques dans les textes turcs musulmans: le *Kitab-i Dede Qorqut*', JA 264 (1976), 35-55.

³¹ The point is made by Habibullah, 'Sultanah Raziah [*sic*]', IHQ 16 (1940), 752, though his other examples comprise female regents. See further my 'Sultan Radiyya bint Iltutmish', in Gavin R. G. Hambly (ed.), *Women in the medieval Islamic world: power, patronage, piety* (New York, 1998), 181-97. On the Qara-Khitan, see Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, *History of Chinese society: Liao 907-1125* (Philadelphia, 1949), 643, 644, 646; also the remarks about the Liao rulers of China *ibid.*, 199-202. Juzjani was aware of only one female Qara-Khitan monarch: 7W, II, 95-6 (tr. 911).

~ new riches, palaces, pomp and magnificence ... Because the Shamsi slaves were of one master (*khwajatash buda*), and all forty became great at one time, one did not bow before another or obey him, and they demanded equality in iqta's, troops, high rank and honour ... As a result of the inexperience of Iltutmish's sons and the supremacy of the Shamsi slaves, the monarchy had forfeited all majesty.³²

Who were the Chihilganls? This question was investigated in a stimulating article by Professor Gavin Hambly, who reached no definite conclusion as to the origin or meaning of a term not used by Juzjani or, in fact, in any Indian source other than Barani's work.³³ It is true that at one point above Barani employs instead the term 'forty' (*chihil*), which led the sixteenth-century compilers Harawl and Firishta to assume that Iltutmish had forty slaves: this in turn induced modern historians to speak of a 'college' of forty.³⁴ Yet the concept is of dubious value. On every other occasion Barani has recourse to the distributive numeral, which strongly suggests that the Chihiganis were so termed because each commanded a corps of forty ghulams. It is worth noting that in contemporary Egypt there were amirs commanding units of forty royal mamluks; we should perhaps conclude that the Chihilganls formed a parallel group of commanders within the ranks of Iltutmish's Shamsi slaves.³⁵ As Hambly observes, Barani ascribes only three amirs by name to the ranks of the Chihilganls;³⁶ it is worth noting that they are all relatively junior ghulams of Iltutmish.

The rise of the Shamsi ghulams

The bloody conflict outlined by Barani is nowhere mentioned explicitly by Juzjani, writing when the hegemony of the Shamsi ghulams was at its zenith; but its onset is clearly visible in his account of the turbulent era of Iltutmish's heirs. In all likelihood Firuz Shah, who according to 'Isami failed to accord his father's Turkish slaves sufficient attention,³⁷ relied excessively upon a number of Tajik bureaucrats whom the Turkish slaves

³² TFS, 27-8; for a fuller translation of the passage, see I. Habib, 'Formation', 15-16. There is a brief reference to this phase of the Sultanate's history at TFS, 550.

³³ Gavin R. G. Hambly, 'Who were the Chihilganls, the forty slaves of Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish of Delhi?', *Iran* 10 (1972), 57-62. For an alternative view, see Khurram Qadir, 'The amiran-i-chihalgan of northern India', *JCA* 4, no. 2 (1981), 59-146.

³⁴ Nizam al-Din Ahmad Harawi, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, ed. B. De (Calcutta, 1931-5, 3 vols.), I, 78 (tr. 93), and Firishta, I, 130. Both were possibly influenced by 'Isami's story that Iltutmish was offered forty slaves and bought them all except Balaban, the future sultan: FS, 122 (tr. 238). For the 'college', see Haig in *Cambridge history of India*, III, 61-2; Habibullah, *Foundation*, 346; Nizami, *Some aspects*, 111 n.7, and in HN, 232-4. I. Habib, 'Formation'. 16, takes 'forty' in a less literal sense.

³⁵ Ayalon, 'Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army - II', 469-70.

³⁶ Ulugh Khan Balaban, his cousin Shir Khan, and Temiir Khan (later muqta' of Samana and Sunnam after Shir Khan's death: below, p. 77): *TFS*, 25, 65; Hambly, 'Who were the ChihilganI?', 61.

³⁷ *FS*, 130 (tr. 248, but n.l. *ibid*, is misleading, since it cites as examples nobles who were not slaves).

~ massacred at Tara'in in the course of the sultan's campaign against the rebel Kabir Khan and his allies. Radiyya, by contrast, was vigorously supported by her father's Turkish ghulams (*umara-yi turk ki bandagan-i Shamsi budand*).³⁸ But she soon began to construct a power-base of her own. When the Turk Sayf al-Din Aybeg-i *Tutuq, whom she had appointed as her deputy in command of the army (*na'ib-i lashgar*) with the style of Qutlugh Khan, died in 635/1237, his office passed not to a Turk but to the Ghuri amir Qutb al-Din Hasan b. 'AlI.³⁹ She was deposed because in promoting an African (Habashi) slave, Jamal al-Din Yaqut, to the rank of intendant of the stable (*amir-i akhiir*) she had alienated the 'Turkish maliks and amirs who were Ilutmish's slaves' and in particular the *amir-hajib*, Ikhtiyar al-Din Aytegin.⁴⁰ A rising by Kabir Khan at Lahore in 636/1239 failed, but in the next year Aytegin and his ally *Altunapa, the governor of Tabarhindh, contrived a mutiny while the sultan was on campaign, and Yaqut was executed; Radiyya was incarcerated at Tabarhindh under the supervision of * Altunapa.⁴¹

With the enthronement of Mu'izz al-Din Bahram Shah (637-9/1240-2), the Turkish amirs took further steps to concentrate power in their own hands, with the formal institution of the office of na'ib (viceroy), which was conferred on the *amir-hajib* Aytegin; it is significant that their oath of allegiance (*bay'at*) to the new sovereign was conditional upon Aytegin's appointment.⁴² But when Aytegin usurped certain imperial prerogatives, Bahram Shah grew resentful of his tutelage and had him murdered in Muharram 638/July 1240; the office of na'ib lapsed.⁴³ For a short time the direction of affairs was in the hands of another Shamsi, the new *amir-hajib* Badr al-Din Sonqur-i Rumi. Sonqur rendered the sultan valuable service in the campaign against * Altunapa, who had reacted to the elimination of his ally Aytegin by marrying Radiyya and marching on Delhi to restore her to the throne.⁴⁴ The principal role, however, was passing to Junaydi's successor as wazir, Nizam al-Mulk Muhadhdhab al-Din, who fell out with Sonqur and poisoned the sultan's mind against him. When Sonqur hatched

³⁸ *TN*, II, 36 (tr. 779); at I, 458 (tr. 640), they are called simply *umara-yi turk*.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 459 (tr. 641-2). Sayf al-Din's sobriquet, given as BHTW in Habibi's text and as 'Bihag' by Raverty, appears as TTQ in BL ms., fols. 182b, 183a. This looks like the Tu. title *tutuqltotaq*, on which see Denis Sinor, 'The Turkish title *tutuq* rehabilitated', in *Turcica et Orientalia. Studies in honor of Gunnar Jarring* (Istanbul, 1988), 145-8; alternatively it could be a nickname, *tutuq*, 'tongue-tied' (Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 453), or 'lip' (Sau-vaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 124). For his epitaph, from Abuhar, see *ARIE* (1970-1), 18-19, 119 (no. 4).

⁴⁰ HN, 240, 243. *TN*, II, 21, 22-3 (tr. 748, 750); BL ms., fol. 183a, gives Yaqut the title 'chief amir' (*amir al-umara*"), a phrase omitted in the printed text of *TN* (I, 460).

⁴¹ See generally Habibullah, *Foundation*, 119-21. *Altunapa's name is spelled 'LTWNYH' in the printed text (Raverty's 'AltQnlah'), but I suspect that *ya* is an error for *pa* or *ba* and that we have here Tu. *altun*, 'golden', + *abalapa*, 'ancestor', or *oba*, 'clan', 'tribe', found among the Qipchaq/Polovtsy: *Pol'noe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, I. *Lavrent'evskaia letopis'*, 2nd edn (Leningrad, 1926-8), col. 278; Clauson, 5-6, 131.

⁴² *TN*, I, 463 (tr. 649). ⁴³ Habibullah, *Foundation*, 121-2. ^M *TN*, II, 24 (tr. 753).

~ a conspiracy to replace Bahram Shah with one of his brothers, the wazir reported it and Sonqur was banished from court to his iqta of Bada'un in Safar 639/August 1241. Returning without permission three months later, he was imprisoned and put to death.⁴⁵

Bahram Shah in turn was overthrown in 639/1242 when, under the influence of one of his courtiers, Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah Farrukhi, he contemplated the wholesale removal of the Turkish slave officers.⁴⁶ In Jumada I 640/October 1242 the Turkish commanders attacked and killed the wazir

Muhaddhab al-Din, who had played them off against Bahram Shah and who now sought to concentrate power in his own hands and to exclude the Turkish amirs from all state business; he seems to have been the last wazir with military inclinations for almost a century. The fact that the ringleaders were not punished but were in fact rewarded suggests that the new sultan, Mas'ud Shah, was behind them.⁴⁷ Like his two predecessors, however, Mas'ud Shah tried to cut the Turkish amirs down to size. Although Juzjani does not define the 'nobodies' (*nakasan*) who had wielded influence at court during the final months of his regime, a later account suggests that he relied on black African slaves.⁴⁸

Thus far, then, Juzjani and other authors do provide corroborating evidence for Barani's analysis. There are grounds, nevertheless, for regarding that analysis as deficient in two respects. At no time, firstly, did a party comprising Turkish ghulams exclude free elements, whether Turks or not. Opposition to Rukn al-Din Firuz Shah (and then initially to Radiyya) brought together the Turkish ghulam Kabir Khan, the free Turkish noble 'Ala' al-Din Jam, the Ghurl amir Salari, and the presumably Tajik Junaydi.⁴⁹ Several Tajik officials were implicated in Badr al-Din Sonqur's plot to remove Bahram Shah: among them were the chief qadi, Jalal al-Din Kasani, who was deposed and banished from Delhi, and the accountant-general (*mushrif-i mamalik*) Taj al-Din Musawi, who was executed with Sonqur in 639/1241.⁵⁰ Prior to his execution, Sonqur vainly sought the protection of the Ghurl amir Qutb al-Din Hasan.⁵¹ Juzjani assures us that Ghurl and Tajik as well as Turkish maliks were affronted at the position of Yaquf in Radiyya's counsels; and of Bahram Shah we learn, again, that he

⁴⁵ Habibullah, *Foundation*, 122-3.

⁴⁶ *TN*, I, 466-7, and II, 20, 30 (tr. 658-9, 747, 761-2).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 469, and II, 27, 42 (tr. 662, 757, 787). Taj al-Din Sanjar *Kirit Khan was promoted to the rank of intendant of the imperial elephants (*shihna-yi pit*) and subsequently to that of *sar-i jandar*, while Badr al-Din Sonqur Sufi-yi Rumi (the future Nusrat Khan, not to be confused with his namesake above) took over the dead wazir's territory of Kol.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 471 (tr. 668-9). *FS*, 144. *TMS*, 34.

⁴⁹ *TN*, I, 455-6, 458 (tr. 633-4, 639). It is noteworthy that Kabir Khan and Jam had suffered a lapse from favour during Ilutmish's latter years and that Salari, who had served the late sultan as *amlr-hajib*, is *not so* described under the new reign. Jan! and Kabir Khan: *ibid.*, II, 6, 9 (tr. 726, 731-2). Salari: Habib, 'Formation', 13; also *JH*, I, 12.

⁵⁰ *TN*, I, 464-5 (tr. 652-3, 654). ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, II, 25 (tr. 753).

~aroused the fears of Ghtiri as well as Turkish amirs.⁵² The rejection of 'Izz al-Din Balaban and the choice of Mas'ud Shah similarly demonstrate an alliance of different elements. The notion of the sovereignty passing to one of Ilutmish's Turkish ghulams perhaps found little favour with the Ghuris, while the other Shamsis for their part were unwilling to jettison the family of their old master. It has been rightly pointed out that the structure of power that emerged in 639/1242 bears the marks of a compromise among the various groups within the elite.⁵³ The office of na'ib was revived and conferred on Qutb al-Din Hasan; a senior Shamsi, Qaraqush Khan, was made *amir-hajib*; and Taj al-Din Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq, one of the three amirs said to have checked Tzz al-Din Balaban's pretensions, received the iqta^c of Bada'un.⁵⁴ Collaboration between Turk and non-Turk was evidently not beyond the bounds of possibility. It appears, however, that what made the internal crisis in the Sultanate so protracted, and so dangerous, was a split among the Shamsis themselves.

The second defect of Barani's analysis is that it treats the Shamsis as a monolithic group. Historians of the parallel Mamluk military slave institution in Egypt and the Near East are accustomed to speaking of *khushda-shiyya*, the sense of comradeship and unity of interest that bound together the slaves of the same master. Such sentiments, however, often failed to outlive the master himself, and to pay too much attention to *khushdashiyya* is to court the risk of over-simplification.⁵⁵ It is surely possible - though the sources do not reveal it - that individuals among Ilutmish's elite corps of ghulams were conscious of

closer links with colleagues from the same tribal background. What is still more likely is that there was initially a stronger sense of solidarity among the junior ghulams, who would have been a distinct group with interests of their own.

We should note how many of the Turkish slaves who were instrumental in Firuz Shah's downfall and Radiyya's accession seem to have been junior ghulams still employed in the imperial household. A group described by Juzjani as 'the Turks of the court' (or 'the capital') had manifested their disenchantment with Firuz Shah at an early stage by leaving Delhi for 'Hindustan', conceivably in order to join his brother in Awadh. But they were intercepted; among them was Balaban 'the Lesser', who suffered a brief spell of imprisonment.⁵⁶ It was 'the Turkish amirs and personal slaves who were serving in the centre' (*umara-yi turk-u bandagan-i khass ki dar khidmat-i qalb budand*) who had mutinied at Tara'in; and these same officers, called now 'the centre [consisting] of Turkish amirs' (*qalb-i umard-*

⁵² *Ibid.*, II, 22-3, 164 (tr. 750, 1133). ⁵³ Habibullah, *Foundation*, 24.

⁵⁴ *TN*, I, 468 (tr. 661-2); cf. also II, 20, 26, 36-7 (tr. 747, 755, 780).

⁵⁵ D. Ayalon, 'L'esclavage du mamelouk', *IONS* 1 (1951), 29-31, 34-7, repr. in his *Mamluk military society*; cf. also the remarks of Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the middle ages: the early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382* (London and Sydney, 1986), 65, 88-90.

⁵⁶ *TN*, II, 48-9, 51 (tr. 802, 805).

~ *yi turk*), who deserted Firuz Shah at Kilokhri and recognized Radiyya.⁵⁷ In all probability Iltutmish had purchased many of them at a relatively recent date. 'Izz al-Din Balaban (Kiishlu Khan), for example, one of the two men named as the ringleaders at Tara'in, had been acquired during the siege of Mandor (i.e. in 624/1227); by the time of Iltutmish's death he had become muqta of Baran.⁵⁸ But the *emeute* surely involved many others who now received important offices at court or their first iqta's as a reward for bringing Radiyya to the throne. *Altunapa, to whom she transferred Baran, had been Iltutmish's chief canopy-bearer (*sar-i chatrdar*).⁵⁹ Baha' al-Din Balaban 'the Lesser', purchased by Iltutmish only in 630/1232-3, was at his master's death merely a falconer (*khasadar*); Radiyya promoted him to *amir-i shikar*.⁶⁰ Of his brother Sayf al-Din Aybeg (the future Kishli Khan), purchased in the course of an embassy from Iltutmish to Egypt and Baghdad which can be reliably dated to 629/1231-2, we are told that until Radiyya's accession he had simply served in the sultan's private household (*khidmat-i dargah-i khass mikard*); but he now became deputy commander of the guard (*nd'ib-i sar-i jdndar*). Taj al-Din Sanjar (later Arslan Khan), obtained from the same source and probably around the same time, was like Balaban a falconer; but Radiyya made him cupbearer (*chashnigir*) and subsequently allotted him the iqta' of Balaram.⁶¹ The status and aspirations of such ghulams would have set them not only against outsiders - including free Turkish grandees - but even, on occasions, against Iltutmish's more senior slaves like Kabir Khan, who had long ago attained high rank in the state apparatus and received an iqta'. The history of Iltutmish's successors is in large measure the story of the rise of his junior slaves to positions of power and of the tensions among them that threatened to tear the infant Delhi state asunder.

Balaban and his rivals

Balaban 'the Lesser', who under Bahrain Shah had been promoted from *amir-i shikar* to *amir-i akhur*, had distinguished himself in the siege of Delhi in 639/1242, for which he received the iqta' of Hansi. Since he is known to have enjoyed the patronage of the late *amlr-hdjib* Badr al-Din Sonqur, who

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 456 (tr. 634-5, 636).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 36 (tr. 777-9 garbled). *Kushlu[k]* means 'strong', 'powerful': *TMENP*, III, 639 (no. 1676).

⁵⁹ *TN*, II, 21 (tr. 748).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 48, 51 (tr. 802, 806); for the date of purchase, II, 48 (tr. 801). The meaning of *khdsadar* was

established by Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 67-8.

⁶¹ Kishli Khan: *TN*, II, 45, 46 (tr. 796-8). Arslan Khan: *ibid*, II, 33, 34 (tr. 766 and n. 3, 767); for *arslan*, 'lion', see Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 4. Embassy from Delhi to Egypt in 629/1231-2: Ibn al-Dawadari, VII, 305. *Kishli*, which may mean 'humanity' (Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 754), is found in the title of a Khwarazmian amir earlier in the century: *TJG*, I, 80 (tr. 103, mistakenly equating it with *kiishlu*).

~had secured for him his first iqta' at Rewari, he doubtless participated in the revolt against Bahrain Shah from a desire to avenge his old friend. The same circumstance may have led him to share also in the attack on Sonqur's enemy Muhadhdhab al-Din, since Juzjani's phrasing suggests a link between the wazir's death and Balaban's promotion to *amur-hajib*.⁶² This was at the expense of Qaraqush Khan, who was dismissed to his iqta' of Bhayana. It is difficult to know what to make of his subsequent transfer from Bhayana to Kara or the bald statement at the end of his biography that in 644/1246, following the overthrow of Mas'ud Shah, he was killed in that region.⁶³ All this might indicate that he was a rival of Balaban, who had possibly engineered his demotion; but we cannot be sure. At any rate, Balaban was almost certainly instrumental in Mas'ud Shah's removal and the enthronement of Mahmud Shah (644-64/1246-66), events related by Juzjani in highly anodyne terms.

In 647/1249 Balaban became na'ib and was granted the style of Ulugh Khan, and the sultan married his daughter. His allies among the nobility were also favoured. The new viceroy transmitted his office of *amir-hdjib* to his brother Sayf al-Din Aybeg, now styled Kishli Khan, and a number of other supporters were promoted: the Shamsi Taj al-Din *Teniz Khan, who is invariably described as a faithful henchman of Balaban, became deputy *amir-hajib*; Balaban's own slave, Ikhtiyar al-Din Aytegin-i *mui-yi daraz* ('the long-haired'), hitherto deputy to the *amir-i akhur*, moved up to succeed Kishli Khan in that office.⁶⁴ The wazir Sadr al-Mulk Najm al-Din Abu Bakr, who had succeeded Muhadhdhab al-Din around the time of Balaban's own appointment as *amir-hdjib*, appears to have been another ally.⁶⁵

From about this juncture we begin to discern the dim outline of an opposition group, also led by Shamsis. Already, we are told, Balaban's promotion to the dignity of *amir-hajib* had been resented by other maliks.⁶⁶ The new na'ib and his allies proceeded to make a concerted attack on 'Izz al-Din Balaban, who in 639/1242 had been consoled with the style of Kushlii Khan and an extensive but distant iqta' of Nagawr and had since 643/1246 held the additional grant of Multan. Dissatisfied with this, he obtained from Mahmud Shah Uchch as well, on condition that he relinquish Nagawr; but he failed to honour his part of the bargain. Multan, which Kiishlii Khan lost to Hasan Qarluq's forces, was subsequently occupied by Ulugh Khan Balaban's cousin Shir Khan, from whom Kushlu

⁶² *TN*, I, 469, and II, 51-2 (tr. 663-4, 806-7); but cf. II, 53 (tr. 809), where Balaban's appointment alone is mentioned and is dated in 642/1244-5.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, II, 20 (tr. 747).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 59-60 (tr. 820-1); cf. also II, 29, 46 (tr. 759, 798). *Teniz Khan's title figures in Habibi's text as TR; Raverty reads 'Tiz', and in BL ms., fol. 206, while there is no dot above the middle 'tooth', the final letter is clearly z. For Tu. *tenizldeniz*, 'sea', 'ocean', see Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 527; *TMENP*, III, 205-7 (no. 1192). That Aytegin-i Mui-yi Daraz was Balaban's slave we know from *TFS*, 83.

⁶⁵ *TN*, I, 469 (tr. 663-4). Habibullah, *Foundation*, 126. ⁶⁶ *TN*, II, 52 (tr. 807).

~ Khan vainly endeavoured to take it. After a campaign headed by Ulugh Khan and the sultan ousted him from Nagawr, which was conferred on the na'ib's brother Kishli Khan, Kushlu Khan retired to Uchch, where he was taken prisoner by Shir Khan and released only after ordering the garrison to surrender. Kushlu Khan, who had thus been deprived of all his iqta's in favour of the viceroy's supporters and kinsmen, was compensated with Bada'un early in 649/1251.⁶⁷

Kushlu Khan had his revenge during a campaign to the north-west in 650-1/1252-3, when Ulugh Khan

Balaban was dismissed first to Hansi and then, deprived of Hansi in favour of an infant son of the sultan, to Nagawr. He was replaced as na'ib by Qutb al-Din Hasan, and in a general reshuffle of appointments his friends and family were demoted. Kishli Khan, *Teniz Khan and the wazir Sadr al-Mulk were all removed from office; Juzjani for the second time forfeited his post of chief qadi; and Shir Khan, whose extensive iqta's comprised Uchch, Multan and Tabarhindh, was dislodged by the sultan's forces and retired into Mongol territory. Kushlu Khan and his allies, who included the shadowy Qutlugh Khan and the Indian 'Imad al-Din Rayhan, shared out offices and iqta's among themselves: Rayhan became *wakil-i dar*, and Kushlu Khan recovered his old iqta's in Sind.⁶⁸

Juzjani tells us frustratingly little about Ulugh Khan Balaban's enemies. Although he devotes a fair-sized biography to Kushlu Khan, no such compliment is paid to Qutlugh Khan, who was sufficiently important to marry the sultan's mother.⁶⁹ To label the opposition to Balaban as an 'anti-Turkish' faction⁷⁰ is to be misled by Juzjani's polemic contrasting 'Turks' and 'Hindus'. By his own admission they included Kushlu Khan and Qutlugh Khan as well as lesser figures like the latter's son-in-law 'Izz al-Din Balaban-i Yyizbegi; and he specifically mentions Turks who were allied with Rayhan out of hostility to Ulugh Khan.⁷¹ Juzjani writes bitingly of Rayhan

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 37-8 (tr. 780-4); see also I, 484-5, and II, 44, 46, 61-2 (tr. 689-90, 792, 798, 822-3).

⁶⁸ Shir Khan: *ibid.*, I, 487 (but reading *az masdff-i kunar-i db-i Sindh* for the *az masaff-i kuffar-i ab-i Sindh* of the text), and II, 34 (tr. 695-6, 767); see also II, 38 (tr. 784) and 44 (to be corrected from IOL ms., fol. 291a; Raverty's tr., 792, garbled). *FS*, 146-9 (tr. 269-74), seems to have a distorted account of this campaign, allegedly against the Mongols and dated 656. The year, which Habibullah (*Foundation*, 136) puts even later, is impossible, since Qutb al-Din Hasan (d. 653/1255) is listed among the commanders and Balaban-i Zar (i.e. Kushlu Khan) is left at Uchch and Multan on the sultan's return. For Shir Khan's flight to the Mongols, see p. III below; for the rest, Habibullah, *Foundation*, 126; he had wrongly assumed (*ibid.*, 125) that Qutb al-Din had not survived 'Ala' al-Din Mas'ud Shah.

⁶⁹ *TN*, I, 489 (tr. 701); cf. also I, 493, and II, 39 (tr. 710, 785). S. B. P. Nigam, *Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi A.D. 1206-1398* (Delhi, 1968), 40, believes that the marriage, which he dates at the onset of 1255, alienated the sultan; but we have no evidence as to when it took place.

⁷⁰ Habibullah, *Foundation*, 126, 132, 195. Nizami, *Some aspects*, 141, and in *HN*, 262. Cf. also P. Saran, 'Politics and personalities in the reign of Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud the slave [*sic*]', in his *Studies in medieval Indian history* (Delhi, 1952), 228.

⁷¹ *TN*, II, 68 (tr. 833); cf. II, 70 (tr. 836), for 'Turks' and 'Hindus', but also a reference to

~ as a baseborn Indian eunuch (*majbub-u naqis-u az qaba'il-i Hind*); this suggests, incidentally, that he was of slave status and renders it unlikely that he belonged to what could properly be termed an emerging Indian Muslim noble class. Rayhan's candidate for the office of chief qadi, Shams al-Din, hailed from Bahraich, and the iqta' of Bahraich is later said to have been restored (*ruju' shuda*) to Rayhan on his dismissal from court in 653/1255.⁷² Since Bahraich had been Mahmud Shah's iqta' prior to his accession, there is a strong possibility that Ulugh Khan's enemies drew support from the sultan's own power-base and that Rayhan was the sultan's own slave; Mahmud Shah himself, as well as his mother and her husband, was doubtless behind them.

Balaban and his followers regained power by dint of allying with the sultan's renegade brother Jalal al-Din Mas'ud, who six years previously had fled from his iqta's by way of Santur to take refuge with the Mongols.⁷³ Juzjani is reticent concerning his subsequent activities, and we are dependent instead on the history of India presented by Wassaf and Rashid al-Din, writing in Mongol Persia.⁷⁴ According to their version of events, Jalal al-Din had grown apprehensive of the hostility of a number of Ilutmish's old slaves. Although the Iranian tradition does not offer a wholly reliable guide to the history of the Sultanate and various details are incorrect,⁷⁵ these slaves can, with one exception (Qutlugh Khan), be identified with persons named by Juzjani as allies of Ulugh Khan Balaban.⁷⁶ Jalal al-Din Mas'ud's return with a Mongol army, and the creation of a client state for him around Lahore and the north-western Panjab, will be dealt

with later

Rayhan's association with Qutlugh Khan. For Yiizbegi, see *ibid.*, I, 487 and II, 64 (tr. 695, 827).

⁷² *Ibid.*, II, 66 (tr. 829), for a brief notice of Rayhan; I, 487, and II, 64 (tr. 694, 827), for Shams al-DIn; II, 69, for Rayhan and Bahraich. Nigam, *Nobility*, 39 n.37, also links Rayhan with Bahraich.

⁷³ *TN*, I, 482 (tr. 683-4). For Santur, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 229.

⁷⁴ Wassaf, 310; *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. *text* Taf. 57, Pers. *text* Taf. 21-22 (German tr. 47-8); Qashanl (c. 1318), *Ta'rikh-i Uljaitu Sultan*, ed. Mahin Hambly (Tehran, 1348 Sh./ 1969), 184-5.

⁷⁵ The late date given for the prince's flight, 651/1253-4, is probably that of his reappearance in India with a Mongol army. Another error is that Jalal al-DIn is said to have been an earlier sultan, deposed by Ulugh Khan in favour of Radiyya. Qutlugh Khan is listed among Ulugh Khan's confederates. If this is not an error, then the two men may have become enemies only after Jalal al-Din's departure; Wassaf's account does in fact claim that Qutlugh Khan subsequently grew fearful of Ulugh Khan.

⁷⁶ See Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 78. 'Sungur Khan' is very probably Shir Khan Sanjar. Aybeg-i Khita'i, muqta^c of Baran, bore the style of *Ikit Khan: Raverty gives his style as 'Ban' or 'Bat' Khan, but cf. BL ms., fols. 192b, 194a, and IOL ms., fols. 262a, 263b (also Habibfs apparatus, I, 488, 491). Sayf al-DIn Aybeg-i Shamsi ^cAjamI, whom JuzjanI entitles 'Erkli Dadbeg' (Tu. *erkli*, 'having authority', 'one's own master': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 224), had held the office of *aniir-i dad* since 640/1242-3. 'Yuzbak' is Ikhtiyar al-DIn Yiizbeg Toghril Khan (*yiizbeg*, 'commander of a hundred': *ibid.*, 983), who had apparently replaced Jalal al-DIn himself as muqta^c of Qinnawj and who was also surely a member of the na'ib's affinity, since just prior to the Qinnawj grant Balaban had been instrumental in his restoration to the sultan's favour.

~ (p. 111) When in 652/1254 he advanced east from Lahore, he was joined by a number of amirs, headed by Ulugh Khan, who had lost out in the power struggle of the previous year.⁷⁷ Inconclusive manoeuvres by the rebels and the sultan's army were followed by a compromise of which Rayhan was the immediate victim: he was relieved of his office and dismissed to his new iqta' of Bada'un.⁷⁸ It seems that he was discarded by the sultan and by certain of those who had earlier profited from Ulugh Khan's removal. One of them was surely Arslan Khan, who had supplanted Shir Khan at Tabarhindh but who now appears among Jalal al-Din Mas'ud's followers. Another was Qutlugh Khan's son-in-law, 'Izz al-Din Balaban-i Yuzbegi, who negotiated with Jalal al-Din Mas'ud and Ulugh Khan on the sultan's behalf and who narrowly escaped assassination by Rayhan's agents: he is found enjoying the court's favour henceforward.⁷⁹ Jalal al-Din Mas'ud, on the other hand, had reaped less from the settlement than he might have anticipated. Along with his confederates, he was reconciled with Mahmud Shah; but we read only that Lahore was recognized as his iqta', and he seems to have withdrawn there and ceased to play any role in events at the centre. At any rate, there is no mention of him as accompanying the imperial army when Ulugh Khan Balaban and the sultan re-entered Delhi in Dhu'l-Hijja 652/ January 1255.⁸⁰

Ulugh Khan Balaban was swift to reimpose his dominance at court. In Rabi' II 653/June 1255 the na'ib Qutb al-Din Hasan, who appears to have attempted to mediate in the preceding struggle, was arrested and executed, allegedly for some remark which had offended the sultan. Ulugh Khan was restored to the viceroyalty, while the dead man's iqta' of Mirat was transferred to Kishli Khan, once more *amlr-hajib*.⁸¹ Ulugh Khan had also wasted little time in moving against the opposition group. At the very beginning of 653/1255, Qutlugh Khan and the sultan's mother were dismissed from court and ordered to take up residence in Qutlugh Khan's new iqta' of Awadh. Around the same time Rayhan was deprived of Bada'un in favour of Ulugh Khan's adherent *Teniz Khan and transferred to the more distant Bahraich, where in Rajab 653/August 1255 he was killed by Taj al-Din Siwistani.⁸² Qutlugh Khan maintained the struggle for some time in Awadh, before joining forces with Kushlii Khan from Sind in 655/ 1257; attempting to manufacture a coup in Delhi which was frustrated by

⁷⁷ Including Kishli Khan from Kara and Aybeg-i Khita'i from Sunnam and Mansurpur. The unnamed amir

from Awadh, *TN*, II, 66 (tr. 830), is probably Yuzbeg Toghril Khan, who received that territory after being removed from Qinnawj for insubordination by Qutb al-Din Hasan b. 'AlI: *ibid.*, II, 31 (tr. 762), where no dates are given, but this seems the most plausible reconstruction of events.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 488-9, and II, 66-8 (tr. 699-700, 830-4).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 68, 78 (tr. 832, 833, 849). Balaban-i Yuzbegl may have continued to bask in the court's favour as late as 656/1258 (below, p. 92).

⁸⁰ *TN*, I, 489, and II, 68-9 (tr. 700, 834). ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I, 489, and II, 46 (tr. 702, 798-9). ⁸² *Ibid.*, I, 489, 490, and II, 69, 70 (tr. 701, 702-3, 834, 835-6).

~ Ulugh Khan's adherents, the allies briefly besieged the capital but were obliged to retreat following the na'ib's arrival with his army.⁸³ Nothing more is heard of Qutlugh Khan, who may have left India to seek shelter with the Mongols.⁸⁴ Kushlii Khan, for his part, retired to Sind: according to Juzjani, his forces were heavily depleted, since most of the contingents from Uchch and Multan deserted him and many took service with Ulugh Khan and the court.⁸⁵ As far as we can tell from Juzjani's account of the next few years, Ulugh Khan Balaban's opponents were excluded from any share of power at the centre; he held the vicerealty unchallenged until his usurpation of the throne itself some ten years later.

In his analysis of the period preceding Balaban's accession as sultan, Dr Nigam sees the pattern as the elimination of rival elements such as Africans or Tajiks, which left the Turks unchallenged, followed by a phase in which rival Turkish factions struggled for power but in a more restrained fashion, involving bloodless changes of regime and compromises.⁸⁶ Whether the conflicts of the 1250s were in fact more restrained, on one level, is highly questionable. Admittedly there was no repetition of the massacre of 634/1236, which has the appearance of small-scale genocide; but we still see the political murders of individuals like Qutb al-Din Hasan. The virulence of the struggle surprised not only contemporary observers but even the protagonists. When Kushlu Khan was obliged in 648/1250 to go to relieve Uchch, which was under attack from Shir Khan, he pinned his hopes, we are told, on the fact that they were both 'of one house and one threshold'.⁸⁷ In other words, since the two amirs had been slaves of Iltutmish, he anticipated that they would be able to reach some amicable arrangement. He was to be disappointed: Shir Khan placed him in custody and released him only when the city had been taken. 'Never could there be a more amazing case than this', exclaims Juzjani, describing how Balaban's forces and those of Kushlu Khan and Qutlugh Khan confronted each other in 655/1257; 'for they were all alike of one purse and messmates of one dish, between whom the accursed Satan had brought forth such discord'.⁸⁸ There are grounds for suggesting, in fact, that the situation in the 1250s was not less but more dangerous because it could not be resolved merely by the mass disposal of a group of Tajik bureaucrats. Rather, it involved a contest between two more nearly equal parties, who engaged in full-blown civil war. Both groups, moreover, were prepared to seek the assistance of the pagan Mongols. Ulugh Khan Balaban and his confederates regained power by

⁸³ *Ibid.*, I, 490-1, 492-4, and II, 39, 69-75 (tr. 703-6, 707-10, 784-6, 835, 836-44).

⁸⁴ *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text, Taf. 57, alone specifies that Qutlugh Khan made for Mongke's court; the Persian text (Taf. 22), like Wassaf, 310, and Qashani, 184-5, says merely that he set out in Jalal al-Din's wake (tr. 48 has misleadingly 'schlossen sich Galal ad-Din an'). He was allegedly accompanied by 'Sungur Khan' (i.e. Shir Khan): this is unlikely, though Shir Khan too is known to have fled to the Mongols.

⁸⁵ *TN*, I, 493, and II, 39 (tr. 710, 786). ⁸⁶ Nigam, *Nobility*, 37-8. ⁸⁷ *TN*, II, 38 (tr. 783). ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 73 (Raverty's tr. 841 modified).

~ allying with a Mongol satellite; and Kushlu Khan, as we shall see, reacted to his defeat by turning Sind into a Mongol encampment.

The Ghiyathid aristocracy

We have, unfortunately, minimal information on Balaban's assumption of the Sultanate when Mahmud

Shah died; as we saw (p. 52), even the manner of the late sultan's death and the fate of his offspring are unclear. It is likely, though by no means certain, that the Shamsid regime was terminated by the use of open force. Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah is the only Shamsid monarch apart from Firuz Shah known to have had his own establishment prior to his accession, so that he was accompanied to Delhi from Bahraich by 'great numbers of horsemen and paiks' (*mabalighi-yi mard-i paik-u suwar*).⁸⁹ His possession of independent resources of manpower may be one reason why he retained the throne for longer than the brief interval vouchsafed to other members of his dynasty, especially if he was behind the opposition to Ulugh Khan.

Ulugh Khan Balaban's long career prior to his enthronement, particularly as muqta' of Hansi since 639/1242, had furnished him with the means to acquire a force of personal retainers (*hashamha-yi khass*).⁹⁰ It doubtless included the equipage of a thousand paik slaves that accompanied him on his hunting expeditions as sultan and is described as being 'of long standing' (*qadim*).⁹¹ Before he became sultan, he also possessed Turkish ghulams of his own. We meet them already in the pages of the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*. Important and influential officers like Aytegin-i Mui-yi Daraz and the *sipahsalar* Qarachomaq, who represented Ulugh Khan in the negotiations of 652/1254 with the sultan.⁹² Their tribal origins are unknown. Presumably they were purchased after the final Mongol assault on the Qipchaq in 1239-40, when his own fellow-tribesmen, the Olberli, were finally scattered and many fled across the Black Sea into Anatolia;⁹³ like the Egyptian Sultan al-Salih Ayyub, Balaban could have profited from a glut on the market in Turkish youths.

It must also be borne in mind that his long tenure of the viceroyalty since 647/1249, with only a brief interruption, enabled Ulugh Khan Balaban to manoeuvre his own supporters and friends into strategic positions. His brother Kishli Khan was succeeded as *amir-hajib* on his death in 657/1259 by his son 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad, who retained the office well into

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 479 (Raverty's tr. 677 unaccountably renders *mard* as 'domestics').

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 72, 74 (tr. 839, 841). ⁹¹ *TFS*, 55.

⁹² *TN*, II, 67 (tr. 831-2). His name is Tu. *qara*, 'black', + *chomaq*, 'mace' (Clouston, *Etymological dictionary*, 422-3; cf. Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 93). For Aytegin, see above, p. 71.

⁹³ al-Yunini, III, 240. Irwin, *Middle East*, 17-18, calling them 'Barali'.

~ Balaban's reign.⁹⁴ It is possible (though by no means guaranteed) that those who emerge as supporters of Balaban in earlier crises backed his seizure of the throne. Nusrat Khan Badr al-Din Sonqur, for example, who had moved swiftly to Delhi's assistance in 655/1257 when it was besieged by the na'ib's enemies, is known to have remained a muqta' until at least 669/1271.⁹⁵ In the preface to his *Ghurrat al-Kamal*, moreover, Amir Khusraw contrives a word-play alluding to his maternal grandfather, the '*arid*' Imad al-Mulk (d. c. 671/1272-3), as 'sultan-maker'; and we know from the same author that Imad al-Mulk's own establishment had a complement of 200 Turkish and 2000 Hindu slaves and 1000 horsemen.⁹⁶ Possibly Imad al-Mulk - a Shamsi according to Barani - was instrumental in Ulugh Khan Balaban's usurpation of the throne: certainly the '*arid*'s department had been active in the defence of Delhi on Balaban's behalf in 655/1257.⁹⁷

A later tradition claims that Balaban, as sultan, abolished the office of na'ib, although it is known to have been revived before his death.⁹⁸ Barani says that in his aim of destroying his former colleagues (*khwajatan*), the great Shamsi maliks, he had a number poisoned, so that his cousin Shir Khan, who held the iqta's of Lahore, Sunnam and Deopalpur, would not come to court either during Mahmud Shah's reign or in Balaban's, for fear of meeting the same fate; eventually, however, in c. 668/1269-70, Balaban had him poisoned also. Those Shamsis who survived did so only by virtue of the sultan's own favour.⁹⁹ Barani names two of them, Temur Khan and 'Adil Khan. Temiir Khan appears as Temiir Khan Sonqur-i 'Ajami, malik of Kuhram, in Juzjani's list of Mahmud Shah's nobles: after Shir Khan's death, Balaban granted him the iqta's of Sunnam and Samana. 'Adil Khan is surnamed Shamsi-yi 'Ajami, which suggests his identity with the *amir-i dad* Sayf al-Din Ayyub (above, n.76).¹⁰⁰ Of the ultimate fate of these

⁹⁴ *TN*, I, 495 (tr. 713). *TFS*, 35, 36-7, 113-14.

⁹⁵ *TN*, II, 42 (tr. 787-8). G. Yazdani, 'Inscription of Sultan Balban from Bhayana, Bharatpur State', *EIM* (1937-8), 5-6 (though identifying him in error with the Nusrat Khan of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's reign).

⁹⁶ *DGK*, IOL Persian ms. 51 (Ethe 1186), fol. 34b, *agar nishan-i sultarii nadasht sultan-nishani dasht* (loosely translatable as 'If he was not [himself] the sultan, he [nevertheless] made the sultan'). The phrase is mangled in the printed edition by Sayyid Wazir al-Hasan 'Abidi (Lahore, 1975), 67, which also gives in error a figure of 100,000 for the Hindu slaves and omits the Turks.

⁹⁷ *TN*, I, 493 (tr. 709). For a sketch of 'Imad al-Mulk's career, see *TFS*, 114. He is possibly identical with Iftikhar al-Mulk Sharaf al-Din Muhammad Rashidi, who is said to have occupied the *dlwdn-i 'ard-i mamdlik* when Balaban was na'ib: *DA*, RRL Persian ms. 1231, fol. 56b, and tr. Sh. Abdur Rashid, 'Dastur-ul-Albab fi 'Ilm-il-Hisab', *MIQ* 1 (1950), 93. That 'Imad al-Mulk's name was Muhammad is clear from *TS*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 36b, where his son is addressed as 'Mahmud-i Muhammad'. The assumption that he was of Indian extraction is not warranted by the sources.

⁹⁸ *DA*, fol. 56b (tr. Rashid, 93). But see *TMS*, 51, 52, for the na'ib Kochu.

⁹⁹ *TFS*, 47-8, 65; and a brief reference at 550.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 36, 50, 65, 83. Temiir Khan in Mahmud Shah's reign: *TN*, I, 476, and BL ms., fol. 188b (tr. 673). For an inscription of Aybeg-i Shamsi-yi 'Ajams son Muhammad at Farrukhnagar in Gurga'un, dated 674/1276, see G. Yazdani, 'The Inscriptions of the Turk

~ grandees, however, we are not informed. That Balaban's purge was by no means complete is evident from Barani's comment on the number of sons of Shamsi ghulams who held office in the Ghiyathid era.¹⁰¹

By modern historians Balaban has been charged with sapping the roots of Turkish power in India.¹⁰² But his purpose, of course, in bringing down a number of his former colleagues was to promote his own slaves. ToghriI, who usurped control of the distant province of Lakhnawti and was overthrown in c. 680/1281-2, is the most notorious of them. Balaban's favourite ghulam, according to Barani, was Ikhtiyar al-Din Begbars, who became *amir-hdjib/barbeg*, possibly in succession to 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad b. Kishli Khan, accompanied the sultan on his Bengal campaign and was given the job of hunting down ToghriI when the revolt collapsed.¹⁰³ Others of whom we are told incurred the sultan's displeasure and forfeited their high offices and even in some cases their lives, as did Malik *Buqubuq (see p. 101) and Aytegin-i Mui-yi Daraz (Amin Khan), muqta' of Awadh, hanged in c. 678/1279-80 for his failure to suppress ToghriI's revolt. The sons of Balaban's slaves, referred to as his *mawlazadagan* ('sons of freedmen'), also played a significant role in the affairs of state. An example is the *sar-ijandar* Ikhtiyar al-Din 'Ali b. Aybeg, popularly known as Hatim Khan, who was granted Amroha as his iqta^c early in Balaban's reign and under Kayqubad received Awadh and the style of Khan Jahan; the poet Amir Khusraw was for some years in his service.¹⁰⁴ In the reign of Balaban's successor there was still a recognizable and self-conscious group of 'Ghiyathis', former ghulams of the old sultan or their offspring, like Ikhtiyar al-Din Alp Ghazi who opposed the newly established Khalji regime in 689/1290.¹⁰⁵

Although Balaban, therefore, changed many of the personnel, ghulam status and ancestry persisted as qualifications for high office. Yet in the course of his reign the ruling class was certainly broadened. No more than his Shamsid predecessors did Balaban preside over an elite that was exclusively of Turkish origin and composed only of his close kin or his slaves and their progeny. Barani depicts him as virulently hostile to the

Sultans of Delhi', *EIM* (1913-14), 26-7; *RCEA*, XII, 206-7 (no. 4711). In addition, Balaban's old ally Nusrat Khan was still in command at Bhayana in 669/1271 (above).

¹⁰¹ *TFS* 66 Taj al-Din, the son of Qutlugh Khan-i Shamsi, is named as one of the 'amirs of Hindustan' sent against the rebel ToghriI: *ibid.*, 83. His father is probably the Qutlugh Khan who died in 635/1237 (above,

p. 67).

¹⁰² E.g. by Saran, 'Politics and personalities', 242-3; Nigam, *Nobility*, 42, saying that Balaban 'sought to destroy the Turkish nobility'; Nizami, *Some aspects*, 143, and in HN, 285-6.

¹⁰³ *TFS* 61, for his closeness to Balaban; and see also 24, 81, 88. His name, usually transliterated 'Bektars', shows clearly in BL ms., fols. 32a, 47a, as BYKBRS; for the same form in contemporary Egypt, see al-Safadi, *Waji*, X, 187-8.

¹⁰⁴ *TFS*, 36, 118-19; and for Awadh, *QS*, 221; *RI*, V, 55. *Mawlazada* is explained in Hodivala. *Studies*, I, 342. On Khusraw, see Mirza, *Life and works*, 66, 69, 70-3.

¹⁰⁵ *TMS*, 63: on him, see n.128 below. For another example of an amir with this sobriquet. 'Qutluḡ Sultani Ghiyathf, see Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 31-2.

~ promotion of the lowborn and as refusing to appoint a certain Kamal-i Mahyar to the post of revenue-intendant (*khwaja*) at Amroha. We might be less inclined to accept this testimony at face value and to dismiss it as Baram's personal view mediated through the sultan, were not a slightly fuller version of the story found in a fifteenth-century source. But Balaban's objection was clearly based on the fact that Kamal-i Mahyar was the son of a Hindu slave.¹⁰⁶ His own career having been temporarily blighted by the Indian ghulam Rayhan, the sultan could well have conceived an aversion for persons of the same background. It is noteworthy that Balaban's antipathy did not extend to Indians - whether converts or not - of noble extraction. We are told that his servitors included a certain 'Hatya Paik', presumably a Hindu aristocrat, who received the high stipend of 100,000 *jitals* (i.e. approximately 2000 *tangas*).¹⁰⁷ In the wake of his campaign against the people of the Salt Range (Kuh-i Jud) in c. 665/1266-7, Balaban brought back with him to Delhi the two sons of their raja, who adopted Islam. The appearance of both these princes, 'Ali Shah Kuhjudi and 'Izz al-Din Khurram, together with the despised Kamal-i Mahyar, among the maliks of Balaban's grandson Kayqubad may be taken to signal the rise of an Indian Muslim aristocracy even prior to the Khalji era, with which it is traditionally associated.¹⁰⁸

The nobility still included Tajiks, of whom the most prominent in Balaban's latter years was the kotwal of Delhi, Fakhr al-Din, entitled 'Chief Amir' (*Malik al-Umara*). Barani, who claims that Fakhr al-Din and his father had occupied this post between them for eighty years, thereby allows us to identify the father as Jamal al-Din Nishapturi, described as *ulugh kotwalbeg* in 655/1257 when Delhi was under attack by Balaban's enemies: Nishapuri origins would explain the grandiloquent title *Khan-i Khurasan* which Fakhr al-Din acquired under Kayqubad.¹⁰⁹ His nephew and son-in-law, Nizam al-Din, who became Kayqubad's *dadbeg* and who is described as a survivor 'from among the illustrious Shamsi and Balabani maliks', is a mysterious figure and seems to emerge out of thin air, unless he is to be identified with Nizam al-Din Buzghala, Balaban's *wakil-i dar*.¹¹⁰ During Balaban's reign, too, Muslim notables continued to arrive from the many territories occupied by the Mongols.¹¹¹ One especially distinguished immigrant was the deposed sultan of Kirman, Hajjaj, who remained for ten years

¹⁰⁶ *TFS*, 36-7. Sayyid Ashraf Jahangir Simnani, *Maktubat-i Ashrafi*, BL ms. Or. 267, fol. 66b.

¹⁰⁷ *TFS*, 210.

¹⁰⁸ *TMS* 40, 54. See *TFS*, 126, for all three among Kayqubad's nobles. I. H. Siddiqui, 'Social mobility in the Delhi Sultanate', in I. Habib (ed.), *Medieval India* 1, 24.

¹⁰⁹ Jamal al-Din: *TN*, I, 493 (tr. 709). Fakhr al-Din: *TFS*, 117-18, 126 (to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 67b); his career is outlined by B. S. Mathur, 'Malik-ul-Umara Fakhruddin -the kotwal of Delhi', *IC* 39 (1965), 205-8.

¹¹⁰ *TFS* 131, I68; cf. also 24, 36, 37, 191. *Buzghala* means 'kid' in Persian: see the word-play in

TS, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 40a. ¹¹¹ Firishta, I, 131, citing 'Ayn al-Din Bljapuri.

~ and left for his homeland only after the accession of Jalal al-Din Khalji, but died en route at Bhakkar towards the end of 690/1291.¹¹²

It appears that Balaban may have consciously built up the power of Khalaj amirs and profited from the influx of Mongol notables following the upheavals in Mongol territory after c. 1260 (below, pp. 108-10, 115-16). His brother Kishli Khan, as *amir-hajib* in the 1250s, is said to have been on good terms with the Khalaj amirs, among others, while at a later date Khalaj officers served in Sind under Balaban's son Muhammad, the 'Martyr Prince'.¹¹³ Amir Jamal Khaljl, whom Balaban created *na'ib-i dadbeg*, was probably his *hajib* Jamal al-Din 'All, employed as his envoy to the Mongols in 658/1260.¹¹⁴ If we can trust Wassaf, the future sovereign Jalal al-Din Khaljl was a refugee from Mongol territory in the 1260s who had held command (*amarat*) of the Khalaj on behalf of the ruler of Binban;¹¹⁵ if he is the person referred to by Juzjani as 'the Mongol "resident" (*shihna*) in Binban, who was the son of the amir Yughrush', Jalal al-Din himself may have accompanied the Mongol embassy to Delhi in 658/ 1260.¹¹⁶ Barani, who lists him and his brother Shihab al-Din Mas'ud among Balaban's maliks, has Jalal al-Din later recalling with emotion Balaban's enthronement.¹¹⁷

Mongol immigrants, by contrast, were a new element in the politics of the Sultanate. In much the same way as Mongol commanders and their followers, worsted in some conflict with their confreres, began to seek asylum in the dominions of the Mamlik Sultans of Egypt and Syria after 660/1262,¹¹⁸ so Mongol notables fled into the territories of the sultan of Delhi. According to a fourteenth-century author, a whole quarter of the capital was named 'Chingizi' after them in Balaban's era. If not already Muslims, they at any rate embraced Islam after their arrival and, like their

¹¹² Nasir al-Din Kirmani, *Simt al-'Ula li'l-Hadratil-'Ulya* (c.1315), ed. c Abbas Iqbal (Tehran, 1328 Sh./1949), 49. Anonymous, *Ta'rikh-i Sistan*, ed. Malik al-Shu'ara Bahar (Tehran, 1314 Sh./1935), 405, and tr. L. P. Smirnova (Moscow, 1974), 376. Hamd-Allah Mustawfi Qazwini, *Ta'rikh-i Guz'ida*, ed. 'Abd al-Husayn Nawa'i (Tehran, 1339 Sh./1960), 532 (but with the wrong year, 669, for his flight). Rashid al-Din says that Hajjaj remained in India for almost fifteen years: *JT*, II, ed. E. Blochet, GMS, XVIII (Leiden and London, 1911), 552, and tr. J. A. Boyle, *The successors of Genghis Khan* (London and New York, 1971), 305/tr. Iu. P. Verkhovskii, *Sbornik letopisei*, II (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), 198. Brief references in Wassaf, 291, and in Shabankara'i (738/1337), *Majma' al-Ansab*, ed. Mir Hashim Muhaddith (Tehran, 1363 Sh./1984), 199. That the Kirman ruler left Sistan on the news of the Ilkhan Abaqa's advance into Khurasan places his departure in 678/1279: see *JT*, III, ed. A. A. Alizade and tr. A. K. Arends (Baku, 1957), text 152-3, tr. 94, and for the date, Jean Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese des Qaraunas', *Turcica* 1 (1969), 85 n.4.

¹¹³ *TN*, II, 46 (tr. 798). *TMS*, 47. ¹¹⁴ *TFS*, 24. *TN*, II, 86 (tr. 860).

¹¹⁵ Wassaf, 311; *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 57 (Pers. text Taf. 23 corrupt; cf. German tr. 48-9); QashanI, 185.

¹¹⁶ *TN*, II, 88 (tr. 862). *TMS*, 56, 61, calls his father Yughrush (Bras in the mss.).

¹¹⁷ *TFS*, 24, 178. For Shihab al-Din, see also *ibid*, 186; *DR*, 54; Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Kortantamer, Ar. text 29 (German tr. 108).

¹¹⁸ D. Ayalon, 'The Wafidiya in the Mamluk kingdom', *IC* 25 (1951), 81-104, repr. in his *Studies*.

~ successors who entered the Sultanate in the time of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, are designated as 'neo-Muslims' by Barani.¹¹⁹ Maliks with unmistakably Mongol names among the nobles of Balaban and his successor include Bayanchar; Ulaghchi, the son of Turghai, Balaban's 'chief armour-bearer of the left hand' (*sar-i sildhdar-i maysara*); Turumtai, one of the commanders who failed to suppress the Bengal revolt; and Ja'urchi, Kayqubad's *sar-i jandar*.¹²⁰

These neo-Muslim amirs seem initially to have formed part of the coalition that secured the throne for Kayqubad and to have shared power with Nizam al-Din, since they are described as enjoying office and

favour (*shughldar-u muqarrab*). But having disposed of other competitors, such as the wazir, Nizam al-Din turned against them also. The Mongol amirs, including his former allies Kerei and the *sar-i jdndar* Ja'urchi, were rounded up and most of them executed, although Ja'urchi and Mughaltai were merely exiled.¹²¹ Many of Balaban's *mawldzddas* who were related to them by marriage were also eliminated, notably Malik Shahik, entitled Azhdar Khan, who was *amir-hajib* and muqta'of Multan, and Malik *Turki, the '*arid*'¹²² It looks very much as if Nizam al-Din, rather than Balaban, did most to undermine the Turkish ghulams during the few years prior to the seizure of power by the Khaljis.

Even after Nizam al-Din's removal, however, Mongol amirs were still at large. 'Isami may be correct in naming those who later murdered Kayqubad as the sons of *Turki, i.e. Kayqubad's '*arid*' who had perished during Nizam al-Din's ascendancy. That the ex-sultan is said to have been wrapped in his bedclothes and kicked to death recalls pagan Mongol practice, which did not permit royal blood to be spilled on the ground.¹²³ And members of Balaban's slave establishment who had weathered the purge were able to assume power: it was 'Balaban's slaves among the maliks, amirs, nobles and military commanders' who despaired of the ailing Kayqubad early in 689/ 1290 and endeavoured to rule through his infant son Kayumarth.¹²⁴ Again we see a coalition of different elements, since this group, headed by Aytemur *Kachhan and Aytemur Surkha, who on Nizam al-Din's downfall

¹¹⁹ Firishta, I, 131, citing Bijapuri's *mulhaqat* to *TN. TFS*, 133.

¹²⁰ Bayanchar's name is garbled as NAHN in *TFS*, 126, and as 'HHN *ibid*', 183 (for the correct form BAYNJR, see BL ms, fols. 67b, 99a). Ja'urchi: *TMS*, 53, and *FS*, 184-8 (tr. 315-19). Turumtai: *FS*, 165-6 (tr. 292-3). Turghai and Ulaghchi: *TFS*, 24, 126, 183. The father's name is actually Tu. *turghai*, iark', 'sparrow': Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 128; Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 541. For Mo. *ulaghchi*, 'officer of the postal relay-system', see Paul Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or* (Paris, 1950), 34-5; for Bayanchar (Mo. *bayan*, 'rich', + suffix *char*), *ibid.*, 52, 89; and for Mo. *turumtai*, 'male hawk', see F.D. Lessing, *A Mongolian-English dictionary* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), 827.

¹²¹ *TFS*, 133-4. *TMS*, 53. *FS*, 186-8 (tr. 317-19). ¹²² *TFS*, 134. *TMS*, 55-6.

¹²³ *TFS*, 173. Cf. J. A. Boyle, 'The death of the last 'Abbasid Caliph: a contemporary Muslim account', *JSS* 6 (1961), 150, repr. in his *The Mongol world-empire* (London, 1977).

¹²⁴ *TFS*, 171.

~ had become respectively *barbeg* (*amir-hajib*) and *wakil-i dar*, allowed the Khalaj Jalal al-Din to be summoned from his iqta^c of Samana and given the office of '*arid*' and the iqta' of Baran, with the style of Shayista Khan.¹²⁵ But the two Aytemurs sought to destroy Jalal al-Din. Aytemur *Kachhan fell in the struggle, while Surkha was killed in a vain bid to secure Kayumarth.¹²⁶

Jalal al-Din's rise to power appears to have been the product of a compromise. As Barani admits, a number of Turkish maliks and amirs had thrown in their lot with him,¹²⁷ and there had been negotiations with the Ghiyathi party, headed by Balaban's nephew Malik Chhajju; though why Chhajju refused Jalal al-Din's offer of the dignity of na'ib and opted to retire to the iqta' of Kara is not explained. Jalal al-Din's own enthronement in 689/1290 was the signal for Chhajju to revolt in Awadh at the head of Balaban's Turkish slaves and their families and certain of the 'neo-Muslim' Mongol amirs. Chhajju and many of his supporters were captured; Jalal al-Din is said to have treated them leniently, though they forfeited their iqta's and offices and Chhajju himself, who was sent to Multan, is not heard of again.¹²⁸

The 'Khaljl Revolution'

Jalal al-Din's accession marked a break with the past in a way in which Balaban's usurpation had not. Early Muslim geographers and historians had regarded the Khalaj as a Turkish people,¹²⁹ but accounts of the transfer of power from the Ghiyathids to the Khaljis indicate that in late-thirteenth-century Delhi they were regarded as a race quite distinct from the Turks.¹³⁰ This may well be due to the particular sense acquired by the word 'Turk', which in large measure had come to mean a Turkish ghulam (appendix I).

¹²⁵ *TMS*, 55-6. For the title Shayista Khan, see *TFS*, 126, 170 (SYAST; but cf. BL ms., fol. 91b).

¹²⁶ I have largely preferred the circumstantial account in *TMS*, 56-61, to that of *TFS*, 172-3, where these events appear to be conflated to form a single episode, with *Kachchan's death closely followed by Surkha's. The version in *FS*, 203-9 (tr. 365-72), seems to belong to the same tradition as Sirhindi's. On one point Sirhindi is definitely in error. He calls the child sultan Kayka'us (actually the name of Bughra Khan's younger son and successor at Lakhnawti), but Barani's Kayumarth is corroborated by *QS*, 137, 142 etc., and by Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Kortantamer, Ar. text 29 (German tr. 108).

¹²⁷ *TFS*, 172'.

¹²⁸ The rebels included Balaban's *mawlazada* Amir 'Ali Hatim Khan, *sar-i jandar* and muqta' of Awadh; two other former Ghiyathi commanders, Azhdar Khan's son Ikhtiyar al-Din Alp Ghazi, muqta' of Kasrak (who was killed), and Malik Bahadur; and the 'neo-Muslim' amirs Bayanchar and Ulaghchi. HN, 313-15. The sources are *TMS*, 62-4; *TFS*, 181-4; and (the most detailed) *MF*, 7-22. For Alp Ghazi as one of Kayqubad's maliks, see *TFS*, 126 (omitting 'LP; but cf. BL ms., fol. 68a). His parentage is given in *GK*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 284a ('ZDR JAN in error for 'ZDR XAN); cf. also *WH*, *ibid.*, fols. 114b, 143a (*piir-i Azhdar Malik*).

¹²⁹ References are conveniently collected in Aziz Ahmad, 'Early Turkish nucleus', 103-5. See also Shabankara'I, 87, who calls Jalal al-Din 'likewise a Turk from among the Turkmen Khalaj' (*ham turklbudaz tarakima-yi khalaj*).

171-2; cf. also 150, *az asl-u qawm-i digar*.

~ The transfer of power to Jalal al-Din was greatly resented by the notables of Delhi, members of the great households (*khaylkhanaha*), many of whom may have been Turkish ghulams or their offspring and had been ensconced in the capital since at least Balaban's day.¹³¹

Whether the change of dynasty had profound implications for the composition of the aristocracy, however, by diluting the Turkishness of the governing class, is another question. Nobles of Turkish slave ancestry may indeed have been the principal casualties of the Khalji seizure of power. Barani portrays the sons of Balaban's maliks during Jalal al-Din's reign as a pool of dispossessed nobles, alert for opportunities to undermine the new regime. For a time it seems that various grandees from Balaban's era who had lost their offices and stipends attached themselves to the new sultan's eldest son, Mahmud, entitled Khan-i Khanan; but on his premature death in c. 691/1292 they engaged in a conspiracy to replace Jalal al-Din with the dervish Sidi Muwallih and to redistribute court offices and iqta's among the sons of Balaban's khans and maliks. By no means all of them were Turks: they included the former grand qadi Kasani, *Hatya Paik and the kotwal *Birinjin.¹³² Although the charges could not be proven, two of the accused nobles were executed and the rest despoiled of their property and banished to outlying regions.¹³³ The conspiracy seems to have been divulged to the sultan by a Mongol amir named Alughu, who had joined his court in 691/ 1292.¹³⁴

As we might expect, the new sultan took care to promote fellow-Khalaj tribesmen, particularly members of his somewhat large family, which comprised at the very least three sons; a brother, Malik Khamush, who became '*arid*'; an uncle; and four nephews, one of whom was 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad (the future sultan), the offspring of Jalal al-Din's deceased elder brother, Shihab al-Din Mas'ud. Other newly promoted Khalaj amirs include the sultan's kinsman Ahmad-i Chap (at one time chamberlain to Aytemur Surkha, and so called from the clipped pronunciation of *hajib* by the Khalaj), who became *sar-i jandar-i maymana*, and probably Malik Iwad, who bore a name common among the Khalaj.¹³⁵

Yet Sirhindi, who asserts that the majority of posts went to the new sultan's kinsfolk,¹³⁶ overstates the case. An examination of the nobles listed

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 172, 173.

¹³² For the kotwal's name, which appears as BRNJTN in *TFS*, see BL ms., fol. 113b (BRNJYN). Birinjin had presumably succeeded Fakhr al-Din, whose death during Jalal al-Din's reign is mentioned only by late sources: *AHG*, II, 782; *Firishta*, I, 161. For Khan-i Khanan's personal name, see *GK*, cited in Mirza, *Life and works*, 83 and n.3.

133 TFS 210-11. For differing interpretations of this episode, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 267-8, and Simon Digby, 'Qalandars and related groups', in Friedmann, *Islam in Asia*, I, 67-8.

¹³⁴ *TMS*, 65; for his arrival, see *TFS*, 218-19.

¹³⁵ *TMS*, 62. Jalal al-Din's relatives are listed in *FS*, 226-7 (tr. 392-3). On Ahmad-i Chap, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 266.

¹³⁶ *TMS*, 62.

~ by both Baranī and Sirhindī in their accounts of Jalal al-Din's reign reveals that a large proportion had been prominent under the Ghiyathids and did not belong to the Khalaj. The most obvious instances are Khwaja Khatir al-Din, who had been disgraced by Nizam al-Din but who was now restored as wazir, and the kotwal Fakhr al-Din, who was confirmed in office.¹³⁷ Malik Fakhr al-Din Kuchi and his brother Malik Taj al-Din possibly belonged to a family which had produced amirs in Iltutmish's day; under Jalal al-Din they are found acting respectively as *dadbeg* and as muqta' of Awadh.¹³⁸ Other examples of nobles who had served the Ghiyathids are the Indian converts Malik 'Ayn al-Din 'All Shah Kuhjudī and his brother Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Khurram, of whom the latter was now promoted to *wakil-i dar*.¹³⁹ Such examples could be multiplied.¹⁴⁰ We even find Ikhtiyar al-Din-i Hindu Khan-i Ghiyathi - from his cognomen (*nisba*) evidently the son of one of Balaban's slaves - as *nd'ib-i wakll-i dar* under the new sultan.¹⁴¹ Although some of these men would later be implicated in a half-hearted conspiracy against Jalal al-Din,¹⁴² it is noteworthy that none of them is said to have supported Chhajju's revolt and that the Kuhjudī brothers and Taj al-Din Kuchi fought under the Khalaj banners on that occasion.¹⁴³

The opening years of the Khalaj dynasty exhibit a striking continuity with the preceding era; and the ruling elite following Jalal al-Din's accession bears the stamp of compromise that we noticed in connection with earlier changes of regime. By contrast, the impression given is that a dramatic shift in the composition of the ruling class - the real 'Khalaj revolution' - came

¹³⁷ *TFS*, 174, 177.

¹³⁸ For Taj al-Din and Fakhr al-Din, see also *ibid.*, 203; *MF*, 14. Their father may have been Balaban's *dadbeg*, Malik Nasir al-Din Kuchi: *TFS*, 24 (though *FS* gives this as the name of Fakhr al-Din's brother). For earlier Kuchi maliks, *TN*, I, 456, 458, 459, and II, 6, 13 (tr. 633-4, 639, 640, 726, 735).

¹³⁹ *TMS*, 84 (KHJWRY in error). *MF*, 27, 33-4. *TFS*, 174 ('XBAR for 'XTYAR, to be corrected from BLras, fol. 93b), 177, 195, 233.

¹⁴⁰ Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Begtiit, *nd'ib-i amir-hdjib* under both Kayumarth and Jalal al-Din: *TMS*, 60, and *TFS*, 126 (SKNT, to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 68a); and for the name, L. Rasonyi, 'Les noms de personnes imperatifs chez les peuples turcs', *AOH* 15 (1962), 241-2. Malik Mughaltai, previously exiled by Nizam al-Din: *TMS*, 64-5. Malik Nasir al-Din Rana, who retained his office of *shihna-yi pil* from Balaban's reign through to that of 'Ala' al-Din Khalaj: *TMS*, 58. Malik Nusrat-i sabah, whose father had likewise been a malik and who now became chief inkwell-holder (*sar-i dawtdar*): *TFS*, 174 (JNAH for SBAH, to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 93b), 198, 204; *FS*, 227 (tr. 393); *MF*, 14. Others mentioned in *MF* include Malik 'Ayn al-Din *Hiranmar, who became Jalal al-Din's *amlr-i shikar*; Malik Mahmud, Jalal al-Din's *sar-i jdndar*; Malik *Kiki, who governed Kol for the new sultan.

¹⁴¹ *TMS*, 62, 69.

¹⁴² *Hiranmar forfeited his office of *sar-i jdndar* and Taj al-Din seems to have been deprived of Awadh,

but Mughaltai and Mubarak were merely banished to their iqta's for one year: *TFS*, 190-2; *TMS*, 64-5.

¹⁴³ Except where other references have been given, the reconstruction in this paragraph is based on *TFS*, 126, 174, 177; *TMS*, 54, 62; and *MF*, 14, 28. Nigam, *Nobility*, 53 and Appendix C, reaches conclusions broadly similar to mine, though relying on the corrupt readings in the printed text of *TFS*.

~ with 'Ala' al-Din. Initially the new sovereign was careful to reward those Jalali grandees who had deserted his cousins. But once 'Ala' al-Din's henchmen had secured the surrender of Multan in Muharram 696/ November 1296 and Jalal al-Din's sons and their supporters had been blinded, the regime was strong enough to move against the Jalali amirs. In the second year of the reign (late 696-late 697/1297-8), the great majority of them, including Hiranmar (now Amin Khan), who had briefly held Multan, and Abachi (Arslan Khan), were arrested and imprisoned, blinded or executed; their wealth, iqta's and offices were confiscated, and their military contingents transferred to 'Ala' al-Din's own *clientela*. According to Barani, only three, who had not betrayed Jalal al-Din's sons or accepted gifts from the new regime, were spared.¹⁴⁴ Even this did not end the purge of the old nobility. The Malik al-Umara' Fakhr al-Din, kotwal of Delhi, had probably died during Jalal al-Din's reign; but his sons were rounded up and executed in 700/1301 on suspicion of complicity with a rising in Delhi led by their freedman Hajji Mawla.¹⁴⁵ Barani exaggerates when he claims that in his own day no descendants of Balaban's nobles survived (see below, pp. 189-90);¹⁴⁶ but there can be little doubt that their almost total disappearance dates from the reign of 'Ala' al-Din.

144 *TFS* 242, 247-8, 249-51. *TMS*, 71-2.

145 *TFS*, 282. For Fakhr al-Din's death, see above, n . 132.

146 *TFS*, 48; cf. also HN,302.

~CHAPTER 5

The centre and the provinces

The terminology applied to the sultan's dominions was frequently unspecific. Juzjani writes of 'the empire of Delhi' (*mamalik-i Dihli*) and Barani of 'the provinces of the Delhi empire' (*bilad-i mamalik-i Dihli*).¹ Ibn Battuta speaks of Muhammad b. Tughluq's empire as 'Hind and Sind',² distinguishing the territory that had been won for Islam in the eighth century from the rest of the subcontinent. A Muslim geographer of an earlier generation distinguishes 'Hindustan', the conquests of the Ghurids and their *epigoni*, from the wider Indian world, which he terms 'Hind'.³ This usage echoes that of writers within India. Juzjani sometimes calls the Sultanate, like the Ghaznawid and Ghurid conquests before it, 'the territories' (*mamalik*) of Hindustan;⁴ and we read accordingly of rulers obtaining the 'throne' (*takht*), or 'the kingdom' (*mulk*), of Hindustan.⁵ But in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, confusingly, 'Hindustan' also had a narrower significance for Muslim authors within the subcontinent. It denoted the Doab - the mesopotamia (*miydn-i du db*) between the Yamuna and the Ganges - along with the other partially subjugated regions to the east and south-east. People flee from Delhi 'to Hindustan';⁶ we hear of 'the iqta's in the direction of Hindustan' (*simt-i Hindustan*)⁷ and of the amirs and troops of Hindustan, clearly in this restricted sense of the regions of the Doab, Awadh and Kara.⁸ Such latitude in the use of geographical terms can

¹ *TN*, II, 39 (tr. 785). *TFS*, 468.

² *IB*, III, 94, 161, 215, 248 (tr. Gibb, 593, 628, 657, 674); see also al-Safadi, *Waft*, III, 172.

³ Ibn Sa'id al-Maghribi, *Kitab al-Jughrafiyya*, 134, 163.

⁴ *TN*, I, 6, 398, and II, 88, 90 (tr. xxxii, 455, 863, 874-9); cf. also I, 418 (tr. 530), where the term is used of the whole of Muslim-ruled territory in the subcontinent, including Sind; also II, 9, 32, *mamlakat-i Hindustan* (tr. 731, 764).

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 162, 169 (tr. 1129, 1153). *TFS*, 249. *FS*, 604, 605 (tr. 898, 899).

⁶ *TN*, II, 49 (tr. 802).

⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 66 (tr. 830): they comprised 'Kara and Manikpur, Awadh and Tirhut as far as Bada'un'. *TFS*, 272, 300. *TMS*, 63.

⁸ *TN*, I, 453, and II, 15, 29, 66 (tr. 629, 739, 759, 760, 830). The person in command was usually the muqta' of Awadh. *Ibid.*, II, 72 (tr. 839), 'Hindustan' clearly denotes Awadh, as distinct from the hill-state of Santur; but cf. II, 58-9 (tr. 818), where it also implicitly includes the Chawhan kingdom of Ranthanbor. *TFS*, 57, 141, 181, 182, 257, 300, 301, 328.

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~ give rise to confusion. Barani strikes perhaps the most incongruous note of all when he describes Sultan Balaban's vanquished 'Hindustani' troops (from Awadh) being despoiled by 'Hindus'.⁹

Even in the thirteenth century the Sultanate technically embraced a vast area and comprised several regions which could be termed kingdoms in their own right. Lahore, as 'the residence of Khusraw Malik'¹⁰ (the last Ghaznawid sultan) and successively the appanage of Iltutmish's two elder sons (pp. 30, 46 above), was one. Another was Lakhnawti, wrested by Iltutmish with such difficulty from its Khalaj rulers and extensive enough to be termed a 'clime' (*iqtim*).¹¹ Both Juzjani and Barani speak of the 'throne' (*takht*) or 'kingship' (*mulk*) and the 'insignia of rulership' (*padishahi*) being conferred on those sent to govern Lakhnawti - whether Balaban's son in c. 680/1281 or great amirs like 'Ala' al-Din Jani and (later) his son Qilich Khan Mas'ud.¹² Viceroys of this eminence received certain quasi-imperial privileges such as the right to the durbash, or baton, and the chatr or ceremonial parasol: thus Iltutmish sent his son Nasir al-Din Mahmud in Bengal a red chatr in 626/1229, and Balaban conferred a chatr and a durbash on one son, Bughra Khan, at Lakhnawti, and a chatr on the other, Muhammad, at Multan, later transferring this emblem of authority to Muhammad's son Kaykhusraw when his father died.¹³ By this time Multan had replaced Lahore as the territory allotted to the heir-apparent, though whether Jalal al-Din Khaljl, in conferring the city on his son Erkli Khan, granted him the customary insignia we are not told. The policy seems to have continued into the fourteenth century, when 'Ala' al-Din Khaljl bestowed similar insignia - a red chatr, a robe of honour, and two standards - on his eldest son Khidr Khan at Chitor in 703/1303, in much the same way as he conferred a chatr on the submissive Yadava king of Deogir in 706/1307.¹⁴

The Delhi Sultanate could not, perhaps, be clearly defined in spatial terms. During the thirteenth century it should be seen as a collection of sub-kingdoms,¹⁵ some ruled by Hindu potentates who periodically rendered tribute, others by princes of the sultan's dynasty or by Muslim amirs and muqta's.¹⁶ What ultimately determined the extent of the monarch's rule was recognition by the provincial governors, particularly those of outlying regions. Juzjani's claim that at Radiyya's accession 'all the maliks and amirs from the territory of Lakhnawti as far as Diwal (Daybul) and Damrila

⁹ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁰ *TN*, I, 454 (tr. 631).

¹¹ E.g. *TFS*, 82, 93.

¹² *Ibid.*, 82, 92. *TN*, I, 448, and II, 13, 31, 35, 78.

¹³ *Ibid.*, I, 454 (tr. 630). *TFS*, 66, 92, 110; for Bughra Khan, see also *DGK*, 69.

¹⁴ Yadava king: *KF*, 63-4; *TFS*, 326. Khidr Khan: *DR*, 67; *TFS*, 367; *TMS*, 11.

¹⁵ A point made by Peter Hardy, 'The growth of authority over a conquered political elite: the early

Delhi Sultanate as a possible case study', in John S. Richards (ed.), *Kingship and authority in South Asia* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1978), 203-4.

¹⁶ This is implicit in the views which Barani puts into Balaban's mouth: *TFS*, 93.

~ manifested submission',¹⁷ is (whether true or not) a more idiomatic statement concerning a sultan's authority than any amount of grandiloquence about the throne of 'the whole of the empire of Hindustan'.

Disintegration and recovery

During the thirteenth century the empire created by Iltutmish fluctuated considerably in extent, as the conflicts within the ranks of the aristocracy, particularly the struggle between Ulugh Khan Balaban and his enemies in the 1250s, were often played out also in the provinces. That we know less about developments in territories at a distance from Delhi reflects in some measure the nature of the source material. The regional histories spawned from the fifteenth century onwards by the successor states fail to supplement Juzjani's testimony for the thirteenth, and apart from the period of his exile in Lakhnawi (640-3/1242-6) Juzjani's perspective is always that of the centre and the court. Nevertheless, his *tabaqa* 22 - on the Shamsi maliks - does furnish a good deal of data on the *iqta*'s.

Following Iltutmish's death in 633/1236, Juzjani tells us, respect for 'the kingdom of Hindustan' suffered a sharp decline, so that rivals sprang up on all sides and desired to appropriate its territories.¹⁸ Many of these unspecified enemies would have been Hindu princes, while in Sind the most formidable adversary confronting Iltutmish's successors was initially the former Khwarazmian lieutenant Hasan Qarluq. But the sultan's own officers also profited from the situation at the centre. Juzjani's cryptic remark that the Shamsi slave Sayf al-Din Aybeg, *muqta*' of Uchch, 'grew powerful' on Iltutmish's death might suggest that he briefly asserted his independence of Delhi before he was killed in a riding accident.¹⁹ Sind is expressly included among the territories that submitted to Radiyya, and the next officer in charge of Uchch of whom we are told was her appointee, Hindu Khan, who was removed after her deposition.²⁰ The Mongol invasion of the Sultanate early in 639/1241-2 furnished new opportunities for self-aggrandisement. At Lahore Qaraqush Khan Ikhtiyar al-Din Aytegin, who had been installed there by Radiyya after the suppression of Kabir Khan's revolt in 637/1239-40 (p. 67 above), had supported her attempt to regain the throne in the following year,²¹ and so was at this time technically in rebellion against Bahrain Shah. An army sent from Delhi turned back to besiege the capital and overthrow the sultan; but its purpose - not to relieve Lahore, we are told, but merely to guard the frontier²² -

¹⁷ *TN*, I, 459, omitting Damrila; but cf. BL ms., fol. 182b (also Raverty's tr., 641).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 9(tr. 730-1).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 8-9 (tr. 730-1): the phrase *qui-yi hdl gashta* is omitted in the printed text, but is found in BL ms., fol. 199a.

²⁰ *TN*, I, 459 (tr. 641); II, 19 (tr. 746), for Hindu Khan.

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 462 (tr. 647).

²² *Ibid.*, I, 466 (tr. 657).

~ reflects the fact that under Qaraqush Khan the city was now regarded as lying outside the sultan's dominions. In Multan Kabir Khan Ayaz had proclaimed his independence with the adoption of a *chatr*, and occupied Uchch.²³ At this critical juncture, therefore, neither Lahore nor Sind formed part of the Sultanate.

Kabir Khan Ayaz and his son Taj al-Din Abu Bakr in turn defended their principality against Hasan Qarluq. The rule of this shortlived dynasty, for which Professor Nizami coined the appropriate name

of 'Ayazi', ended with Abu Bakr's death in the early 1240s, when Hasan Qarluq finally obtained Multan.²⁴ Although Sind was recovered by the sultan's forces in the wake of the Mongol invasion of 643/1245,²⁵ the risk of secession grew with the onset of the conflicts of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah's reign. Sind effectively ceased to form part of the Sultanate shortly afterwards, when Kushlu Khan, thwarted in his joint bid with Qutluq Khan to seize Delhi (pp. 74-5 above), appealed to the Mongols. Juzjani, writing when the Mongols had dismantled Multan's fortifications, betrays by his phrasing that Sind now lay outside 'the borders of the empire of Delhi' (*sarhaddhd-yi mamalik-i Dihli*).²⁶

Lahore is described as ruined (*khardb*) in the wake of the Mongol sack in Jumada II 639/December 1241,²⁷ although the city seems to have been held for a couple of years by Ikhtiyar al-Din Yizbeg (Toghri Khan).²⁸ There after Juzjani makes little mention of Lahore,²⁹ which like the regions lying beyond it, in the far north-west, had apparently come to form part of the Mongol dominions. From c. 651/1253 we find the renegade prince Jalal al-Din Mas'ud b. Iltutmish at Lahore as a Mongol client (p. III below). He maintained himself there only for a short time, being dislodged by Shir Khan on the latter's return from the Mongol court.³⁰ Although he once more became an ally of the Delhi government, Shir Khan soon began to evince designs on his old iqta' of Tabarhindh, which was currently held by Arslan Khan, and engaged in conflict with him too. At this point the court interposed, winning Shir Khan over with the grant of Tabarhindh and 'the whole of the territory and iqta's which he had previously held', including presumably Lahore. Yet the place was doubtless impossible to hold, and Shir Khan seemingly abandoned it. When in 657/1259 the sultan obliged

²³ *Ibid.*, II, 6 (tr. 727).

²⁴ At Uchch Hindu Khan's officials, however, remained in place: for this and Hasan Qarluq's seizure of the city, *ibid.*, II, 169-70 (tr. 1153). 'Ayazi dynasty': HN, 249, 255, 260. On Abu Bakr, see Siddiqi, 'Historical information', 64.

²⁵ TN, II, 28, 37 (tr. **758, 781**).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 39 (tr. 785); and cf. also II, 86 (tr. 860).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 169 (tr. 1153). For the date, see below, p. 105 and n.12.

²⁸ TN, II, 30 (tr. 762).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 43, has Lahore being granted to Shir Khan along with Tabarhindh in 643/1245, but cf. BL ms., fol. 211 (also Raverty's tr., 793), where Lahore is omitted.

³⁰ TN, II, 44 (tr. 793).

~ him to exchange his extensive assignment with Nusrat Khan, the muqta' of Bhayana, there is no mention of Lahore among the latter's new holdings.³¹

To the east, Awadh could be characterized as another problematic region in the 1250s. Qutluq Khan, who was sent there after his removal from court in 653/1255, encroached on the territory of Bada'un, and defeated a force under its muqta' *Teniz Khan, reinforced by troops from Delhi under Begtemur Or Khan-i Rukni; Or Khan was killed.³² In 654/1256 Awadh was entrusted to Arslan Khan, who had been a prominent supporter of Ulugh Khan Balaban two years before; and the new muqta' performed sterling service by obstructing Qutluq Khan's efforts to occupy Kara. But then, says Juzjani, Arslan Khan's attitude towards the government underwent a change and he grew rebellious. When preparations were under way at Delhi early in 656/1258 for a campaign to drive the Mongols from Sind, Arslan Khan and Qilich Khan Jalal al-Din Mas'ud, the son of 'Ala' al-Din Jani and muqta' of Kara, neglected to bring their contingents. Ulugh Khan Balaban marched on Kara, and the two recalcitrant amirs were brought to heel.³³ Qilich Khan received a patent for Lakhnawti; Arslan Khan was transferred to Kara, although as we shall see his new iqta' was not of a size to contain his ambitions.

Beyond Awadh, tenuous links bound Delhi to the distant Muslim-held territories in Bengal. In the fourteenth century this region would be known as the 'lowlands' (*furudast*),²⁴ to distinguish it from the 'upper country' (*bald-dast*), which vaguely embraced the north-west and the lands beyond the Indus towards Transoxiana. 'Afif, a westerner of course, makes the 'lowlanders' (*furudastan*) confess to being no match for those from the uplands (*baladastdn*).²⁵ Yet to conquer and hold Bengal - 'a land for foot-soldiers' (*zamln-i rijdla*), as the Tughluqid Sultan Firuz Shah would describe it in 1354³⁶ - was no easy task. It was proverbially wealthy - 'a Hell full of dainties' (*duzakh ast pur-i nimat*), to quote Ibn Battuta.³⁷ None of the amirs of Hindustan, says Barani, could rival in terms of men, elephants or treasure whoever controlled Bengal; and the conduct of many of its governors during the thirteenth century fully vindicated the nickname 'Bulghakpur' ('city of insurrection') which he says men gave to Lakhnawi.³⁸

After Iltutmish's death, the sultans had to recognize the autonomy of

³¹ *Ibid.*, II, 42-3 (tr. 788); for the exchange, see also II, 44 (tr. 794).

³² *Ibid.*, I, 490, and II, 29 (tr. 703, 759-60).

³³ *Ibid.*, II, 34-5, 77-8 (tr. 768-9, 847-8). For Qilich Khan, who has frequently been confused with other grandees, see appendix II.

³⁴ *TFS*, 189. *SFS*, 33, 48. Bihamadkhani, fol. 421b, uses the term more broadly, for the regions east of the Yamuna.

³⁵ 'Afif, 153; for the sense, see Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 127.

³⁶ 'Afif, 119. On this phrase, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 312-13, who translates it as 'a land of foot-soldiers': in view of the phrase that follows regarding the difficulty of life among the islands, I suspect that the sultan meant, rather, 'a land [fit only] for foot-soldiers', i.e. that the heavily armoured horsemen of the Delhi Sultanate were ineffective here.

³⁷ *IB*, IV, 210 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 867).

³⁸ *TFS*, 82.

~ their representatives at Lakhnawi while receiving little in return. Since 631/ 1233-4 the muqta' of both Bihar and Lakhnawi had been the Shamsi slave 'Izz al-Din Toghril Toghan Khan. The geographical location of his iqta' conferred on Toghan Khan a good deal of independence, and once Iltutmish was dead he engaged with impunity, it seems, in warfare against the muqta' of Lakhnor (the region on the west bank of the Ganges), slaying him and appropriating part of his territory. Both Radiyya and Bahram Shah nevertheless legitimized Toghan Khan's irregular actions by sending him a red chatr and standards; and after the accession of Mas'ud Shah, Toghan Khan dropped all pretence of loyalty to the Delhi court. An inscription from Bihar dated 640/1242 accords him a variety of grandiose titles and makes no reference to the sultan. In this same year he advanced into the Kara-Manikpur region in an abortive attempt to occupy Awadh.³⁹

Following a disastrous campaign against the Hindu kingdom of Jajnagar (Orissa) late in 641/early in 1244, however, Toghan Khan asked the sultan for reinforcements. Mas'ud Shah thereupon despatched to Lakhnawi not merely a red chatr and a standard but a robe of honour and an ornate tent. But these attentions were apparently designed simply to throw Toghan Khan off guard. We learn elsewhere that Taj al-Din Sanjar *Kirit Khan died from an arrow-wound outside the city of Bihar in an obscure conflict soon after 640/1242,⁴⁰ which - unless the place had been lost by the Muslims and the enemy was a Hindu king - suggests that the government may already have been attempting to retrieve Bihar. Now, on Toghan Khan's appeal for help, orders were issued to the muqta' of Awadh, Temur Khan, and other commanders to move into Bengal. When this supposedly relieving force reached Lakhnawi, it engaged in hostilities not with the Hindus, who had withdrawn, but with Toghan Khan. Compelled to come to terms, he surrendered the province to Temur Khan and accompanied the other amirs back to Delhi. At this juncture Mas'ud Shah's

government indulged in another attempt to play the two enemies off against each other, granting Toghan Khan in 643/1245 Temiir Khan's iqta' of Awadh. Temiir Khan's reaction to the seizure of Awadh from his officers is not described; but he remained in control of Lakhnawti until both men died, on the same day in Shawwal 644/March 1247, during the reign of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah.

The history of Lakhnawti over the next few years is obscure. An inscription of 647/1249 commemorates as the current muqta' Jalal al-Din Mas'ud (the later Qilich Khan), son of Ala' al-Din Jam.⁴¹ But he is not mentioned at this stage by JuzjanI, who next names Ikhtiyar al-Din Yiiizbeg

³⁹ It was on the borders of Kara that JuzjanI waited on him before accompanying him back to Lakhnawti: *TN*, I, 469 (tr. 662-3). For Toghan Khan's career, see *ibid.*, II, 13-17 (tr. 736-42). Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 16-17; *RCEA*, XI, 143 (no. 4215).

⁴⁰ *TN*, II, 27-8 (tr. 757).

⁴¹ Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 19-22; *RCEA*, XI, 211 (no. 4320).

~ Toghril Khan in command of the province. The career of this compulsive rebel epitomizes the problems posed for the government by over-mighty subjects. On the accession of Mas'ud Shah, Yuzbeg had been entrusted with Tabarhindh. Then - most probably at the time of that monarch's expedition to Uchch in 643/1245-6 - he was transferred to Lahore, where he first engaged in conflict with an otherwise unknown malik and then defied the sultan's authority. As we have noted, Ulugh Khan Balaban secured for him both a pardon and a new iqta' at Qinnawj, where he seems to have again proved refractory, probably in support of Balaban. Reduced to obedience by an expedition under Qutb al-Din Hasan b. 'Ali, he was brought back to court and subsequently assigned Awadh. It is likely that he supported Ulugh Khan Balaban's return to power in 652/1254. From this date, however, Yiiizbeg Toghril Khan is found in command at Lakhnawti. Here a major victory over the raja of Jainagar, who had successfully resisted Toghan Khan's aggression over ten years previously, encouraged him to assert his independence of Delhi; he assumed three chatrs and had coins struck and the khutba read in his own name as Sultan Mughith al-Din. He died a few years later, in the course of a disastrous invasion of neighbouring Kamrup (Assam).⁴²

Yiiizbeg Toghril Khan's death seems to have occurred before Safar 655/ February-March 1257, when coins were again being struck at Lakhnawti in the name of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah.⁴³ At the end of 656/1258 Lakhnawti was conferred once more on Qilich Khan Jalal al-Din Mas'ud-i Jani, who had recently been guilty of insubordination along with Arslan Khan. But only a few months later, in Jumada II 657/June 1259, Ulugh Khan Balaban persuaded the sultan to recognize as muqta' 'Izz al-Din Balaban-i Yiiizbegi, whom we have already encountered as the son-in-law of the rebel Qutlugh Khan and who had just secured the court's favour by sending impressive gifts to Delhi.⁴⁴ In the event, however, Balaban-i Yiiizbegi lost the province not to Qilich Khan (who is not heard of again) but to the latter's confederate. Acting without sanction from Delhi and giving out even to his own sons and troops that he was engaged in a plundering expedition into infidel Malwa, Arslan Khan left Kara and marched swiftly on Lakhnawti. The city was taken and sacked, and Balaban-i Yiiizbegi, who returned from operations in eastern Bengal (Bang) to offer battle to the invaders, was captured and put to death. This was the state of affairs in the east when Juzjani stopped writing in 658/1260.⁴⁵

⁴² *TN*, II, 30-3 (tr. 762-6), for Toghril Khan's biography. His career is conveniently summarized by Habibullah, *Foundation*, 129-30. For his coins, see now Roma Niyogi, 'A new coin of Mughisu-d-Din Yuzbak of Bengal', *JNSI*40 (1978-9), 136-8.

⁴³ *CMSD*, 55 (no. 225C). ^M *TN*, I, 495, and II, 35, 78 (tr. 712, 770, 848-9).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 35 (tr. 769-72). Laiq Ahmad, 'Kara, a medieval Indian city', *IC* 55 (1981), 85, confuses the events of these years and assumes that Arslan Khan's sack of Lakhnawti preceded the recalcitrance mentioned above.

~ Barani's testimony may indicate that Arslan Khan remained defiant in Lakhnawti until his death,

since the despatch of elephants from Bengal to Delhi upon Balaban's accession in 664/1266 by his son and successor, Tatar Khan Muhammad, was viewed as something out of the ordinary.⁴⁶

Events in these outlying regions highlight the restrictions on the power of the sovereign. Amirs frequently revolted; in distant Bengal, at least, they might do so with impunity for some years. In order to assert itself, the government on more than one occasion resorted to acts of duplicity. The sultan might confer a rebel's territory on a rival only to make use of the dispossessed amir as a counterweight to the now over-powerful commander who had taken his place, as seems to have transpired in 642/1244 first in the removal of Toghan Khan from Lakhnawtl and then in his despatch to Awadh. Sometimes the court made virtually simultaneous grants of the same *iqta'* to two different nobles and left them to fight it out. This occurred in 653/1255, when the conferment of Bahraich on Taj al-Din Sanjar Siwistani followed suspiciously close on the heels of its allocation to 'Imad al-Din Rayhan (p. 74). It may have been the policy regarding Lakhnawti in 656/1258, when the regime's contradictory actions defy interpretation. Perhaps the court had briefly envisaged the removal of Balaban-i Yiizbegi, as a surviving connection of Qutlugh Khan. But it is equally possible that the reconciliation between Qilich Khan and the regime at Delhi was merely superficial and that the grant of Lakhnawtl represented an attempt to double-cross him.

In the latter part of Mahmud Shah's reign the Delhi empire had contracted to the point where it embraced an area hardly larger than that ruled at his accession by Iltutmish. When Juzjani wrote, it might well have appeared to be in a state of disintegration. Why it did not disintegrate, we shall probably never fully understand. As regards the western provinces, a partial explanation is surely furnished by divisions within the Mongol ranks (see below, pp. 108-10, 115-16). But such information as we have concerning the Sultanate's internal history furnishes no answer. Between Juzjani's completion of his *Tabaqat* in 658/1260 and the commencement of Barani's history with the accession of Balaban stands a hiatus of six years that may well have been crucial for the Sultanate's survival.

To say that the government's authority over its distant provinces was restored during Balaban's own reign is to beg a large question, for the treatment of events by Barani, 'Isami and Sirhindi is far less detailed than Juzjani's handling of the vicissitudes of Mahmud Shah's era; it cannot be emphasized sufficiently that we know more about Balaban as khan and na'ib than we do of his time as sultan. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that under Balaban some kind of *rassemblement* occurred of the territories

⁴⁶ TFS 53; see also 66, where he is called Muhammad and described as '*padishah* of Lakhnawti.

~ that had at one time acknowledged Iltutmish. He is known to have led an army to Lahore within a few years of his accession and to have restored and repopulated the city,⁴⁷ so that it can once more be deemed to have formed part of the Sultanate; though it is surely significant that we find no reference to its being granted as *iqta'* again before the fourteenth century. Sind was also recovered. At some point towards the end of Mahmud Shah's reign, Kushlu Khan lost control of the province, in obscure circumstances. In a problematic passage, 'Isami says that Ulugh Khan Balaban profited from Kiishlu Khan's absence to seize Multan.⁴⁸ His disappearance may be connected with the advent of the Neguderi Mongols, which will be examined later (see pp. 115-16). At any rate Balaban was able to instal as viceroy in Sind his own elder son Muhammad (Khan-i Shahid),⁴⁹ who governed until his untimely death in battle with the Mongols at the very end of 683/in March 1285.

Lakhnawti appears to have been regained with comparative ease, since Tatar Khan died in, or soon after, 665/1266—⁷⁵⁰ and Balaban despatched his own representatives to the province. The sources differ, Barani and 'Isami alleging that the sultan's ghulam Toghril was sent out to Lakhnawtl as governor (*wall*), while Sirhindi has Balaban appointing Amin Khan (i.e. Aytegin-i Mui-yi Daraz; see p. 78) to the post, with Toghril as his deputy (na'ib).⁵¹ In any event, the province proved no less turbulent for Balaban than for his Shamsid predecessors. Toghril rebelled in *c.* 678/1279-80, and in a gesture strikingly reminiscent of Yuzbeg a generation earlier-assumed the style of Sultan Mughith al-Din. He defied two successive campaigns by the sultan's lieutenants before he was overwhelmed by an army under Balaban in person, probably in 680/1281-2.⁵²

Balaban then entrusted Lakhnawtl to his younger son, Bughra Khan Mahmud, who proclaimed his own sovereignty after the old sultan's death in 685/1287, when he found his expectations of the throne cheated by his son Kayqubad, and briefly occupied Awadh.⁵³ The status of Lakhnawtl after father and son were reconciled in 686/1287 is therefore unclear; but

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 61. *TMS*, 40. Cf. also *FS*, 164 (tr. 291).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 154-5 (tr. 278-80).

⁴⁹ *TFS*, 66, dating this after the death of Shir Khan, which at 64-5 is said to have occurred 'four or five years' into the reign.

⁵⁰ For an inscription of Tatar Khan dated 665/1266-7, see Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 23-5; *RCEA*, XII, 121-2 (no. 4854).

⁵¹ *TFS*, 81. *FS*, 165 (tr. 292). *TMS*, 40.

⁵² *TFS*, 81, 83-92; at 81, Barani places Toghril's revolt 'fifteen or sixteen years' after Balaban's accession, i.e. in 677-8/1278-80 if we start from his incorrect year 662 for the sultan's enthronement. This can be reconciled with the report on Balaban's campaign against Jajnagar (Orissa) found in *RI*, V, 5-13, and dated 5 Shawwal 680/17 January 1282 (*ibid.*, 13). Firishta, I, 138, also dates the revolt precisely to 678, though on what authority is unclear. *FS*, 164 (tr. 291), puts the rising a mere eight years after Balaban's accession, and later, 168 (tr. 296), supplies the impossible year 670.

⁵³ *QS*, 36, 44-6.

~ following the transfer of power in Delhi to Jalal al-Din Khalji in 689/1290 Bughra Khan and his successors certainly acted as independent monarchs. Epigraphical evidence shows that their authority extended also over the Muslim territory in southern Bihar.⁵⁴ This branch of the Ghiyathid dynasty was shortlived. Bughra Khan's young son and successor, Rukn al-Din Kayka'us, who died around the turn of the century, was followed first by an obscure ruler named Shams al-Din Dawlat Shah and then by Shams al-Din Firuz Shah, who is probably identical with Kayka'us's amir Firuz-i Aytegin and who founded a new dynasty.⁵⁵ At some point 'Ala' al-Din Khalji may have attacked Bengal;⁵⁶ but it was only with the outbreak of a struggle among Firuz Shah's sons, leading to the intervention of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq Shah in 724/1324, that the region again became a province of the Delhi Sultanate (see below, pp. 200-1).

The iqtai'and provincial government

At the heart of the thirteenth-century Sultanate lay the *khalisa* or 'reserved' lands - what might be called the 'royal demesne' - from which the sultan's own officials collected revenue directly and which provided his most immediate resources. Regarding the full extent of the *khalisa* we have no information, although it is usually taken to have included the environs (*hawali*) of Delhi.⁵⁷ Other territories were granted out as *iqta'*. The term '*iqta'*' applied not only to the large assignments enjoyed by great amirs but also to the smaller ones established by Iltutmish in the Doab, according to Barani, who tells us that each grantee (*iqta'dar*) was expected to raise from one to three horsemen.⁵⁸ It is possible that Amir Khusraw's father, Sayf-i Shamsi (d. c. 659/1261), held such an *iqta'*.⁵⁹ [Early in his reign Sultan Balaban sought to resume many of these small *iqta'*s into the *khalisa*, on the grounds that the grantees were now too old to serve or had died and had transmitted their holdings to heirs who performed no service; in the event, says Barani, he was dissuaded by the kotwal Fakhr al-Din.⁶⁰ Although the chronicler does not say so, the episode was doubtless a measure of

⁵⁴ A. A. Kadiri, 'Inscriptions of the Sultans of Bengal from Bihar', *EIAPS* (1961), 35-6; Q. Ahmad, *Corpus of Arabic and Persian inscriptions of Bihar (AH 640-1200)* (Patna, 1973), 9-10 (no. 3).

⁵⁵ On Dawlat Shah, see John S. Deyell, 'A reassessment of the new coin of Daulat Shah of Bengal', *JNSI* 41 (1979), 82-90. For Firuz Shah's line, see Abdul Majed Khan, 'The historicity of Ibn Batuta re

Shamsuddin Firuz Shah, the so-called Balbani king of Bengal', *IHQ* 18 (1942), 65-70; R. C. Majumdar, *History of mediaeval Bengal* (Calcutta, 1973), 18.

⁵⁶ According to the anonymous translator of *Bahr al-Hayat*, IOL Persian ms. 432 (Ethe, no. 2002). *TFS*, 227-9, 254, speaks only of his designs on Bengal. An ode in *GK* (tr. in ED, III, 543) refers to a campaign in Bihar and the seizure of Bengal elephants from Lakhnawti.

⁵⁷ On the *khalisa*, see W. H. Moreland, *The agrarian system of Moslem India* (Cambridge, 1929), 29 and n.1; more generally, A. K. S. Lambton, 'Khalisa', *Enc.Isl*²

⁵⁸ *TFS*, 62.

⁵⁹ On him, see *DGK*, 66, 67: he died when Khusraw was seven.

⁶⁰ *TFS*, 60, 61-4.

~ Balaban's need for fresh resources with which to reward his own retinue who had supported his accession.

Our information about the conferment of iqta's is of course more plentiful for the larger kind; and it is also far greater where Shamsi ghulams are concerned than it is for nobles of free status, about whom we know very little. Some regions appear regularly as iqta's in Juzjani's *Tabaqdt*. Iltutmish had at one time held 'the iqta' of the town (*qasaba*) of Baran with its dependencies (*madafat*), for example, and Baran was frequently granted out as iqta' during his reign and those of his Shamsid successors.⁶¹ It is unclear whether certain major offices automatically carried with them the grant of particular localities. Certainly, a close link can be detected between the office of wazir and the town of Kol; though this ceased with the overthrow of Muhaddhab al-Din in 640/1242.⁶² In the biography of Aybeg-i Shamsi-yi 'Ajami we read of 'the iqta's of the *amir-i dad*, and Juzjani's phrasing suggests at least that in his capacity of *dddbeg* of the empire that amir received the iqta' of Palwal and Kama.⁶³ By Kayqubad's reign, there seems to be a clear connection between the office of *'arid* and the iqta' of Baran.⁶⁴

[There are indications that a few major strongholds were 'reserved' (*mahrusa*) as part of the sultan's *khalisa* and were consequently not granted as iqta'. The place most consistently referred to as *mahrusa* is Gwaliyor following its recapture in 630/1232-3.⁶⁵ On that occasion Iltutmish-appointed an *amir-i dad* and a castellan (*kotwal*).⁶⁶ Subsequently, when its troops were placed under the authority of the muqta' of Bhayana and Sultankot, he was instructed to make Gwaliyor his headquarters and is said to have held the intendancy (*shihnagi*) of that territory (*wilayat*).⁶⁷ Certain other important towns are referred to as *mahrusa*, but their status appears to have varied. The city of Bihar, for instance, is once termed *mahrusa*, but it is also spoken of as an iqta'.⁶⁸ Tabarhindh is more often described as *mahrusa*,⁶⁹ and accordingly we find Qaraqush Khan appointed as 'intendant (*shihna*) of the private domain (*khalisat*) of Tabarhindh'.⁷⁰ On one or two other occasions the relationship between the city and its commander is unclear: *Kezlik Khan is described as the 'malik' of Tabarhindh and Arslan Khan is said to have been entrusted with the *mahrusa* of Tabarhindh.⁷¹ Similarly, although Juzjani applies the term *mahrusa* to Uchch when

⁶¹ *TN*, I, 443, and II, 8, 21, 25, 27, 29 (tr. 604, 730, 748, 754, 757 [with Bada'un in error], 759).

⁶² Z. A. Desai, 'Inscriptions of the Mamluk Sultans of Delhi', *EIAPS* (1966), 8-11; *TN*, I, 456, 469 (tr. 634, 662). For grantees among the military aristocracy later in the thirteenth century, see *ibid.*, II, 42 (tr. 787); *RCEA*, XI, 258-9 (no. 4394); *TFS*, 66, 88, 113.

⁶³ *TN*, II, 41 (tr. 790-1).

⁶⁴ *TFS*, 134, 170.

⁶⁵ *TN*, I, 460, and II, 19, 24, 25, 78, 214.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 448 (tr. 620 renders *kotwal* as 'seneschal').

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 10-11 (tr. 732).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 9, 28 (tr. 731; and cf. also 757).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 34, 38, 43, 44 (tr. 723, 767, 784, 792). ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 20 (tr. 746).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, I, 446 (tr. 613), for *Kezlik Khan; II, 34 (tr. 767), for Arslan Khan.

~ describing its conquest by Ilutnish in 625/1228 and its conferment on *Kezlik Khan, we read that in 629/1231-2 'the city and iqta' of Uchch' were granted to Sayf al-Din Aybeg.⁷² One is tempted to infer from this wording that the fortified city itself formed no part of an iqta^c grant and that whatever authority the muqta' wielded here rested on a different basis. But this is clearly not the case with Tabarhindh at those times when it figures unequivocally as an iqta'. Ikhtiyar al-Din *Altunapa is described as its muqta' under Radiyya (at a period when it is nevertheless designated as *mahrusa*);⁷³ 'Ala' al-Din Mas'ud Shah granted the city as iqta' to Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg (Toghrih Khan);⁷⁴ and later in the reign of the same sultan we read that 'the fortress of Tabarhindh was assigned to Shir Khan as iqta' and the whole of the dependencies (*maddfdt*) of the *mahrusa* of Tabarhindh were bestowed upon him'.⁷⁵ Such terminology precludes any possibility that the iqta' grant extended only to the hinterland and did not apply to the stronghold itself.

In some cases the terms in which a grant is couched vary between one recipient and another; and we even find the same grant described in different language at two different points in the *Tabaqdt*. Kabir Khan is said to have been granted 'the city and fortress of Multan, its townships (*qasabat*) and its districts near and far (*atrdf-u hawali*)', and appointed to the governorship (*aydlat*); elsewhere he is duly termed *wall* of Multan.⁷⁶ Later, however, when held by Qaraqush Khan and a second time by Kabir Khan himself, Multan is called an iqta'.⁷⁷ 'The territory (*wildyat*) of Awadh and its dependencies (*maddfdt*)' were allotted to Temur Khan by Radiyya, and Qutlugh Khan received the 'government' (*aydlat*) of Awadh in 653/1255;⁷⁸ but elsewhere these officers are referred to as muqta's of Awadh, which on other occasions also is expressly said to have constituted an iqta'.⁷⁹ In rare cases, we gain the impression that the muqta' held the specific rank of *amir-idad* in the town entrusted to him, as did Aybeg-i Shamsi-yi 'Ajami in Kasrak and subsequently in Baran.⁸⁰ Even in the case of those provinces with more prestigious connotations, like Lahore, the status of the grant probably varied with that of the grantee. Within a few years, in the hands of amirs rather than a prince of the blood, Lahore, though still at one point designated as a *mamlakat*, was being assigned as iqta'.⁸¹

Vague and contradictory terminology prevents us from imposing neat categories on thirteenth-century arrangements. We clearly cannot expect consistency from our sources, and perhaps in any case the distinction between gubernatorial status (*aydlat*) and that of muqta' is of no practical significance. Although the iqta' was in origin a revenue assignment, the

⁷² *Ibid.*; II, 3, 8 (cf. Raverty's tr., 724, 730).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, I, 460; cf. I, 462 (twice).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 30.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 43.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 455-6, and II, 5.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 20, 163.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 17, 69.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 458, 489, and II, 16, 17, 27.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 42 (tr. 791).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I, 455, 459, 460, 465, and II, 7, 30, 163; also II, 6, for the *mamlakat* of Lahore.

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muqta' was not some remote pensionary or military aide at court who had no connection with the territory in his grant, but an officer who incurred genuine administrative responsibilities. Earlier in the century Hasan-i Nizami had inserted in his *Taj al-Ma'athir* the instructions purportedly given to the unnamed amir who had received the *ayalat* of the newly conquered fortress of Banaras. He was to care for the interests of both the men of the sword and the men of the pen, to protect them from the infidel, to oversee the labours of the peasants (*ra'ayd*), to ensure the security of the fortresses, and to discharge the requirements of charity and good works. The injunctions said to have been issued to Husam al-Din Oghulbeg at Kol a year or so later are not dissimilar. His duties include not only the waging of *Jihad*, the guarding of highways and the encouragement of trade, but also honour and preferment to members of the 'religious class' and the administration of justice without distinction between those of good birth and the common people.⁸²

Some muqta's, if our sources can be trusted, attained these high standards. The Bhayana region owed its flourishing condition to the efforts of Baha' al-Din Toghril, Mu'izz al-Din's ghulam commander who had become its first muqta' in 592/1196.⁸³ 'Whatever district (*ndhiyat*) or iqta' or territory (*wilayat*) was placed under his control', says Juzjani of Aybeg-i Shamsi-yi 'Ajami, 'has flourished, and the generality of the subjects (*'dmma-yi ra'dya*) have been content.'⁸⁴ The same author assures us that when the two uncles of 'Ala' al-Din Mas'ud Shah (one of them the future sultan Mahmud Shah) went to their newly conferred grants, they busied themselves not only with the holy war but also with improving the conditions of the peasantry.⁸⁵ Of *Kezlik Khan (d. 629/1231-2) at Uchch, it is said that he strove for the security and repose of the peasants and performed good works and acts of charity.⁸⁶ Balaban is praised by Barani for bringing prosperity to every territory conferred on him as malik or as khan; and Juzjani says that when he first arrived at Hansi he 'gave his attention to cultivation (*'imarat*), and the people derived contentment from the monuments of his justice and the rays of his generosity'.⁸⁷ So too another future sultan, Jalal al-Din Khalji, allegedly caused his assignment of Payal to flourish.⁸⁸ None of this necessarily testifies, of course, to an enlightened outlook on the part of the muqta'. He had a vested interest in the material condition of the tract of which he enjoyed the revenues; and possibly in any case such eulogies, like the instructions cited by Hasan-i Nizami or the exhortations later ascribed to Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq,⁸⁹ tell us at least as much about what was expected of the muqta' as about what was

⁸² *Taj*, fols. 135b-136a, for Banaras; fols. 138a-141a for Kol.

⁸³ *TN*, I, 421 (tr. 545, 547).

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 41 (tr. 789-90 modified).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 470 (tr. 665).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 5 (tr. 724).

⁸⁷ *TFS*, 45. *TN*, II, 52 (tr. 807 modified).

⁸⁸ *FS*, 201 (tr. 364).

⁸⁹ *TFS*, 430.

~ actually accomplished. Hardy's reminder that the thirteenth-century muqta' was one 'commissioned by the sultan to take charge not of a local territorial unit but of a local situation'⁹⁰ is surely salutary. The task of the grantee may have consisted primarily in receiving the tribute from the more

compliant Hindu chiefs at some strongpoint and using it as a base for military operations to extract further tribute and plunder from their less accommodating peers.⁹¹ In a large number of cases, Juzjani can find little more to say of an amir's activities within a particular iqta' than that he chastised Hindu 'recalcitrants' (*mutamarriddn*) and 'rebels' (*mufsidan*), and destroyed their lairs (*mawdsat*).⁹² Few are credited with founding mosques and implanting Islamic institutions.⁹³

It is possible that in the latter half of the thirteenth century the relative wealth and importance of an iqta' may have been expressed in terms of the number of horsemen the grantee maintained. Thus Barani tells us that Balaban's slave Malik *Buqubuq, muqta' of Bada'un, had 4,000 horsemen in his service (*chakir*), and that Malik Nusrat-i Sabah, muqta' of Ganuri and Chawpala (now Moradabad) in the reign of Jalal al-Din Khalji, had 700 horsemen.⁹⁴ These figures appear modest alongside the capacity of Shir Khan, who a generation earlier had held Sunnam, Lahore, Deopapur and 'the iqta's in the path of the Mongol advance', to raise 'several thousands',⁹⁵ or the army assembled by Taj al-Din Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq at Bada'un in 640/ 1242, which numbered 'eight thousand horse and numerous infantry and paiks' and incurred the jealousy of unnamed rivals.⁹⁶

It is to be assumed - though we have little information on the fiscal aspects of the iqta' - that in this period local revenues outside the khalisa were delivered to the muqta's appointees rather than to the central government in Delhi. Within his territory the muqta' in turn distributed iqta' grants with a view not only to recruiting warriors but also to enlisting the administrative capacities of the learned. Among the kindnesses Juzjani received at the hands of Taj al-Din Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq when he visited Bada'un in 640/1242 was the bestowal of an iqta'; though 'destiny and fortune' beckoned the chronicler on towards Lakhnawti.⁹⁷ There seems no reason to doubt that in the Shamsid era the system functioned much as it did later in the century, under Balaban and Jalal al-Din Khalji. The muqta' retained so much of the revenue (*khardj*) from his grant as he required to pay and fit out his troops, or for other administrative purposes, and

⁹⁰ Hardy, 'Growth of authority', 203.

⁹¹ I. Habib, 'Economic history of the Delhi Sultanate', 295.

⁹² *TN*, II, 7-8, 17, 27, 42, 47, 52 (tr. 728, 743, 757, 787, 799, 809). For the *mawas*, see p. 125 below.

⁹³ *TN*, II, 26 (tr. 755).

⁹⁴ *TFS*, 40, for *Buqubuq, and 204 (reading corrected from BL ms, fol. 110b), for Nusrat-i Sabah.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁹⁶ *TN*, II, 26 (tr. 755).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* (tr. 756).

~ remitted the surplus (*fawadil*) to the capital.⁹⁸ Barani indicates that by Balaban's era the sultan nominated an accountant (*khwaja*) to operate within the province alongside the muqta', reflecting the government's concern to ascertain the extent of the revenue available.⁹⁹ Balaban also planted informers (*baridan*) in the iqta's to report on the activities of his amirs and their families.¹⁰⁰ Barani tells us that Balaban's son Muhammad personally conveyed the surplus revenue from Sind to his father's court every year and that he brought three years' revenue following the sultan's return from Bengal.¹⁰¹ We have no information regarding the proportion of the surplus. In exceptional circumstances, as for particularly demanding military operations, the muqta' was permitted to keep the surplus also. So it was that in c. 694/1295 the future sultan 'Ala' al-Din was allowed to retain the surplus revenue from his iqta's of Kara and Awadh on the pretext of heading an expedition to Chanderl,¹⁰² though in the event he made for Deogir and won the booty that enabled him to overthrow his uncle the sultan.

What proportion of his time the muqta' was expected or able to spend in his territory is unclear. By

the 1290s we begin to hear of a deputy (*na'ib*) in some iqta's. Barani's father became both *na'ib* and *khwaja* of Baran at 'Ala' al-Din's accession.¹⁰³ His responsibilities, presumably, included the super-vision of revenue collection and the fitting out of troops. A muqta' with major administrative commitments in Delhi was evidently not expected to see to these matters in person. Juzjani, describing how Ulugh Khan Balaban in 653/1255 had to go to Hansi to oversee the mustering of contingents from the Siwalik region (Hansi, Sarsati, Jind and Barwala), which had been subject to delay, appears to suggest that this was unusual.¹⁰⁴

Those who fell foul of the government could suffer banishment to their iqta's, a fate met with relatively frequently in the pages of the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*. To draw examples from the power struggle of the 1250s, Ulugh Khan Balaban, when he forfeited the office of *na'ib* in 651/1253, was ordered to retire to Hansi; in 653/1255 his enemies Rayhan and Qutlugh Khan were dismissed respectively to Bada'un and to Awadh; and in 655/1257 any of their confederates among the religious aristocracy of Delhi who held an iqta' in the vicinity (*hawati*) of the capital were ordered to take up residence there.¹⁰⁵ Almost four decades later, certain of the amirs accused of conspiring against Sultan Jalal al-Din Khalji were punished by being sent to their iqta's for one year, a penalty which Barani evidently intended his

⁹⁸ *TFS*, 164, 220-1. I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', in Raychaudhuri and Habib, 69, more cautiously, suggests that the despatch of the surplus from the iqta's was being demanded 'well before the fall of Balban's dynasty'.

⁹⁹ *TFS*, 36-7 (in the iqta' of Amroha); and see I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 69-70.

¹⁰⁰ *TFS*, 40, 44-5.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 69, 108-9.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 220-1.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 248.

¹⁰⁴ *TN*, II, 70-1 (tr. 837); see also I, 490 (tr. 703).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 486, 489, 492 (tr. 693, 700, 701, 708); also II, 64, 69 (tr. 826, 834).

~ readers to view as excessively lenient.¹⁰⁶ Bada'un often figures as the destination of those who lapsed from favour at court, as it was for Badr al-Din Sonqur in 638/1241, for Kushlu Khan in 649/1251 and for Rayhan three years later (in each case, as its newly appointed muqta'), and for the deposed qadi Imad al-Din Shafurqani in 646/1248.¹⁰⁷ The fate of Qadi Jalal Kasani, who was implicated in the Sidi Muwallih affair, was to be sent off to Bada'un as qadi.¹⁰⁸ Under Sultan Balaban the penalties were harsher. His slave Malik *Buqubuq, *sar-i jnddr* and muqta' of Bada'un, was executed for slaying a chamberlain (*farrash*), and the *qorabeg* Haybat Khan, who held the iqta' of Awadh, narrowly escaped the same sentence for likewise killing a man.¹⁰⁹ But perhaps these were the exceptions.

Evidence from the period of Ulugh Khan's ascendancy as *na'ib*, from 653/1255 onwards, suggests that certain grants and offices were becoming hereditary, especially those held by the religious aristocracy, who tended to enjoy incomes exempt from any kind of service and known as *in'amdt*. Juzjani received grants in this category from Ulugh Khan Balaban, namely a village in the Hansi region, of which he took possession in 647/1249-50, and another village (in an unspecified location), together with a pension in cash, on the completion of his *Tabaqat*.¹¹⁰ When the *Shaykh al-Islam* Jamal al-Din Bistami and the qadi Kabir al-Din died in 657/1259, their offices (*manasib*) were conferred on their sons; and in like fashion the *in'dmat* of the imam Hamid al-Din of Marigala, who died a few months later, passed to his children. It comes as a greater surprise to find this trend affecting military and administrative office. Kishli Khan was succeeded as *amir-hajib* in this same year by his son 'Ala' al-Din Muhammad, and in Balaban's reign the *'arid* was followed by his son.¹¹¹ In the early Khalji era Taj al-Din 'Iraqi transmitted his office of *omir-i ddd-i lashgar* to his son Kabir al-Din.¹¹² Apropos of iqta's, however, the hereditary principle carried less weight. We know of no muqta' whose grant passed on his death to a relative; but Juzjani reveals that Arslan

Khan was deemed to merit the iqta' of Bhayana on the grounds that he had married the daughter of Baha' al-Din Toghril, its first muqta'.¹¹³ In the reign of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, Qilich Khan Jalal al-Din Mas'ud, 'Ala' al-Din Jam's son (see appendix II), was twice granted Lakhnawti, which his father had briefly

¹⁰⁶ TFS, 192.

¹⁰⁷ Sonqur: *TN*, I, 465, and II, 25 (tr. 654, 753). Others: *ibid.*, I, 482, 485, 489, and II, 68 (tr. 685, 690, 700, 833).

¹⁰⁸ TFS, 211.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 40-1, 84.

¹¹⁰ *TN*, I, 481, 484, and II, 61, 220 (tr. 681, 687, 821-2, 1294-5).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, 495 (tr. 713); for 'Ala' al-Din as *amir-hajib* under Balaban, see also TFS, 24, 35, 36, 113. *TS*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 36b.

¹¹² TFS, 361.

¹¹³ *TN*, II, 34 (tr. 767). It is also possible (though Juzjani makes no explicit link here) that Temur Khan's claim to Lakhnawti, when he wrested it from Toghan Khan in 642/1244, derived from his marriage to a daughter of its former muqta', Sayf al-Din Aybeg-i Yaghantut: *ibid.*, II, 18 (tr. 744).

~ eld in iqta' under Ilutmish.¹¹⁴ There is perhaps meagre evidence that the hereditary principle was not totally irrelevant in the allocation of major qta's in the thirteenth century, several decades before the Tughluqid Sultan iruz Shah made it the chief criterion.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 78 (tr. 848-9); *RCEA*, XI, 211 (no. 4320). For Jani, see *TN*, I, 448, and II, 9 (tr. 618, 731-2).

~CHAPTER 6

The Mongol threat

The Mongol world-empire

When Chinggis Khan died in 1227, without having returned to western Asia, his empire extended from the steppes of present-day Mongolia to north-eastern Persia and the Hindu Kush. It was not until the election of his son and successor, Ogodei, as great khan (*qaghanlqa'an*), at an assembly (*quriltai*) in Mongolia in 1229, that the Mongols again paid any attention to the Indian borderlands, and only in 639/1241 that they first entered the territory of the Delhi Sultan, thus inaugurating a long period of hostilities with the Sultanate which lasted beyond the sack of Delhi by the Central Asian conqueror Temur in 801/1398. These conflicts are less fully covered than Chinggis Khan's own invasion of India. The principal sources for Mongol activities in eastern Persia and Central Asia - Juwayni's *Ta'rikh-i Jahan-Gusha* (658/1260), Rashid al-Din's *Jami' al-Tawarikh* (c. 703/1303-4) and Wassaf's *Tajziyat al-Amsar* - devote comparatively little attention to Mongol relations with the subcontinent. As we have seen, Wassaf's work includes also a brief history of the Delhi Sultanate down to the early years of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, which was in turn utilized by Rashid al-Din and by Qashani (c. 718/1318). Details of a few Mongol campaigns in India can also be gleaned from the history of Herat (*Ta'rikh-Nama-yi Harat*) by Sayfi (c. 722/1322). But these Iranian historical traditions only partially fill in the gaps left by Indo-Muslim chroniclers like Juzjani and Barani, who report Mongol invasions but conversely display virtually no interest in conditions within the Mongols' own territories.

By Ogodei's death the Mongols had adopted an ideology of world conquest, according to which the whole earth was already granted to them by the eternal sky-god (Tenggeri). Other rulers had a clear

duty to recognize their place within this world-empire, to submit in person to the qaghan, to put their troops at his disposal, to accept a Mongol resident (*shihna*) and to dismantle their fortifications. Any restraint the Mongols manifested in making good their title to the whole world sprang only from tactical considerations. It was sometimes necessary to make a truce with one ruler

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~ in order to concentrate on another enemy elsewhere. But in the Mongols' vocabulary, 'peace' and 'submission' were the same word (Tu. ill): the qaghan had no allies, only subjects.¹

As we saw (p. 34), the Mongols' principal attacks in 620-1/1223-4 were directed against Nandana and the Lahore region, then under Khwarazmian domination, and Multan, which belonged to Qubacha. Professor Habi-bullah suggested that Chinggis Khan refrained from further operations in India out of regard for the Delhi Sultan's neutrality, as demonstrated in his failure to assist Jalal al-Din. The Mongol conqueror is further credited with 'moderation' and a 'scrupulous observance of international practice'.² If so, Chinggis Khan's policy towards India in 1223 affords a unique instance of this spirit. There is, in any case, no reason why he should have regarded India as an immediate objective, on a par with the empire of the Khwarazm-shah. At this time, Khwarazm, Transoxiana and the Ghazna region had yet to be pacified, and while he was based south of the Hindu Kush divisions of his army were engaged in vital campaigns to suppress revolts in Khurasan. Even the troops that Ogodei later sent to this region were designated in the so-called 'Secret history of the Mongols' merely as a reserve force (Mo. *gejige*) for the main army operating in Persia under Chormaghun.³

It is possible that Ilutmish made some gesture of submission of which Juzjani does not tell us. Ninety years later, in 710/1310-11, in an embassy to Sultan 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, the Ilkhan Oljeitii reminded him how his predecessors had, 'both in the time of Chinggis Khan and in the time of ... Ogodei Qa'an, breathed the breath of conciliation and obedience and through the words of envoys had laid the countenance of loyalty on the face of the earth'.⁴ This may, of course, amount to no more than diplomatic swagger. The arrival of 'the ruler of In-tu (Hind)' at Ogodei's court, reported under the year 1229 in the Chinese dynastic history of the Mongol period, the *Yuan Shih*,⁵ perhaps refers to some Hindu prince or to Hasan Qarluq, the ruler of Binban. Yet we know that Ilutmish did receive embassies from the Mongols, since JuzjanI assures us that he never

¹ Eric Voegelin, 'The Mongol orders of submission to European powers, 1245-1255', *Byzantion* 15 (1940-1), 378-413. Klaus Sagaster, 'Herrschaftsideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den fruhen Mongolen', *CAJ* 17 (1973), 223-42. Igor de Rachewiltz, 'Some remarks on the ideological foundations of Chingis Khan's empire', *PFEH* 1 (1973), 21-36. David Morgan, 'The Mongols and the eastern Mediterranean', in B. Arbel *et al.* (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, 1989 = *Mediterranean Historical Review* 4, no. 1), 200, suggests that this ideology postdated rather than preceded the burst of expansion under Chinggis Khan.

² Habibullah, *Foundation*, 206.

³ *Mangghol un niuca tobca'an*, para. 270, ed. (in transcription) L. Ligeti, *Histoire secrete des Mongols* (Budapest, 1971), 243; tr. F. W. Cleaves (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 210; tr. Igor de Rachewiltz, in *PFEH* 31 (March 1985), 26 and n. at 58.

⁴ Wassaf, 528.

⁵ Waltraut Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen von Ogodei und Guyuk', *ZS* 10 (1976), 125.

~ killed their envoys but simply sent them off under guard in some fashion (*ba-tariqi*).⁶

The first Mongol encroachments

The reign of Ogodei (626-39/1229-41) witnessed a steady build-up of pressure beyond the frontier

of the Sultanate. After the first *quriltai*, troops under Dayir Noyan advanced from Herat into Sistan and overthrew its ruler, Yinaltegin (632/1235).⁷ It was probably the Mongol forces in Tukharistan, Qunduz and Taliqan, as also, it seems, those in Ghazna, together totalling two *tumens* (20,000), under the command of Monggedu (Mengutei),⁸ which soon afterwards moved into Kabul, Ghazna and Zabulistan and obliged Hasan Qarluq to accept a Mongol resident (*shihna*).⁹ At a second *quriltai* in 632/1235, further Mongol troops under *Oqotur were ordered to advance on India, and Kashmir was ravaged in the course of a campaign lasting six months.¹⁰ In 636/1238-9 Qarluq, who had become tributary to the Mongols, was suddenly attacked by the generals (*noyans*) Anban and Neguder and expelled from his territories of Ghazna, Kurraman and Binban. He fell back on the Sultanate, launching an attack on Uchch which was repulsed by its muqta', Sayf al-Din Aybeg.¹¹ The Mongols' campaign against Hasan Qarluq brought them to the frontiers of the Delhi Sultanate, and they now occupied the territories which had served as the springboard for the Ghurid invasions of India two generations earlier. In 639/1241 an army under the joint leadership of Dayir and Monggedii invested Lahore. The muqta', Qaraqush Khan, fled, and although Dayir was killed in the fighting the city fell on 16 Jumada 11/22 December 1241.¹² the reaction from Delhi, where Bahram Shah was highly

⁶ TN,II,214(tr. 1284).

⁷ Bosworth, *History of the Saffarids*, 409-10. For Dayir, see Boyle, 'Mongol commanders', 240; Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 70-1.

⁸ TN, II, 153, 169 (tr. 1109, 1152). *JT*, I, part 1, ed. A. A. Romaskevich *et al.* (Moscow, 1965), 188, and tr. A. A. Khetagurov, *Sbornik letopisei*, I, part 1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 109 (where the subject of the sentence is wrongly taken to be Mongke), similarly describes the camping-grounds of this army as 'Qunduz-i Baghlan and the confines (*hudud*) of Badakhshan'. For the form of Monggedu's name, see Boyle, 'Mongol commanders', 242 and n.67. On the *tiimen*, a unit of (sometimes notionally) 10,000, see D. O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), 89.

⁹ TN, II, 159 (tr. 1119).

¹⁰ *JT*, II, 42 = II, part 1, ed. A. A. Alizade (Moscow, 1980), 120 (tr. Boyle, 55/tr. Verkhovskii, 36). *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 61 (German tr. 56); there is a lacuna in the TSM ms. here. The BL Persian ms. Add. 7628, fol. 391a, says that the Mongols stayed six months and that the raja of Kashmir returned after seven *years*. This error misled Jahn, 'A note on Kashmir and the Mongols', *CAJ* 2 (1956), 177; his date for the invasion (*ibid.*, 179) is also wrong.

¹¹ TN, II, 8-9, 162 (tr. 730, 1128-9).

¹² *Ibid.*, II, 163-5 (tr. 1133-6); II, 166 (tr. 1142), for the date, which is given as Jumada I at I, 465-6 (tr. 655); for the joint command, see II, 6 (the meaning of *dar muwafaqat* is obscured in Raverty's tr., 727). Raverty (1135 n.5) rejects Juzjani's testimony on the grounds that

~ unpopular with the military, was ineffectual. In 643/1245-6 a campaign by Monggedii dislodged from Multan Hasan Qarluq, who had recently seized the city, and forced him to flee by boat down the Indus towards Siwistan and Daybul; the Mongols then invested Uchch for a time, before an expedition by Sultan 'Ala' al-Din Mas'ud Shah obliged them to retreat. Uchch and Multan were pacified by a detachment under Aybeg-i Khita'i the *sar-ijandar* and muqta' of Baran.¹³

JuzjanI gives prominence in his account of this campaign to the role of the future sultan Balaban in securing Monggedii's withdrawal, and proudly describes how the Delhi forces went over to the offensive in the winter of 644/1246-7, early in the reign of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, when Balaban advanced as far as the Indus, greatly intimidating the Mongol frontier patrols. But the chronicler's statement that the Mongols were thereby deflected from invading in this year betrays the fact that their inroads had become an annual event.¹⁴ In any case, they soon sought to take advantage of the fighting around Multan between Kushlu Khan and his rival Shir Khan (see pp. 71-2), for JuzjanI records the despatch of a great number of Mongol prisoners to court in 648/1250-1 by *Kiirbuz, Shir Khan's deputy at Multan.¹⁵

Tensions within the Mongol empire

Mongol operations on the Sultanate's western frontier since 639/1241 had proved less than impressive. Why, we cannot be certain. Dayir's death would account only for the immediate withdrawal from Lahore. The notions that the climate made India an unattractive goal and that the Panjab was ecologically unsuited to the Mongols' own brand of pastoral nomadism must be discarded. It is true that the heat had compelled Dorbei to withdraw from Multan in 621/1224;¹⁶ but this would hardly explain the failure of the Mongols to establish themselves in the Panjab. Not only were they accustomed to climatic extremes in their original habitat, but in the fourteenth century we find them wintering in India on a regular basis, which suggests that they found adequate pasturage for their livestock. The aims of the Mongol invasions of India will be discussed more fully in chapter 11.

More important in the longer term were the tensions within the imperial dynasty. Firstly, the lines between the qaghan's sphere of authority and those of his more important kinsfolk were increasingly blurred. On the one hand, Chinggis Khan had allotted to each of his relatives a specific

Dayir is mentioned as still alive in Mongke's reign (1251-9). But this is a misunderstanding based on the vagueness of Rashid al-Din: see *JT*, III, 21-2 (tr. Arends, 22).

¹³ *TN*, I, 471, and II, 28, 54-6, 170-1 (tr. 667-8, 758, 809-13, 1153-6).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 479-80, and II, 56-7 (tr. 677-9, 814-16).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 484 (tr. 688); for the appointment of *Kurbuz to Multan, see II, 38, 44 (tr. 782, 792).

¹⁶ *TJG*, I, 112 (tr. Boyle, 142).

~ pasturage together with a certain number of nomadic subjects - the complex termed in Mongolian *ulus*. Juwayni describes the largest of such units, those granted to the conqueror's four sons, Jochi, Ogodei, Chaghadai and Tolui, as radiating out from the homeland in Mongolia in a westerly direction according to seniority. As the eldest, Jochi was entrusted with the westernmost territory 'as far as the hooves of Mongol horses had trodden';¹⁷ and when he died, shortly before Chinggis Khan, his son Batu became the real founder of the Mongol power in the Pontic and Caspian steppes, known to historians as the Golden Horde.

On the other hand, the Mongol conquests were regarded as the joint possession of the entire imperial family. The sedentary regions appear from Ogodei's reign onwards to have been run by 'satellite administrations' comprising representatives of both the qaghan and neighbouring princes.¹⁸ The principle of joint rule found expression also in the *tama* system, which was elucidated by the late Jean Aubin. The forces sent to each newly conquered territory included contingents furnished by each branch of the imperial family, so that the interests of one prince could not be furthered without the consent of relatives whose forces were operating alongside his own. Thus in the Indian borderlands in the 1230s the families of Chinggis Khan's four sons were each represented by a commander.¹⁹

We should note, secondly, the absence of recognizable rules for the succession to the qaghanate. A prince designated by the previous monarch was often ignored in favour of a more competent or senior member of the dynasty, a system for which the late Professor Joseph Fletcher borrowed from the Celtic world the label 'tanistry'.²⁰ Thus during the five-year interregnum that separated the death of the qaghan Ogodei in Mongolia in December 1241 from the election of his son Giyyiig (644-6/1246-8), rumours reached Delhi of bitter conflicts among the princes, including the sons of Chinggis Khan's younger brother Temiige.²¹ Guyug's early death, which averted a fratricidal war with his cousin Batu in Central Asia, was followed by another interval of three years, after which Batu and his party elbowed aside Giyyiig's offspring and secured the imperial dignity for Tolui's son Mongke (1251-9). Opposition from the two middle branches of the dynasty was ruthlessly crushed; in a major redistribution of resources, the majority of the Ogodeyid and Chaghadayid princes were deprived of their pasturelands and were put to death or exiled.²²

To rally support behind the new regime, campaigns were instituted on

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1,31 (tr. Boyle, 42).

¹⁸ Paul D. Buell, 'Sino-Khitans administration in Mongol Bukhara', *JAH* 13 (1979), 141-7.

¹⁹ Sayfi, 174. For the *tama* system, see Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 74-5.

²⁰ J. Fletcher, 'The Mongols: ecological and social perspectives', *HJAS* 46 (1986), 17, 24-8.

²¹ *TN*, II, 166-7 (tr. 1143-4). See P. Jackson, 'The dissolution of the Mongol empire', *CAJ* 22 (1978), 197-9.

²² *Ibid.*, 200-8.

~ fronts as far distant as China and Western Asia.²³ In 1252-3 Sali Noyan was sent to the Indian borderlands at the head of fresh troops, and was given authority over all the forces commanded in the past by Dayir and by *Oqotur. Sali was himself subordinated to Mongke's brother Hulegu,²⁴ who in 653/1255 was to march westwards at the head of a great army and would crush both the Isma'ili Assassins in northern Persia (654/1256) and the 'Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad (656/1258). In accordance with the *tama* system, the qaghan's forces were accompanied by contingents representing other princes of the imperial dynasty, among which the troops supplied by the Jochids predominated.²⁵

The distant location of the Jochid ulus gave its princes a good deal of practical independence from the qaghan. Batu's power extended well beyond the confines of what would later be Horde territory: Juzjani testifies to his authority throughout those parts of Persia occupied by the Mongols, and Sayfi furnishes more specific evidence, showing how Batu intervened in the affairs of Herat in the 1240s.²⁶ According to reports which reached Egypt ten years or so later, the Golden Horde was entitled to anything from a third to two-fifths of the spoils from Persia.²⁷ But although Hiilegii's presence in Western Asia might have been seen as a challenge to the Jochids' position there, friction arose only after the death of Mongke in 1259 and the outbreak of a struggle in the following spring between his brothers Qubilai and Arigh Boke in the Far East.

Even as he ceased writing, Juzjani had heard the first rumours of tension between Hulegii and his cousin Berke, Batu's brother and now ruler of the Golden Horde. The reason given - the outrage felt by Berke, who had been reared as a Muslim, at the fate of the 'Abbasid Caliph - is also found in sources from the Mamluk empire.²⁸ In fact, however, conflict between Berke and Hiilegu was deferred for some three years following the sack of Baghdad, and authors writing further west, who were better placed to observe events, attribute the clash to two quite different causes. One is that Hulegii deprived the Golden Horde of its customary share of the spoils from Persia. The other reason furnished in the sources for the enmity between Hulegii and Berke is that they supported rival candidates in the

²³ T. T. Allsen, *Mongol imperialism: the policies of the Grand Qan Mongke in China, Russia, and the Islamic lands, 1251-1259* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), 1-5.

²⁴ *JT*, I, part 1, 188 (tr. Khetagurov, 110); *JT*, III, 21-2 (tr. Arends, 21). Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 73, 79. Sali's despatch to India is dated in July 1253 by the *Yuan Shih*: Waltraut Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen des Mongke', *ZS* 13 (1979), 22.

²⁵ Jackson, 'Dissolution', 220-1.

²⁶ *TN*, II, 176 (to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 155b; cf. Raverty's tr., 1172). Sayfi, 122-8, 136-9. For Batu, see Jackson, 'Dissolution', 212-13, 218.

²⁷ D. Ayalon, 'The Great *Yasa* of Chingiz Khan: a re-examination', part B, *Studia Islamica* 34

(1971), 174, repr. in his *Outsiders in the lands of Islam* (London, 1988). Jackson, 'Dissolution', 220-1.

²⁸ *TN*, II, 198 (tr. 1257). al-YuninI, II, 365. al-Safadi, *Wafi*, X, 118.

~ succession dispute: Berke acknowledged Arigh Boke, whereas Hulegu favoured Qubilai.²⁹

Hulegu's precise status at the time of Mongke's death is problematic. When describing the terms of his commission, the Ilkhanid chronicler Rashid al-Din uses highly guarded language. According to his version of events, Mongke privately intended his brother to remain in Persia and transmit it to his descendants (the so-called 'Ilkhans'), but he made a show of ordering him to return to Mongolia once the conquest was completed.³⁰ This reads suspiciously like an attempt to justify the position of the Ilkhans retrospectively. It must be emphasized that we have no other evidence for any such purpose on Mongke's part, and sources composed within the Mamluk empire assert, on the contrary, that at some point after the fall of Baghdad Hiilegii rebelled and established himself as the ruler of the province.³¹ Even the actual title (*il el*, 'subordinate', *khan*) taken by Hulegii and his line is not attested prior to 658/1260.³² He appears to have profited from the outbreak of conflict in the Far East to convert his position from that of commander-in-chief in Persia to that of ruler of an ulus on a par with his kinsmen, receiving from Qubilai the legitimation he so needed. The Jochid princes and generals in his army were arrested and executed or imprisoned, and most of their troops slaughtered; and he was then free to encroach on the territories south of the Caucasus that the Jochids regarded as their own. As a consequence, war broke out in 1261.³³

The events following Mongke's death marked the dissolution of the Mongol empire. Even after Arigh Boke's submission in 1264, Qubilai, who reigned from the new capital of Khanbaligh (Ta-tu) in northern China, could count on the allegiance only of Hiilegii and his descendants, the Ilkhans of Persia, so that it is possible to speak of a 'Toluid axis' comprising these two geographically remote powers. From c. 1270, moreover, he was confronted with a coalition of enemies in Transoxiana and Turkestan. Here the Chaghadayid prince Alughu, who had defected to Qubilai from Arigh

²⁹ John W. Dardess, 'From Mongol empire to Yuan dynasty: changing forms of imperial rule in Mongolia and Central Asia', *Monumenta Serica* 30 (1972-3), 128-31. P. Jackson, 'The accession of Qubilai Qa'an: a re-examination', *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society* 2 (1975), 1-10. *Idem*, 'Dissolution', 226-7. Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: his life and times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), 46-62.

³⁰ *JT*, III, 24 (tr. Arends, 22).

³¹ *MA*, ed. and tr. Klaus Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich* (Wiesbaden, 1968), Ar. text 2 (German tr. 91).

³² Reuven Amitai-Preiss, 'Evidence for the early use of the title *il-khan* among the Mongols', *JRAS*, 3rd series, 1 (1991), 353-61. Thomas T. Allsen, 'Changing forms of legitimation in Mongol Iran', in G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the steppe: state formation on the Eurasian periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), 227.

³³ For a more detailed investigation of the origins of this conflict, see Jackson, 'Dissolution', 226-35; also *idem*, 'From ulus to khanate: the making of the Mongol states, c. 1220-1290', in R. Amitai-Preiss and D. O. Morgan (eds.), *The Mongol empire and its legacy* (forth-coming).

~ Boke, had nevertheless profited from the civil war to re-establish Chagha-dai's ulus on quite new foundations, appropriating for himself the revenues of the neighbouring sedentary regions which should have gone to the qaghan; Baraq, whom Qubilai despatched west to rule Chaghadai's ulus after Alughu's death, soon defied him. But the most dangerous enemy confronting Qubilai in this region was Qaidu, a grandson of Ogodei, who was recognized as their khan by a number of Chaghadayid and Ogodeyid princes and noyans in 670/1271 when Baraq died.³⁴ Qaidu's empire was an extensive one. He took over the fiscal administration of the sedentary regions of Central Asia, whose officials were now his appointees, and he is

found nominating the rulers of Chaghadai's ulus, who seem to have acted as his subordinates. He and his allies remained hostile to the regime at Khanbaligh until his death in 1303; and the Mongol world did not acknowledge a single qaghan again until 1304 (below, p. 220).³⁵

The disintegration of their empire into a number of rival khanates seriously impaired the Mongols' capacity to prosecute expansionist campaigns on any front, whether in China, in eastern Europe, in Syria or in India. The Ilkhans were required to keep vigilant watch for an invasion of Transcaucasia by the forces of the Golden Horde. Periodic attacks by the Chaghadayid Mongols, and particularly that of 668/1270, effectively turned Khurasan at times into a no-man's land.³⁶ The Ilkhans retaliated in 671/1272-3 by sacking Bukhara.³⁷ The abandonment of the old claim to world-rulership is most starkly demonstrated in the new-found readiness of Mongol princes to ally with outside powers against their own kinsfolk. The Ilkhans were confronted from 662/1263-4 by an understanding between their northern neighbours, the Golden Horde, and the Mamluk regime in Egypt and Syria. Their own efforts to counteract this by negotiating for joint action with the Mamluks' enemies in Catholic Europe were unavailing.³⁸

³⁴ Jamal al-Qarshi, *Mulhaqat al-Surah*, ed. in V. V. Bartold, *Turkestan v epokhu mongol'skogo nashestviia* (St. Petersburg, 1898-1900, 2 vols.), I (texts), 138. Wassaf, 76. *JT*, II, 192 (tr. Boyle, 153/tr. Verkhovskii, 100), and III, 138 (tr. Arends, 87).

³⁵ The fullest survey of Qaidu and his empire is to be found in Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the rise of the independent Mongol state in Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997). Briefer accounts in W. Barthold, *Four studies on the history of Central Asia* (Leiden, 1956-62, 4 parts in 3 vols.), I, 124-9; Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959-73, 3 vols.), I, 124-9; J. A. Boyle, 'Kaydu', *Enc. Isl.*²; more generally, Dardess, 130-1.

³⁶ *JT*, III, 148 (tr. Arends, 92).

³⁷ Berthold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, 4th edn. (Leiden, 1985), 63.

³⁸ S. Zakhirov, *Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Zolotoi Ordy s Egiptom* (Moscow, 1966). Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war, 1260-1281* (Cambridge, 1995), 78-86, 94-105. J. A. Boyle, 'The Ilkhans of Persia and the princes of Europe', *CAJ* 20 (1976), 25-40. Morgan, *Mongols*, 183-6. For a more detailed survey of the halting of the Mongol advance in 1260-2, see Jackson, 'Dissolution', 236-43.

~ The Sultanate's 'Mongol crisis'

The build-up of Mongol power in Persia had been all the more menacing in view of the fact that the Mongols were being drawn into the internal affairs of the Delhi Sultanate following the flight into Mongol territory in 646/1248 of Mahmud Shah's brother Jalal al-Din Mas'ud. The sources composed in Persia state that Mongke ordered Sali Noyan to assist him to recover 'his ancestral realm'. Successive attacks by Sali on Multan and Lahore, which are described by Sayfi and in which the governor of Multan bought off the invaders, seem to have formed part of this effort. Regarding the fate of Lahore we are told nothing, since Sayfi breaks off at this juncture to describe the fortunes of Shams al-Din Muhammad Kart, the client malik of Herat, who had accompanied Sali's forces but now withdrew and returned home. The expedition of Mahmud Shah's forces towards Sind by way of Lahore in 650/1252, in which Ulugh Khan Balaban fell from favour (see p. 72), must have been a response to this inroad.³⁹ As a result, the Mongols were unable to penetrate further than Jajner and fell back, but the prince was installed as client ruler of Lahore, Kujah and Sodra, which were subject (*il*) to them.⁴⁰

Jalal al-Din Mas'ud's authority in these regions did not last long after his participation in the campaign which restored Ulugh Khan Balaban to power in 652/1254. At some point soon afterwards, he was joined by Balaban's cousin Shir Khan, who had also taken refuge in Mongol territory and returned in the wake of the na'ib's reinstatement. The two men fell out, and Jalal al-Din, who retired and left his dependants and troops in the hands of his rival, probably died within the next few years. When Shir Khan engaged in conflict with Arslan Khan, the muqta' of Tabarhindh, the Delhi government intervened and

granted him, in return for his allegiance, not only Tabarhindh but 'the whole of the territory and iqta's which he had previously held': this formula must have been designed to embrace Lahore, Uchch and Multan.⁴¹

³⁹ *TN*, I, 486 (to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 192a; cf. Raverty's tr., 692). Sayfi, 157-9 (*sub anno* 644). Habibullah (*Foundation*, 215) was thereby led to connect the invasion with Balaban's campaign in the Salt Range. But Sayfi's chronology is unreliable for this period (see Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 72-3), and the year is too early for either Sali or Shams al-Din Kart to be in the Indian borderlands. That Sayfi mentions the '*ld-i Qurban* (10 Dhu'l-Hijja) as falling during the siege of Multan (158) is an argument in favour of locating this expedition in 650, where it harmonizes with the time of year specified by Juzjani. The governor of Lahore, whom Sayfi names as KRT Khan (Kirit Khan?), cannot be identified. We should, perhaps, have expected Toghrl Khan (Yiizbeg): see above, p. 92.

⁴⁰ Wassaf, 310; *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 57, Pers. text Taf. 22 (tr. 48 reads 'Haibar' for the HHNYR of the mss.); Qashani, 185. For this episode, see Karl Jahn, 'Zum Problem der mongolischen Eroberungen in Indien (13.-14. Jahrhundert)', in *Akten des XXIV. internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses Munchen ... 1957* (Wiesbaden, 1959), 618.

⁴¹ *TN*, II, 44 (tr. 793). This settlement must have occurred prior to 654/1256, when we find Arslan Khan in Awadh. That Jalal al-Din Mas'ud was dead by 658/1260 is indicated by the

~ Mongol interests in the Lahore region had already suffered a setback, it is fair to assume, as a result of Jalal al-Din Mas'ud's reconciliation with Mahmud Shah.⁴² Now he had been supplanted by Shir Khan, who was subject to the sultan and, encouraged by Delhi, harboured designs on Sind. This region too had recently become a Mongol protectorate. Following his triumphant return to Uchch and Multan in 651/1254 Kiishlii Khan had used the good offices of Shams al-Din Muhammad Kart of Herat to offer his submission and had accepted a Mongol *shihna*. When he and his confederates failed to take Delhi in 655/1257 (see pp. 74-5), Kiishlii Khan turned to his Mongol overlords. His appeal to Hulegu for assistance -made, according to Juzjani, in person - elicited an immediate response. In the winter of 655/1257-8 Sali Noyan entered Sind in strength and dismantled the fortifications of Multan; his forces may also have invested the island fortress of Bhakkar on the Indus.⁴³ Although the sultan's army moved out of Delhi, its stance appears to have been purely defensive. The government was evidently concerned not to provoke the Mongols. In Safar 657/February 1259 Shir Khan was transferred to an extensive assignment centred on Bhayana and hitherto held by Nusrat Khan, who now replaced him at Tabarhindh, and Juzjani expressly ascribes the exchange to the need to avert conflict on the frontier, presumably with Kushlu Khan.⁴⁴ The impression of a propitiatory attitude is heightened by the continued failure of the Delhi forces to take action against the Mongols during these months, while the enemy assailed the sultan's territory.

When Juzjani wrote, the Mongols had overwhelmed 'the whole of the land of Turan and the east'. Everywhere 'from the borders of China, Turkistan, Ma wara' al-Nahr, Tukharistan, Zawul[istan], Ghur, Kabul, Ghaznayn, Iraq, Tabaristan, Arran, Adharbaijan, the Jazira, Anbar, Sistan, Makran, Kirman, Fars, Khuzistan, Diyarbakr, and Mawsil, as far as the limits of Rum and Syria', Muslim rulers had been swept away.⁴⁵ During the previous two decades, the territories that owed allegiance to the Delhi Sultan had shrunk dramatically under the impact of the Mongol advance. Iltutmish's operations against the Khwarazmshah's lieutenants, which we noticed earlier (p. 36), had brought under his control a number of important

formula '*alayhi'l-rahmatu* in Juzjani's list of Iltutmish's offspring in BL ms., fol. 179b, and IOL ms., fol. 242b.

⁴² *TN*, I, 489 (tr. 700), says that Lahore was recognized as his iqta'.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, I, 494, and (with *lashgarha* in error for *kungurha*) II, 76 (tr. 711, 844); for Kiishlii's submission, see II, 38-40 (tr. 784, 786). Bhakkar: Sayfi, 250-7 (*sub anno* 657). Kiishlii Khan's dealings with the Mongols are perhaps linked with the embassy from 'a sultan of India' which accompanied a Western European missionary on the early stages of his journey from Mongke's court in July-August 1254 (although this could equally refer to Shir Khan): William of Rubruck, 'Itinerarium', xxxvi, 3, in A. Van den Wyngaert (ed.), *Sinica Franciscana, I. Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV*

(Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 306; tr. P. Jackson and D. O. Morgan, *The mission of Friar William of Rubruck*, HS, 2nd series, 173 (Cambridge, 1990), 247 and n.2.

⁴⁴ *TN*, II, 44 (tr. 794). ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 90-1 (tr. 870-1, 879-85).

~ strongholds between the Jhelam and the Ravi. Juzjani lists among his conquests Kujah (the modern Gujrat), Nandana, Sodra and Siyalkot; Kujah and Nandana are described as border regions (*sarhadd*).⁴⁶ But in Radiyya's reign the Mongols already held the tracts beyond the Chenab, which is doubtless why the rebel Kabir Khan, when pursued north by Radiyya's forces in 637/1239, was unable to retreat further than 'the confines of Sodra'.⁴⁷ By the time the renegade prince Jalal al-Din Mas'ud returned with Mongol aid in c. 650/1252, Lahore, Kujah and Sodra, as we saw, were all subject to them, and Jajner is described as border territory.⁴⁸ Even Jalal al-Din's defection proved only a temporary setback, since Juzjani's phrasing betrays the fact that as a result of Sali Noyan's campaigns Sind lay outside the dominions of his sovereign Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah.⁴⁹ The Mongols, who through their satellites controlled Binban, the Salt Range and the middle and upper Indus valley, now threatened the heartlands of the Delhi Sultanate. Describing the events of the late 1250s, Juzjani twice refers to Tabarhindh as 'the frontier'.⁵⁰ It is the 'frontier of' Islamic territory, such as the province of Sind, Lahore, and the direction (*taraf*) of the river Beah' that the Mongols were attacking by 656/1258; when Nusrat Khan exchanged iqta's with Shir Khan in the following year, he received 'the frontiers (*sarhadahd*) as far as the River Beah fords'; and a few years into Balaban's reign the Mongols were crossing the Beah.⁵¹

In these circumstances, the tradition (*hadith*) that the Mongol tide would begin to ebb once it reached Lahore⁵² provided cold comfort. By 1260 their dominion showed no sign of contraction. Moreover, the advent of the Mongols was believed to herald the end of time. 'Awfi saw them as the harbingers of Gog and Magog.⁵³ And had not several authors transmitted the Prophet's statement that the first sign of the end of time would be the irruption of the 'Turks'?⁵⁴ Juzjani's reiterated prayer that the sovereignty of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah would endure until the Day of Resurrection (*td qiydm-i qiydm*)⁵⁵ is perhaps more than merely sycophantic hyperbole. For Muslims of his generation, the last things were not far off.⁵⁶ When relating the Mongol occupation of Uchch and Multan in 655/1257-8, the chronicler permits his anxiety at one point to seep through the skein of his otherwise matter-of-fact account of these events.⁵⁷

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 22, where Iltutmish grants both places as iqta' (KWJAT, to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 204a, which has KWJAH; also tr. 750).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 6 (tr. 726-7).

⁴⁸ Wassaf, 310; *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 57, Pers. text Taf. 22 (and see n.40 above); Qashani, 185.

⁴⁹ *TN*, II, 86 (tr. 860). ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 44 (tr. 793, 794).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, II, 43, 79 (tr. 788, 850-1). *TFS*, 81. ⁵² *TN*, II, 166 (tr. 1136-42).

⁵³ *JH*, BL ms. Or. 4392, fol. 127b, *muqaddima-yi Ya'juj-u Ma'juj*.

⁵⁴ *TN*, II, 92-4, 98 (omitted in Raverty's tr.).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 422, 450, 462, and II, 189. ⁵⁶ See also *ibid.*, I, 440, and II, 48 (tr. 597, 800).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 40 (tr. 786). For a useful analysis of Juzjani's view of the Mongols, see D. O.

~ It comes as something of a surprise, therefore, to find the Mongols in turn adopting a more conciliatory stance, in the last contacts recorded by Juzjanl. In response to an indirect approach from Nasir al-Din Muhammad b. Hasan Qarluq, who ruled Binban as a Mongol satellite, Ulugh Khan Balaban had sent a chamberlain (*hdjib*) with his consent to a marriage alliance between their two families. The envoy's mission became known to Kiishlii Khan, who alerted the Mongols, and Nasir al-Din Muhammad had to

pass him on to Hiilegii's court in Persia; but he did so, allegedly, with additional letters drafted by himself but purporting to come from Ulugh Khan. Hiilegii welcomed the *hajib* and sent him back with his own emissaries, who were received by the sultan and Ulugh Khan in Rabi' II 658/March 1260. Juzjanl makes great play of the review outside Delhi in which the Mongol envoys were treated to an impressive demonstration of the Sultanate's military strength. Hulegu allegedly instructed Sali Noyan that if a Mongol horse entered Mahmud Shah's dominions its hooves were to be lopped off.⁵⁸

From what Juzjanl says, Nasir al-Din Muhammad aimed to pass off Ulugh Khan's response as a gesture of submission to the Mongols and thereby acquire credit with them as the intermediary. But the chronology of the Mongol embassy may have a significance which was not apparent to Juzjanl. Hulegu's representatives had already reached the vicinity of Delhi when Ulugh Khan Balaban left for a brief campaign against the Meos (Miwat) in Safar 658/February 1260.⁵⁹ By the time of their despatch (towards the end of 657/1259) Hiilegii would already have heard of the death of his brother the qaghan. Anticipating a disputed succession, he may have patched up peace with the Sultanate in order to leave his hands free while he completed the conquest of Iraq and Syria. Alternatively, the fact that Berke too was in diplomatic contact with Delhi in this same year has prompted the suggestion that both rulers were actuated by their rivalry, the one seeking the support of a fellow-Muslim in order to encircle the Ilkhanate, the other the sultan's neutrality.⁶⁰ It is equally possible, of course, that Juzjanl's story masks a genuine offer of submission by Ulugh Khan, designed to buy time for the Sultanate. Such a scenario would better explain the emphatic manner in which Sali was forbidden to encroach on Delhi territory, reminiscent of the privilege of inviolability accorded, for instance, to Lesser Armenia when its king became a Mongol client in 1254.⁶¹ But that the Mongols did not crown their spectacular advance of the

Morgan, 'Persian historians and the Mongols', in Morgan (ed.), *Medieval historical writing*, 111-13.

⁵⁸ *TN*, II, 83-8 (tr. 856-63).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 79 (tr. 851).

⁶⁰ Aziz Ahmad, 'Mongol pressure in an alien land', *CAJ* 6 (1961), 183-4, 185. Aubin, 'L'ethnogene', 81. See *TN*, II, 218 (tr. 1292), for Berke's embassy to Delhi.

⁶¹ Kirakos Ganjakeci, *Patmufyun Hayoc*, tr. Robert Bedrosian, *Kirakos Ganjakets'i's History of the Armenians* (New York, 1986), 304; see also J. A. Boyle, 'The journey of Het'um I, king of Little Armenia, to the court of the Great Khan Mongke', *CAJ* 9 (1964), 181.

~ past decade with the conquest of further Delhi 'territory was due primarily to the outbreak of strife within the imperial dynasty in 1260.

The advent of the Neguderis

In the Indian borderlands, special circumstances robbed Hulegu of his ability to direct military operations against the Delhi Sultanate. Some of the Jochid troops in Persia escaped massacre at the hands of Hulegu's forces and took refuge in Syria and Egypt with the Mamluk Sultan.⁶² Others fled into present-day Afghanistan to join Neguder, who commanded the Jochid contingent there. But Hulegu's forces in turn defeated Negiider's army, which moved eastwards and, according to Rashid al-Din, overran the territory 'from the mountains of Ghazna and Bini-yi Gaw to Multan and Lahore'.⁶³ This is the first mention of Bini-yi Gaw, a locality which is closely associated with the Negiideris and which is known to have lain not far from Shal (the modern Quetta).⁶⁴

Iranian sources, regrettably, have no more to say about the arrival of the Negiideris, or Qara'unas as they were also known (appendix III), but a garbled story picked up in Kirman by Marco Polo a few years later may throw some light upon it. He makes Negiider's band pass through Badakh-shan, the Pashai and Kashmir until they reached 'the city Dilivar', which they wrested from its ruler, 'Asidin Soldan', and which allegedly became Negiider's base.⁶⁵ The Polo account is here highly confused, and has attracted the

attention of successive commentators.⁶⁶ There can be little doubt that his 'Asidin' is 'Izz al-Din Kushlu Khan,⁶⁷ though in this case 'Dilivar', which has been identified plausibly with Lahore ('citta di Livar'), presents some difficulty,⁶⁸ since Kiishlii Khan, who ruled in Sind, is not

⁶² Jackson, 'Dissolution', 232-3. Ayalon, 'Wafidiya'.

⁶³ Sayfi, 270-2, with the date 660/1262, though in view of Rashid al-Din's chronology 661/ 1263 is more likely. *JT*, II, 139 (tr. Boyle, 123/tr. Verkhovskii, 82); and cf. Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 80-1, for an elucidation of the text.

⁶⁴ Sayfi, 270. For Shal as the alternative name of Quetta, see *IG*, XXI, 13, 20. The identification of Bini-yi Gaw with Shashgaw (15 m. N.E. of Ghazna on the road to Kabul), cited in Boyle, 'Mongol commanders', 247 n.74, is therefore to be discarded.

⁶⁵ Marco Polo, *Le divisament dou monde*, tr. A. C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, *The description of the world* (London, 1938, 2 vols.), I, 121; tr. Sir Henry Yule, *The book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian*, new edn. H. Cordier (London, 1903-20, 3 vols.), I, 98.

⁶⁶ Yule, *ibid.*, I, 103 n., rightly observed that Polo conflates two quite distinct episodes, one involving the Jochid general and the other, which occurred several years later, a Chagha-dayid prince (actually named Tegiider) who was active in the Caucasus region. See also Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 190-6. The confusion between Negiider and Teguder is repeated in Spuler, *Mongolen in Iran*, 62, and Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 206, 208. Sir Aurel Stein, 'Marco Polo's account of a Mongol inroad into Kashmir', *Geographical Journal* 54 (1919), 92-103, stands in need of revision.

⁶⁷ Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 52, while agreeing with 'the general opinion that this must be Balaban' (Asidin > Ghiyath al-Din), still had doubts and observed that the name 'looks more like 'Izz al-Din'.

⁶⁸ Yule, I, 104-5 n. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 626, on the other hand, was still prepared to

~ known ever to have held that city; the history of the Lahore region between its abandonment by Jalal al-Din Mas'ud and its restoration by Balaban in c. 666/1268 is a blank. The only other author to speak of Kushlu Khan's fate is Isami, who alleges that Kushlu Khan lost Multan to Balaban and was obliged to take up residence in Binban, though he brought the Mongols into Sind on two subsequent occasions.⁶⁹ On the other hand, contemporary poets praise Kushlu Khan's son, Nasir al-Din Muhammad, who was clearly no hapless exile but a prince of some standing who ruled Uchch and Multan for a few years.⁷⁰ The whole question of Kushlu Khan and his dynasty is doubtless destined to remain unresolved.

Simultaneously with these upheavals, two other figures who had played a leading role in events on the frontier over the previous decade were likewise eliminated. Alughu's forces, at the point when that prince was still aligned with Arigh Boke, arrested Sali and took him as a prisoner to Transoxiana.⁷¹ The downfall of Nasir al-Din Muhammad b. Hasan Qarluq is attributed in the Ilkhanid sources to the intrigues of Shams al-Din Muhammad Kart of Herat and an otherwise unknown 'Khudawandzada Barghundi; he was summoned to Hiilegii's court, along with certain other local rulers, and executed on a charge of disloyalty. A consequence of his removal was the flight to India of the Khalaj leader and future Delhi Sultan, Jalal al-Din, who had been in his service.⁷²

The Mongols and India after 664/1266

Given what we know of the era of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, it is surprising that some decades later, in the sketch of the Sultanate's history with which he prefaces his *Diwal Rani*, Amir Khusraw dated the onset of Mongol inroads from Balaban's reign.⁷³ But if Barani is to be believed, these years did witness a revival of Mongol pressure on the Panjab. He blames it on the fact that the successors of Shir Khan, who had held the iqta's in the path of the Mongol advance and had been poisoned on

envisage Delhi; though *ibid.*, 195-6, both 'Deli' and 'Malabar' of Ramusio's version are regarded with suspicion.

⁶⁹ *FS*, 154-5 (tr. 278-80).

⁷⁰ Siddiqi, 'Historical information', 66. 'Amid Sunnami, cited by Bada'uni, *Muntakhab al-Tawarikh*, ed. M. A. 'Ali (Calcutta, 1864-9, 3 vols.), I, 110, 121. See also the laconic mention in *TFS*, 66.

⁷¹ Wassaf, 12. Rashid al-Din mentions only that Alughu sent troops to Samarqand, Bukhara and other parts of Transoxiana, though adding, confusingly, that he attacked the possessions of Berke (like Alughu, a supporter of Arigh Boke): *JT*, II, 403-4 (tr. Boyle, 257-8/tr. Verkhovskii, 163). See Barthold, *Turkestan*, 488.

⁷² Wassaf, 311. *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 57, Pers. text Taf. 23 (German tr. 48-9 has 'Mamluken' in error for *muluk*). Qashani, 186. Cf. also Siddiqui, 'Qarlugh kingdom', 85-6.

⁷³ *DR*, 50.

~ Balaban's orders, did not share his capacity.⁷⁴ Even if this is true, the Mongol inroads may simply reflect the fact that the Neguderis were now launching raids from bases closer at hand than those occupied by Sali Noyan's army. They almost certainly mounted the attack on Uchch and Multan which a later tradition placed in the year of the death of the Chishti shaykh Farid al-Din Ganj-shikar (664/1265-6).⁷⁵ At any rate, annual attacks once more became the pattern.⁷⁶ Later, Barani asserts that the Mongols regularly advanced as far as Rupa on the upper Sutlej.⁷⁷ The restoration of Lahore was the only recovery Balaban was able to make in the north; but there is, significantly, no mention of its being granted as iqta' again prior to the fourteenth century.

Sultan Balaban entrusted the task of guarding the western frontier to his sons: the elder, Muhammad, was granted Sind, and the younger, Bughra Khan Mahmud, was stationed at Samana. The two princes shared responsibility for defence against the Mongols with the *barbeg*, Ikhtiyar al-Din Begbars, and Barani pays tribute to the effectiveness of these arrangements.⁷⁸ Around 680/1281-2, however, Bughra Khan was transferred permanently to Lakhnawi. It is possible that this weakened the frontier defences in the last years of Balaban's reign, since 'Isami records an invasion by two bands of Mongols in which the force sent to repel them by Muhammad suffered a reverse.⁷⁹ A heavier blow was to fall in the winter of 683/1284-5, when Muhammad himself was defeated and killed in battle with the Mongol commander Temur.⁸⁰ According to the most circumstantial account of the engagement, given in a *marthiya* by Amir Hasan Dihlawi which is preserved by Sirhindi, it took place at Bagh-i *Nir, close to the junction of the Ravi and the Greater Dhandh, on 29 Dhu'l-Hijja 683/8 March 1285. Amir Hasan's friend and fellow-poet, Amir Khusraw, who was briefly taken prisoner by the Mongols, commemorated the disaster in his *Wasat al-Hayat*.⁸¹

Temur again invaded India and ravaged the territory between Lahore

⁷⁴ *TFS* 65-6. Barani's analysis contradicts what we know about the disposition of iqta's at the time Juzjani wrote, when Shir Khan had been moved from Tabarhindh to Bhayana (see above, p. 112).

⁷⁵ Amir Hasan Dihlawi, *Fawa'id al-Fu'ad*, ed. M. Latif Malik (Lahore, 1386/1966), 373-4.

⁷⁶ *WH*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fols. 90a, 134b. *TFS*, 82; and see also 50-1, where a speech put into Balaban's mouth refers to annual invasions.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 82, with the corrupt reading 'ZWRB': text restored by Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 85-6. On Rupa, 'a town of considerable antiquity' situated at 30° 58' N., 76° 32' E., see *IG*, XXI, 339.

⁷⁸ *TFS*, 80, 81: for the *bdrbeg's* name, see above, p. 78.

⁷⁹ *FS*, 171-3 (tr. 299-300).

⁸⁰ The description of Temiir as 'one of the great Chingizi amirs, to whom belonged Herat, Qandahar, Balkh, Badakhshan, Ghaznayn, Ghur and Bamiyan' is not found in any source earlier than Firishta (I, 143) and is consequently suspect; it is nevertheless accepted by Aziz Ahmad, *Political history*, 285.

⁸¹ Quoted at length by Bada'uni, I, 138-55 (extensive citations in Mirza, *Life and works*, 56-9). See also *TFS*, 109 (with the year 684); *FS*, 175-81 (tr. 304-11). The date is supplied by Amir Hasan (quoted in *TMS*, 45) and by Khusraw in *WH*, IOL ms. 412, fols. 133a, 134b

~ and Samana early in 686/1287, when the new sultan, Balaban's grandson Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad, had begun to move east in preparation for the confrontation with his father Bughra Khan in Awadh. On the approach of the *barbeg* Khan Jahan Shahik, the Mongols retreated without offering battle and, according to Sirhindi, were pursued as far as the foothills of Jammu.⁸² But with the decay of the sultan's authority, and the concentration of power in the hands of Nizam al-Din (above, pp. 53, 81), many nobles were eliminated, among them Shahik (now Azhdar Khan and amir of Multan).⁸³ Responsibility for frontier defence appears thereafter to have fallen principally to the Khalaj amir Jalal al-Din Firuz, whom Balaban had made muqta' of Kaithal and na'ib of Samana.⁸⁴ But although Jalal al-Din is portrayed as a veteran of the Mongol front by the time he ascended the throne in 689/1290, we know virtually nothing of his exploits. Amir Khusraw simply puts into the new sultan's mouth references to campaigns against the Mongols of 'Ghaznayn, Kurraman and *Birjand', and later alludes to his intention of advancing from Multan towards Ghazna; Barani is even less specific.⁸⁵

Soon after his accession, the sultan, who had entrusted the iqta' of Multan to his second son, Erkli Khan, found time, amid the victories of a twelve-month period commemorated in Amir Khusraw's *Miftah al-Futuh*, to march against the Mongols. This campaign, from which he returned to Delhi at the onset of 690/1291 after an absence of one month, was directed against a region that cannot be identified.⁸⁶ It apparently provoked the next Mongol assault, in 691/1292, headed by the prince 'Abd-Allah. The sultan made camp in a locality called by both Barani and 'Isami 'Bar Ram', where a river (the Sutlej?) separated the two armies. After some skirmishing between the two vanguards, however, a truce was declared. Jalal al-Din and 'Abd-Allah exchanged friendly messages and gifts, and the Mongol prince withdrew, leaving behind under a commander named Alughu a group of his followers who accepted Islam and who were settled by the sultan in the neighbourhood of Delhi.⁸⁷ Thereafter we hear of no further invasions during Jalal al-Din's reign. Following the old sultan's murder in 695/1296 by his nephew 'Ala' al-Din, his sons, having held out for a time in Multan, were forced to surrender and were later put to death. This crisis may well

(cited by Bada'uni, I, 147). The location given in *WH* varies: on the borders of Multan (fol. 78a), or in the vicinity of Lahore (fol. 132b).

⁸² *QS*, 62-5. *TMS*, 54.

⁸³ *TFS*, 134.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 170, 194, 195.

⁸⁵ *MF*, 8. *DR*, 51. *TFS*, 196. Birjand may be identical with 'Barghund' (above, p. 116), an alternative name of Naghar: Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 168; A. D. H. Bivar, 'Naghar and Iryab: two little-known Islamic sites of the north-west frontier of Afghanistan and Pakistan', *Iran* 24(1986), 131-8.

⁸⁶ *MF*, 22, 23. The region is named as BALAGHTRK: the same reading is found in IOL Persian mss. 51, fol. 490a (margin), and 412, fol. 788b (margin).

⁸⁷ *TFS*, 218-19. A different account of this episode is furnished in *FS*, 209-14 (tr. 372-9), where the Mongols retreat after an indecisive battle with Jalal al-Din's brother, Malik Khamush.

~ have weakened the defences of Sind, a situation of which, as we shall see in chapter 11, the Mongols were not slow to take advantage.

The Negiideris and their Mongol neighbours

The collapse of Mongol unity after Mongke's death had deposited in the Indian borderlands a body of Mongol troops with no allegiance to either the Ilkhans or the Chaghadayids; the region was now the camping-grounds of a smaller, independent grouping without access to the resources of the whole Mongol empire. The strength of the Negiideris was sufficiently modest not to jeopardize the survival of the Sultanate, but still powerful enough to form yet another barrier in India's defence, obstructing any expansionist tendencies on the part of the Mongols of Persia or of Transoxiana. Marco Polo heard tell of Neguder that he 'makes war on all the Tartars who dwell round about his kingdom'; and certainly the Negiideris acquired a name for brigandage and highway robbery and were notoriously unready to submit to any ruler.⁸⁸

Their arrival in the Indian borderlands drove a wedge between India and Hulegu's dominions.⁸⁹ Ilkhanid sources speak of Negiideri raids on Fars and Kirman and assert that the people of Fars lived in fear of such raids down until the end of the reign of the Ilkhan Arghun (d. 690/1291).⁹⁰ When the Chaghadayid khan Baraq invaded Khurasan in 668/1269-70, Hulegu's son and successor, Abaqa, sought to deflect him with the offer of Ghazna and 'Kurraman-i Binban'⁹¹ - regions that were currently not in his gift. The Ilkhans may not have been primarily interested in this tract, and may at this stage have envisaged leaving its reduction to the Chaghadayids. This is not to say that they made no effort to exert indirect influence over the Negiideris or to mount punitive expeditions against them. Both Hulegii and Abaqa despatched a series of commanders against Neguder and his forces.⁹² During Baraq's attack on Khurasan, various Chaghadayid princes deserted to the Ilkhan, and Abaqa sent one of them, Mubarak Shah, to head 'the army of Negiider in the confines of Ghaznayn'.⁹³ But Mubarak Shah's death in 674/1275-6 while leading an attack on the province of Kirman suggests that his allegiance to the Ilkhan was superficial.⁹⁴ Abaqa had also

⁸⁸ Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, 122/tr. Yule and Cordier, I, 99. Sayfi, 432.

⁸⁹ Jahn's view ('Zum Problem', 618) that it was the constant need to defend their other frontiers which prevented Hulegii's successors from making good their claims to present-day Afghanistan fails to take account of the situation that had emerged there.

⁹⁰ *JT*, III, 151-2 (tr. Arends, 94). Ibn Zarkub, *Shiraz-Nama* (c. 1344), ed. Bahman Karimi (Tehran, 1310 Sh./1932), 66/ed. Ismail Wa'iz Jawadi (Tehran, 1350 Sh./1971), 91-2. Wassaf, 199-203.

⁹¹ *JT*, III, 122 (tr. Arends, 78); and cf. Sayfi, 308.

⁹² Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 80 n.3, for textual references.

⁹³ *JT*, II, 193 (tr. Boyle, 153-4/tr. Verkhovskii, 100).

⁹⁴ Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 83. Anonymous, *Ta'rlkh-i Shahi-yi Qarakhita iyyan* (late thirteenth century), ed. Muhammad Bastani-Parizi (Tehran, 2535 Shahanshahi/1976), 248-50.

~ Map 2: The frontier with the Mongols

~ entrusted another Chaghadayid, Bojei, with a command among the Negu-deris, and Bojei's son 'Abd-Allah, who would later invade India (above, p. 118), appears to have succeeded him by this juncture.⁹⁵ In 678/1279, in reprisal for a Neguder raid on Kirman and Fars, Abaqa himself led an army as far as Herat, receiving the submission of Mubarak Shah's sons, while his son Arghun was sent on ahead into Ghur and Gharchistan. A number of Negiideri amirs and their dependants were subsequently employed in the Ilkhans' service in western Persia.⁹⁶

These Ilkhanid campaigns, it seems, had strictly limited aims. The hypothesis advanced by Professor U. N. Day, that the sudden spate of Mongol incursions into India from c. 1285 reflects the disorders in Persia after Abaqa's death in 680/1282,⁹⁷ is difficult to sustain. The Mongols of Persia were cut off from India not only by the Negiideris but also by the sometimes recalcitrant Kartid kingdom of Herat and by the virtually autonomous kingdom of Sistan. Abaqa's successor Ahmad included Tiginabad in a grant to the malik of Sistan in 683/1284, and indeed Sistan is described as still not subject (7/) to the Ilkhan in the reign of Ghazan (694-703/1295-1304).⁹⁸ The most we can say is that the Ilkhans' operations in eastern Khurasan may have encouraged the Negiideris to devote more attention to the Panjab. But there were certainly other, more local stimuli at work. The seizure of Qandahar in 680/1281 by the Kartid malik of Herat, Shams al-Din Muhammad II,⁹⁹ would surely have menaced the Negiideris, and may therefore help to explain an apparent increase in Mongol pressure on the Delhi Sultanate in Balaban's last years.

As for the Chaghadayids, Alughu's advance into the Indian border

⁹⁵ Kirmani, *Simt*, 49. *JT*, II, 177, *hakim-i charik-i Qarauna bud dar hudud-i Ghaznayn* (tr. Boyle, 144; not in text used for Verkhovskii's tr.)- Anonymous (fifteenth-century) Chinggisid genealogy, *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, BN ms. Ancien fonds persan 67, fol. 29b, for Bojei's flight to Abaqa. In *JT* (but not in his genealogical work, *SP*, TSM ms. HI Ahmet 2937, fol. 117b), Rashid al-Din seems to list this branch of the Chaghadayids twice, and we need not assume, with Aubin ('L'ethnogenese', 84 n.l), that there were two princes called Bojei. Barani calls 'Abd-Allah 'grandson of Hulu [i.e. Hulegu]' (*TFS*, 218), an error which misled Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 30; but it possibly reflects awareness at Delhi that 'Abd-Allah had been an Ilkhanid appointee.

⁹⁶ *JT*, III, 152-3, 252 (tr. Arends, 94, 143); cf. also *JT*, II, tr. Verkhovskii, 100 (sentence omitted from Blochet's text; see Boyle tr., 154 n.40). On this campaign, see Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 85-6; and for the subsequent history of the Negiideri contingents trans-ported westwards, *ibid.*, 87-90.

⁹⁷ U. N. Day, 'The north-west frontier of the Sultanate', in his *Some aspects of medieval Indian history* (New Delhi, 1971), 43-4; and cf. also his 'The north-west frontier under the Khalji Sultans of Delhi', *IC* 39 (1963), 99.

⁹⁸ Ja'far b. Muhammad b. Hasan Ja'fari, *Ta'rikh-i Yazd*, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran, 1338 Sh./ 1959), 27; for the grant, see Bosworth, *History of the Saffarids*, 435. On the kingdom of Herat, see T. W. Haig and B. Spuler, 'Kart', *Enc. Isl.*²; also Spuler, *Mongolen in Iran*, 129-33, and his 'Das heutige afghanische Gebiet und sein Ringen urn Selbstandigkeit gegeniiber die Mongolen im 13./14. JH.', in G. L. Ulmen (ed.), *Society and history. Essays in honor of Karl August Wittfogel* (The Hague, 1978), 403-9.

⁹⁹ Sayfi, 369-73: the date, of course, is not above question (above, p. III, n.39).

~ regions - instanced in the overthrow of Sali Noyan - appears to have been a temporary phenomenon. Despite Aubin's assertion that 'the impossibility of maintaining contact with the Golden Horde soon condemned the Neguderis to a change of masters which was already complete around 1270', we may well question whether the Chaghadayids did effectively assert their authority here at this time.¹⁰⁰ Still less could they have retained it in the troubled years that followed. What links, if any, the renegade Chaghadayid princes whom the Ilkhans installed in the Ghazna region retained with the Chaghadayid ulus is not clear. In his account of Chaghadai's line, Rashid al-Din, writing at the very beginning of the fourteenth century, speaks of 'the province of Ghazna and the Qara'una army, which has long had connections with them'.¹⁰¹ But perhaps we should not read too much into this. The political organization of the Negiideris was doubtless a loose one, and the influence of the head of Chaghadai's ulus - like that of his enemy, the Ilkhan - varied at different times and from one contingent to another.¹⁰² Not until the last decade or so of the thirteenth century was a successful effort made from Transoxiana to bring the Negiideris under control and to dominate the marches of India (see chapter 11); and then the impact on the Delhi Sultanate would be felt more keenly than at any previous time.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 82: 'L'impossibilite de maintenir le contact avec la Horde d'Or condamna bientot les Neguderis a un transfert de sujétion qui etait deja chose faite vers 1270. Les

Cagataides en furent les beneficiaires, et non les Ilkhans.'

¹⁰¹ *JT*, II, 174, *lashgar-i Qara'una ki az qadim bdz ba-ishan ta'alluq dashta and* (tr. Boyle, 142/tr. Verkhovskii, 92,-3).

¹⁰² See the remarks in Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 87.

~ CHAPTER 7

Raid, conquest and settlement

To chart the progress of Muslim arms during the thirteenth century is by no means an easy task. There are no contemporary Hindu narrative sources, properly speaking; even the epic *Hammiramahakavya*, for example, dates from the end of the fifteenth century. From the Hindu side, inscriptions -whether on stone or in the form of copper-plate grants issued by rulers to their subordinates - are the best evidence we possess, although the references there to *Mlecchas* ('unclean ones'), *Turushkas* ('Turks') and *Yavanas* ('Westerners') are frequently vague. Muslim writers, less than forthright about reverses, provide fragmentary data. To notice, moreover, that Juzjani's accounts of military operations are largely confined to those on which Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah or Ulugh Khan Balaban were present is to recognize the extent of our ignorance. There must have been numerous military operations conducted at a local level by amirs and muqta's which won fresh territory for the revenue-collector and the settler, but of which we know nothing. Although the distribution of iqta's may serve as a pointer to Muslim conquest, the information available for any given time is hardly exhaustive. Here and there an inscription dating the construction of a mosque confirms the presence of a Muslim community; but even so we cannot tell whether this was the earliest mosque to be built in the town concerned.

It is important not to be misled by the terminology of holy war (*jihad, ghazw*) employed by Juzjani and others. The primary aims of the Islamic holy war are the defence of the *Dar al-Islam* and the extension of Muslim rule over pagan territory. In the circumstances of the early Sultanate period, the latter aim could only be realized in certain regions for perhaps a limited time; it might not be realizable at all. A case in point is the great fortress of Ranthanbor in Rajasthan, which was taken twice, and repeatedly attacked, before its final capture by 'Ala' al-Din Khalji in 700/1301. During the thirteenth century the pious Muslim monarch might have to be content with swashbuckling raids. In the more spectacular cases, the capital of a Hindu kingdom was taken, looted and then abandoned so that its ruler was able to reoccupy it in the wake of the Muslim army's departure. Assaults of this

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~ kind rallied the faithful, weakened an infidel prince by depriving him of treasure, horses and elephants and diminished his standing in the eyes of his peers and his subjects. But many expeditions would have been designed simply to replenish stocks of cattle and slaves. For much of the period after 633/1236 Muslim domination either remained static or receded as the Sultanate proved unable even to hold on to the acquisitions made by Mu'izz al-Din and Aybeg or by Iltutmish.

Predatory incursions into Hindu territory might also have other main-springs than conventional religious fervour. Ulugh Khan Balaban is said to have recommended military activity against the Hindu powers to Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah in order that plunder wrested from the Hindus might be used to pay the troops that resisted the Mongols.¹ Such campaigns also often served the interests of the individual commander. Balaban's own lucrative expedition to Ranthanbor in 652/1254, which immediately pre-ceded his return to power at court; Toghril's profitable raid on eastern-Bengal just prior to his insurrection in c. 678/1279-80; and still more the booty obtained from the Deccan by 'Ala' al-Din Khalji in 695/1296 which greased his path to the throne, suffice to remind us of that.

Strongholds and refuges

Earlier we saw how the Ghurid conquests established a basis for Muslim rule in the north

Gangetic plain, while leaving certain Hindu rulers on their thrones in return for the payment of tribute. At a local level, power remained in the hands of a host of lesser chieftains who frequently defied the sultan's government. When he wanted to conjure up a vivid image of the peace and order that prevailed under 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, it was enough for Barani to depict these chiefs (*muqaddams*) and headmen (*khutslkhots*) as standing guard on the highways and keeping watch over travellers and caravans.² Ibn Battuta, who visited the Sultanate during Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign, was careful to distinguish Hindus who lived in villages subject to a Muslim officer (*hakim*) from those he terms 'rebels and warriors who maintain themselves in the fastnesses of the mountains and plunder travellers'.³ And he returns to the theme at a later juncture:

The infidels in the land of India inhabit a territory which is not geographically separated from that of the Muslims, and their lands are contiguous, but though the Muslims have the upper hand over them yet the infidels maintain themselves in inaccessible mountains and rugged places, and they have forests of reeds ... The infidels live in these forests, which for them are as good as city walls, and inside them they have their cattle and grain and supplies of water collected from the rains, so

¹ TN,II,57(tr.816).

² TFS, 324; and see also 340. For the term *khot*, see Yule and Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, 480-1; S. H. Hodivala, 'Notes on Hobson-Jobson', IA 58 (1929), 173; *idem*, *Studies*, I, 277-8.

³ IB, III, 133 (tr. Gibb, 612).

~ that they cannot be overcome except by strong armies of men who go into these forests and cut down those reeds...⁴

These are the *mawasdt* (sing, *mawds*, 'shelter', 'refuge') that figure so frequently in our Indian Muslim sources. The word applied to any of the countless regions of broken terrain, arduous defiles and jungles where the Muslim heavy cavalry could barely penetrate and the enemy could hold out with relative impunity.⁵ One such region was surely the *tarai* beyond the river Saru (Sarju) - 'the abundant jungles of Hindustan, the narrow passes and the torrents, and the dense foliage of numerous trees', as Juzjani puts it - where Balaban advanced in 654/1256 in the fruitless pursuit of his Muslim enemies.⁶ The *mawds*, of course, served as a refuge also for Muslim rebels like Qutluq Khan, who passed through such territory on his way to seek asylum in Santur in 654/1256;⁷ although sometimes their hopes were cheated, as when Malik Chhajju in 689/1290 and the adherents of 'Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru in c. 740/1339-40 were handed over to the sultan after seeking asylum in a *mawds*.⁸ The term grew to be synonymous with defiance. 'All Gawr and Tirhut became *mawas*', says 'Isami when referring to the Muslim-led secession of Bengal and Bihar in Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign.⁹

Hindu warriors were often ready to side with Muslim rebels against the government. Toghril's insurrection in c. 678/1279-80 drew in large numbers of foot from the landed gentry of Bengal - those 'renowned paiks', as Barani calls them, who subsequently paid a heavy price when the victorious sultan Balaban had them all beheaded.¹⁰ No more successful were the *rawats* and paiks - termed merely 'some infidel troops from Hindustan' (*az Hindustan sipahi-yi chand bi-din*) by Amir Khusraw - who gathered around Balaban's nephew Malik Chhajju at Kara in 689/1290 in an attempt to overthrow the Khalji regime. They paraded before Chhajju, taking up the betel-leaf (*tanbul*) in their familiar ceremony of pledging allegiance, and boasted how they would fall upon Sultan Jalal al-Din's canopy (*chatr*) in the heat of battle; but instead they were rounded up and taken prisoner when Chhajju lost his nerve and fled.¹¹ Kara appears to have been a veritable nursery of such auxiliaries for Muslim rebels. Not only did 'Ala' al-Din recruit two thousand paiks here only a few years later, but we find 'drug-quaffing paiks' allegedly behind a rising in c. 1338 in the same locality.¹²

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 389 (tr. Gibb, 741-2).

⁵ Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 226-9. Examples are found in TN, I, 491, and II, 17-18, 19, 26, 27, 29, 47,52,53,57,61,72,76-7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 71, *jangalha-yi Hindustan-i gashn wa-mada'iq-i lurha wa-iltifaf-i ashjar-i bisyar* (Raverty's tr., 837-8, modified).

⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 72 (tr. 839); cf. also I, 491 (tr. 704-5 inaccurate).

⁸ *TFS*, 182, 490-1.

⁹ *FS*, 606 (tr. 902).

¹⁰ *TFS*, 83, 91.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 182-3. For Amir Khusraw's dismissive phrase, see *MF*, 8.

¹² *TFS*, 222, 487. For the reservoir of armed men on which the Mughals later drew, see Dirk

~ In describing the Muslim and Hindu territories as geographically unseparated, Ibn Battuta was pointing to a feature of the Sultanate that marked it out from other Muslim polities. Elsewhere in the Islamic world it made sense to talk of the Dar al-Islam and the Dar al-Harb; but not in India. A series of dots would indicate the extent of the sultans' rule with greater realism than does the uniform shading favoured in historical atlases. Obeisance (*paibus*, *zaminbus*), like tribute, was intermittent. Barani makes Nizam al-Din advise Sultan Kayqubad to advance to meet his father in 686/ 1287 at the head of an imposing army, in order that the rais and ranas might be induced to wait upon him en route.¹³ The open countryside, the forests, the hills - these were the domain of the infidel. The Muslim population of the Sultanate largely resided in its fortified towns and cities, and even there they were not unusually a minority. Ibn Battuta observes of the great fortress of Gwaliyor that it was 'an isolated and inaccessible castle, in the midst of the infidel Hindus', and that the generality of its inhabitants were infidels; so too were the majority of the people of the neighbouring town of Alapur.¹⁴ Not long afterwards we find 'Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru, as governor of Sind for the Tughluqid Firtuz Shah, commenting acidly on 'peasants (*dahaqin*) and landholders (*zamindars*) who are only ostensibly subjects (*ra'aya-yi suri*) and pay tax out of fear of the army or the blow of the sword'.¹⁵ From each strongpoint the authority of the Muslim governor and tax-collector radiated outwards for a distance that waxed and waned with the conduct of local military operations or the proximity of a large field army sent from Delhi. In India the 'war zone', peopled by *harbis*, was never far away.

The heartlands

We are told very little of the relations of the sultan's governors in Sind with local Hindu powers. Sultan Balaban's son Muhammad, when governor of Multan, was married to the daughter of a Hindu rai, who ransomed his son-in-law's body from the Mongols in 684/1285.¹⁶ When not intent on repelling Mongol attacks, Muhammad seems to have been engaged principally in asserting his authority over the partially Islamized Sumra princes of the Indus delta. Having been tributary to Qubacha, they had submitted to Ilutmish, and Diwal (Daybul) and Damrila are said to have been subject to

H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: the ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan, 1450-1850* (Cambridge, 1990), chap. 1, esp. 3-17.

¹³ *TFS*, 141; cf. also 108, where the chiefs come to wait upon Balaban after the Bengal campaign.

¹⁴ *IB*, III, 188, 195, and IV, 29 (tr. Gibb, 642, 645, 785).

¹⁵ *IM*, 75. For the varied groups who made up the class loosely termed *zamindars*, see I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 58-9.

¹⁶ *FS*, 180-1 (tr. 311).

~ Radiyya.¹⁷ But their allegiance could not be taken for granted, and it must have fallen to the

sultan's representatives at Siwistan to keep watch on them. Muhammad's *iqta'* is said to have extended as far as Janani, a town some 120 miles upstream from Thatta and known to have been held by the Sumras; but we know that in *c.* 680/1281-2 he reduced the Sumra strong-hold at Damrila.¹⁸ At some point early in the fourteenth century, says 'Afif, 'Ala' al-Din Khalji mounted an unsuccessful campaign in the region, although we also know that his *muqta'* at Deopalpur, Ghazi Malik Tughluq, constructed in lower Sind a new fortress, which he named Ghazipur.¹⁹ Thereafter, no more is heard of this territory until the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq.

The Panjab was home to a number of imperfectly subdued tribes, notably the Khokhars, whose original territory lay between the Jhelam and the Chenab but who were by now encroaching on the regions east of the Beah.²⁰ They chiefly threatened Lahore. In 639/1241 Qaraqush Khan, the *muqta'* of Lahore, massacred a band of Khokhars whom he found scavenging in the stricken city for anything the Mongols might have left behind.²¹ According to Barani, Balaban's cousin Shir Khan subdued the Khokhars and other tribes, a feat which proved beyond the capacity of his successors; and Amir Khusraw credits Jalal al-Din Khalji too with harrying them.²² But in the following century we learn from one of Ibn Mahru's letters that the road from Multan to Ajudhan (now Pakpattan) was regularly harassed by marauding Khokhars.²³

Further east, and closer to the heart of the Sultanate, Muslim governors based at fortresses like Tabarhindh, Sunnam and Samana had to contend with other turbulent peoples - the Bhattis and Mains of the Abuhar region, the Mandahars of Kaithal, and the Jats. They were for the most part hardy pastoralists who nomadized in the riverine tracts, and Barani, while a prisoner in Bhatner, saw their *talwandis*, laagers formed out of wagons within which they gathered their livestock close to a source of water.²⁴ Todars and Jats, as well as Khokhars, are found among the troops with

¹⁷ *TN*, I, 459 (omitting Damrila, but cf. Raverty's tr. 640). Damrila is Danbharlo, 150 m. E. of Karachi: J. A. Boyle, 'Jalal al-Din Khwarazm-Shah in the Indus valley', in Khuhro (ed.), *Sind through the centuries*, 129 n.13.

¹⁸ *FS*, 175 (tr. 304): immediately prior to his overthrow by the Mongols (683/1285). *DGK*, 69. *WH*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 140b; hence Bada'uni, I, 154 (WMBRLH in error). *TMS*, 43, for the southern boundary of Muhammad's *iqta'*. For Janani, see *IB*, III, 101 (tr. Gibb, 596-7).

¹⁹ Ghazipur: *SFS*, 91. 'Ala' al-Din: 'Afif, 251; the late and contradictory testimony on this is reviewed by Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 133-4.

²⁰ Abdus Subhan, 'Khokhar', *Enc. Isl.*². For their original territory, see *Taj*, fol. 190a.

²¹ *TN*, II, 165-6 (tr. 1136). ²² *TFS*, 65. *DR*, 52. ²³ *IM*, 168.

²⁴ *TFS*, 568; and cf. Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 305, for a translation of this passage. On these tribes, see generally H. A. Rose, *A glossary of the tribes and castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier province* (Lahore, 1911-19, 3 vols.), II, 101-6 (Bhattis), 357-77 (Jats), and III, 65 (Mandahars), 102-4 (Minis or Mains); also Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 295-6. The Jats were abandoning their pastoralism for agriculture: Irfan Habib, 'Jatts of Punjab and Sind', in

~ which Radiyya and *Altunapa opposed Bahram Shah in 638/1240.²⁵ The fortress at Bhatner was built by Shir Khan as *muqta'* of Deopalpur, and he, according to Barani, reduced these peoples to obedience.²⁶ But the future sultan Jalal al-Din Khalji fought against the Bhattis and the Khokhars and, when conducting a raid on Mandahar territory as *muqta'* of Kaithal (i.e. in the late 1280s), sustained two wounds in the face that left him scarred ever afterwards.²⁷ And periodic resistance continued into the fourteenth century, for Muhammad b. Tughluq was to head a punitive campaign against the Mains, the Bhattis and the Mandahars in *c.* 1337. It would have been some such group which had attacked Ibn Battuta's party in 734/1334 in the plain between Ajudhan and Abuhar.²⁸

Immediately south of Delhi lay Alwar, a hilly region pitted with defiles and ravines and in the thirteenth century heavily forested. This, to the Muslims, was the *kuhpaya*, 'the highlands'. An alternative

name was 'Miwat', after its inhabitants, the Meos, who appear to have been loosely subject to the Chawhan (Chahamana) kings of Ranthanbor,²⁹ and whose depredations reached across Hariyana in the north and to Bhayana in the east. Muslim outposts had been created in this tract at Rewari, Narnawl, Palwal and Kama, which appear as iqta's under Iltutmish and his immediate successors: Rewari was for a time the assignment of Balaban, who early in his career is said to have reduced to obedience 'the *mawasat* of the *kuhpaya*.'³⁰ In 658/1260, when his dependants on the outskirts of Hansi had suffered from Meo raids, Balaban led two devastating cam-paigns deep into their territory, bringing back 250 of their leading men for execution in Delhi and putting thousands of Meos to the sword.³¹ Juzjani's fulsome narrative might easily persuade us that the Meos had been suppressed for all time, but for Barani's claim that during the reigns of Iltutmish's offspring the Meos had continued unchecked, so that they were robbing the mansions (*saraiha*) in the neighbourhood of Delhi itself and harassing the water-carriers at the Hawd-i Shamsi. Balaban gave priority to crushing them, and spent the first year of his reign clearing the jungles in the environs of the capital and slaughtering the Meos. He constructed a fortress at Gopalgir and established various redoubts (*thanaha*). After this, alleges Barani, the citizens of Delhi were spared the

Harbans Singh and N. Gerald Barrier (eds.), *Panjab past and present. Essays in honour of Dr. Ganda Singh* (Patiala, 1976), 92-103.

²⁵ *FS*, 139 (tr. 259).

²⁶ *TFS*, 65.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 195. *DR*, 52.

²⁸ *IB*, III, 133-5 (tr. Gibb, 612-13). For Muhammad's campaign, see *TFS*, 483.

²⁹ See generally J. Burton-Page, 'Me'0', *Enc. Isl.*², and 'Mewat', *ibid.* For the link with Ranthanbor, *TN*, II, 58-9 (tr. 818); Habibullah, *Foundation*, 152, 153.

³⁰ *TN*, II, 6, 8, 41 (tr. 726, 730, 790); and for Balaban, II, 52 (tr. 806-7). For Kama, in the Bharatpur territory, 39 m. N.W. of Mathura, at 27° 40' N., 77° 20' E., see Raverty, 790 n.9; for Palwal, see also Shu'aib, 'Inscriptions from Palwal', 2-3; *RCEA*, X, 56, 72-3 (nos. 3678, 3703).

³¹ *TN*, II, 78-83, 89 (tr. 850-6, 864); also a brief reference to the first campaign at I, 496 (tr. 715).

~ threat of the Meos.³² The mosque constructed at Narnawl in 671/1272 may indicate the success of Balaban's policy.³³ Under Jalal al-Din Khalji, Narnawl again appears under Muslim rule, and the fact that on his outward march against Ranthanbor in 690/1291 the sultan was able to move by way of Rewari and Narnawl suggests that he anticipated no trouble from the Meos.³⁴ But a chance remark by Ibn Battuta reveals that Muhammad b. Tughluq had been obliged to send troops into the hilly regions near Delhi hot long before the Moroccan traveller's arrival.³⁵ Nothing throws into sharper relief the limitations of Muslim governmental authority than these recurrent crises in a territory so close to the capital.

The north and west

Beyond the Khokhars lay the people of the Salt Range (Kuh-i Jud). Their suppression by Mu'izz al-Din in 601/1204 had not cowed them for long, and their conversion to Islam had been merely temporary. In 643/1245 the raja of the Salt Range, 'Jaspal Sihra', acted as guide to the invading Mongol army, for which he incurred a punitive attack by the Delhi forces under the *army-hajib* Balaban in the following year.³⁶ Soon after his accession as sultan in 664/1266, Balaban led another expedition to the Salt Range, bringing back the raja's two sons as hostages:³⁷ they appear to have accepted Islam, and are later found enrolled among the nobility (above, p. 79).

During the thirteenth century the sultans seem to have had little contact with the Hindu princes of the mountains to the north, for which the term Qarachil is employed by Juzjani and by Ibn Battuta;³⁸ Muhammad b. Tughluq is the first sultan known to have launched a campaign to these distant regions. Our

sources barely mention Kashmir and Jammu, each under its own dynasty of rajas, and there is no evidence that they ever acknowledged the overlordship of Delhi. But even in Juzjani's time expeditions were sent into the territories lying due north of Delhi. When the raja of Santur, 'Ranpal, paramount among the Hindus', gave asylum to

³² *TFS*, 55-7. For Gopalgir, see also *FS*, 164 (tr. 291).

³³ S. S. Hussain, 'A new inscription of Sultan Balban from the State Museum, Patiala', *EIAPS* (1972), 1-3; *ARIE* (1973-4), 13, 181 (no. D250).

³⁴ *MF*, 25; *ibid*, 28, for an amir of Narnawl. For this place, at 28° 3' N., 76° 10' E., see *IG*, XVIII, 380-1.

³⁵ *IB*, III, 293 (tr. Gibb, 696-7). ³⁶ *TN*, II, 56-7 (tr. 815); cf. also I, 479 (tr. 678-9).

³⁷ *TMS*, 40. *TFS*, 59-60, mentions the campaign only briefly.

³⁸ *TN*, II, 126 (tr. 1046); the form is given in *scriptio plena* by *IB*, III, 325. The name is Turkish and appears to mean 'opening in the snow', from *qar*, 'snow', and *achil-*, 'to open': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 26, 641; Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*, 64 ('*qaracil...* endroit qui ne gele pas dans une surface gelee'). The suggested link with Sanskrit *achala*, 'mountain', and hence with the location 'Kularchak' (*recte* Kularchal), near Kashmir, mentioned in the eleventh century by al-Biruni, is therefore groundless.

~ Balaban's enemy Qutlugh Khan, Balaban sacked his residence at Silmur (Sirmur) in 655/1257.³⁹

Rajasthan and the Siwalik

The northern part of the Aravalli range formed the backbone of the territory called by the Muslims 'Siwalik' (not to be confused with the modern usage, which refers to a section of the sub-Himalaya). This was a vast area, stretching from Hansi and Sarsati as far south as Nagawr, Ajmer, Sambhar Namak and Mandor; and indeed a phrase of Barani's suggests that it was deemed to include Jalor also.⁴⁰ Early in his reign, Iltutmish led an expedition to Jalor, ruled by a branch of the Chawhan dynasty. Its king, Udayasimha ('Udayasa'), was reduced to submission and undertook to pay tribute.⁴¹ The arrangement does not seem to have been long respected, since Iltutmish in 624/1227 attacked and captured Mandor, which is known to have belonged to Udayasimha, and indeed an inscription of his son Chachigadeva proclaims that Udayasimha had 'curbed the pride of the Turushka'.⁴² Perhaps this is an allusion to the recovery of Mandor, which figures as part of an iqta' only once, in 639/1242, and was clearly lost by the Muslims at some later date, since it had to be retaken by Jalal al-Din Khalji in 691/1292.⁴³ Of Jalor, nothing more is heard until the following century.

Ajmer, the former capital of the main branch of the Chawhan dynasty, had been seized by Aybeg following its occupation by Hariraja, brother of Prthviraja III. During the reign of Iltutmish it was the centre of an iqta' which comprised also Lawa, Kasili and Sambhar Namak, and was held for a time by Nasir al-Din Aytemiir al-Baha'i. But these latter districts do not appear again as Muslim territory in the thirteenth century, and when we next find Ajmer granted as iqta' it is in conjunction with Mandor and Nagawr, as part of the large assignment entrusted to Kiishlu Khan in 639/ 1242.⁴⁴ By this time the southernmost regions of the Siwalik would have been under heavy pressure from the Chawhans at Ranthanbor, and the grant perhaps indicates that an amalgamation of local resources was deemed necessary. It must also be significant that thereafter Muslim authors do not refer to Ajmer until the fourteenth century. A Sanskrit epic claims that the Chawhan king of Ranthanbor, Hammiradeva (1283-1301), passed

³⁹ *TN*, II, 72-3 (tr. 839-40); see also I, 491 (tr. 704-6).

⁴⁰ *TFS*, 289. The narrower usage is found in *TN*, I, 284, 400-1 (tr. 200, 468). See generally Yule and Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, 843-4.

⁴¹ *Taj*, fols. 228a-232b. For Jalor among Iltutmish's conquests, see *TN*, BL ms., fol. 179b.

⁴² D. R. Bhandarkar, 'The Chahamanas of Marwar', *EI* 11 (1911-12), 74 ff. For Udayasimha's possession of Mandor, see Ray, *Dynastic history*, 1128-31; and for Iltutmish's campaign, 77V, I, 446 (tr. 611).

⁴³ *TFS*, 220. *FS*, 215 (tr. 379-80). *TMS*, 64, 65. For the kingdom of Jalor, see generally Sharma, *Early Chauhan dynasties*, 167-79.

⁴⁴ *TN*, I, 468, and II, 8 (tr. 661-2, 728).

~ Map 3a: The war against the Hindu powers in northern India

~ through Ajmer (Ajayameru) in the course of a victorious progress from Abu back to his capital.⁴⁵ If reliable, this tradition suggests that the fortress no longer formed part of the Sultanate.

Ranthanbor itself, reputed by Juzjani so impregnable as to have defied the attacks of some seventy Hindu kings down the ages,⁴⁶ had become tributary in 587/1191. The city was apparently still subordinate to Iltutmish in 1215, for an inscription at Manglana, on the northern fringes of the Chawhan kingdom, mentions not only Prthviraja's grandson Valhanadeva but also 'Samasadana' (Shams al-Din) as the sovereign at Yogini (Delhi). But Ranthanbor had evidently defied the sultan by 623/1226, when his army captured the fortress after a long siege. Following Iltutmish's death, however, it was invested by the Hindus, and in c. 635/1237-8 Radiyya sent to its relief the Ghuri malik Qutb al-Din Hasan b. 'Ali: he seems to have judged it impossible to hold, since he withdrew the Muslim garrison, dismantled the fortifications and abandoned the place.⁴⁷

For several decades the war effort against the Chawhan kingdom did not prosper. At some time towards the end of Iltutmish's reign, Aytemur al-Baha'i met his death in an expedition from Ajmer into the Bundi region,⁴⁸ which almost certainly belonged to Prthviraja's descendants. After its recovery by the Hindus, Ranthanbor was attacked by the Delhi forces on a number of occasions. In 646/1248-9 Ulugh Khan Balaban led an army towards 'the highlands (*kuhpaya*) and Ranthanbor' to chastise 'Bahar Deo', described by Juzjani as 'the greatest of the rais of Hindustan' and identified by modern historians with the Chawhan king Vagbhata, Valhanadeva's successor. Balaban returned to the attack in 652/1254, during his exile at Nagawr, and advanced in the direction of 'Ranthanbor, Bundi and Chitor'. On both occasions 'Bahar Deo' was routed, and the Muslim army obtained a considerable plunder.⁴⁹ A further campaign was launched against Ranthanbor early in 657/1259, though the fact that we are told nothing of the outcome is probably an indication of failure.⁵⁰

We do not hear of Ranthanbor again in the Muslim sources until Jalal al-Din Khalji's attack in 690/1291, which is described in Amir Khusraw's *Miftah al-Futuh*. The sultan defeated an army sent against him by the Chawhan king, who then abandoned his capital at Jhayin and fled into the hills. Jalal al-Din occupied Jhayin, and its idols were smashed to pieces to be taken back to Delhi; detachments were sent on plundering forays to the

⁴⁵ Nilkantha Janardan Kirtane, 'The Hammira Mahakavya of Nayachandra Suri', *IA* 8 (1879), 64-5.

⁴⁶ *TN*, I, 445 (tr. 610-11).

⁴⁷ Pandit Rama Kama, 'Manglana stone inscription of Jayatrasimha; (Vikrama-) Samvat 1272', *IA* 41 (1912), 85-8. *TN*, I, 445-6, 459-60 (tr. 611, 642).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 8 (tr. 728).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 482-3, and II, 58-9, 65 (tr. 684-5, 818-19, 828); Raverty adopted the reading 'Nahar', but

cf. Ray, *Dynastic history*, 1095-6.

⁵⁰ TN, I, 495 (tr. 713).

~ south and east.⁵¹ Writing at some remove from these events, Barani gives the impression of a rather more limited achievement. According to him, Jalal al-Din took Jhayin, demolished its idols and plundered the territory, but spent less than a day inspecting his army's siege operations at Ranthanbor before raising the investment to avoid further expenditure in Muslim lives. A second campaign against Jhayin, towards the end of 691/ 1292, accomplished nothing more than the acquisition of booty.⁵² Apart from this invasion, the Chawhan kings do not appear to have been seriously troubled by Muslim armies for the rest of the century, and were free to engage in conflict with their Hindu neighbours, notably the Paramara kings of Malwa.⁵³ The overthrow of the Chawhans of Ranthanbor was deferred until the reign of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, and was to herald the Muslim advance on Chitor, Malwa and the lands beyond the Vindhyas. Not for nothing did Amir Khusraw call Ranthanbor 'the key to the south'.⁵⁴

Muslim sources barely mention conflict in the thirteenth century with the Guhila kings who dominated Mewar from their capital at Chitor (now Chittaurgarh), and we are dependent on scattered references to Muslims in the epigraphy of the region. Of Jaitrasimha (d. just before 1260), the Chirwa inscription of his grandson Samarasimha claims that the Muslims, among others, failed to humble him. From the same source we learn that during his reign the troops of the *suratrana* (sultan) attacked Nagadraha (Nagada). Since Jaitrasimha's resistance to the Muslims elicits high praise in Samar-asimha's Mount Abu inscription also, it is possible that he was able to avenge this outrage. No further clashes with the Muslims are reported until the reign of Samarasimha himself (c. 1273-1301), who, in the florid language of that inscription, 'like unto the primaeval boar ... in a moment lifted the deeply sunk Gurjara land out of the Turushka sea'.⁵⁵ Whatever episode is in question here, the statement suggests at least that at some date prior to 1285 the Guhila monarch had profited from the relative passivity of the Sultanate under Balaban.

⁵¹ *MF*, 28-35. There is a briefer account in *FS*, 223-4 (tr. 388-9). Jhayin has been identified by Satya Prakash Gupta, 'Jhain of the Delhi Sultanate', *MIM* 3 (1975), 209-15, with Chhain or Chhan, 7 m. S. of Ranthanbor, at 25° 55' N., 76° 27' E.

⁵² *TFS*, 213-14, 220.

⁵³ R. R. Halder, 'Inscription of the time of Hammir of Ranthambor, dated (V.S.) 1345', *El* 19 (1927-8), 46. On the thirteenth-century Ranthanbor kingdom, see Sharma, *Early Chauhan dynasties*, 118-25.

⁵⁴ *KF*, 54.

⁵⁵ Bernhard Geiger, 'Chirwa-Inschrift aus der Zeit des Guhila-Fürsten Samarasimha rVikrama-Sarhvat 1330 [A.D. 1273]', *WZKM* 21 (1907), 150. F. Kielhorn, 'Mount Abu stone inscription of Samarasimha [Vikrama]-samvat 1342', *IA* 16 (1887), 354. See generally Ray, *Dynastic history*, 1186-90, 1195; but his reference, *ibid*, 1190, to an appearance in Mewar by Jalal al-Din Mas'ud, brother of Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud, is based on a misreading of CTWR for SNTWR, i.e. Santur (above, p. 73).

~ The Doab and Awadh

In the middle of the thirteenth century the Doab was still largely enemy territory, and Muslim control in all probability barely extended beyond the walls of the principal towns in the north: Mirat (Meerut), Kol (close to modern Aligarh) and Baran (now Bulandshahr), all of which had been occupied by the Muslims since the time of Aybeg. The extent of the problem confronting the government at Delhi is strikingly revealed by the fact that in 647/1249-50 Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah's forces, on their way to campaign in the Qinnawj region, were pinned down in warfare with an unidentified Hindu opponent immediately after crossing the Yamuna.⁵⁶ The iqta' of Mirat, which was conferred on Balaban's brother Kishli Khan in 653/1255, is said to have extended 'as far as the foothills of Bandiyaran', and the new muqta'

spent the next few years reducing 'the hills of Bandiwaran as far as Rurki and Mayapur'.⁵⁷ Early in his reign Balaban constructed a fortress at Rurki,⁵⁸ but the place is not mentioned again in the Sultanate period. Nor is Jhinjhana, which appears as an iqta' during Iltutmish's reign⁵⁹ and at that time was seemingly the most northerly Muslim outpost in the region. Nevertheless, the erection of mosques in the 1280s at Manglawr and Garhmuktesar testifies to the growth of a Muslim presence in the northern Doab.⁶⁰

The advance of Muslim arms in the southern part of the Doab is better documented. Here certain towns were clearly under the sultan's rule by the middle of the thirteenth century and are mentioned in iqta' grants. Maha'tin was joined with Mahir (Mathura), Bhayana and Gwaliyor to form extensive assignments both for Nusrat al-Din *Talsi in Iltutmish's day and for Shir Khan in 657/1259. Jalesar and Balaram, the latter an iqta' already in Radiyya's time, also formed part of Shir Khan's iqta'.⁶¹ On the other hand, the very size of these two extraordinary grants again alerts us to the fact that the Muslims' military resources had to be stretched over a vast area. Mahir and Maha'un are not heard of again prior to the fourteenth century. It is possible that the reduction of these tracts had followed upon an obscure victory gained by Iltutmish at Chandawar in Etawa (scene of the overthrow of the Gahadavala king Jayachandra by the Ghurid forces in 590/1194), to which Juzjani makes one fleeting reference.⁶² The enemy here

⁵⁶ *TN*, I, 483, and II, 60-1 (tr. 686-7, 821).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 47 (tr. 799).

⁵⁸ *FS*, 164 (reading ZRKY, but cf. Husain's tr., 291).

⁵⁹ *TN*, II, 29 (tr. 759). For Jhinjhana, see *DGUP*, III. *Muzaffarnagar*, 263-4.

⁶⁰ Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 28-30; *ARIE* (1975-6), 178 (no. D254); *RCEA*, XIII (Cairo, 1944), 21-2 (no. 4832).

⁶¹ *TN*, II, 11, 34, 44, 62, 78 (tr. 733, 767, 794, 824, 849). Balaram is possibly Bilram, 19 m. N. of Etah, at 27° 49' N., 78° 38' E.: *DGUP*, XII. *Etah*, 159-61.

⁶² *TN*, II, 17 (tr. 742-3). For Chandawar, 'an ancient village of considerable historical importance', at 27° 7' N., 78° 23' E., see *DGUP*, VIII. *Agra*, 238-9; Irfan Habib, *An atlas of the Mughal Empire* (Oxford and Delhi, 1982), 27 and map 8A.

~ may have been Jayachandra's nephew Ajayasimha, who seems to have usurped control over the Etawa region at least when the rest of the Gahadavala kingdom passed to the late king's son.⁶³ Whatever the case, local opposition was by no means at an end, and may have revived after Iltutmish's death. In 642/1244 Balaban inflicted severe devastation on the districts of Jarali and Deoli 'and other *mawasaf* on the northern borders of Etawa'.⁶⁴ After his accession to the throne, he was obliged to conduct a lengthier campaign in the Doab, building fortresses at Kampil, Patiyali, Bhojpur and Jalall. Of these, Patiyali, at least, had been in Muslim hands for some time, having been the birthplace of Amir Khusraw in c. 651/1253, and by Balaban's death had been renamed Mu'minpur (Town of the Faithful).⁶⁵ Barani mentions that mosques were erected in these towns, and the date 665 (1267) found on the mosque at Jalall enables us to date the sultan's operations with some accuracy.⁶⁶ Such military activity would have made possible the occupation of places like Sakit (Sekit), where a mosque was raised in 684/1285.⁶⁷ But Muslim pressure on Etawa was sporadic, and the assertion of Delhi's authority was a slow process. On its western borders Rapri, lower down the Yamuna, is not referred to as a Muslim base prior to the reign of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji.⁶⁸

The result of Balaban's operations in the Doab, says Barani, was to 'open the road to Hindustan' (i.e. Awadh and the regions to the east).⁶⁹ One aim had possibly been to safeguard communications with the isolated strong-hold of Qinnawj, on the right bank of the Ganges. Within a short time of its capture by Aybeg in 595/1199 Qinnawj seems to have been recovered by the Hindus, since Iltutmish is credited with its conquest and issued coins inscribed 'from the tribute (*kharaj*) of Qinnawj'.⁷⁰ Thereafter it served as an important base of operations against the Hindu princes, its muqta's not only conducting local raids on their own account⁷¹ but also contributing troops, as we shall see, for warfare in 'Malwa' to the south. The four-

month

⁶³ P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, xviii and 92-4.

⁶⁴ *TN*, II, 53-4 (tr. 809). Raverty's identification of the former with 'Jurowli', at 28° 17' N., 78° 17' E. (809 n.7), is unconvincing. See Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 230, who suggests either 'Julowlee', 35 m. S. of Fatehgarh, or 'Joollee', 14 m. S. of Sekit; here and at I, 402, he equates Deoli with Thornton's 'Duhlee' in Etawa, at 27° 2' N., 78° 53' E.: cf. *DGUP*, X. *Mainpuri*, 204 ('Dihuli').

⁶⁵ *DGK*, 70. Mirza, *Life and works*, 16-17.

⁶⁶ TFS, 57-8. For the mosque at Jalall, see Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 25-6; *RCEA*, XII, 122 (no. 4585); for this 'ancient town', 13 m. E. of Aligarh, at 27° 52' N., 28° 15' E., see *DGUP*, VI. *Aligarh*, 261-3. Bhojpur lies at 27° 17' N., 79° 41' E., 6 m. S. of Fatehgarh: *DGUP*, IX. *Farrukhabad*, 184-5; for Kampil, at 27° 39' N., 79° 20' E., see *ibid.*, 215-16; and for Patiyali, at 27° 42' N., 72° 5' E., *DGUP*, XII. *Etah*, 201-3.

⁶⁷ Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 31-2; *RCEA*, XIII, 47-8 (no. 4870).

⁶⁸ *TFS*, 328, 333; and see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 281. G. H. Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Khalji Sultans of Delhi and their contemporaries in Bengal', *EIM*(1917-18), 30.

⁶⁹ *TFS*, 58.

⁷⁰ *CCIM*, I, part 2, 21 (no. 39). *CMSD*, 71-2 (no. 52). *Taj*, in *ED*, II, 241. *77V*, I, 452 (tr. 627).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, I, 470 (tr. 665).

~ campaign of 647/1249-50 by the army of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah appears to have been directed at the Qinnawj region, for an inscription from Bilram records the martyrdom of a Muslim commander at this time at a village near Qinnawj.⁷² It may similarly have taken some considerable time to wrest the region between Qinnawj and the distant outpost of Kara from the infidel. *Barihun (Barhamun?), which is known to have lain in the vicinity of Qinnawj and which was twice granted as iqta' by Iltutmish, is not mentioned again.⁷³ The walls of Tilsanda, which JuzjanI likens to Alexander's Gates, succumbed only in 645/1248 to an attack by Mahmud Shah's forces.⁷⁴ And there were in all likelihood reverses, which claimed the lives of the Muslims commemorated in various epitaphs from Bilram dated 658/1260, 683/1284 and 703/1303, the last of them in the fortress of Chandawar.⁷⁵

East of the Ganges, the important stronghold of Bada'un, in Muslim hands since 594/1198, faced towards Katehr (corresponding roughly to present-day Rohilkhand), which surfaces repeatedly in our sources as the territory of the most refractory of infidel peoples. The reduction of this tract by Iltutmish, to which JuzjanI alludes, may have occurred in 1227.⁷⁶ But it was a shortlived affair, since Sanjar-i Qabaqulaq, as muqta' of Bada'un under Mas'ud Shah, is said to have overthrown 'the *mawasat* of Katehr and Bada'un', conducted numerous expeditions and founded mosques.⁷⁷ Around the middle of the thirteenth century we hear of other Muslim-held centres in these parts, like Sambhal and Kasrak, which first appear as iqta's in Mahmud Shah's reign, and Amroha, which became an iqta' only under Balaban.⁷⁸ In 652/1254, during a campaign that had taken him through Bardar (Hardwar) and Bijnor as far as the banks of the Rahab (Ramganga), Mahmud Shah retaliated for the loss of one of his lieutenants by inflicting, in Juzjani's words, 'a reverse on the infidels of Katehr that [the people of] that territory will remember for the rest of their lives'.⁷⁹ But memory, it

⁷² *ARIE* (1966-7), 82 (no. D249). For the expedition, see *TN*, I, 483, and II, 60-1 (tr. 686-7, 821).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, II, 20, 36 (tr. 746, 779). This place is mentioned by tenth-century geographers: al-Muqaddasi, *Descriptio imperil Moslemici*, ed. M. J. De Goeje (Leiden, 1877), 478 (variant reading: BRHYN); *Hudud al-'Alam*, facs. edn V. V. Bartol'd (Leningrad, 1930), fol. 15b (tr. Minorsky, 90), placing it

near Qinnawj.

⁷⁴ *TN*, I, 480, 481 (tr. 679-80, 681). See Raverty, 679-80 n. 6, and Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 222: the village of Tilsanda near Cawnpore (Kanpur), mentioned by the latter, seems most likely.

⁷⁵ *ARIE* (1966-7), 83 (nos. D252, D253, D255).

⁷⁶ When Iltutmish is known to have been at Bada'un: P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 80-9. Katehr is omitted in the printed edition of *TN*, but cf. BL ms., fol. 180a (corrupted to 'LYHR'). The varying significance of the term 'Katehr' is discussed in Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 259.

⁷⁷ *TN*, II, 26 (tr. 755).

⁷⁸ Sambhal: *ibid*, I, 482 (tr. 684). Amroha: *TFS*, 36-7, and Habibullah, *Foundation*, 156. Kasrak: *TN*, II, 42 (KRK; but cf. BL ms., fol. 211a, KNRK, and Raverty's tr., 791); the place is identified by P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 81-2, with a village in Tilhar tahsil in Shahjahanpur district.

⁷⁹ *TN*, I, 487-8 (tr. 696-8).

~ Map 3b: The war against the Hindu powers in northern India

~ seems, was brief. The disorders of c. 665/1266-7, in which Bada'un, Sambhal, Amroha and Ganuri were subject to further depredations by the infidel, brought down upon Katehr the wrath of Balaban, who razed the town of that name and despatched five thousand archers to ravage the rest of the territory. As a result, claims Barani, there was no further trouble from Katehr until the end of the reign of Jalal al-Din Khalji.⁸⁰ During his time Ganuri was joined with Chawpala (present-day Moradabad) on the Rahab to form a sizeable iqta', indicating perhaps that resources here were thinly spread.⁸¹ Yet Jalal al-Din mounted plundering operations in the Kabar district, and under 'Ala' al-Din the government's grip was sufficiently secure for it to be incorporated into the khalisa.⁸²

South of Bada'un lay the extensive territory of Awadh. The Muslims had at some unspecified point occupied the city of this name, the ancient Ayodhya, which in the 1190s was the iqta' of Husam al-Din Oghulbeg. Early in the thirteenth century we hear of other towns in the area which served as iqta' headquarters, like Kasmandi and Mandiyana (Mandiaon), both in the neighbourhood of the later city of Lakhnaw (Lucknow).⁸³ The muqta's of Awadh played a prominent role in the interminable war against the infidel. It was while he was based in Awadh that not long after 623/1226 Iltutmish's eldest son, Nasir al-Din Mahmud, crushed a ruler 'Hardu Dal', called by Juzjani 'Bartu' (possibly a subordinate of the Gahadavalas), who had been a thorn in the flesh of the Muslim settlers in the region. But the prince's victory, commemorated in verses of the poet Siraji,⁸⁴ did not effect the pacification of Awadh, and in the following decades Taj al-Din Sanjar *Kirit Khan and Taj al-Din *Teniz Khan are each in turn credited with uprooting the *mawasat* of the region.⁸⁵ Thereafter, although we learn at intervals the names of Awadh's muqta's, including for a short time the future sultan 'Ala' al-Din, there is a gap in our knowledge of developments here until the Tughluqid period.

Banaras had been taken from the Gahadavalas in 590/1194, and Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar had profited from their troubles to establish a base in the districts of *Sekhit and Bhoili, in the Chunar region on the opposite bank of the Ganges, from where he mounted operations against

⁸⁰ *TFS*, 59. Ganuri is identified by Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 259-60, with Thornton's 'Genori' or 'Genouri', in Bulandshahr, at 28° 20' N., 78° 4' E.

⁸¹ *TFS*, 204 (KANWD, to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 110b). For Chawpala, see *MF*, 13; Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 366; *DGUP*, XVI. *Moradabad*, 232.

⁸² *MF*, 21-2. *TFS*, 323-4. For Kabar, later renamed Shergarh and 'an ancient town', at 28° 39' N., 79° 22' E., see *DGUP*, XIII. *Bareilly*, 268-9.

⁸³ *TN*, II, 29, 72 (tr. 759, 838). For Kasmandl, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 233, and *DGUP*, XXXVII. *Lucknow*, 195-6. For Mandiaon, at 26° 56' N., 80° 58' E., see *ibid*, 245-7; Habib, *Atlas*, map 8A.

⁸⁴ Siddiqi, 'Historical information', 55-6. *TN*, I, 453 (tr. 628-9). For a different identification, see Habibullah, *Foundation*, 111 n.99. Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 218, was surely wrong to link 'Bartu' with a raja in the Bhitargarh district of eastern Bengal.

⁸⁵ *TN*, II, 27, 29 (tr. 757, 760).

~ Maner and Bihar.⁸⁶ But the Muslim foothold here may have been transient. The Gahadavalas continued to hold out in the more inaccessible parts of the Banaras and Chunar regions;⁸⁷ and although JuzjanI mentions Banaras among the strongpoints taken by Iltutmish from defeated Muslim rebels (p. 29 above), it is not mentioned as an iqta' again and disappears from sight. The first inscription attesting Muslim rule belongs to the reign of Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah Khalji (716-20/1316-20).⁸⁸

The road to Bengal

In the early thirteenth century the furthest Muslim base beyond Awadh in the direction of the infidel territories of Nepal and Tirhut was the old town of Bahraich, which housed the shrine of Salar Mas'ud, a Muslim warrior of uncertain background, and had become a major focus of pilgrimage.⁸⁹ Bahraich was held by the Muslims in Iltutmish's reign; and here, as JuzjanI proudly announces, his sovereign Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah waged holy war against unspecified Hindus prior to his accession.⁹⁰ It may have been the same regions that in 690/1291 were ravaged by Jalal al-Din Khalji following his victory over the rebel Malik Chhajju, for Amir Khusraw says that in cutting down the jungles he was seeking to open a road to Lakhnawti: *mawas* after *mawas* yielded tribute to the sultan, but regrettably none of the places Khusraw mentions can be identified.⁹¹ Barani asserts that the rai of Gorakhpur had paid tribute to the administrative district (*shiqq*) of Awadh prior to the upheavals of Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign;⁹² but it is doubtful if the relationship went back into the thirteenth century.

During the early Sultanate period Muslim armies were raiding both Tirhut (north Bihar) and the neighbouring region of Nepal known in JuzjanI's time as 'Bhatlgun'. Tirhut had paid tribute to Ghiyath al-Din Twad, which is doubtless why JuzjanI lists it among Iltutmish's conquests,⁹³

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 423 (readings corrupt; Raverty's tr., 549-50, has 'Bhagwat' for the first, but cf. BL ms., fol. 170a, SKHYT): see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 206, on the identification of these places, of which the second, Thornton's 'Bhoelee', lies at 25° 6' N., 83° 3' E.; also *DGUP*, XXVII. *Mirzapur*, 278-84.

⁸⁷ P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 56-70 (nos. 11:5-6). See more generally Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala dynasty*, 113-19.

⁸⁸ *ARIE*(\9I\2), 91 (no. D170).

⁸⁹ I. H. Siddiqi, 'A note on the Dargah of Salar Mas'ud in Bahraich in the light of the standard historical sources', in Christian W. Troll (ed.), *Muslim shrines in India* (Delhi, 1989), 44-7.

⁹⁰ Iltutmish: 'Awfi, *Lubab al-Albab*, I, 115. Mahmud Shah: *TN*, I, 470, 478 (tr. 665, 676).

⁹¹ *MF*, 22-3 (reading KSHWN for KYTHWN, i.e. *Kaithun). *FS*, 224 (tr. 390-1), with 'BRY and KYTHWN. *TMS*, 64, includes a faint echo of this campaign ('NHRY KYTHWR) in an obviously corrupt sentence.

⁹² *TFS*, 587-8. *SFS*, 33, likewise claims that 'Karosa' and Gorakhpur were dependencies of Awadh.

⁹³ *TN*, I, 437 (tr. 587-8); omitted in the list of Iltutmish's conquests at I, 452, but see BL ms., fol. 180a.

~ and in Radiyya's time Toghril Toghan Khan, as muqta' of Bihar and Lakhnawi, conducted a lucrative raid on Tirhut.⁹⁴ But Tirhut was also vulnerable to attacks from the opposite direction. Radiyya's muqta' of Awadh, Temur Khan, penetrated 'as far as the limits of Tirhut' and exacted tribute from Bhatigun;⁹⁵ and at the beginning of 654/1256 Balaban, on the heels of his enemy Qutlugh Khan, led an army as far as 'Bhatigun and the limits of Tirhut', returning with a vast plunder.⁹⁶ In 702-3/1302-3, the muqta' of Kara is found commanding the troops of 'the east, Bengal and Tirhut',⁹⁷ which is a mystery, given that Bengal did not then form part of the sultan's dominions. Otherwise we hear no more of Muslim attacks on Tirhut until Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq's expedition of 724/1324.

The subjugation of Bihar, of which Juzjani gives no details apart from an account of the capture of the city itself (identical, in all probability, with Uddandapuri),⁹⁸ was clearly a piecemeal process. Gaya (Vajrasana), which was under Muslim rule in 1219,⁹⁹ was no longer in Muslim hands when the Buddhist monk Dharmasvamin passed through Bihar in 1234; although he bears eloquent testimony to continued Muslim military activity in both Bihar and Tirhut.¹⁰⁰ Following Balaban's recovery of the eastern provinces soon after c. 665/1267, Gaya may still have been unsubdued, since a local ruler boasts in an inscription of 1268 that he has preserved his territory from the sultan.¹⁰¹

Much of the credit for the implantation of Islam in west Bengal belongs to the Khalaj rulers, who are praised for building mosques, colleges (*maddris*) and hospices (*khanaqahat*), and for munificence towards Muslim scholars and sayyids.¹⁰² A paucity of sources, however, renders the progress of Muslim settlement here even more obscure than it is elsewhere. After Juzjani's time, inscriptions show that one of the Muslim strongpoints he

⁹⁴ *TN*, II, 14 (tr. 737).

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 17-18 (tr. 743). Here (n.3) Raverty, who had earlier identified this region correctly (*ibid.*, 639 n.8; cf. also 567 n.1), defined it as 'the tract lying on the left bank of the Son, east of Banaras'. Cf. also Habibullah, *Foundation*, 150, who, following Cunningham, defines it as the Tons valley ('Bhathgora'). But this is to ignore the link with Tirhut which Juzjani makes on both occasions. The name is perhaps connected with the town of Bhatgaon, on which see *IG*, VIII, 89.

⁹⁶ *TN*, II, 71-2 (Raverty's tr., 838, reads 'Badikot', but the place is evidently identical with that mentioned in Temur Khan's biography).

⁹⁷ *TFS*¹, Digby Coll. ms, fol. 113a; *TFS*, 300.

⁹⁸ *TN*, I, 423 (tr. 551-2); a brief reference to the conquest of the territory of Bihar at I, 425 (tr. 556). For Uddandapuri, see Shri Hasan Nishat Ansari, 'Historical geography of Bihar on the eve of the early Turkish invasion', *JBR* 49 (1963), 257 n.3.

⁹⁹ *ARIE* (1962-3), 24, 80 (no. B261).

¹⁰⁰ G. Roerich, *The biography of Dharmasvamin (Chag lo-tsa-ba Chos-rje-dpal)* (Patna, 1959), 61-4. For the date, see the introduction by A. S. Altekar, v-vi; and for Muslim pressure on Bihar, *ibid.*, xix.

¹⁰¹ Hasan Nishat Ansari, 'Gaya epigraph of V.s. 1325 noticing Balban as *Biruban*', *JBR* 53 (1967), 170-81: the editor is sceptical and suggests that this security was purchased with tribute.

¹⁰² *TN*, I, 427, 436 (tr. 559-60, 583).

~ mentions - Deokot, which was the capital until 'Iwad's accession - was still a centre of Muslim power at the end of the thirteenth century, under the independent Ghiyathid sultans; but others - like Narangui, Ganguri, or Basankot (the last-named founded by 'Iwad) - do not surface again.¹⁰³ Juzjani distinguishes the region of Ral (Rarh), with its centre at Lakhnor, west of the Ganges, from Barind (Varendra), the tract to the east of the river, which included Deokot.¹⁰⁴ After its capture by the Hindus in

642/ 1244 (below), we simply do not know when Lakhnor was recovered.

Iwad extorted tribute from the Sena kings in eastern Bengal (Bang), and after the conquest of Lakhnawti by Iltutmish this pressure was maintained by his representatives. The second of these, Sayf al-Din Aybeg, owed his sobriquet *Yaghantut* to the great number of elephants he obtained by way of plunder from Bang and despatched to the sultan.¹⁰⁵ Toghril Khan Ikhtiyar al-Din Yuzbeg is found in 653/1255 striking coins from 'the revenue (*kharaj*) of the territory (*'ard*) of *Badar and Nudiya';¹⁰⁶ the mention of the latter city demonstrates that the Senas had at some point reoccupied their old capital. They survived into the second half of the century, when they were apparently supplanted by a rival power which had arisen in Tipperah. This region, which Barani calls 'Jajnagar', may have been the object of a lucrative expedition by Balaban's lieutenant Toghril, as governor of Lakhnawtl, immediately prior to his rebellion against the sultan and his assumption of the imperial title.¹⁰⁷ One of the two known kings of the Tipperah dynasty was the 'Danuj Rai of Sunarga'un (Sonargaon) who sought his revenge by cooperating with Balaban and undertaking to obstruct the rebel's flight.¹⁰⁸

Bang was only one of the territories that offered rich pickings to the Muslim rulers of Lakhnawtl. Nobody sought to emulate Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar, who had returned a broken man from a disastrous campaign through the upper Brahmaputra region, possibly into the region of Assam the Muslims called Kamrtup or Kamrud;¹⁰⁹ but his successors at Lakhnawtl

¹⁰³ Basankot: *ibid.*, I, 436 (tr. 581-2). Narangui: I, 432, 434 (tr. 572, 574, 577). Ganguri: I, 433 (tr. 575). Deokot: I, 431-4 (tr. 572, 574, 576, 578); Abdul Karim (ed.), *Corpus of the Arabic and Persian inscriptions of Bengal* (Dacca, 1992), 48-53. On the possible location of some of these places, see Monmohan Chakravarti, 'Notes on Gaur and other old places in Bengal', *JASBns*5(1909), 199-235.

¹⁰⁴ *TN*, I, 436-7, and II, 13 (tr. 584-5, 737).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 9-10 (tr. 732). For Tu. *yaghantut*, 'seize elephants', see Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 904, in conjunction with Rasonyi, 'Noms de personnes', 241-2.

¹⁰⁶ *CCIM*, II, 146 (no. 6). *CMSD*, 55 (no. 225D).

¹⁰⁷ TFS 82; 83. For Barani's usage (*Jahajnegar*, 'city of boats or ships'), see Chakravarti, 'Notes on Gaur', 217.

¹⁰⁸ TFS, 87 *TMS*, 42-3. He has been identified with Ariraja Danujamadhava Dasarathadeva, who issued a copper-plate grant around this time: Habibullah, *Foundation*, 183 n.32; Ray, *Dynastic history*, 383 n.1; and for a survey of the later Senas, *ibid.*, 379ff.

¹⁰⁹ *TN*, I, 427-32 (tr. 560-72). On this expedition, see the evidence reviewed in Digby, *War-horse and elephant*, 45-6; cf. the dubious hypothesis in Z. V. Togan, 'About the campaign of the Indian Khalach-Turks against the Keraites of Mongolia in Northern Tibet in the

~ conducted operations over a vast area. Iwad levied tribute not merely on Kamrup but also on the Eastern Ganga kingdom of Orissa, usually designated in the Muslim sources as Jajnagar.¹¹⁰ On balance the Delhi Sultan's governors were less successful. Toghan Khan was in 641/1244 worsted in continual warfare with the king of Jajnagar, with the result that a Hindu army took Lakhnor, where Toghan Khan's lieutenant fell in the fighting, and menaced Lakhnawti itself: it was saved only by the timely appearance of troops sent by the Delhi Sultan (above, p. 91).¹¹¹ The reverse at the hands of Jajnagar appears to be celebrated in an inscription of King Narasimha II of Orissa, referring to his father's victory over the 'Yavanas of Radha (Rarh) and Varendra'.¹¹² Toghan Khan's humiliation was avenged some ten years later by Yuzbeg, who sacked the Jajnagar king's capital at an unidentified place named '*Umardan'.¹¹³ But Yuzbeg himself met his death in c. 655/1257 while engaged in an ambitious and heedless invasion of Kamrup.¹¹⁴ From a *fath-nama* in Amir Khusraw's *Rasa'il al-I'jaz*, it appears that in 680/1282 Balaban himself led a campaign into Orissa which reduced King 'Mal Deo' to submission.¹¹⁵

The era of the independent Ghiyathid sultans and of their successors of the line of Firaz-i Aytegin was marked by significant advances at the expense of the independent Hindu powers within Bengal proper. From a coin issued by Balaban's grandson Kayka'us and struck 'from the *kharaj* of Bang', it is clear that part of the eastern delta was now once again tributary to the Muslims.¹¹⁶ Under Shams al-Din Firaz Shah, Sunarga'un appears as a Muslim mint-town. Satga'un (Satgaon) too appears to have been annexed in his reign, and a mosque was built at Tribeni, on the Hooghly, in 698/1298-9. Epigraphical evidence reveals that Sirihat (Sylhet), lying immediately east of the Brahmaputra, was reduced in 703/1303-4.¹¹⁷ All these places would pass briefly under the rule of the Delhi Sultan as a result of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq's expedition of 724/1324 (below, pp. 200-1).

years 1205-1206', *JPHS* 12 (1964), 187-94, and in *Proceedings of the 36th International Congress of Orientalists* (Delhi, 1968), 174-8.

¹¹⁰ *TN*, I, 437 (tr. 587-8).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 15 (tr. 739-40).

¹¹² N. Vasu, 'Copper-plate inscription of Nrsimha-deva II of Orissa, dated 1217 Caka', *JASB* 65, part 1 (1896), 232-4, 267 (verse 84).

¹¹³ *TN*, II, 31 (tr. 762-3). Habibullah, *Foundation*, 144, was sceptical that '*Umardan' was actually deep within Orissa.

¹¹⁴ *TN*, II, 32-3 (tr. 764-6).

¹¹⁵ *RI*, V, 5-13: see 8-11 for 'Mal Deo'; 13 for the date; 'WDH must be an error for 'WRSH. Khusraw's heading for the *fath-nama* refers only to Lakhnawti, which misled Mirza, *Life and works*, 219.

¹¹⁶ H. E. Stapleton, 'Contributions to the history and ethnology of north-eastern India - IV. Bengal chronology during the period of independent Muslim rule. Part I, 686-735 A.H. (1286-1334 A.D.)', *JASB* ns 18 (1922), 410.

¹¹⁷ Abdul Karim, *Corpus*, 53-6. Stapleton, 411-12. For the Sylhet inscription, see Ahmad Hasan Dani, *Muslim inscriptions of Bengal* (Dacca, 1957), 7 (no. 9). See generally Majumdar, *History of medieval Bengal*, 17-19.

~ **Bundelkhand and Malwa**

The town of Bhayana originated with the settlement of Sultankot, founded by Baha' al-Din Toghril as part of his strategy to take Gwaliyor.¹¹⁸ Gwaliyor, which had submitted to Aybeg in 597/1200-1, was retaken by the Hindus, doubtless after Aybeg's death, but in 630/1233 the city fell to Iltutmish after an eleven-month investment; the last Pratihara (Parihara) king, 'Mangal Deo', fled to Narwar.¹¹⁹ Nusrat al-Din *Talsi, whom Iltutmish in 631/1234 appointed as muqta' of Bhayana and Sultankot and prefect (*shihma*) of Gwaliyor, was in addition entrusted with overall command of the troops of Qinnawj, Mahir and Maha'un, perhaps an indication of the importance attached by the sultan to this particular front.¹²⁰ From these bases Muslim commanders waged war on the Chan-della kingdom of Jejakabhukti (modern Bundelkhand). Its capital, Kalinjar, had fallen to Qutb al-Din Aybeg in 599/1203, following the death of King Paramardideva, and had briefly been an iqta.¹²¹ But Trailokyavarman, Paramardideva's son and heir, had evidently recovered it by Iltutmish's last years.¹²² *Talsi defeated Trailokyavarman, capturing the rai's ceremonial parasol and standards during the pursuit.¹²³ Yet Muslim military activity had little impact on the Chandella kingdom. Although Kalinjar itself was not re-established as the capital following its recovery, and the kings normally resided at Ajayagarh, some twenty miles to the south-west, this seems to have been the sole concession made to the proximity of Muslim power by the Chandella ruler, who continued to style himself 'king of Kalinjar'. In an inscription of his son Viravarman, Trailokyavarman is credited with 'lifting up the earth immersed in the ocean formed by the streams of the Turushkas'.¹²⁴ Viravarman himself issued a copper-plate grant in 1280 to a nobleman who had vanquished the 'Turushkas' among others.¹²⁵ Nor were

these monarchs deflected from the duty of warring against their Hindu neighbours, notably the Kalachuri kings of Chedi and the Jajapellas of Narwar.¹²⁶

¹¹⁸ *TN*, I, 421 (tr. 545); cf. also II, 34 (tr. 767).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 448 (tr. 619). The form adopted by Raverty is 'Mangal-deV, though BL ms. reads MYKL DYW; another variant reading, MLKDYW, suggests something like 'Melugideva' (cf. Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 216). For the last Pratihara kings, see Ray, *Dynastic history*, 829 n.l, 834 n.l.

¹²⁰ *TN*, II, 10-11 (tr. 732-3). ¹²¹ *Taj*, fols. 182a-185a.

¹²² *TN*, II, 10-11, 12 (tr. 733, 734-5). K. N. Dikshit, 'Garra plates of the Chandella Trailokyavarman: [Vikrama-]samvat 1261', *El* 16 (1921-2), 272-7. R. K. Dikshit, *Candellas*, 157-8, following Ray, *Dynastic history*, 725, suggests that Trailokyavarman recovered Kalinjar as early as 1205.

¹²³ *TN*, II, 10-11, 12, 62-3(tr. 733, 734-5, 834-5).

¹²⁴ P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 100-5 (verse 7).

¹²⁵ Sir Alexander Cunningham, 'Report of a tour in Bundelkhand and Rewa in 1883-84', *ASIR* 21 (1885), 75. The grant is no longer extant: Ray, *Dynastic history*, 732, where the date cited, Vikrama samvat 1237, is an error for 1337.

¹²⁶ For the attack on Narwar, see D. C. Sircar, 'Inscriptions of the time of Yajvapala Gopala',

~ During the return march from his invasion of the Chandella kingdom in 632/1235, *Taisi had been ambushed by a ruler whom Juzjani calls 'Chahar-i Ajari'. This was the earliest recorded Muslim clash with Chahadadeva, the second of the Jajapella (Yajvapala) kings, who around this time wrested the stronghold of Narwar from the Pratiharas and made it their residence. Juzjani, who was then qadi of Gwalyor, heard an account of the engagement from the veteran amir's own mouth, and it is clear that *Taisi had extricated his army with considerable difficulty.¹²⁷ He died soon after Radiyya's accession, and in 635/1238 her troops evacuated the Muslim population of Gwalyor.¹²⁸ Juzjani retained the office of qadi, and this was confirmed in 643/1245, but on each occasion he simultaneously received an important post in Delhi, suggesting that the Gwalyor appointment was simply one *in partibus infidelium*.¹²⁹ That the great fortress was now in enemy territory emerges from the campaign launched at some point in Radiyya's reign by Temur Khan Qiran from Awadh towards 'Gwalyor and Malwa' in which he is said to have done signal service.¹³⁰

The enemy was undoubtedly the Jajapella king. Juzjani, describing Ulugh Khan Balaban's campaign against him in 649-50/1251-2, says that it headed towards 'Gwalyor, Chanderi, Nurwul (Narwar) and Malwa' and speaks of him as 'the greatest of all the rais of that country'. Balaban succeeded in taking Narwar and putting it to the sack.¹³¹ Gwalyor seems to have been recovered at this juncture, for in 657/1259 the governorship of the fortress, together with a large iqta' comprising Kol, Bhayana, Balaram, Mahir, Maha'un and other territories, was conferred on Balaban's cousin Shir Khan.¹³² Once again, the amalgamation of widely dispersed resources may indicate both the fragility of Muslim rule and the magnitude of the Hindu threat. Gwalyor, which Juzjani could call 'one of the celebrated strongholds of Islam', was apparently in Hindu hands once more by the last years of Balaban's reign, for among those overcome by the noble who received the above-mentioned grant from the Chandella monarch Vira-varman in 1280 was Hariraja of Gopagiri, i.e. Gwalyor.¹³³ Unless Hariraja

El 31 (1955-6), 326-7; and for relations with the Jajapellas generally, see R. K. Dikshit, *Candellas*, 168-70.

¹²⁷ *TN*, II, 11-12, 62-3 (tr. 733-4, 824-5). For the correct identification of 'Chahar', see M. B. Garde, 'A note on the Yajvapalas or Jajapellas of Narwar', *IA* 47 (1918), 241-4, refuting the suggestion that he belonged to a branch of the Chawhans; though the older view is reiterated by Ray, *Dynastic history*,

1103-4. The surname 'Ajari' is discussed by Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 224-5, who connects it with the locality Arjar, some 40 m. S.E. of Narwar.

¹²⁸ TN, II, 25-6 (tr. 754-5). Mongol envoys incarcerated at Gwaliyor were transferred to Qinnawj: *ibid.*, II, 214 (tr. 1285). For Taisi's death, see *ibid.*, I, 458, and II, 13 (tr. 639-40, 735-6).

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 460, 470 (tr. 644, 667).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 17 (tr. 743).

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, I, 485-6, and II, 62, 63 (tr. 690-2, 824-5).

¹³² *Ibid.*, II, 44 (tr. 794); and for the date, cf. I, 495 (tr. 712-13).

¹³³ Cunningham, 'Report of a tour in Bundelkhand and Rewa', 74-6. For the phrase from Juzjani, see *TN*, II, 44 (tr. 794).

~ was a client ruler under the sultan's overlordship, which is unlikely, then the grant shows that the fortress had once more slipped out of Muslim control. This possibility is borne out by the fact that Jalal al-Din Khaljl is found conducting a plundering expedition to Gwaliyor shortly before his murder in 695/1296.¹³⁴

As for Chahadadeva, little reliance can be placed on Juzjani's assertion that he had been totally overthrown and rooted out of his kingdom. The coins and inscriptions of the Jajapella dynasty dictate a more sober assessment, demonstrating as they do that Chahadadeva and his successors maintained their hold on Narwar into the fourteenth century. The ultimate fate of the Jajapellas is obscure, and it is usually assumed that they fell victim to an unrecorded invasion by the forces of 'Ala' al-Din Khaljl.¹³⁵ It would have been some such campaign that resulted in the Muslim occupation of Chanderi, which is known to have occurred prior to 711/1312.¹³⁶

To the north-east of the Jajapella and Chandella kingdoms lay the Muslim outposts of Kara and Manikpur, which are frequently linked in the sources. Kara acknowledged Muslim authority as early as Aybeg's reign, and was the seat of an amir in the time of Iltutmish.¹³⁷ When muqta' of Kara during Radiyya's reign, Temur Khan Qiran is said to have conducted numerous forays against the infidel, but no details are given.¹³⁸ In 645/1248 we find the army of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah based at Kara, while Balaban led a detachment against a Hindu potentate called by Juzjani 'Dalakimalaki' (?). The dynastic affiliations of this prince, said to have occupied the regions along the Yamuna between Kara and Kalinjar, are uncertain; but he was not, apparently, a Chandella, for we are told that 'the rais of the marches (*atraf*) of Kalinjar and Malwa' were unable to subdue him. His stronghold was looted by the Muslims, and his family and dependants were captured.¹³⁹ This was the victory which Juzjani tells us he commemorated in his lost *Nasiri-Nama*; but for all the chronicler's bombast it is difficult to withstand the impression that the campaign was on a relatively trifling scale.¹⁴⁰ We do not hear of operations from Kara again

¹³⁴ TFS, 223, 228. *TMS*, 67; for Sirhindi's claim that Gwaliyor was in Muslim hands again by the first year of 'Ala' al-Din's reign, see *ibid.*, 72 (the text reads KALPWR).

¹³⁵ Sircar, 'Inscriptions of the time of Yajvapala Gopala', 323-36; also his 'Yajvapala Gopala', *IHQ* 32 (1956), 399-405.

¹³⁶ Z. A. Desai, 'The Chanderi inscription of 'Alau'd-din Khalji'', *EIAPS* (1968), 4-10. Cf. also *TFS*, 323.

¹³⁷ *ARIE* (1969-70), 11, 98 (no. D214). *TN*, I, 452 (reading KWH for KRH; but cf. Raverty's tr., 627). On Kara, see generally Laiq Ahmad, 'Kara'.

¹³⁸ *TN*, II, 17 (tr. 743).

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 481-2, and II, 57-8 (tr. 681-3, 816-18). Ray, *Dynastic history*, 729-30, and Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 222-3, thought 'Dalakimalaki' might be the Chandella king Trailokyavarman; but Juzjani's account suggests a less powerful chief.

¹⁴⁰ Laiq Ahmad, 'Kara', 84, assumes that Kishli Khan was appointed as muqta' of Kara in 653/1255 (*recte* 651/1253) and that for a few years prior to this it was in Hindu hands.

~ until 'Ala' al-Din Khalji became muqta' of the region in 689/1290 and 'trampled underfoot numerous *mawasaf*'.¹⁴¹

According to Juzjani, Aybeg had conquered the territory as far as the frontiers of Ujjain.¹⁴² The Sultanate's first war against the Paramara dynasty of Malwa was deferred until the end of the reign of Iltutmish, who in 632/ 1235 invaded the kingdom and successively plundered the cities of Bhilsan (Bhilsa) and Ujjain, destroying the temple at the former place and removing the idol of Mahakala to Delhi.¹⁴³ Like so many other exploits of the period, however, this campaign had no permanent results; and we have no record of any subsequent Muslim attack on the Paramaras before the Khalji era, when in c. 692/1293 the future sultan 'Ala' al-Din, as muqta' of Kara, plundered Bhilsan and carried off its great bronze idol.¹⁴⁴ Juzjani speaks of campaigns towards Malwa on a number of occasions, but he is not employing the term in its narrow sense, to refer to the Paramara kingdom, which in his day was beyond the reach of the sultan's lieutenants. In the same vein Amir Khusraw describes the troops of Jalal al-Din Khalji as advancing as far as the borders of Malwa in 690/1291, when they crossed the Chambal and the Kunwari (Kunar).¹⁴⁵ For these writers, 'Malwa' appears to function as a general label for the entire region lying south and south-west of modern Bundelkhand.

The prospect of dominion

The idea of paramountcy over the entire subcontinent had a long pedigree,¹⁴⁶ and had possibly communicated itself to Delhi's sovereigns. A Sanskrit inscription of Balaban's reign might have appeared to give them every encouragement, since it depicts the sultan's authority as radiating over 'the Dravida country and Rameshvaram'.¹⁴⁷ Court poets, too, flattered Muslim rulers regarding their putative conquests. In the *Qiran al-Sa'dayn*, Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad is made to boast: 'Sometimes I give my troops gold from Gujarat; at others I write drafts [for them] on Deogir ... I make Malwa the repository of my riches; Jajnapur I cause to meet the obligations of my treasury ...'¹⁴⁸ At the time, however, this was mere fantasy. Prior to

¹⁴¹ *KF*, 8; see also *FS*, 227-8 (tr. 393-4), for his severity towards recalcitrant Hindus while at Kara.

¹⁴² *TN*, I, 417 (tr. 516-17); and see above, p. 19, n.62.

¹⁴³ *TN*, I, 449 (with the year 631), 452 (cf. BL ms, fol. 180a; tr. 621-3, 628). Ray, *Dynastic history*, 907, places this invasion in the reign of Devapala (c. 1218-36).

¹⁴⁴ *TFS*, 220.

¹⁴⁵ *MF*, 34.

¹⁴⁶ Andre Wink, *Land and sovereignty in India* (Cambridge, 1986), sect. I, esp. 15-21.

¹⁴⁷ Palam Baoli inscription, V.s. 1333/1276, in P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 5-6, 12 (no. 1:4). See the comments of Peter Hardy, 'The authority of Muslim kings in mediaeval South Asia', in Marc Gaborieau (ed.), *Islam et societe en Asie du Sud*, Collection Purusarthe 9 (Paris, 1986), 39.

¹⁴⁸ *QS*, 63, *gah ba-hasham zar diham az Gujarat * gah ba-Diwglr nawisam barat * ... Malwa-ra waqi'-i dafa'in kunam * Jaj* [printed text has jam in error] *nagar wajh-i khazain kunam* (tr. in ED, III, 526).

~ 'Ala' al-Din's audacious raid of 695/1296, the people of Deogir had never even seen a Muslim

army from the north.¹⁴⁹ For the Muslims of the thirteenth-century Sultanate, most of central and peninsular India was *terra incognita*. In this direction the Hindu territories seemed to stretch away indefinitely. The bounds of Malwa, wrote Amir Khusraw later - again fully availing himself of poetic licence - exceeded the ability of skilled surveyors (*muhandisan*) to measure them.¹⁵⁰ It is a striking testimony to the vigour of 'Ala' al-Din's regime that, as we shall see in chapter 10, events had already overtaken this observation some years before Khusraw died.

¹⁴⁹ *TFS*, 222-3. For Hindu poetry and epigraphy of the Yadava kingdom which seems to contradict Barani, see P. M. Joshi and A. Mahdi Husain, 'Khaljis and Tughluqs in the Deccan', in H. K. Sherwani and P. M. Joshi (eds.), *History of medieval Deccan (1295-1724)* (Hyderabad, A. P., 1973, 2 vols.), I, 34-5, who suggest, however, that these refer to some clash with Muslims in the coastal region.

¹⁵⁰ *KF*, 56.

~ PART II

The zenith of the Sultanate

~ CHAPTER 8

Sultans, saints and sources

Sources for the period down to 752/1351

For the whole period from 'Ala' al-Din's reign (695-715/1296-1316) through to the early 1350s, we continue to be dependent largely on three authors writing within India, namely Barani, 'Isami and Sirhindi, together with - for Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign (724-52/1324-51) - the memoirs of the Moroccan visitor Ibn Battuta. Authors writing in the Mughal era - notably Nizam al-Din Ahmad Harawi (d. 1003/1594), 'Abd al-Qadir Ba da'uni (late sixteenth century), and the seventeenth-century compilers Ulughkhani (Hajji al-Dabir) and Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah Astar-abadi (Firishita) - generally rely upon Barani or Sirhindi and have no value as primary sources; but they occasionally preserve for us details gleaned from earlier works that are no longer extant. It should be noticed that there exists an earlier version of Barani's *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* (utilized by the fifteenth-century writer Bihamadkhani), of which there have survived three manuscripts¹ and which from 'Ala' al-Din onwards begins to diverge from the revised text; while for his reign, at least, the manuscripts of this first recension differ even from each other. A reading of the standard version suggests, in fact, that Barani may have drafted an account of 'Ala' al-Din's reign as a separate work and subsequently incorporated it in a larger history, but without amending his treatment of the first few months.²

Chronology is no less a problem for this period than for the previous century. Barani's very attention to analysis at the expense of chronology raises difficulties for the student of Muhammad's reign in particular. Like 'Isami, he furnishes few dates, although there are more in his first recension than in the revised text; and in the latter Barani expressly denies that he is presenting the crises of Muhammad's reign in strict chronological order.³ It is with some difficulty that a narrative framework can be reconstructed by

¹ Here I have relied primarily on Bodleian ms. Elliot 353 and a ms. in the private collection of Mr Simon Digby; but certain readings have been checked against RRL Persian ms. 2053.

² The events from late 695 to the autumn of 696 are thus covered twice: *TFS*, 239, 242-6.

³ *Ibid.*, 468, 478.'

~ means of these accounts with some assistance from Ibn Battuta, although he too is sparing of dates and many episodes to which he alludes preceded his arrival in 734/1333.⁴

How much is lost, we cannot be sure. Barani tells us that 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's reign was distinguished by a number of prominent historians (*mu'arrikhān*). Kabir al-Din, the sultan's *amir-i dad-i lashgar*, is said to have excelled in the skills of a secretary (*dabiri*) and in composition (*inshd'*). He allegedly completed volumes of *fath-ndmas* and also wrote a *Ta'rikh-i 'Ala'*. Amir Arslan *Kalāhi, too, had such a prodigious memory for the deeds of past sultans that he was able to answer 'Ala' al-Din's questions without recourse to books. Barani, claiming merely that his own *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* was based simply on abridgement of past histories, does not say explicitly that these included anything written by Kabir al-Din or Amir Arslan.⁵ In any event, no work by either man has survived, and what we are told of Amir Arslan does not suggest that he wrote a history of his own.

Of the written sources known definitely to have existed, some would have been invaluable: Bijapuri's *Mulhaqdt*, for instance, the 'long' *qasida* on Firuz Shah's exploits composed by Mutahhar, and the *Shdh-Ndma* composed by Muhammad b. Tughluq's court poet, Badr-i Chach, and described by Bada'uni as a 'treasure'.⁶ 'Afif, who dubs himself the author of 'the histories of sultans',⁷ claims to have written biographies (*mandqib*) of 'Ala' al-Din, of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq, of Muhammad b. Tughluq and of Muhammad b. Firuz, and an account of Temur's sack of Delhi in 801/1398 (*dhikr-i khardbl-yi DihlJ*);⁸ but no trace of these works exists today. Similarly lost is another *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi*, to which a certain 'Abd al-'Aziz[-i?] Shams *Bhanawri lays claim in the preface to his translation of the *Kitdb-i Bardhi*.⁹ In the 1540s a certain Husam Khan composed in Gujarat a *Tabaqdt* (or *Ta'rikh-i Bahddur-ShdhJ* which is no longer extant but was

⁴ The difficulties are compounded by later writers, beginning with *TMS*, where the sultan's campaign to Nagarkot in 738/1337 is wrongly identified with an earlier expedition sent to the Qarachll region; this misled Ishwari Prasad, *A history of the Qaraunah Turks in India* (Allahabad, 1936), 126ff. The older schema based on this false chronology from 739 onwards is thereby skewed: see Sir Wolseley Haig, 'Five questions in the history of the Tughluq dynasty of Dihli', *JRAS* (1922), 336-65; and for some of the problems, N. Venkata Ramanayya, 'The date of the rebellions of Tilang and Kampila against Sultan Muhammad bin Tughlaq', *Indian Culture* 5 (1938-9), 135-46, 261-9 (though his date for Fakhr al-Din's revolt in Bengal, *ibid.*, 138, 140, is surely too late).

⁵ *TFS*, 14, 361. For Taj al-Din Iraqi, see *ibid.*, 358.

⁶ Mutahhar: Bihamadkhani, fols. 407a, 413a-414b (tr. Zaki, 4, 15). Badr: Bada'uni, I, 241; P. Jackson, 'Badr-i CacT, *Enc.Isl², Supplement*; the date of completion of the *Shah-Nama* is given in a chronogram in Badr's *Qasa'id*, ed. M. Hadi 'Ali (Kanpiir, n.d.), 85 (see also ED, III, 572-3).

⁷ 'Afif, 256.

⁸ 'Ala' al-Din: *ibid.*, 478. Ghiyath al-Din: *ibid.*, 27, 36. Muhammad b. Tughluq: *ibid.*, 42, 51, 92, 274, 394, 451. Muhammad b. Firuz: *ibid.*, 148-9, 273, 428, 440. Sack of Delhi: *ibid.*, 182, 185.

⁹ IOL Persian ms. 1262, fol. 2b; Ethe, *Catalogue*, col. 1112 (no. 1997), assumes that the author is to be identified with 'Afif.

~ utilized by Ulughkhanl and is cited by Firishta.¹⁰ From the excerpts we have, it is clear that Husam Khan had access to sources other than Sirhindi or Bihamadkhani; his chronology, however, bears marked similarities to Sirhindi's.

The one chronicle contemporary with 'Ala' al-Din that has come down to us is Amir Khusraw's prose work, *Khaza'in al-Futuh*, which was completed in 711/1311-12 and provides a florid and bombastic account of the sultan's victories over various Mongol attacks and of Kafur's campaigns in the south; the poet himself calls it a '*fath-nama*'.¹¹ Khusraw's last historical works are the *Nuh Sipih*, written in 718/1318 under Qutb al-DIn Mubarak Shah and incorporating an account of the sultan's expedition to the Deccan; the *Diwal Rani*, which was completed just after the end of the Khalji period, in 720/1320, and contains details not found elsewhere; and the *Tughluq-Ndma*, commemorating the overthrow of the usurper Nasir al-DIn Khusraw Shah and the accession of Ghiyath al-DIn Tughluq (720-724/ 1320-1324).¹² In addition, although

the treatise on prose composition, *Rasa'il al-I'jaz*, which Khusraw produced in 719/1319-20, is rather suspect, some of the documents it contains appear to be based in part on genuine originals.¹³

For the Tughluqid era, although it seems that we must discount the fragment of the alleged memoirs of Muhammad b. Tughluq, which the majority of scholars no longer regard as authentic,¹⁴ we have access to richer and more varied material than for any of the previous dynasties. There are a few works composed in order to commemorate specific events, like the *Basatin al-Uns* (726/1325-6) in which Taj al-Din Muhammad-i Sadr-i A'la Ahmad-i Hasan 'AydawsI, known as Ikhtisan-i Dabir, describes Tughluq's Lakhnawtl campaign of 724/1324,¹⁵ and some of the verses of Muhammad's court poet Badr-i Chach. The extensive correspondence (*insha'*) of 'Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru, who served both Muhammad and Firuz Shah as governor of Multan and who died at some point before

¹⁰ On Husam Khan, see the introduction to *AHG*, Ross's edition of the *Zafar al-Walih*, II,

xxvii-xxix. He is cited by *Firishta*, I, 3, and II, 512. ¹¹ *KF*, 170; see *ibid.*, 26, for the current year.

¹² Useful summary of contents in Syed Hashimi, 'The Tughluq-namah', *IC* 8 (1934), 301-12, 413-24.

¹³ For an analysis, see S. H. Askari, 'Risail [sic]-ul-I'jaz of Amir Khusrau: an appraisal', in *Dr. Zakir Husain presentation volume* (Delhi, 1968), 116-37; *idem*, 'Material of historical interest in I'jaz-i-Khusravi', *MIM* 1 (1969), 1-20.

¹⁴ BL ms. Add. 25785 (of *TN*), fols. 316ff.; tr. in A. M. Husain, *Tughluq dynasty* (Calcutta, 1963), 265-76, and facsimile of text at end. See *ibid.*, 567-72, for an analysis of the document, which Husain believed to be authentic; for the contrary (and now widely accepted) view, Nizami, *Studies in medieval Indian history*, 76-85, and his *On history and historians*, 198-205; the arguments are reviewed in Stephan Conermann, *Die Beschreibung Indiens in der 'Rihla des Ibn Battuta*, IU, 165 (Berlin, 1993), 47-9.

¹⁵ S. H. Askari, 'Historical value of Basatin-al-Uns', *JBORS* 48, part 2 (1962), 1-29. Ikhtisan, *Basatin*, BL ms. Add. 7717, fol. 19b, gives the current year as 726.

~ 772/1370,¹⁶ contains a good deal of material on fiscal and military affairs, mostly relating to Firuz Shah's era, although some letters date from the time of Muhammad. In the *Dastur al-Albab* which Hajji 'Abd al-Hamid Ghaznawi began in 734/1333-4 and completed in 766/1364-5, we have a treatise on the administration of the Sultanate from the pen of a clerk (*muharrir*), of particular value on the subject of taxation.¹⁷ For the fourteenth century, lastly, we also possess material relating to the *sufi* orders (*silsilas, tariqas*), in which reference is sometimes made to contemporary political events. Chief among these, for our purposes, are the collected biographies of *sufi shaykhs*, the *Siyar al-Awliya'*, of Muhammad b. Mubarak Kirmani (Amir Khwurd; d. 770/1368-9); Amir Hasan Dihlawi's *Fawa'id al-Fu'ad*, comprising the discourses (*malfuzat*) of the influential Chishti Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya' (d. 725/1325); and Hamid Qalandar's *Khayr al-Majalis* (c. 755/1354), which contains those of Shaykh Nasir al-Din Mahmud *Chirdgh-i Dihli* ('the Lamp of Delhi').¹⁸

Turning to sources from outside India, the so-called correspondence (*mukdtibai*) of the Ilkhanid statesman Rashid al-Din must be discounted as a contemporary source for Indian affairs: many of the letters undeniably reflect a considerable familiarity with the administrative machinery in Persia and with the nature of the India trade, but it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion of Reuben Levy that they emanate from India itself in the fifteenth century.¹⁹ With the onset of the Tughluqid era, data from external sources become more plentiful. Wassaf's latest information on the Sultanate relates to the accession of Muhammad b. Tughluq;²⁰ but the opening up of Muslim India during Muhammad's reign to diplomatic contact with distant parts of the Islamic world, especially Mamluk Egypt, is reflected in the encyclopaedia *Masalik al-Absar* of al-'Umari (d. 749/1349), who was able to amass a veritable dossier of information about India; in notices on Muhammad and his empire in the biographical dictionaries - *al-Wafi bi'l-Wafayat* and *Ayan al-Asr* - of al-Safadi (d. 764/1363), the chronicles of Ibn

¹⁶ His death is mentioned in *SFS*, 154.

¹⁷ The author states that he was forty-four in 734 and that he was 917 months old, i.e. in his seventy-seventh year, on completing the book. This is said to have occurred in 760: *DA*, fols. 3a, 4b, cited without question by Rashid, 'Dastur-ul-Albab', 59. But the details contradict one another, and the correct year must be 766.

¹⁸ For these and other (often spurious) works, see Mohammad Habib, 'Chishti mystic records of the Sultanate period', *MIQ*, 1 (1950), no. 2, 1-42; Nizami, *On history and historians*, 163-80.

¹⁹ R. Levy, 'The letters of Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah', *JRAS* (1946), 74-8. See now A. H. Morton, 'The letters of Rashid al-Din: Ilkhanid fact or Timurid fantasy?', in Amitai-Preiss and Morgan, *The Mongol empire and its legacy* (forthcoming). K. A. Nizami, 'Rashid-u'd-Din Fazlullah as an Ilkhanid envoy to the court of Ala-u'd-Din Khalji', *PIHC* 29 (*Patiala* 1967) (Patna, 1968, 2 vols.), I, 139-43, and in *On history and historians*, 99-104, acknowledges some of the problems, but is inclined to accept the authenticity of the letters.

²⁰ Incorrectly placed in 723/1323. But the current year at one point appears as 727 (Wassaf, 607). The date 718 (*ibid*, 608) is manifestly an error for 728: Barthold, *Turkestan*, 49 n.2.

~ Abi'l-Fada'il (fl. 1340) and Shabankara'i (738/1337-8),²¹ and the travel narrative of Ibn Battuta. Of these, the *Tuhfat al-Nuzzar* (often called simply the *Rihla*) of Ibn Battuta, who spent several years in the Sultanate, furnishes a picture of life at Muhammad's court and in his dominions between 734/ 1333 and c. 748/1347 that in its vividness is unmatched elsewhere. The archive of the shaykhs of Jam in Khurasan, found in the fifteenth-century *Fara'id-i Ghiyath* of Yusuf b. Muhammad b. Shihab al-Jami (Yusuf-i Ahl), contains correspondence with the Delhi government during the reigns of both Muhammad and his successor.²²

Sources from 752/1351 onwards

The earlier recension of Barani's *Ta'rikh-i Flruz-Shdhi* embraced only the first four years of Flruz Shah's reign, and the revised text was completed two years after that. We are told that when the sultan desired a history of his reign to be written, and invited applications from would-be chroniclers following Barani's death in c. 762/1360-1, none came forward, and he was reduced to composing his own account, which he caused to be carved on the dome of the Jami' Masjid at his new capital, Firuzabad.²³ Fortunately, however, this dearth of historiographical enterprise did not last, and for Flruz Shah's reign (752-90/1351-88) we have access to a crop of literary sources. What might be called 'official' history is represented by the copy of Flruz Shah's lengthy inscription that has come down to us as *Futuhdt-i Firiiz-Shdhi*,²⁴ and by the panegyric *SJrat-i Flruz-Shdhi*, produced for the sultan soon after c. 772/1370 by an anonymous author who may have been the poet Mutahhar.²⁵ It was not, however, until the early fifteenth century that 'Afif wrote his *Ta'rikh-i Flruz-Shdhi*, which is the fullest source for the reign. 'Afif, who belonged to a bureaucratic family that had served the Tughluqs and himself worked in the *diwan-i wizarat* in the middle of the 1380s,²⁶ intended his biography of the sultan to be a sequel to Barani's work, comprising the ninety *muqaddimas* which the older historian had

²¹ D. P. Little, 'Al-Safadi as a biographer of his contemporaries', in Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic civilization presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden, 1976), 190-210. C. E. Bosworth and P. Jackson, 'Shabankara'i', *Enc. Isl.*²

²² On this work, see Jean Aubin, 'Le khanat de Cagatai et le Khorassan (1334-1380)', *furcica* 8 (1976), 20 n.19; *PL*, III, part 2, 251-2 (no. 428).

²³ 'Afif, 176-7: around the time of the sultan's return from his Jajnagar campaign, which occurred in Sha'ban 762/June-July 1361 according to *SFS*, 14, and in Rajab/May-June according to *TMS*, 130. Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 129, warns against taking this as a precise indication of the date of Barani's death.

²⁴ K. A. Nizami, 'The Futuhat-i-Firuz Shahi as a medieval inscription', in *PSMI*, 28-33, and in his *On history and historians*, 205-10.

²⁵ As suggested by K. A. Nizami, *Supplement to Elliot and Dowson's History of India*, III (Delhi, 1981), 63.

²⁶ 'Afif, 487-8: the context is the disgrace of Shams al-Din Abu-Rija, which occurred in 785/1383-4 (*ibid.*, 497-8). For 'Afif's forebears in the Tughluqids' service, see *ibid.*, 37, 127, 130-1, 138, 145, 196, 197, 339.

~ announced his intention of writing but had not lived to complete.²⁷ Regrettably, the text we have is defective at the end, to judge from the list of contents supplied by 'Afif himself. Both Sirhindi (838/1434) and Bihamad-khani (842/1438) supply information on Firuz Shah's reign which is not found in 'Afif's *Ta'rikh*; and they continue to be our principal sources from the 1380s onwards. Bihamadkhani's general chronicle, the *Ta'rikh-i Muhammad!*,²⁸ which down to 755/1354 relies on Barani's earlier recension, becomes at that juncture an original source; and though less detailed than Sirhindi's work it has the particular merit that it was composed not at Delhi but in the newly autonomous principality of Kalpi and hence provides us with a different vantage-point from that of earlier chroniclers.

Temur's invasion of India is of course covered in some detail by the Timurid chronicles. The most immediately contemporary of these was the lost *Ruz-Nama-yi Futuhdt-i Hindustan* of Qadi Nasir al-Din 'Umar, who accompanied the conqueror. This was abridged both by Ghiyath al-Din 'Ali Yazdi, whose *Ruz-Nama-yi Ghazawat-i Hindustan* has survived, and by Nizam-i Shami, who incorporated it into his *Zafar-Nama*, an account of Temur's career completed in 806/1404. Both works (and possibly also Qadi Nasir al-Din's original text) were in turn utilized by Sharaf al-Din 'Ali Yazdi when he came to produce his own *Zafar-Nama* in 828/1424-5.²⁹

The Khalji Sultans

Barani depicts 'Ala' al-Din Khalji as an unlettered soldier with little time for the 'ulama', but a man of boundless ambition who had to be dissuaded from founding his own religion; he was amazed that such a sultan, who set *realpolitik* above the injunctions of the Shari'a, could have prospered to the extent that he did.³⁰ Yet for 'Isami the contrast could not have been stronger between 'Ala' al-Din, who had done so much to implant Islam in India, and the contemporary sultan, Muhammad b. Tughluq, who had presided over its collapse;³¹ and at the time of Ibn Battuta's visit to Delhi a few years before, the citizens evidently looked back on 'Ala' al-Din's era as a golden age.³² It is true that the reign was marked both by the repulse of formidable Mongol invasions and by spectacular advances at the expense of independent Hindu powers in Rajasthan and the south. The capacity of the Sultanate to raise large and effective military forces was placed on a new footing by means of economic reforms which kept prices low in the capital.

Ibid., 29-30; cf. *TFS*, 529-30, 602.

On which see Peter Hardy, 'The *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi* by Muhammad Bihamad Khani', in

Gupta (ed.), *Essays presented to Sir Jadunath Sarkar*, 181-90.

For the relationship between these works, see John E. Woods, 'The rise of Timurid

historiography', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 46, part 2 (1987), 93-5.

TFS, 261-6, 289. For Barani's view of the sultan, see generally Hardy, *Historians*, 32-4.

FS, 604, 605-6 (tr. 898, 900-1).³² *IB*, III, 184 (tr. Gibb, 640).

~ Barani describes such achievements in terms of the miraculous.³³ But he also cites the opinion of the mystic Shaykh Bashir that 'Ala' al-Din's regime, founded as it was on his uncle's murder, was inherently

unstable;³⁴ and in the chronicler's own eyes the fate of 'Ala' al-Din's sons was retribution for Jalal al-Din's murder.³⁵

During 'Ala' al-Din's final illness, which Barani calls dropsy (*istisqa*), his heir, Khidr Khan, was imprisoned in Gwaliyur at the instigation of the sultan's na'ib, the slave Kafur, and shortly blinded following his father's death on 7 Shawwal 715/4 January 1316;³⁶ his brother Shadi Khan suffered the same fate. Kafur, whose aim, if Barani is to be trusted, was to destroy the entire Khalji dynasty,³⁷ ruled through an infant son of 'Ala' al-Din, Shihab al-Din 'Umar; but he enjoyed power for a mere thirty-five days before being murdered by 'Ala' al-Din's paiks. Another son then assumed the regency, but soon displaced the child ruler, on the pretext that the boy's mother had tried to poison him, and himself reigned as Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah (716-20/1316-20). In 718/1318, on the return march from a campaign in the Deccan, Qutb al-Din's cousins, the descendants of Jalal al-Din's brother Khamush (Yughrush Khan), were executed on suspicion of complicity in a plot to assassinate the sultan;³⁸ Khidr Khan, Shadi Khan and 'Umar were put to death; and their remaining brothers were despatched to Gwaliyur. In Jumada II 720/July 1320 the sultan's favourite, the Indian slave Hasan, entitled Khusraw Khan, had him murdered and ascended the throne as Nasir al-Din Khusraw Shah - the only Delhi monarch, in fact, who was an Indian convert to Islam. All 'Ala' al-Din's surviving sons were now massacred.³⁹ The Khalji dynasty appears to have been completely exterminated. When one of 'Ala' al-Din's senior lieutenants, Ghazi Malik Tughluq, the muqta' of Deopalpur, posing as the avenger of his master's heirs, marched on Delhi and overthrew Khusraw Shah, no member of the dynasty could be found to take the throne.⁴⁰ Ghazi Malik himself was accordingly proclaimed as Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq Shah (720-724/ 1320-1324).⁴¹

For some, says Barani, the parallel between the reigns of Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad and Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah Khalji was striking.⁴² In both cases a young and profligate ruler succeeded a harsh and despotic one,

³³ *TFS*, 339.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 377-8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 237.

³⁶ The date for 'Ala' al-Din's death supplied in *DR*, 259. *TMS*, 81, gives 6 Shawwal, and *TFS*, 369, the evening of that day; *FS*, 344 (tr. 524), has 11 Shawwal.

³⁷ *TFS*, 375.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 393. *FS*, 363-4 (tr. 562-3).

³⁹ *DR*, 273-85; *Tughluq-Nama*, 23-4, 31-2, 47; *TFS*¹ Bodleian ms, fol. 172a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 146b (not in *TFS*, 408). For a relatively detailed version of their fate, as current in Delhi some years later, see *IB*, III, 189-90, 191-4 (tr. Gibb, 643, 644-5), who believed, however, that all Qutb al-Din's brothers were put to death during his reign.

⁴⁰ *TFS*, 421-2; and see also 237. *Tughluq-Nama*, 140-1, does not actually confirm that the Khalji dynasty was extinct.

⁴¹ For the date of Tughluq's death, usually given as 725/1325, see appendix V.

⁴² *TFS*, 383, 387-8.

~ leading to a general relaxation of state authority and public morals. Yet Qutb al-Din manifested greater military energy than his precursor, heading a campaign which reasserted imperial rule over the Deccan in 718/1318. For a time at least the young sultan won great popularity through the abrogation of his father's repressive measures. Many matters are unexplained however, and Barani is guilty of his customary inconsistency. Even allowing for hyperbole, it is not clear, for instance, why, if the sultan could not bear to

be parted even for one hour from Khusraw Khan,⁴³ he was prepared to send him on a lengthy expedition to the far south. Nor do the chroniclers indicate why amirs who threatened to report the favourite's treasonable plans to the sultan during that campaign ranged themselves under his banner against Tughluq a few years later (pp. 177, 179 below) - especially since the latter's revolt is portrayed by both Amir Khusraw and Barani as a Holy War (*ghaza*).⁴⁴

One answer to this second problem may well be that Nasir al-Din Khusraw Shah's rule was less repugnant than our sources would have us believe. Barani is conceivably right when he alleges that idolatry was practised within the royal palace, presumably by those of Khusraw Shah's adherents who were not converts. But his story, on the other hand, that Khusraw Shah and his lieutenants treated Qur'ans with blatant disrespect and set up idols in mosques is hardly worthy of credence; it is noteworthy that the *Tughluq-Nama* talks of idolatry in less specific terms and that the version of events heard by Ibn Battuta, who singles out for mention only a prohibition on slaughtering cows, is rather less extreme.⁴⁵ Yet even if Khusraw Shah's regime cannot be regarded as anti-Muslim, it is still necessary, on the other hand, to explain the widespread acquiescence in the murder of Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah. Possibly Qutb al-Din's assumption of the caliphal title, which is not mentioned in the literary sources but which can be dated to 717/1317-18,⁴⁶ had scandalized many Muslims. Some hint may be found, too, in Barani's claim that Qutb al-Din had been on bad terms with the Chishti shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya' as a result of the murder of Khidr Khan.⁴⁷ Given the sultan's poor relations with the Chishti khanaqah, it is conceivable that in the eyes of the shaykh and his

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 382.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 399-400, for the amirs' threats. *Tughluq-Nama*, 62, 100, and *TFS*, 415-16, for holy war.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 410-11. *Tughluq-Nama*, AA. IB, III, 200 (tr. Gibb, 648). For a balanced assessment of Khusraw Shah's reign, see Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 313-16; also Hardy, 'Force and violence', 172.

⁴⁶ He is called merely *Qasim Amir al-Mu'minin* in an inscription of 5 Muharram 718/9 March 1318: Z. A. Desai, 'The Jalor 'Idgah inscription of Qutbu'd-Din Mubarak Shah Khalji', *EIAPS* (1972), 12-19. The title of caliph is found in inscriptions later in that year: Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Khalji Sultans of Delhi', 38-40; Z. A. Desai, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', *EIAPS* (1962), 4-5. But it appears on coins of 717: *CMSD*, 96-101. Qutb al-Din is frequently addressed as *khalifa* in *NS*.

⁴⁷ *TFS*, 394.

~ sympathizers the Indian upstart was preferable to the Khalji. Qutb al-Din may thus have alienated support and played into the hands of Khusraw Khan and his party.

Shaykhs and chroniclers

All monarchs and their kingdoms, wrote 'IsamI, lay under the protection of a saint; and the first step of Providence when it wished to destroy a country was to effect the saint's departure.⁴⁸ Thus for him the death of Nizam al-Din ushered in the horrors endured by Delhi in the era of Muhammad b. Tughluq,⁴⁹ and the prosperity of Dawlatabad, prior to the revolt against Muhammad from 745/1344 onwards, could be attributed to the presence of two shaykhs, Burhan al-Din and Zayn al-Din.⁵⁰ Sufis from Khurasan had been present in India since the Ghurid era, and two orders had grown up - the Suhrawardiyya, with their principal base at Multan, and the Chishtiyya, whose headquarters were in Delhi. The orders differed in their attitudes towards the state: for the Suhrawardiyya, association with the powerful was permitted; the Chishti shaykhs, by contrast, eschewed contact with the court and the nobility and rejected revenues and government service (*shughl*). Relations between the two groups were nevertheless harmonious and based on mutual respect.⁵¹

The view expressed by 'IsamI is especially common, of course, among those who recorded the discourse of shaykhs and the hagiographers like Kirmani (Amir Khwurd), who saw the very presence of Muslims in India as a miracle (*karamat*) on the part of the Chishti Shaykh Mu'in al-Din;⁵² Amir Hasan Dihlawi thought that Multan had been saved from the Mongols in Qubacha's time through the intervention

of Shaykh Qutb al-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki.⁵³ But such convictions were shared by other writers whose lifestyles and fortunes were less closely bound up with the orders. 'Afif believed it was the shrine of Qutb al-Din Munawwar that preserved Hansi during Timur's invasion.⁵⁴ Recalling to mind the tyranny of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, Barani could conceive of no reason for the continued success of the sultan's regime other than the fact that Nizam al-Din Awliya' graced his capital.⁵⁵

The numinous power or spiritual charisma (*baraka*) of a shaykh could be seen as territorial and as constituting a rival locus of authority (*wilayat*) to

⁴⁸ *FS*, 455-6 (tr. 687-8).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 456-7 (tr. 688-9).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 458-9, 461-2 (tr. 691-2, 696-7).

⁵¹ K. A. Nizami, 'Early Indo-Muslim mystics and their attitude towards the state', *IC* 22 (1948), 388-92, 395-8, and 23 (1949), 13-21. Aziz Ahmad, 'The sufi and the sultan in pre-Mughal Muslim India', *Der Islam* 38 (1962), 142-7. S. Digby, 'The sufi shaikh as a source of authority in mediaeval India', in Gaborieau (ed.), *Islam et societe*, 63-5.

⁵² *Siyar*, 47, cited in Digby, 'The sufi shaikh as a source of authority', 72.

⁵³ Amir Hasan Dihlawi, *Fawa'id al-Fu'ad*, 185.

⁵⁴ 'Afif, 82; and cf. also 133, where it is attributed to the *baraka* of Munawwar's successor.

⁵⁵ *TFS*, 324-5.

~ that of the sultan.⁵⁶ Several anecdotes show shaykhs conferring the sover-eignty on a prince. Stories were current in Juzjani's day that kingship had been bestowed by *faqirs* both on Husam al-Din 'Iwad and on Ilutmish; similar tales are told regarding Balaban and 'Ala' al-Din Khalji; and 'Afif reports no less than four anecdotes in which Firuz Shah is promised the crown by shaykhs, among them Nizam al-Din Awliya'.⁵⁷ That the shaykh's khanaqah might also serve as a rallying-point for disaffected elements had been thrown into relief by the Sidi Muwallih affair in the time of Jalal al-Din Khalji (above, p. 83).

In these circumstances, relations between court and khanaqah might not always be harmonious,⁵⁸ and for our chroniclers one of the most important criteria in evaluating a sultan's reign was his treatment of holy men. Here, for all his faults, 'Ala' al-Din, who demonstrated a growing attachment to Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya' during his last years, proved relatively sound.⁵⁹ The reign of his son Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah, however, was vitiated by his relations with Nizam al-Din. When the saint condemned the murder of Khidr Khan, who had been his disciple (*murid*), the sultan responded with slights and threats and attempted to set up the immigrant Shaykhzada Shihab al-Din JamI and the Suhrawardi Rukn al-Din of Multan as his rivals in Delhi.⁶⁰ Nizam al-Din was extremely influential: we are told of several notables who were among his disciples.⁶¹ During the brief reign of Nasir al-Din Khusraw Shah, Nizam al-Din accepted gifts of money from the usurper, and spent them on charitable causes. He thus made a new enemy of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq Shah when that monarch sought to retrieve the sums disbursed by his predecessor.⁶² Hostility between the two men persisted: Tughluq is said to have been contemplating further action against Nizam al-Din during the return march from Bengal just before his death; though the shaykh's ironic comment, *Dilli az tu dur ast* ('Delhi is some way off for you'), is not reported by any author prior to Sirhindi.⁶³

Nizam al-Din survived only a few months into the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq, with whom his relations had been cordial: Ibn Battuta was told

⁵⁶ Digby, 'The sufi shaikh as a source of authority', 62-3; *idem*, 'The sufi *shaykh* and the sultan: a conflict of claims to authority in medieval India', *Iran* 28 (1990), 71-81.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 75-8. See further Eaton, *Rise of Islam*, 82-6.

⁵⁸ Nizami, 'Early Indo-Muslim mystics', *IC* 23 (1949), 312-21; for good relations, *ibid.*, 165-70.

⁵⁹ *TFS*, 332.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 394, 396. For Qutb al-Din's close relations with Shaykhzada Jami, see *IB*, III, 294 (tr. Gibb, 697); also Digby, 'The sufi *shaykh* and the sultan', 79 n.20. Rukn al-Din's own relations with Nizam al-Din remained harmonious: *idem*, 'The sufi shaikh as a source of authority', 64.

⁶¹ 'Afif, 69, 445; and cf. also *TFS*, 396.

⁶² For the cancellation of grants made from the treasury by Khusraw Shah, see *ibid.*, 439.

⁶³ *TMS*, 96-7: the remark is embellished in later sources. For more details, see Digby, 'The sufi *shaykh* and the sultan', 72-4.

~ that Muhammad carried the shaykh's bier.⁶⁴ Their contacts seem to have contributed to the strain between Tughluq and his heir-apparent. Yet the new sultan's own relations with shaykhs proved problematic when he sought to recruit the talents of sufi shaykhs for service to the state.⁶⁵ This created no difficulty for the Suhrawardi order, which had never objected to involvement in the world's affairs: Mu'izz al-Din, son of the Suhrawardi Shaykh 'Ala' al-Din Ajudhani, seems to have accepted the governorship of Gujarat without demur.⁶⁶ The sultan's relations with the descendants of the Chishti shaykh Hamid al-Din in Nagawr were also cordial.⁶⁷ But for most of the Chishtiyya, his policy constituted a major crisis. Ibn Battuta retails numerous anecdotes demonstrating the shaykhs' resistance and the harsh punishments they suffered in consequence. It was Amir Khwurd's opinion that Muhammad's dismal end far from the capital was due to his treatment of holy men, chiefly Nizam al-Din's successor (*khalifa*), Nasir al-Din Mahmud *Chiragh-i Dihli*.⁶⁸

From Ghiyath al-Din to Firuz Shah

The Tughluqids (720-815/1320-1412) proved to be the longest-lived of the dynasties that ruled over the Sultanate. During Tughluq Shah's brief reign, Bengal was again subjected to the sultan's overlordship, the Kakatiya kingdom of Arangal (Tilang; Telingana) was annexed, and Muslim authority was established over much of the Pandya kingdom of Ma'bar. Barani's view of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq is somewhat one-sided. He chooses to ignore the sultan's strained relations with Nizam al-Din, and praises Tughluq for being in many respects a model Muslim ruler. He was like a father to his troops; his dominions enjoyed justice and security; his piety and personal morality were above criticism. Tughluq is said to have accomplished what 'Ala' al-Din had done, but without bloodshed.⁶⁹ But when he comes to describe the punishment in Delhi in 721/1321-2 of those who had mutinied during the campaign in Tilang, Barani lets his guard drop, revealing that the wives and children of the ringleaders were put to death.⁷⁰ Yet there is no hint of condemnation here for a practice which had begun under 'Ala' al-Din and which Barani clearly deplored.⁷¹

Tughluq perished when a newly constructed building at Afghanpur collapsed on him. Although Barani makes no such accusation, the suspicion

⁶⁴ *IB*, III, 211 (tr. Gibb, 653-4); and see also *MA*, ed. Spies, 20 (German tr. 46)/ed. Fariq, 38 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 45).

⁶⁵ *IB*, III, 294 (tr. Gibb, 697).

⁶⁶ *TFS*, 507, 512. *SFS*, 20-1 (tr. Basu, in *JBORS* 23 [1937], 98). *Siyar*, 196.

⁶⁷ K. A. Nizami, 'Some documents of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq', *MIM* 1 (1969), 305-6, 307, 309-13.

⁶⁸ *Siyar*, 245-6, cited in Digby, 'The sufi *shaykh* and the sultan', 74. For Muhammad and the Chishtiyya, see generally Nizami, 'Early Indo-Muslim mystics', *IC* 24 (1950), 60-5.

⁶⁹ *TFS*, 445.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 449.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 253.

~ that his eldest son and designated heir, Muhammad (Ulugh Khan), had contrived his death was shared by 'Isami and by al-Safadi's informants, while Ibn Battuta attributes it to the skill of the intendant of buildings (*shihna-yi imarat*) Ahmad b. Ayaz, whom Muhammad rewarded with the post of wazir.⁷² The smooth transition that followed Tughluq's death might have seemed to reinforce the impression that a new era of stability had dawned, for Muhammad was apparently the first sultan to enjoy a peaceful succession. The image of the sultan conveyed by foreign writers and fostered by his own propaganda is one of a mighty warrior for the cause of Islam, whose triumphs are unprecedented and who unlike his predecessors has cowed the Mongols.⁷³ But in the event the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq (724-52/1324-51) was characterized by rebellion and disaster. Although a number of revolts in the years 727-8/1326-8 were suppressed, the sultan embarked on various ambitious projects which entailed considerable expenditure. The effects of their failure were accentuated by plague and famine. A further wave of rebellions from 734/1334 onwards absorbed the attention of Muhammad and his lieutenants, and led to the definitive loss of Ma'bar, Tilang and Bengal; while a new Hindu power emerged from *c.* 1336 at Vijayanagara. Although he secured a temporary respite after 741/1340, and successfully applied to the 'Abbasid Caliph at Cairo for a diploma of investiture in 744/1343, his last years witnessed a widespread revolt by members of the military class, the *amiran-i sada* ('amirs of a hundred') in Deccan and Gujarat. The rebels in Gujarat were defeated; but at Deogir (Dawlatabad) in 748/1347 the rebel leader Hasan Gangu, the founder of the Bahmanid dynasty, established an independent sultanate. When Muhammad died near Thatta on 21 Muharram 752/20 March 1351 he wielded no authority south of the Vindhya.

Muhammad b. Tughluq posed a problem for the historians: even the unimaginative Sirhind interrupted his annalistic catalogue of events to try to explain the causes of the sultan's failure.⁷⁴ Yet we simply cannot take at face value all the charges levelled at the sultan by our principal sources. On certain heads, their testimony overlaps; to a degree they paint a similar picture of Muhammad's character. Barani, 'Isami and Ibn Battuta all comment, for instance, on the sultan's interest in philosophy;⁷⁵ but that is

⁷² *FS*, 420 (tr. 633). al-Safadi, *Wafi*, III, 172, partial tr. M. S. Khan, 'An undiscovered Arabic source of the history of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughlaq', *IC* 53 (1979), 187. *IB*, III, 212-15 (tr. Gibb, 654-6).

⁷³ *Conquests and spread of Islam: Shabankara'i*, 87-8, 287; *MA*, ed. Spies, 29 (German tr. 55)/ ed. Fariq, 53 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 54). *Mongols: MA*, ed. Lech, 40 (German tr. 118). See Muhammad's own appeal to the notables of Transoxiana in *FG*, SK ms. Fatih 4012, fol. 456b.

⁷⁴ *TMS*, 113-15.

⁷⁵ *TFS*, 464-5. *FS*, 510 (tr. 759). *IB*, IV, 343 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 929). For Barani's hostility towards philosophy, see *FJ*, 16, 168-9; tr. in W. T. de Bary, *Sources of Indian tradition* (New York, 1958), 481 -2.

~ not to say that they comprehended it. Professor Nizami has argued persuasively that Muhammad was greatly influenced by the Syrian scholar and jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327), whose pupil 'Abd al-'Aziz Ardabili received a warm welcome at Muhammad's court.⁷⁶ Ibn Taymiyya's aim was to reinvigorate what he saw as decadent Islamic society. To this end, he sought to promote both *ijtihad* (fresh interpretation of religious law) and *jihad* (holy war), and rejected the separation between state and religion as advocated by the Chishtiyya among others. According to Nizami, Muhammad's attested view that 'Religion and the

State are twins',⁷⁷ his concern to enforce orthodox Islamic observance and practice, his attempts to press sufis into the service of the state, and his adoption of the style *al-Mujahidfi sabili'lldh* (The Warrior in the Path of God') were all symptomatic of his attachment to the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya; but his attitudes were misunderstood by those, like Barani and 'Isami, who were unacquainted with currents of thought in the wider Islamic world.⁷⁸

Barani, 'Isami and Ibn Battuta speak with one voice regarding Muhammad's penchant for inflicting harsh punishments.⁷⁹ But whereas Barani and Ibn Battuta, like al-'Umari's informants, are also impressed by his generosity and by his concern for orthodoxy,⁸⁰ 'Isami - a hostile witness writing for a rival monarch in the breakaway Bahmanid Sultanate of the Deccan - has nothing good to say of him following an alleged change in Muhammad's temperament two years into the reign.⁸¹ For 'Isami, Muhammad is above all an apostate who consorts with Hindus and has thereby rendered it lawful for orthodox Muslims to repudiate his authority and to take his life. His suspension of the Friday khutba pending the arrival of a diploma from the caliph (the context supplied by Barani) is distorted as the abrogation of the requirements of Islamic worship.⁸² 'Isami, of course, makes no mention whatever of the caliphal diploma. In his account of the first check administered to the rebel forces of Nasir al-Din Isma'il *Mukh in the Deccan, the insurgents are depicted as the 'faithful' (*mu'minan*) and Muhammad's army as the forces of chaos (*fitna*)⁸³

⁷⁶ IB, II, 75-6, and III, 252-3 (tr. Gibb, 312-13, 676).

⁷⁷ *Siyar*, 196.

⁷⁸ K. A. Nizami, 'The impact of Ibn Taymiyya on South Asia', *JIS* 1 (1990), 120-34.

⁷⁹ *TFS*, 459, 460. *FS*, 446, 468, 472 (tr. 675, 704, 708-9). IB, III, 216, 295-316 (tr. Gibb, 657, 695-708), provides numerous examples.

⁸⁰ Muhammad's generosity: *TFS*, 460-2; IB, III, 216, 217, 243ff. (tr. Gibb, 657, 658, 671ff.); *MA*, ed. Spies, 21-5 (German tr. 47-51)/ed. Fariq, 41-7 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 46-50). His attention to orthodoxy: *TFS*, 459, 460; IB, III, 216, 286-8 (tr. Gibb, 657, 693-4); *MA*, ed. Spies, 21, 25-6 (tr. 46-7, 51-2)/ed. Fariq, 38-41, 47-8 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 45-6, 50-1).

⁸¹ *FS*, 424 (tr. 650).

⁸² *Ibid.*, 515 (tr. 764-5); cf. also 450-1 (tr. 681-2), where Muhammad is compared unfavourably with the epic tyrant Dahhak. For the suspension of the prayers, see *TFS*, 492.

⁸³ *FS*, 535 (tr. 790); see also 538 (tr. 793), and 520 (tr. 771) for a description of some of Muhammad's supporters as 'enemies of the Prophet's faith'. For a contrast between the two authors, see Nizami, *On history and historians*, 133-4; Conermann, *Beschreibung Indiens*, 112-23.

~ Barani's attitude is more complex. Muhammad was 'the wonder of the age', who represented a truly bewildering combination of the opposing qualities required in a sovereign (above, p. 54): in particular, he (Muhammad) failed to distinguish between the duties of sultan and prophet.⁸⁴ The differences between the two recensions of his work are at their most glaring in their treatment of this reign, and Dr Hardy, in a comparison of the two versions, has drawn attention to the fact that the second is more moralistic in tone and attributes a greater degree of responsibility to the sultan.⁸⁵ Dedicating his work to Muhammad's successor, a trusted servant of the late monarch whose own reign nevertheless witnessed a reaction against Muhammad's excesses, Barani is evidently anxious to distance himself from the previous regime. It seems that his need to do so grew between the two versions of the *Ta'rikh*.⁸⁶ For Barani, the most heinous feature of Muhammad's government had been the slaughter of Muslims, and in particular the harsh punishments meted out to the 'ulama', shaykhs, sayyids, sufis, qalandars and members of the clerical and military classes.⁸⁷ But having been in attendance on Muhammad for over seventeen years as a boon companion (*nadim*),⁸⁸ Barani was himself implicated in these crimes. Thus he is at pains to express remorse at his own fear of speaking out against his late master's policies or of offering Muhammad salutary advice.⁸⁹ It is,

however, difficult to assess what use Barani made of his *Fatawa-yi Jahandar* as a vehicle for criticism of the late sultan. The picture he draws of the tyrant Yazdagird, for instance, is in some (though by no means all) respects reminiscent of Muhammad.⁹⁰

For all its defects, Barani's *Ta'rikh* (particularly the later recension) operates on a far higher plane than 'Isami's work. The gulf between the two men emerges clearly in their handling of the creation of a second capital at Dawlatabad in the Deccan and of other enterprises such as the adoption of the so-called token currency and the ill-fated Qarachil expedition. 'Isami, whose aged grandfather had died soon after leaving Delhi for the south in the original emigration, devotes considerable space to the enormity of the

457-60. See the comments of Hardy, *Historians*, 37, and 'Didactic historical writing', 49-51.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 51-7.

⁸⁶ Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, 'Fresh light on Diya' al-Din Barani: the doyen of the Indo-Persian historians of medieval India', IC63 (1989), 71-7.

⁸⁷ *TFS*, 460, 472, 497, for Muslims in general; 459, 465-6 for the 'ulama' etc.

⁸⁸ In *TFS*, Bodleian ms., fol. 196a/Digby Coll. ms, fol. 163b, he describes himself as *dar miyan-i nudama'*. *TFS*, 504, for the number of years; cf. also 466, 497, where he calls himself a *muqarrab*.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 466-7, 497, 517, for his silence; see also the comments of I. Habib, 'Barani's theory', 102.

⁹⁰ *FJ*, 264-6. Yazdagird bribes an invader to retire, rather as Muhammad, in one tradition, is said to have bought off the Chaghadayid khan Tarmashirin (see p. 232, n.101); and thereafter, like Muhammad, raises the land tax (*kharaj*) by one-fifth and one-tenth (*yaki ba-panj-u yaki ba-dah*) in order to recruit a fresh army: see below, p. 262. But his fate (being torn to pieces by his resentful subjects) does not resemble Muhammad's.

~ Dawlatabad project.⁹¹ He sees Muhammad's tyranny as a divine punishment for the readiness of Delhi's citizens to tolerate heresy and religious innovation (*bid'at*); the death of the saint Nizam al-Din Awliya' (725/1325) leaves the city bereft of the protection of his spiritual power; and the token currency and the Qarachil campaign become yet further means of victi-mizing the capital when Muhammad perceives that the exodus of its leading families has not sufficiently crippled its prosperity.⁹² We have here an echo of stories about the sultan's antipathy towards the people of the capital that were current when Ibn Battuta visited Delhi a few years later.⁹³ The idea that Muhammad b. Tughluq, like certain of his predecessors (above, p. 59), regarded the citizens of Delhi with suspicion and hostility is not as out-landish as it might first seem; though precisely why he may have done so is obscure. As the chief impulse behind the establishment of the second capital, however, this is quite unconvincing. Barani is doubtless more realistic in pointing to the geographical location of Dawlatabad, which made it ideally suited to be the centre of a considerably expanded Sultanate. This is a perspective found also in external sources; although as Roy observed, another reason for the sultan's choice of Dawlatabad was the desire to implant Islam more securely in the Deccan.⁹⁴

In outline the analysis of Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign given in Barani's revised *Ta'rikh* is the best thing we have, and it does provide a reasonably serviceable framework. An air of brilliance conceivably hung over the early years of the reign, and deluded Muhammad, who enjoyed the strong position of being the first designated heir to succeed his father as sultan of Delhi, into believing that nothing lay beyond his capacities. Almost from the moment of his accession, the extensive tracts that now owed obedience to him were subjected to a control of greater intensity than in the time of any of his predecessors.⁹⁵ Barani claims that had he reduced the whole world he would not have tolerated the least island or closet being exempt from his authority (a view faintly echoed by one of al-'Umari's informants, who believed that only the islands and a mere span of coastline lay outside Muhammad's empire);⁹⁶ and it certainly seems that he was determined to impose uniformity upon his dominions. Unfortunately, his vision proved impossible to realize, and his efforts to implement it led to the loss of a significant proportion of his

empire. But although Baranis insights

⁹¹ *FS*, 447-8 (tr. 677-8).

⁹² *Ibid.*, 424, 446, 454-6, 459-60, 466, 468 (tr. 650-1, 675-6, 686-9, 693, 702, 704). On 'Isamis perspective, see also HN, 507.

⁹³ IB, III, 314-15 (tr. Gibb, 707-8).

⁹⁴ *TFS*, 473-4; also *TFS*^l Bodleian ms., fols. 190b-191a/Digby Coll. ms, fols. 159b-160a. al-Safadi, *Wafi*, III, 174 (tr. Khan, 188); see also al-Safadi, *A'yan al-'Asr*, SK ms. Asir Efendi 588, fol. 2a. N. B. Roy, 'The transfer of capital from Delhi to Daulatabad', *JIH* 20 (1941), 159-80 (esp. 160-8).

⁹⁵ *TFS*, 468, 469. *TMS*, 97-8.

⁹⁶ *TFS*, 458. *MA*, ed. Spies, 5 (German tr. 23)/ed. Fariq, 11 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 29).

~ are not therefore to be dismissed out of hand, the emphasis laid in the second recension on the illusory character of Muhammad's enterprises is in fact highly tendentious, in that it plays down the connections between them (see chapter 13).

On Muhammad's death in 752/1351, the army commanders and other leading figures present in Sind prevailed upon the late sultan's cousin and *amir-hajib*, Firtiz b. Rajab, to accept the throne; and after expressing a reluctance that may not have been totally assumed, he did so. The accession of Firuz Shah did not go unchallenged. The claims of the late monarch's nephew, Dawar Malik, were advanced by his mother, Tughluq's daughter Khudawandzada, who was dissuaded by the amirs on the grounds of her son's inexperience.⁹⁷ In the capital the wazir Khwaja Jahan Ahmad b. Ayaz had set up as sultan an alleged child of Muhammad's as Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud Shah.⁹⁸ As Firuz Shah moved on Delhi, he was joined by a great many notables who had deserted Khwaja Jahan. Eventually the wazir himself appeared in an attitude of humble submission. Firuz Shah was disposed to be merciful, but yielded to pressure from his amirs, who were out for the old wazir's blood. Khwaja Jahan, despatched to his new iqta' of Samana, was overtaken and executed by Shir Khan, its current muqta'. A few of his associates were likewise put to death;⁹⁹ but the fate of the child sultan he had enthroned is a mystery.

Regarding this affair the sources differ. The *SJrat-i Firuz-Shahi*, which refers to several later plots against Firuz Shah in the vaguest of terms, is even less forthcoming about the reaction at Delhi to the news of Muhammad's death, making no mention of the child sultan and merely condemning the treachery of the wazir.¹⁰⁰ The most plausible account is given by 'Afif. The wazir, who was now the sole member present in Delhi of the triumvirate set up by Muhammad to head the government during his absence, heard reports not simply of Muhammad's death but also of upheavals in which Firuz and Tatar Khan had disappeared. After performing the mourning ceremonies both for the late sultan and for Firuz, to whom he was sincerely attached, the wazir enthroned a child of Muhammad and distributed largesse in order to buttress the infant ruler's position. Only when it was too late to draw back did he learn that the troops in Sind had raised up Firuz

⁹⁷ She and her husband Khusraw Malik were later foiled in a bid to assassinate the sultan and were punished: 'Afif, 45, 100-4. For the parentage of Dawar Malik and the confusion in the sources between him and Khusraw Malik (who was actually his stepfather), see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 309-10.

⁹⁸ *TMS*, 120, is the only literary source to give the style of the infant monarch, for whose coins see *CMSD*, 154 (nos 648-648B); J. G. Delmerick, 'Note on a new gold coin of Mahmud Shah bin Muhammad Shah bin Tughluq Shah of Dihli', *JASB*, 43 (1874), 97-8.

⁹⁹ *TFS*, 534-47. 'Afif, 57-78.

¹⁰⁰ *SFS*, 12-13 (tr. Basu, *JBORS*, 22 [1936], 265ff.). For the plots, see *ibid.*, 7-12 (tr. Basu, 101-7);

also *TFS*, 552, for an attempt to poison Firuz Shah.

~ Shah as sultan.¹⁰¹ 'Afif appears to accept the boy as genuine;¹⁰² and he expressly challenges the story that was current in his day - and retailed, for instance, by Barani - in which the wazir set up some 'bastard child' (*walad al-zana'i*) after learning of the accession of Firuz Shah, and scattered gifts with a view to the imminent struggle for the throne.¹⁰³ It is noteworthy that Barani is the sole author to claim that Muhammad had designated Firuz Shah as his heir (*wali-'ahd*).¹⁰⁴

It is not easy to explain these discrepancies. The grounds for Barani's stance are especially problematic. He is known to have suffered a loss of favour under the new sultan and been imprisoned for some time in the stronghold of Bhatner.¹⁰⁵ The earlier recension of his work is more out-spoken regarding the dismissal and execution of Muhammad's servitors by Firuz Shah; the revised version, on the other hand, strikes a more positive note, contrasting that ruler's leniency with the bloodshed that had been required to ensure the triumph of previous Delhi Sultans.¹⁰⁶ It therefore looks as if one of the purposes behind the redrafting of the *Ta'nkh-i Firuz-Shahi* was to curry favour with the new monarch. 'Afif, writing well after Firuz Shah's death, was perhaps under less pressure to lend legitimacy to his accession; although even he retails stories in which saints as eminent as the sufi shaykhs Nizam al-Din Awliya' and 'Ala' al-Din Ajudhani predicted Firuz Shah's sovereignty, and stresses that the caliphal patents that reached Firuz Shah came unsolicited, in contrast with the recognition that Muhammad had obtained only on request.¹⁰⁷

Completing the revised version of his *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* in 758/1357, Barani was in a position only to assess Firuz Shah's policies during his first few years. Yet he had little doubt what those policies were. There had been no milder sovereign than Firuz Shah since the capture of Delhi; and no previous sultan had avoided shedding blood to the extent that Firuz Shah had done with regard to Khwaja Jahan's supporters;¹⁰⁸ the harsh punishments of previous reigns were now discarded; spies and informers were a

¹⁰¹ 'Afif, 50-3. *TMS*, 119-20, gives a similar but briefer version.

¹⁰² 'Afif, 50, 60, 68, 396; cf. also 54, where the view of the army commanders in Sind, that Muhammad had no son, is reported without comment.

¹⁰³ *TFS*, 539; *TFS'*, Bodleian ms, fol. 212a, calls the child also *ghulamzada*. *TMS*, 120, describes him as 'of unknown ancestry and non-existent lineage' (*majhul al-nasab-u mafqiid al-hasab*). al-Safadi, *Wafi*, III, 172-3 (tr. Khan, 187), heard that Muhammad was incapable of fathering children. The boy is accepted as a genuine son of Muhammad by Haig, 'Five questions', 365-72, and by Jamini Mohan Banerjee, *History of Firuz Shah Tughluq* (Delhi, 1967), 15-16. Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 387-8, and B. P. Saksena, in *HN*, 569-71, are noncommittal.

¹⁰⁴ *TFS*, 532; cf. also 539.

¹⁰⁵ Barani, *Na't-i Muhammadi*, cited in M. Habib, 'Life and thought of Ziyauddin Barani', in M. Habib and A. U. S. Khan, *The political theory of the Delhi Sultanate* (Delhi, 1960), 162 (repr. in Nizami, *Politics and society*, II, 348-9). See also *TFS*, 125, 554, 557, and other references in *PL*, I, 506. I. Habib, 'Barani's theory', 102.

¹⁰⁶ *TFS*, Bodleian ms., fol. 217a; *TFS*, 547-52. Siddiqui, 'Fresh light', 78-9.

¹⁰⁷ 'Afif, 27-9, 273-4, 276.

¹⁰⁸ *TFS*, 548, 551-2.

~ thing of the past.¹⁰⁹ The soldiery enjoyed unprecedented ease: they were able to benefit from the revenues of their villages without even having to serve in the field.¹¹⁰ The new sultan's concern also for the welfare of the 'religious class', to which Barani devotes a whole section of his work,¹¹¹ had been demonstrated at the very outset, in the course of his long journey from Thatta to Delhi. At Siwistan he had restored to the 'ulama', the shaykhs and other notables the pensions, stipends and estates that Muhammad

had confiscated (presumably at the time of Qaysar's rebellion: below, p. 271) and bestowed alms on the *faqirs* and wayfarers. At Uchch he rebuilt the dilapidated khanaqah of Shaykh Jamal al-Din and returned to the shaykh's grandsons their estates and orchards which his predecessor had resumed to the khalisa. The petitions of the people of Multan were granted, and gifts were made to the impoverished family of Shaykh Farid al-Din at Ajudhan.¹¹²

In some measure, these can be viewed as the policies of a new monarch with an insecure title and a consequent need to buy support. For this same reason - to avoid a recurrence of the troubles that had afflicted his predecessor - the sultan made concessions to the nobility and the military class. It was especially necessary for Firuz Shah to promote an image that contrasted with Muhammad's; and indeed the policies he followed tell us a good deal about those of Muhammad which had aroused such resentment. In his *Futuhat* the sultan himself reveals clearly the orthodox Islamic credentials for which he wished to be remembered: the abandonment of draconian punishments; the abolition of uncanonical taxes; the suppression of deviant forms of Islamic practice; the destruction of newly built Hindu temples; the promotion of conversion to Islam among the Hindu populace; the foundation of new mosques and madrasas; the repair of structures erected by past Muslim sovereigns; and humble attentiveness to Muslim saints. Similar preoccupations - though with the addition of holy warfare against the infidel - are reflected in the *Sirat*.¹¹³

Such attitudes might not necessarily have sprung from devotion alone. 'Afif's *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* reveals that it was Firuz Shah's practice to visit and pray at the shrines of saints and past sultans on the eve of all his campaigns, as he did for instance before marching against Thatta;¹¹⁴ and his halts at shrines in Sind had doubtless been designed to ensure victory over the faction of Khwaja Jahan. In any case we are told later that the sultan made a point of visiting shrines whenever he was out riding.¹¹⁵ 'Afif strongly suggests, in fact, that Firuz Shah continued to identify himself with orthodox piety and with the interests of the religious elite throughout his

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 557, 572-4.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 553.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 558-61.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 537-9, 543.

¹¹³ For an interesting assessment of the sultan, see Khurram Qadir, 'Firoz Shah (Tughlaq): a personality study', *JCA* 9 (1986), no. 2, 17-39.

¹¹⁴ 'Afif, 194-6; and see also 230-1, 250.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 371.

~ reign, even to the extent of having his head shaved like that of a sufi disciple (*murshid*) after the death of his heir Fath Khan in 778/1376; it was immediately after this that he prohibited all practices in his dominions that were contrary to the Shari' a.¹¹⁶

In military terms Firuz Shah's reign was undistinguished. He was obliged to acquiesce in the loss of the Deccan and the far south, and his few campaigns to the east - against Bengal in 754/1353 and 760/1359 and Jajnagar in c. 761/1360 - achieved little. His sole successes were the subjection of the Hindu ruler of Nagarkot (Kangra) in 766/1364-5 and the submission, after two invasions, of the Jams of Thatta (767/1365-6). A whole section of 'Afif's *Ta'rikh* is devoted to the sultan's abandonment of distant campaigns (there were still forays to regions nearer at hand, such as the Sirmur hills, Katehr and Etawa)¹¹⁷ and his concentration on settling the affairs of state.¹¹⁸ But the reasons given vary. First 'Afif tells us that when the wazir Khan Jahan (I) deflected him from invading the Deccan Firuz Shah promised not to lead an army against his co-religionists again,¹¹⁹ a sentiment that recalls the inhibitions of Jalal al-Din Khalji. Elsewhere 'Afif provides what seems like an alternative explanation for the abandonment of military

exploits: during the blockade of Thatta, Firuz Shah allegedly vowed that if he reduced the place he would turn to other affairs.¹²⁰ At yet later points in the biography, the sultan is said to have given up campaigning after the death of the highly efficient and trusted Khan Jahan in 770/1368-9 (which would in fact have occurred soon after the end of the Thatta enterprise).¹²¹ These various attempts to account for the sultan's military inactivity in his later years suggest, in fact, that his biographer may have found the matter a source of embarrassment. In the assertion that Firuz Shah's victories caused the people to forget war and to neglect weaponry, there is just a hint that his government undermined the Sultanate's military capacity.¹²²

'Afif and the two authors who cover the entire reign, Sirhindi and Bihamadkhani, claim that the era was characterized by prosperity, justice, clemency and security. Old men assured Sirhindi that there had been no ruler more just, more merciful or more God-fearing since Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah.¹²³ The cheapness and plenty of the reign, according to

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 372-3. The date is given as 777/1376: *ibid.*, 379. But Fath Khan's death is later dated Safar 778/June-July 1376, *ibid.*, 493-4, although *TMS*, 131-2, supplies the date 12 Safar 776/23 July 1374.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 134-5. 'Afif, 493, 497. The dates given are inconsistent.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 261-7.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 266.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 216.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 399, 424. For the year of Khan Jahan's death, which is variously given as 770 (*ibid.*, 345) and 772 (*ibid.*, 422; *TMS*, 131), see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 339, who opts for the earlier date.

¹²² 'Afif, 23. See further the comments of Hardy, 'Force and violence', 178.

¹²³ *TMS*, 140-1. 'Afif, 94, 99-100, 178-80, 193, 456, 512. Bihamadkhani, fol. 407b (tr. Zaki, 4). See also the remarks in *TFS*, 553-4.

~ 'Afif, made Firuz Shah's subjects forget the prosperity even of 'Ala' al-Din's time; and whereas 'Ala' al-Din had brought about low prices by decree, under Firuz Shah they materialized without any effort on the part of the government.¹²⁴ Yet Bihamadkhani and Sirhindi wrote at a time when the Sultanate was a mere shadow of its former self; 'Afif, for his part, completed his biography in the wake of years of internecine strife among Firuz Shah's descendants which had already erupted before he died, on 18 Ramadan 790/20 September 1388, and after the major cataclysm that was Temur's sack of Delhi in 801/1398.¹²⁵ Thus Firuz Shah could be apostrophized, in terms evocative of the Prophet himself, as 'the seal (*khatm*) of the sovereigns of Delhi'. More strikingly, perhaps, 'Afif presents the sultan as a holy man; and the remark that the fall of Delhi ensued upon his death, with its hint that only his existence there had kept the city from destruction, forcefully echoes the idea of spiritual power (*baraka*), found in sufi literature, that we noticed earlier.¹²⁶ If Barani measured the opening years of the reign against the background of Muhammad's regime, for these later authors Firuz Shah's day took on the colours of a golden age by comparison with what followed.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ 'Afif, 293-4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 133, where the sack is described as recent. But the fact that at 314-15 Temur is referred to, not in opprobrious terms, but by the appellation 'Sahib-Qiran' ('Lord of the Fortunate Conjunction') favoured in the Timurid sources, suggests that 'Afif wrote under the Sayyids (i.e. after 1414), who acknowledged Timurid overlordship (below, pp. 318-19, 322).

¹²⁶ 'Afif, 21-2, 28. Digby, 'The sufi *shaykh* and the sultan', 77 and n.69. For an overview of 'Afif's treatment of the sultan, see Hardy, *Historians*, 41-51.

¹²⁷ 'Afif, 292-3. For the importance to 'Afif of Temiir's attack, see Hardy, *Historians*, 41 (and cf. also 55).

~ CHAPTER 9

The Khalji and Tughluqid nobility

The emergence of a new elite

We saw earlier (pp. 83-5) how at 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's accession the nobility was little changed from that of the Ghiyathids. Only after a year or two did the new sultan move against the older aristocracy which he had inherited from his uncle and a noble class emerge which differed substantially from that of Balaban and Kayqubad. Barani divides 'Ala' al-Din's reign into three periods, of which the first was the era of men who were closely linked with his seizure of the throne; the important figures of the second period appear to have been largely bureaucrats; and the third, lasting for four or five years, was dominated by the malign influence of the slave commander Kafur, by now the sultan's viceroy and hence generally called in the sources 'Malik Na'ib'.¹

The obscurity surrounding the origins of many of 'Ala' al-Din's nobles is perhaps only to be expected. Some of the new elite would have been of Khalaj stock, and like his predecessor the new sultan at first promoted close kinsmen, like his brother Almas Beg, now Ulugh Khan, who was made *barbeg* (*amir-hajib*) and given the iqta' of Bhayana; subsequently, in 700/ 1301, he was granted the newly reduced territory of Ranthanbor and Jhayin as his iqta'.² Sanjar, entitled Alp Khan, who served 'Ala' al-Din as *amir-i majlis*, was his wife's brother: at one point 'Isami says that 'Ala' al-Din had reared him since his childhood. He held Multan for a time and was later transferred to the iqta' of Gujarat in c. 1310.³ Of 'Ala' al-Din's brother's sons one, Sulayman Shah, became *wakil-i dar* and received the style of Ikit Khan, while another was granted the title of Qutlugh Khan.⁴ A maternal nephew, Hizabr al-Din Yusuf, became Zafar Khan and 'arid.⁵

Apart from his kinsmen, the two principal amirs in the early years of the

¹ *TFS*, 336-7.

² *Ibid.*, 242, 272, 283.

³ *FS*, 287, 288 (tr. 461, 463), for his iqta's; *ibid.*, 338 (tr. 519), for his upbringing. The reading HRBWN found alongside Alp Khan's name in *TMS*, 71, is an error for *khusurpura* ('father-in-law's son'), the reading of one of the mss.; this term is also used of him in *TFS*, 242.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 273. *FS*, 259, 279 (tr. 431, 453).

⁵ *TFS*, 240, 242, 248. *TMS*, 71.

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~ reign were both men who had formed part of 'Ala' al-Din's entourage in Kara and Awadh prior to his accession. 'Ala' al-Mulk, Barani's uncle, first acted as the new sultan's lieutenant in Kara and Awadh and was then summoned to Delhi to become kotwal in succession to the former Malik al-Umara' Fakhr al-Din.⁶ The other, Malik Nusrat Jalesari, obtained at 'Ala' al-Din's accession the title of Nusrat Khan; he may well have been of relatively humble origin, as doubtless were many of these old associates.⁷ Nusrat Khan, who was instrumental in securing enormous sums for the treasury from the elimination of the Jalali nobles, was one of the new sultan's most trusted amirs, and it is significant that 'Ala' al-Din departed from the practice of his predecessors in making Nusrat Khan simultaneously his na'ib and kotwal of Delhi. In the following year he became wazir and surrendered the office of kotwal to 'Ala' al-Mulk, after which he obtained the iqta' of Kara.⁸

It was a source of grim satisfaction to Barani that those of 'Ala' al-Din's henchmen who participated in his uncle's murder all perished within a few years.⁹ Zafar Khan, who had played a distinguished role against the invading Mongols, fell in battle with them in c. 1300.¹⁰ If we are to believe the chronicler, who employs his uncle as a vehicle for advice to the sultan, 'Ala' al-Mulk was still alive at the time of Qutlugh Qocha's attack; but he presumably died not long afterwards. Nusrat Khan perished during the siege of Ranthanbor in 700/1300-1.¹¹ To what further heights this powerful officer might have risen, had he survived, can only be guessed. Members of his family also attained prominence: a brother, Malik 'Izz al-Din, *amir-hajib* to Ulugh Khan, had been killed by the neo-Muslim Mongols who mutinied on the Gujarat expedition, and a nephew, Malik Fakhr al-Din *Qochu, is subsequently found in possession of the iqta' of Kara (probably in succession to his uncle) and in command of the troops of 'the east, Bengal and Tirhut' in 702-3/1302-3, when he accompanied the *dadbeg* Fakhr al-Din 'Ali Jawna on the abortive campaign against Arangal.¹² But the subsequent history of this emerging aristocratic dynasty is unknown.

Certain of the sultan's kinsmen may well have proved a disappointment to him. Barani heard that Ulugh Khan died suddenly while planning an ambitious campaign to the far south: Tsami transmits a rumour that he had been poisoned for reacting too swiftly to a false rumour of the sultan's

⁶ *TFS*, 250 (reading, with BL ms., fol. 130b, *az mahlul-i malik al-umara-yi qadim*), 257'.

⁷ Iqtidar Husain Siddiqi, 'The nobility under the Khalji Sultans', *IC* 37 (1963), 59-60.

⁸ *TFS*, 248, 249, 250, 272.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 236-7. They included also Malik Asghari the *sar-i dawtdar* and Malik Jawna the *dadbeg*, of whom little is known, apart from their offices.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 253-4, 260-1. *FS*, 259, 262-7 (tr. 431, 434-40).

¹¹ *TFS*, 255-7, 266-72, for 'Ala' al-Mulk; 272 for Nusrat Khan.

¹² 'Izz al-Din: *ibid.*, 252. Fakhr al-Din: *TFS*^l, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 113a; *TFS*, 300 (reading QJW, with BL ms., fol. 149a, for the JHJW of the text).

~ death.¹³ Ikit Khan aspired to emulate his uncle's success in seizing the throne. During a hunting excursion at Tilpat on the march towards Ranthanbor (c. 1301), his men fired at 'Ala' al-Din, who was, however, merely wounded. Duped by the sultan's paik guards into believing that 'Ala' al-Din was really dead, Ikit Khan had himself proclaimed sovereign. But when 'Ala' al-Din appeared on the scene, the troops rallied to him, and Ikit Khan was killed as he fled; his brother Qutlugh Khan was also put to death.¹⁴ Not long afterwards, two of 'Ala' al-Din's sister's sons, 'Umar Khan and Mengu Khan, who held the iqta's of Bada'un and Awadh respectively, were executed for treasonable designs.¹⁵

Our information regarding the amirs on whom 'Ala' al-Din relied during the central part of his reign is relatively meagre; but the list given by Barani suggests that they belonged in the main to the bureaucracy. They included Malik Hamid al-Din, the son of 'Umdat al-Mulk Khwaja 'Ala-yi Dabir, who became *nd'ib-i wakil-i dar*, and his brother Malik Izz al-Din, who was made chief secretary of the empire (*dabir-i mamalik*): the brothers' rise seems to date from around the time of Ikit Khan's conspiracy and the Ranthanbor campaign. Other major figures were Sharaf Qa'ini, the *nd'ib-wazir*, who is credited with imposing a uniform system of tax assessment on an unprecedented number of provinces (see chapter 12); 'Ayn al-Mulk Multani, who had begun his career as secretary (*dablr*) to Ulugh Khan; and Khwaja Nasir al-Mulk Siraj al-Din Hajji, the *na'ib-i 'ard-i mamalik*, who later accompanied Kafur on his southern campaigns.¹⁶ Although the ascendancy of these men may have stemmed from an increasing reluctance on 'Ala' al-Din's part to depend on his relatives, it is also clearly linked with his administrative and military reforms, which enabled him to maintain the armies that both repelled the formidable Mongol threat, conquered a number of Hindu states in Rajasthan and the Yadava kingdom of Deogir, and plundered the far south.

Appropriately enough for a sovereign whose reign was marked by numerous battles with invading Mongols, 'Ala' al-Din's relations with Mongol amirs within India did not run smoothly. Barani suggests that many or all of them forfeited their stipends.¹⁷ Certain of these 'neo-Muslim' commanders accompanied the Gujarat expedition in 698-9/1299-1300 and mutinied when the sultan's generals tried to deprive them of part of their plunder. The outbreak collapsed, and some fled to Karnadeva, the Vaghela

¹³ TFS, 283. FS, 281-2 (tr. 456-7).

¹⁴ TFS, 273-6. FS, 279-81 (tr. 453-5). A briefer account is given in IB, III, 185-6 (tr. Gibb, 641). For a distorted account that reached Mongol Persia, see Qashani, 190-2.

¹⁵ TFS, 277-8.

¹⁶ For Barani's list, see *ibid.*, 337. On Hamld al-Din and his brother, see also *ibid.*, 274-5, 282. For Sharaf, Qa'ini's activities, *ibid.*, 288-9 (the correct reading QAYNY is found in BL ms., fols. 143, 167a); see also Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 278. Khwaja Hajji: *KF*, 82, 85, where his full style is given; *RI*, II, 56-60; *TFS*, 326, 328, 333.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 334.

~ king of Gujarat, while others sought refuge at Ranthanbor. 'Ala' al-Din took a terrible vengeance on their families in Delhi.¹⁸ In the following year, Ikit Khan in his bid for the throne drew support from some neo-Muslim Mongol horsemen in his service; their subsequent fate is unknown.¹⁹ Still later, during Kafur's Ma'bar campaign, a Mongol commander named Abachi planned to betray the Delhi forces to the enemy and to kill Kafur. The plot failed, and the sultan had Abachi executed in Delhi. In reaction, the Mongols in the capital, who allegedly numbered more than 10,000, conspired to kill 'Ala' al-Din and to replace him with their own nominee, whereupon the sultan issued orders to his muqta's to arrest all the Mongols in the empire and put them to death.²⁰ The victims may have included 'Ali Beg and *Tartaq, who had commanded the Mongol invading forces in 705/ 1305 (below, p. 227) and had been recruited into the sultan's service.²¹

It seems that Turkish slaves now played a more restricted role than under the Shamsid and Ghiyathid monarchs. Only a few amirs - notably Ikhtiyar al-Din Temur, who appears as muqta' of Chanderi and Erach in an inscription of 711/1312 with the sobriquet 'Sultanf (i.e. a slave of the reigning sultan), and Ikhtiyar al-Din Tegin, muqta' of Awadh - are known from their names to have been Turks.²² The apparent decline in the number of Turkish slave nobles may have been a matter of policy - a reluctance on 'Ala' al-Din's part to allow Turkish ghulams the stranglehold on the administration that they had enjoyed in the thirteenth century. It could also have been a reflection of the rising cost of such slaves, since Barani complains that their price had risen prohibitively by his day;²³ though this did not prevent the future sultan Muhammad b. Tughluq from accumulating large numbers of Turkish slaves in the early 1320s (see below, pp. 183-4).

The partial eclipse of Turkish slave amirs could well be connected with the rise of two new groups of whom we first hear during this middle phase of 'Ala' al-Din's reign. Afghans had served Balaban and Kayqubad (above, p. 62), and appear to have regularly formed part of the garrison troops of the Multan province, where they are found both under Muhammad the 'Martyr Prince' and under Kushlu Khan in the early Tughluqid era.²⁴ But it is now that they first seem to have provided officers of high rank like Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din *Mall, listed by Barani among the sultan's nobles and later described as one of his great maliks.²⁵ The other category is 'Ala' al-Din's

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 252-3. FS, 253-5 (tr. 424-5).

¹⁹ TFS, 273.

²⁰ FS, 296-7, 298-9 (tr. 470-1, 473-4). TFS, 334-6, setting the total number slain at 20 or 30,000. TMS, 75, dates this episode in 697 and evidently confuses it with the mutiny on the Gujarat campaign.

²¹ KF,41.FS, 305 (tr. 481-2).

²² The readings in *TFS* (241, NKYN, JBAR; 323, BKTN), should be corrected from BL ms., fols. 125b-126a, 160b. For Temiir, see also Desai, 'Chanderi inscription'.

²³ *TFS*, 314.

²⁴ *TS*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 52. IB, III, 322 (tr. Gibb, 712).

²⁵ *TFS*, 240-1, 448. See I. H. Siddiqui, 'The Afghans and their emergence in India as ruling elite during the Delhi Sultanate period', *CAJ* 26 (1982), 252 and n.45.

~ Indian slave officers. A later source alleges that 'Ala' al-Din possessed 50,000 slaves,²⁶ of whom the majority would have been Indians. The victorious campaigns by his forces against a number of major independent Hindu kingdoms afforded greater opportunities for the acquisition of choice Indian slaves, and it is in 'Ala' al-Din's reign that we first encounter their promotion to high office. The earliest to be mentioned is Shahin, an obscure figure whom Isami calls the sultan's adopted son and Kafur's predecessor as na'ib. Put in command of Chitor on its capture in 703/1303, he later took fright following Ulugh Khan's death and joined the exiled ruler of Gujarat.²⁷ Malik Dinar, who served 'Ala' al-Din as *shihna-yi pil*, was also an Indian slave.²⁸ Malik Nanak, another slave, helped to save 'Ala' al-Din's life when his nephew Ikit Khan made a bid for the throne in c. 1301, and was *dkhurbeg* and muqta' of Samana and Sunnam by 705/1305, when he defeated an invading Mongol army.²⁹ Indian slave officers were not necessarily converts to Islam: Amir Khusraw expressly refers to this engagement as the victory of an infidel over other infidels.³⁰

The most celebrated of 'Ala' al-Din's slave lieutenants, of course, is ' Kafur, an Indian captured from his owner in Kanbhaya (Cambay) during the first invasion of Gujarat in 698/1299. Kafur, a eunuch, acquired the nickname *Hazardinari* ('of the thousand dinars') from the price the sultan paid for him.³¹ His early career in 'Ala' al-Din's service is nowhere described, but he fought against the invading Mongols and held the rank of *bdrbeg* by 706/1306-7, when he enjoyed the sultan's confidence sufficiently to be given command of the army that reimposed tribute on the Yadava kingdom of Deoglr.³² Kafur's first known base was Rapri, on the Yamuna, which was his iqta' by 709/1309-10;³³ but towards the end of the reign he was in command at Deoglr, which had by then been annexed to the Sultanate (p. 202 below); the date of his appointment as na'ib is unknown.

During the final phase of the reign, Ala' al-Din was losing his grip: Barani regards as symptomatic his appointment of Hamld al-Din Multani, a royal chamberlain and door-keeper (*kalid-dar*), as chief, qadi of the empire.³⁴ Barani's scattered observations elsewhere suggest that the sultan had ceased to trust the majority of his higher servitors. He proved increas-

²⁶ 'Afif, 272.

²⁷ *FS*, 281-3 (tr. 456-7).

²⁸ *TFS*, 388-9. ■

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 273, 320, 323 (reading MANK, NAYK and TATK respectively, but cf. BL ms., fols. 142a, 158b; Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 243-4, 372, and II, 96, takes the name as 'Nayak'). *KF*, 38-9, confirming that he was a personal slave (*banda-yi khass*). *FS*, 302-5 (tr. 479-81).

³⁰ *DR*, 61. *KF*, 38. Siddiqi, 'Nobility under the Khajji Sultans', 60 n.47. See also Amir * Khusraw, *Baqiyya Naqiyya*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fols. 357b-358a.

³¹ *TFS*, 251-2. IB, III, 187 (tr. Gibb, 642), refers to him as *al-Alfl*, again in reference to the price paid for him. That he was a eunuch (*majbub*) emerges from *DR*, 257, and *TFS*, 368. See generally S. Digby

'Kafur, Malik', *Enc. Isl.*².

³² *KF*, 65; for other references to him as *amlr-hajib*, see *ibid.*, 89, 114.

³³ *TFS*, 328, 333. Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Khalji Sultans', 30.

³⁴ *TFS*, 352; cf. also 298.

~ ingly unwilling to take advice, trying to supervise the conduct of all state business in person and to this end, it appears, dispensing with the office of wazir, whose duties he fulfilled himself. Certain senior officers, such as Malik Qiran the *amir-i shikar* and Malik Qirabeg, still enjoyed 'Ala' al-Din's favour; but they had no power and were little more than courtiers. Experienced and skilled administrators were removed, and in their place the sultan relied on those whom Barani terms lazy slaves (*ghulambachagan*) and indiscreet eunuchs. The sultan also sought to concentrate power in the hands of his own family and his slaves: as a result, he promoted his pleasure-loving heir Khidr Khan prematurely and became too dependent on Kafur.³⁵ From the fact that the brothers Hamid al-Din and 'Izz al-Din were dismissed from office, and Sharaf Qa'inl was put to death,³⁶ it looks as if Kafur perceived these officers as a threat and prevailed upon 'Ala' al-Din to carry out a purge.

'Ala' al-Din's final months, already marred by illness, were clouded by a bitter rivalry between Malik Na'ib Kafur and Alp Khan which in Barani's view destroyed his regime.³⁷ As maternal uncle to the sultan's heir Khidr Khan, Alp Khan had retained some power and influence almost to the very end of the reign, since in what was clearly a bid to secure the succession the sultan married one of Alp Khan's daughters to Khidr Khan and another to a younger son, Shadi Khan.³⁸ But Alp Khan and his two sons-in-law alike fell victim to the machinations of Kafur. The na'ib observed that the sultan was tiring of his chief wife, Alp Khan's sister and Khidr Khan's mother, and set to work to undermine the influence of this family group. 'Ala' al-Din was brought to sanction the murder of Alp Khan in the royal palace, and Khidr Khan was first banished from court to Amroha and then imprisoned in Gwaliyor. The story that reached Persia was that Khidr Khan, his mother and Alp Khan had poisoned 'Ala' al-Din, who was able, however, to execute them all before he died; and to some extent this is corroborated by Ibn Battuta, who heard that they had conspired to replace the sultan with his son.³⁹ The story may, of course, be nothing more than propaganda circulated by Kafur.

The ailing sultan altered the succession in favour of a younger son, Shihab al-Din °Umar, whose mother was the daughter of Ramadeva, the Yadava king of Deogir, and who was duly enthroned by Kafur when 'Ala' al-Din died in 715/1316.⁴⁰ It is tempting to see behind Kafur's coup d'etat an Indian faction, comprising slaves fronted by a puppet sultan who was

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 334, 337-8, 367-8. *TFS*^l Digby Coll. ms., fol. 138a, says that Kafur was made wazir.

³⁶ *TFS*, 337.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 368. For what follows, see generally Lai, *History of the Khaljis*, 265ff. Apart from *TFS*, 368-9, the main sources are *FS*, 337-44 (tr. 517-24), and *TMS*, 79-81.

³⁸ *TFS*, 368. *FS*, 336 (tr. 516).

³⁹ Qashani, 193-4. *IB*, III, 187 (tr. Gibb, 641-2).

⁴⁰ *TFS*, 374, reading RAMDYW for ZAYDH, as proposed by Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 106, and found in BL ms., fol. 185b. The relationship is confirmed by *FS*, 343 (tr. 524).

~ himself half Indian; but the evidence does not permit us to do so. Kafur seems to have enjoyed the cooperation of Kamal al-Din *Gurg* ('the wolf'), whose family originated from Kabul.⁴¹ It was this officer whom he sent to subjugate Gujarat when the province revolted on the news of Alp Khan's death; and Sirhindi even has Kamal al-Din participating with Kafur in Alp Khan's murder.⁴² More probably, therefore,

the two groups we are dealing with represent merely the old 'establishment', perhaps centred on persons of Khalaj origin, and a faction composed of relative newcomers, from widely differing backgrounds, which looked to the na'ib for preferment.

Despite Kafur's activities, a sufficient number of 'Ala' maliks survived to provide some kind of continuity. They included not only Temur and Tegin but also two important figures associated with the middle period - Khwaja Hajji and 'Ayn al-Mulk Multani, who remained respectively *'arid* and governor of Malwa.⁴³ Hushang, the son of Kamal al-Din 'Gurg' who had been killed at the time of 'Ala' al-Din's death while trying to put down a revolt in Gujarat, succeeded to his father's iqta' of Jalor.⁴⁴ Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah gave Malik Dinar the style of Zafar Khan and sent him to govern Gujarat.⁴⁵ It was also to the young sultan's credit that he subsequently appointed as governor of Gujarat the able and well-born Wahid al-Din Qurayshi. Little is known regarding the background of the sultan's maternal kin, of whom Muhammad *MtilaI became Shir Khan.⁴⁶

Kafur's removal did not bring to an end the influence of Indian slave elements. Quite the contrary, for during his brief reign of four years (716-20/1316-20) the new monarch came to rely inordinately on an Indian slave Hasan, captured during the Malwa campaign of 705/1305. Hasan, "whom the sultan had acquired from his *na'ib-i khass-hajib*, Malik Shadi, and who initially served as a member of the watch (*pasban*), obtained the dignity of wazir and the style of Khusraw Khan.⁴⁷ Like Kafur, he aimed high, and attempted to revolt while heading a campaign to the south; but when his colleagues reported his designs, the infatuated sultan refused to believe them and had them punished.⁴⁸ Khusraw Khan shortly murdered his master (720/1320) and himself became sultan. What enabled him to do so was the fact that Qutb al-Din had allowed him to accumulate a personal retinue of Parwari warriors from, his homeland in the region of Bhilmal and Gujarat, whom he then introduced into the Hazar Sutun palace.⁴⁹

⁴¹ See Desai, 'Jalor 'Idgah inscription', where he appears as Mahmud b. Muhammad b. 'Umar Kabul!.

⁴² *TFS*, 369. *TMS*, 80. *FS*, 340-1 (tr.¹520-2), has Kafur also sending Malik Dinar against the Gujarat rebels.

⁴³ *NS*, 100, 112. *TFS*, 379, 388.

⁴⁴ Kamal al-Din: *ibid.*, 369, 388. Hushang: *ibid.*, 379-80 (with SWSMK in error for HWSNG); *Tughluq-Nama*, 57, 65.

⁴⁵ *TFS*, 381, 388-9; and cf. also 379. *FS*, 360 (tr. 558). ⁴⁶ *TFS*, 381.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* *TMS*, 82-3, for Khusraw Khan *aspasban*; also 86. ⁴⁸ *TFS*, 399-400.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 402; and see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 288. Khusraw Khan's brother Hasan had already

~ The Tughluqid coup and its beneficiaries

The origins of Tughluq, who had served 'Ala' al-Din for many years as muqta' of Deopulpur, are a matter of controversy.⁵⁰ No other source corroborates the assertion by certain near-contemporary authors writing in the Mamluk empire that he was a slave.⁵¹ We can also, I suggest, discount the details obtained at Lahore *over* three centuries later by Firishta, namely that Tughluq's father, also named Tughluq, was a slave of Balaban who had married a Jat woman. Ibn Battuta, who arrived in Delhi within ten years of Tughluq's death, learned that the late sultan was one of the Turks known as Qara'unas who inhabited the territories between Sind and Turkestan (i.e. the Neguderis), and had reached India during the reign of 'Ala' al-Din. 'Afif appears to have heard the same story some decades later, since he likewise describes Tughluq and his two brothers as coming from Khurasan in 'Ala' al-Din's time. But the earliest statement we have - and the most deserving of credence - is that found in Amir Khusraw's *Tughluq-Nama*, composed in honour of Tughluq's accession in 720/1320. Khusraw 'has Tughluq declare to the assembled grandees, following the overthrow of Nasir al-Din Khusraw Shah, that he was 'a nomad' (*awara mardi*) and had arrived in Jalal

al-pin Khalji's reign. This suggests that Tughluq was indeed of Mongol or Turco-Mongol stock, as Ibn Battuta's informant claimed; he may have been a follower of the Mongol chief Alughu who entered Jalal al-Din's service in 691/1292 and settled near Delhi (above, p. 118).

The support for Tughluq's rising must have disappointed him. 'Isami, who claims that during his march on Delhi he was joined by many 'Ala'i and Qutbi maliks,⁵² supplies no names. Apart from Bahram-i Ayba, muqta' of Uchch, whose father may have been one of Sultan 'Ala' al-Din's boon-companions (*nadiman*),⁵³ not a single governor is known to have rallied to his side. Of the amirs who were his neighbours, Yaklakhi at Samana, an Indian, actually moved against Tughluq, but was repulsed and was subsequently killed by his own people. The same fate met Mughaltai, the amir of Multan, who had declared for Khusraw Shah. Muhammad Shah Lur at Siwistan was forced by elements within the town to support Tughluq, but in

■ attempted to gather Parwaris during a short visit to Gujarat as its governor: *TFS*, 396-7. *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 173b/ Digby Coll. ms., fol. 147b, suggests that the Parwaris came from Jalor as well as Gujarat. See S. R. Sharma, 'Nasir-ud-din Khusru Shah', in *Mahamahopddhyaya: Professor D. V. Potdar ... commemoration volume* (Poona, 1950), 70-81, for this warrior group.

⁵⁰ For what follows, see R. C. Jauhri, 'Ghiyathu'd-Din Tughluq - his original name and descent', in Horst Kriiger (ed.), *Kunwar Mohammad Ashraf: an Indian scholar and revolutionary 1905-1962* (Berlin, 1966), 62-6.

⁵¹ Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Kortantamer, 27 (German tr. 104). al-Safadi, *Waft*, III, 172 (tr. Khan, 187).

⁵² *FS*, 381 (tr. 584).

⁵³ Rukn al-Din Ayba: *TFS*, 358 (reading DABYR to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 177b: 'YBH). That Ayba was the name of Bahrain's father is clear from *FS*, 388 (tr. 593).

~ the event arrived too late to help him. Further afield, Malik Hushang at Jalor was unwilling to commit himself, and 'Ayn al-Mulk Multani joined Khusraw Shah only to desert him on the eve of battle and retire to his iqta's of Dhar and Ujjain in Malwa.⁵⁴ Tughluq's adherents were kinsmen like his son Malik Jawna (the future Sultan Muhammad), a son-in-law Malik Shadi, and two nephews, Asad al-Din Arslan and Baha' al-Din Garshasp; or subordinates like Yusuf, Tughluq's na'ib at Deopapur, and 'Ali-yi Haydar.⁵⁵ Otherwise his army was made up of outsiders. Amir Khusraw's characterization of them - 'mostly from the Upper Country (*iqlim-i bala*), neither Indian nor Indian chiefs (*Hindu-wala*): Ghuzz, Turks, and Mongols of Rum and Rus ... Tajiks from Khurasan of pure stock'⁵⁶ - is more than a trifle disingenuous. It ignores the Khokhars under their chiefs *Samaj Rai and Gul Chand, to whom 'Isami attributes much of the credit for the victory at Sarsati,⁵⁷ but whose presence on Tughluq's side was difficult to reconcile with the rhetoric of Holy War. Tughluq's affinity, in other words, was markedly regional; his lieutenants were commanders who had fought alongside him on the Mongol frontier, sometimes themselves Mongol renegades, or Hindu warlords who were his close neighbours in the western Panjab.

Tughluq's following is decidedly less impressive than that of his antagonist. The nucleus, of course, comprised Parwaris, headed by Khusraw Shah's maternal uncle *Randhaval. But among the commanders whom Khusraw Shah sent to check the rebels at Sarsati were Temur, the muqta' of Chanderi, Qutlugh the *amir-i shikar*, and *Tulabugha Bughda.⁵⁸ When Tughluq pushed through to Delhi, Khusraw Shah met him at the head of forces that included *Tulabugha Bughda, *Tulabugha Nagawri, Tegin the muqta' of Awadh, Ikhtiyar al-Din Sunbul the *amir-hajib*, Kafur the keeper of the seal (*muhrdar*), and Qabul the supervisor of the market (*shihna-yi manda*).⁵⁹ None of these nobles was an upstart promoted by the usurper: all had held office under Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah, and several - Temur, Tegin, Qutlugh and Qabul - had served his father 'Ala' al-Din before him. Support of this calibre belies the traditional view of Khusraw Shah as a widely hated infidel and of his rival as the avenger of the Khalji dynasty and the saviour of Islam.

Conscious, perhaps, of the relatively narrow support he had enjoyed, Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq after

his accession took care to draw in 'Ala'i

⁵⁴ See Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 38-41. Muhammad Shah Lur appears among the nobles of 'Ala' al-Din's reign: *TFS*, 24Q (omitting 'Lur', but cf. BL ms., fol. 125b). For Yaklahf's Indian extraction, see *Tughluq-Nama*, 68.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 95. *FS*, 380, 382, 383 (tr. 582, 585, 586).

⁵⁶ *Tughluq-Nama*, 84.

⁵⁷ *FS*, 378, 379-80, 382, 384, 385 (tr. 580, 582-3, 585, 588-9). For the SHJ of the printed edition, IOL Persian ms. 3089, fol. 208b, has SMJRAY.

⁵⁸ *Tughluq-Nama*, 101-2. *FS*, 379-80 (tr. 582-3).

⁵⁹ *Tughluq-Nama*, 118 (reading BKYN in error for TGYN). *FS*, 382, 383, 386 (tr. 585, 586, 589-90). *TFS*, 420.

~ maliks and to secure their good will with offices and iqta's.⁶⁰ Khwaja Hajji was retained as 'arid,⁶¹ and 'Ayn al-Mulk Multani remained governor of Malwa, though neither seems to have survived Tughluq (this 'Ayn al-Mulk is to be distinguished from Ibn Mahru, who later bore the same title: see appendix IV). But the alliance with many of the sultan's erstwhile colleagues seems to have been an uneasy one. Tensions emerged in 721/1321-2, when Tughluq deputed a number of amirs from the old regime, along with those of his own creation, to accompany his son and heir, now styled Ulugh Khan, to Arangal. As the result of an intrigue which involved principally a poet in Ulugh Khan's service, named 'Ubayd, and which the sources do little to elucidate, Temur, Tegin and Kafur (who had exchanged his office of *muhirdar* for that of *wakil-i dar*) were easily brought to believe that Ulugh Khan planned to do away with them, and deserted with their contingents, thus jeopardizing the entire campaign. Ulugh Khan extricated himself, and troops were sent against the disaffected amirs. Temur and Tegin were both killed while seeking refuge in Hindu territory; Kafur was taken prisoner and executed in Delhi; their families were all put to death.⁶² All the amirs in question had served 'Ala' al-Din; it may be significant that even 'Ubayd had done so if, as is likely, we can identify him with the 'Ubayd-i Hakim mentioned by Barani among that sultan's boon-companions.⁶³ More importantly, some of these amirs, as we noticed earlier, had supported Khusraw Shah in 720/1320. It is hard to resist the suspicion that the episode afforded the sultan a convenient pretext for eliminating powerful noble households in which he felt unable to repose complete trust. With their removal a significant number of the leading figures of 'Ala' al-Din's era left the stage. ,

As might be expected of a monarch who had come to power with the aid of elements from the north-west, Tughluq favoured officers from those parts. Burhan al-Din, who obtained the post of kotwal and the style of 'Alim Malik, was the founder of an important noble family which had settled at Hansi but originated from Ghazna.⁶⁴ Of his sons, Kamal al-Din became chief qadi and Sadr-i Jahan under Muhammad, and his high standing in the empire is attested both by Ibn Battuta and by al-'Umari's

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 426. *TMS*, 92.

⁶¹ For Khwaja Hajji, see *TFS*, 438; *FS*, 395 (with CACY in error).

⁶² Prasad, *Qaraunah Turks*, 29-33, and Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 65-9, summarize the data in the various sources. *TFS*, 448, 449, lists among the deserters the Afghan malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Mall (printed text has MX, but cf. *TFS*^d, Bodleian ms., fol. 183b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 155a, with ML); but *FS*, 395-6 (tr. 603), says that he remained loyal. For Kafur's rank, see *ibid.*, 394, 400 (tr. 599, 606).

⁶³ *TFS*, 360.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 424, for Burhan al-Din. For the family's origins, see *IB*, III, 143, 161 (tr. Gibb, 617, 628). Burhan al-Din's wife, the mother of Kamal al-Din, was the sister of Mawlana Fakhr al-Din Hansawi: *Siyar*,

~ informants.⁶⁵ Another was Qiwam al-Din, who served as *na'ib-wazir* at Deogir and then, under Muhammad b. Tughluq, was entitled Qutluq Khan and promoted to *wakil-i dar*. At the time of the sultan's abortive Ma'bar campaign in c. 1335, he was once more sent to Deogir (by then renamed Dawlatabad), where he remained in authority for ten years. His recall in 745/1344-5 appears greatly to have undermined Muhammad's authority in the Deccan province and contributed to its secession three years later.⁶⁶ Qutluq Khan's son Muhammad had received from his name-sake the titles of Alp Khan and Nizam al-Mulk, together with the *iqta'* of Gujarat. He did not, apparently, hold this position for long, and in the late 1330s is found deputizing for his father in Dawlatabad during the operations against the rebel Nusrat Khan.⁶⁷ A third son of Burhan al-Din, Nizam al-Din, appears as one of Tughluq's maliks and subsequently, under Muhammad, as 'Alim al-Mulk and governor of Bharuch (Broach).⁶⁸ From there he was transferred to Dawlatabad to replace his brother Qutluq Khan temporarily, but was taken prisoner by rebels and later released and sent to Delhi.⁶⁹

The clan Abu Rija, another new lineage which seems to have attained prominence under the Tughluqids, is again expressly said to have originated from the 'upper country' (*mulk-i bala*), i.e. the north-west. One of its members, Mujir al-Din, had already been made *nd'ib-wazir* at Deogir by Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah Khaljl.⁷⁰ He was still to be found in the region at the time of the Arangal campaign, when he furnished Ulugh Khan with valuable aid in overthrowing the mutinous nobles. This may have earned him the future sultan's trust, for Ibn Battuta refers to him as one of 'the great amirs' of Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign and Barani lists him among the evil influences on that monarch. He served Muhammad loyally, participating with his forces in the campaigns against the rebel Baha' al-Din Garshasp and against 'Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru ten years or so later, when he was governor of Bhayana.⁷¹ Husam al-Din Abu Rija and Shihab al-Din Abu Rija were probably his brothers. The latter obtained the rank of 'king of the merchants' (*malik al-tujjar*) and the *iqta'* of Nawsari on Muhammad's

⁶⁵ *TFS*, 454. *TMS*, 98. *IB*, III, 161, 215, 229 (tr. Gibb, 628, 657, 664). *MA*, ed. Spies, 16 (German tr. 41)/ed. Fariq, 30 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 41).

⁶⁶ *TMS*, 98. *TFS*, 454, 481, 501-2. *FS*, *All*, 426 (tr. 648, 653), shows that he had remained at Deogir in the early years of Muhammad's reign.

⁶⁷ *TMS*, 98. *FS*, 4771 (tr. 717). He does not appear among Muhammad's maliks in the printed text of *TFS*, but cf. BL ms., fol. 225b.

⁶⁸ *TMS*, 98. *TFS*, 502. *FS*, 495, 503 (tr. 739, 749).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 519 (tr. 770). *TMS*, 111.

⁷⁰ *FS*, 369 (tr. 569). *TFS*, 398, elucidated by Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 287-8; in the list of Qutb al-Din's maliks in *TFS*, 379, he appears as 'Fakhr al-Din', but cf. BL ms., fol. 188b. See 'Afif, 454, for the provenance of this family.

⁷¹ *TFS*, *All*. *FS*, 397-9, 427, 473 (tr. 603-5, 653, 711). *TMS*, 101. *IB*, III, 230, 318, and IV, 5 (tr. Gibb, 665, 710, 775), commenting also on his cruelty. For a brief biography, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 287.

~ accession.⁷² Husam al-Din was *mustawfi* under Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq and was detailed to secure Malik Tegin's household in the aftermath of the mutiny at Arangal. He retained his office into the reign of Muhammad, who conferred on him the style of Nizam al-Mulk: sent to Lakhnawti as *na'ib-wazir*, he helped to put down the first revolt of Fakhr al-Din ('Fakhra') at Sunarga'un (c. 1335-6).⁷³ A nephew of Mujir al-Din, Shams al-Din, who was to acquire notoriety by his activities as *mustawfi* under Firuz Shah, was Husam al-Din's son.⁷⁴ Another member of the family corresponded with Ibn Mahru, and some of the Abu Rija clan went on to serve the independent Gujarat sultans in the early fifteenth century.⁷⁵

The aristocracy under Muhammad b. Tughluq

Little is known of the fate of Tughluq's sons, none of whom appears to have survived Muhammad's reign. One, Mubarak Khan, acted in a judicial capacity during the new reign; but Ibn Battuta heard that another, Mas'ud Khan, was put to death, perhaps because his mother was a daughter of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji.⁷⁶ Firuz (the future sultan), the son of the late monarch's brother Rajab, served Muhammad as *barbeg*.¹¹ Two adopted sons of Tughluq certainly enjoyed considerable favour: Tatar Malik (actually the son of a Mongol prince who had invaded India during Tughluq's lieutenancy at Deopapur) attained some prominence, despite temporary banishment following a quarrel with the sultan, while Bahram Khan was entrusted with the government of Sunarga'un.⁷⁸

Virtually half of the appointments made by Muhammad on his enthronement went to men who are known to have originated from the north-west, and included the amirs he had inherited from his father and who had played a leading role in Tughluq's revolt against Khusraw Shah.⁷⁹ But within a few years Muhammad was confronted with insurrections by two of these men, Baha' al-Din Garshasp and Kushlu Khan, which seem to have been provoked by his attempts to intensify his authority in the provinces

⁷² *TMS*, 98.

⁷³ *TFS*, 455 (cf. BL ms., fol. 226a). *TMS*, 94, 98, 104.

⁷⁴ 'Afif, 451, 454. Anonymous, *Ghunya al-Munya*, ed. Shahab Sarmadee (Delhi, 1978), 6-7, gives his full name, Shams al-Dawla wa'l-Din Ibrahim-i Hasan: Husam al-Din is known to have been called Hasan.

⁷⁵ *IM*, 157-9 (Malik Baha' al-Din Nasr-Allah, *na'ib-i khass-hajib*). Z. A. Desai, 'Inscriptions of the sultans of Gujarat from Saurashtra', *EIAPS* (1953-4), 51.

⁷⁶ Mas'ud Khan: *IB*, III, 292 (tr. Gibb, 696). Mubarak Khan: *ibid.*, III, 230, 287-8 (tr. 664, 694); mentioned in *TFS*, 454.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 'Afif, 42. *TMS*, 98.

⁷⁸ Biography of Tatar Malik in 'Afif, 388-94. He had held the *iqta'* of Zafarabad under Tughluq (*TFS*, 428, 451), and was subsequently styled Tatar Khan by Muhammad's successor (*TMS*, 124). Later the author of various legal works, he spoke fluent Arabic: *IB*, III, 281 (tr. Gibb, 690). On Bahram Khan, see *FS*, 422, 444, 472 (tr. 648, 673, 709); *TFS*, 480; *IB*, III, 230, 317 (tr. Gibb, 665, 709), wrongly calling him Muhammad's brother's son (Gibb's tr., 665 n.36, confuses Bahram Khan with Tatar Khan).

⁷⁹ This emerges from the list given in *TMS*, 98.

~ (pp. 256-7 below). This may have provided the impetus to recruit a new body of servitors. He seems to have reposed great confidence in Ahmad b. Ayaz, whom he made wazir in 732/1331-2 with the style of Khwaja Jahan and who is found on a number of occasions leading military forces against rebels.⁸⁰ Khwaja Jahan served Muhammad loyally for the next twenty years, only to fall from power by becoming the focus of resistance to Firuz Shah's accession. When Muhammad left Delhi for the last time, he delegated authority in the capital to Khwaja Jahan, his cousin Firuz and Malik Qabul 'Khalifati' (also known as 'Malik Kabir').⁸¹

As undisputed heir-apparent throughout his father's reign, Muhammad seems to have built up a power-base of his own. Nigam's assertion that the slave system did not receive much encouragement during Muhammad's reign⁸² is simply at variance with the testimony of our sources. Among his most trusted amirs was Malik Qabul, his slave and probably an Indian; and we know that the sultan also recruited black slaves (Habashis), one of whom, presumably, was Badr al-Habashi, his governor at 'Alapur.⁸³ Turks may now have attained some prominence once more. Ibn Battuta heard that Muhammad had alarmed his father by amassing a body of Turkish mamluks. Since the Moroccan traveller found 4,000 of them stationed at Amroha alone, the total figure of 20,000 for Muhammad's Turkish slaves transmitted by al-'Umari is

probably too low.⁸⁴ Ibn Battuta's vivid description of Muhammad's processions suggests that many of his amirs may have been mamluks.⁸⁵ We know the names of only a few of these Turks who rose to high office. 'Imad al-Mulk Sartiz, who became 'arid and governor of Multan and was later transferred to the Deccan, where he fell fighting against the *dmiran-i sada*, was a slave and probably a Turk.⁸⁶ To judge from

⁸⁰ Date of his appointment: *Siyar*, 218. As a military commander: *TFS*, 481; *FS*, 425-31, 471 (tr. 651-8, 707-8); *IB*, III, 318, 324, 332-3, 348-9 (tr. Gibb, 710, 713, 716-17, 723-4). For his ancestry, see p. 189 below.

⁸¹ *TFS*, 509, 522. 'Afif, 50, 452.

⁸² Nigam, *Nobility*, 85.

⁸³ Qabul: *TFS*, 493; *IB*, I, 365, and III, 230 (tr. Gibb, 226, 665), and *passim*. Habashis: *ibid.*, IV, 31 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 786); later, IV, 59-60 (tr. 800), he refers to a guard of fifty Habashi men-at-arms who embarked with him at Gandhar.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 211 (tr. Gibb, 654); and see III, 439 (tr. Gibb, 763), for Amroha. *MA*, ed. Spies, 13 (German tr. 38)/ed. Fariq, 25 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 37); for another reference, to 12,000 mamluks accompanying the sultan, *ibid.*, ed. Spies, 19 (tr. 45)/ed. Fariq, 37 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 44). *IB*, III, 334 (tr. Gibb, 717), says that mamluks accompanied Muhammad on his Ma'bar campaign in c. 1335. But we cannot be certain that these were Turks, since the same author employs the term for slaves whom we know from other sources to have been Indians: see, e.g., *ibid.*, III, 190, 191 (tr. Gibb, 643).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 231 (tr. Gibb, 665).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 44, 94 (tr. Gibb, 562-3, 593): at the latter place Gibb read 'arid-i mamalik, 'inspector-general of the mamluks', for 'drid-i mamalik; but see the French editors' note at *IB*, III, 458-9. Although described both here and at III, 107-9 (tr. Gibb, 600), as governor of Sind, he was not appointed to this post until after Shahu Lodi's revolt in c. 1337: see *TMS*, 107 (with the impossible year 744). Ibn Battuta may thus have confused two visits to the province: see C. F. Beckingham, 'Ibn Battuta in Sind', in Khuhro (ed.), *Sind through the centuries*, 140-1. Firishta, I, 522, calls Sartiz a 'Turkmen'.

~ his name, Malik Qiran Safdar Malik Sultani certainly was.⁸⁷ Another Turk, lastly, was Taghai, who passed from Malik Qiran into the possession of Sultan Muhammad and was promoted to be *shihna-yi bargah*;⁸⁸ his revolt in Gujarat towards the end of the reign proved the most intractable that the sultan had to face.

At this time the Sultanate still served as a magnet for dispossessed princes, adventurers and opportunists from the west. Kushlu Khan's rebellion in Sind had drawn on 'Turks, Afghans and the men of Khurasan'.⁸⁹ Al-'Umari speaks of Turks, natives of 'Khita' (literally 'northern China', but doubtless Mongolia) and Persians in the sultan's own army, and Ibn Battuta refers more than once to the 'amirs of Khurasan' (see below, p. 263) among Muhammad's officers.⁹⁰ What particularly attracted great numbers of immigrant notables was Muhammad's proverbial munificence;⁹¹ the story of his generosity to Sayyid 'Adud al-Din of Yazd, an envoy from Mongol Persia, for example, gained wide currency.⁹² Ibn Battuta, himself a beneficiary of this policy, describes how foreigners were promoted to governorships and to high office, and were treated with the greatest distinction, being addressed, on Muhammad's express instructions, by the special title of 'aziz ('honourable one').⁹³ In c. 733/1332-3, Nizam al-Din, a scion of the former ruling dynasty of Qays in the Persian Gulf, arrived at Muhammad's court, where he spent two years in a vain effort to secure the sultan's aid in recovering his patrimony.⁹⁴ A few years later, Ibn Battuta found Hajji Ke'in, a brother of the Ilkhan Musa, as the sultan's guest: he returned to south-western Persia in 743/1342 and was killed while endeavouring to occupy Shabankara.⁹⁵ Muhammad is known to have sent agents

⁸⁷ See Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 300-1. For Tu. *qiran*, 'one who slaughters', see above, p. 63, n.16.

⁸⁸ The fullest account of his career is to be found in *SFS*, 19-28 (tr. Basu, *JBORS* 23 [1937], 97-

106). For his office, see IB, III, 235 (tr. Gibb, 667). His name is Tu. *taghai*, 'maternal uncle': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 474.

⁸⁹ IB, III, 322 (tr. Gibb, 712).

⁹⁰ MA, ed. Spies, 13 (German tr. 38)/ed. Fariq, 24 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 37). IB, III, 344, 348 (tr. Gibb, 721, 723); cf. also III, 332 (tr. 716), for 'Khurasanis'.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 72-7, and III, 97-9, 243-66 *passim*, 270, 279, 284 (tr. Gibb, 311-13, 595-6, 671-83 *passim*, 685, 689, 692). MA, ed. Spies, 22-5, 38 (German tr. 48-51, 65-6)/ed. Fariq, 41-6, 70 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 48-50, omitting, 48, a sentence about foreigners; 63-4).

⁹² Shabankara'i, 288-9. MA, ed. Spies, 22 (German tr. 48-9)/ed. Fariq, 42-3 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 47-8). al-Safadi, *Wafi*, Biblioteca dell'Accademia dei Lincei, Rome, ms. Fondo Caetani 21, 435-6. A brief allusion in *TFS*, 461.

⁹³ IB, III, 97-8, 243 (tr. Gibb, 595, 671).

⁹⁴ Jean Aubin, 'Les princes d'Ormuz du XI^e au XV^e siècle', *JA* 241 (1953), 105; Shabankara'i, 219. This was the dynasty to which Siraj-i Taqi belonged (below, p. 208).

⁹⁵ IB, III, 256-8 (tr. Gibb, 677-9). Jean Aubin, 'La question de Sirgan au XIII^e siècle', *Studia Iranica* 6 (1977), 289, citing a passage found only in the Tabriz ms. of the third redaction of Shabankara's *Majma'*, which was used by the anonymous author of a general chronicle in Leiden University ms. Or. 1612, fol. 357a, and by Natanzi, *Muntakhab al-Tawarikh* (816/ 1413-14), partial edn by J. Aubin, *Extraits du Muntakhab al-tawarikh-i Mu'ini* (Tehran, 1957), 9-10.

~ to the Persian Gulf to recruit Arab amirs and their followers into his service.⁹⁶ In part this lavish patronage was linked to his expansionist designs in what is now Afghanistan (see chapter 13), and the many notables from Mongol territory who arrived with Ibn Battuta included Khudawand-zada Qiwam al-Din, qadi of Tirmid, his cousin Ghiyath al-Din, two grandees from Transoxiana, and Bahram, malik of Ghazna; later there arrived two Mongol amirs, *Qabtagha and Ahmad-i Iqbal, of whom the first was reputedly descended from the Mongol commander Temur who had overthrown Balaban's son in 683/1285.⁹⁷

Despite Ibn Battuta's testimony that Muhammad preferred foreigners to the indigenous aristocracy, and that the 'Indians' in turn hated the immi-grant 'Khurasani' nobles,⁹⁸ there is clear evidence that the position was more complex; the sultan's favour extended to a much wider *clientela* and native Indians, like the future rebel 'Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru (see appendix IV), also benefited from his generosity and trust.' The Moroccan himself was on friendly terms with the *muhrdar* 'Abu Muslim', one of the many sons of the rai of Kampila whom Muhammad had maintained at his court since the conquest of that territory.⁹⁹ More notable was *Kannu, a Brahman taken prisoner to Delhi on the conquest of Tilang in c. 1322, who entered his service and embraced Islam, receiving the name Maqbul and subsequently the style of Qiwam al-Mulk. Appointed governor of Multan by Muhammad on the suppression of Kushlu Khan's rising in 728/1327-8, he briefly governed Tilang until its revolt in c. 1336, and later became deputy to the wazir Khwaja Jahan Ahmad b. Ayaz. Following Firuz Shah's accession, he obtained the style of Khan Jahan and succeeded Khwaja Jahan as wazir, an office he retained until his death and transmitted to his son.¹⁰⁰

In general, however, Barani stigmatizes Muhammad's Indian servitors as Jowborn.¹⁰¹ They included the notorious 'Aziz Khammar (the Vintner'), on whom the sultan conferred the government of Malwa.¹⁰² A number of them were non-Muslims and - for all the chronicler's jaundiced remarks else-where about drapers (*bazzazan*), goldsmiths and the like¹⁰³ - were probably

⁹⁶ IB, IV, 104 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 818-19).

⁹⁷ Notables from Transoxiana: *ibid.*, III, 374-5, 394-5 (tr. Gibb, 735, 743-4). Bahram: *ibid.*, III, 264-5 (tr. Gibb, 682). Ahmad and *Qabtagha: *TFS*, 520, 584-5; for the second name, probably Mo. *qabtagha*, 'purse', 'bag', see Lessing, *Mongolian-English Dictionary*, 899. P. Jackson, 'The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate in the reign of Muhammad Tughluq (1325-1351)', *CAJ* 19 (1975), 147-8.

⁹⁸ *IB*, III, 344, 349 (tr. Gibb, 721-2, 724).

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 320-1 (tr. Gibb, 711).

¹⁰⁰ Multan: *TMS*, 98, 101. Tilang: *TFS*, 481 (reading QBWL to be amended as in BL ms., fol. 238a), 484. *Naib-wazir. ibid.*, 454, 512. Biography in 'Afif, 394-424. He is to be distinguished from two of Muhammad's other maliks, Qabul (p. 183 above) and Muqbil: see Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 112, 115-16.

¹⁰¹ List in *TFS*, 504-5 (to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 249b). *FJ*, 167-8.

¹⁰² *TFS*, 501-2, 503, 504.

¹⁰³ *FJ*, 180-1; see also 295-302 (at 298 the reader is warned not to be taken in by their administrative skills).

~ kayasthas, members of an administrative class, like Ratan, described as 'a person skilled in calculation and writing', who was entrusted with the fiscal administration of Sind; Bhiran, auditor (*mutasarrif*) at Gulbarga; Samara Singh, who became governor of Tilang; and Dhara, whom Muhammad sent to Dawlatabad as deputy wazir in 745/1344-5, just a matter of months before his authority there disintegrated and the province seceded under the Bahmanid dynasty.¹⁰⁴

The era of Firuz Shah

In his first recension Barani speaks of the number of maliks from the previous regime who were brought low at Firuz Shah's accession.¹⁰⁵ In fact, however, Maqbul was simply the most highly favoured among a significant number of men who came over to the new monarch from Khwaja Jahan during the early weeks and were retained in positions of trust. Husam al-Din, son of Malik Nuwa, became na'ib of Awadh and received the style of Husam al-Mulk.¹⁰⁶ Malik Mubarak, the son of Muhammad's leading amir Malik Qabul Khalifati, served as *silahdar-i khass* and later *wakil-i dar*, surviving Firuz Shah himself.¹⁰⁷ Even A'zam Malik Shaykhzada Bistami, who as one of the associates of Khwaja Jahan had been banished from Firuz Shah's territories, was later pardoned when he reappeared with a caliphal robe, and was restored to favour with the style of A'zam Khan.¹⁰⁸ And although Barani mentions - with ill-disguised relish - how the new sultan dismissed the foreigners who had flocked to Muhammad's court from Herat, Sistan, Aden and Qusdar in expectation of rewards,¹⁰⁹ Firuz Shah's nobles included also some of the most distinguished immigrants of the previous reign. Khudawandzada Qiwam al-Din Tirmidi, Muhammad's *na'ib-i wakil-i dar*, became Khudawand Khan and *wakil-i dar*, while his nephew was entitled Sayf al-Mulk and made *amir-i shikar-i maymana*.¹¹⁰ The Mongol amirs *Qabtagha and Ahmad-i Iqbal, too, enjoyed Firuz Shah's favour, and Ahmad's son Husayn in turn served the sultan and married his daughter.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Ratan: *IB*, III, 105-6 (tr. Gibb, 599). Bhiran: *FS*, 485 (tr. 726-7). Samara Singh: K. H. Kamdar, in *Proceedings of the 7th all India oriental conference (Baroda, 1933)* (Baroda, 1935), 629-33. Dhara: *TFS*, 501. Others are named *ibid.*, 504-5. On this class, see generally Yusuf Husain, 'Les Kayasthas ou "scribes", caste hindoue iranisee, et la culture musulmane dans l'Inde', *REA* (1927), 455-8.

¹⁰⁵ *TFS I* Bodleian ms, fol. 217a. Siddiqui, 'Fresh light', 78.

¹⁰⁶ *TFS*, 528 (to be completed by the still slightly corrupt reading in BL ms., fol. 261a). *TMS*, 133. Bihamadkhani, fol. 417a (tr. Zaki, 22).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, fols. 416b-417a (tr. Zaki, 21). 'Afif, 287, 338, calling him ambiguously Mubarak-i Kablr.

108 *TMS*, 127-8; cf. also °Afif, 281; and for his partisanship of Khwaja Jahan, *TMS*, 120, 123, and *TFS*, 543, 545.

109 *TFS*, 538. 110 *Ibid.*, 454, 580. *TMS*, 124.

¹¹¹ *TFS*, 527, 544, 584-5. °Afif, 280. *TMS*, 140, for the marriage.

~Like his predecessors Firuz Shah built up a corps of amirs of his own creation. One of the most significant long-term developments of the reign was the accumulation of offices and iqta's in the hands of his slaves. They are referred to by different authors, under the events of the following reigns, as 'Turkish' slaves and 'amirs' (*bandagan-i turk*, *umara-yi atrak*) and as 'Hindustanis'. The apparent contradiction may be resolved if it is assumed that many of them were of eastern Indian provenance: thus Juziani, over a century earlier, had written of the natives of Tibet and Arakan as 'Turks'.¹¹² According to °Afif, Firtiz Shah made greater efforts to acquire slaves than any of his predecessors: provincial governors were under orders to forward the choicest slaves to court as part of their annual gift to the sultan, and the total number of royal slaves rose to 180,000. Of these, 40,000 were in attendance at court or formed part of Firuz Shah's retinue; the remainder were occupied in a variety of tasks, some of them being taught a skilled craft.¹¹³ The royal ghulams became such an important element in the state that responsibility for their affairs was transferred from the wazir's department (*diwan-i a'la-yi wizarat*) to a completely new department, the *diwdn-i bandagan*, with its own officials and headed by the °arid-I *bandagan-i khass*.¹¹⁴

Some of his slaves had been in Firuz Shah's service prior to his accession, like Malik Bashir, who became °*arid-i mamalik* with the style of °Imad al-Mulik;¹¹⁵ or Malik *Dilan, who served the new sultan as *amir-i shikar*, an office of increasing importance under a monarch who was so devoted to the chase;¹¹⁶ or Malik Qabul, nicknamed Toraband, who became amir of Bada'un¹¹⁷ and is to be distinguished from a namesake and fellow slave, Malik Qabul Qur'an-khwan, the *amir-i majlis* and muqta° of Samana.¹¹⁸ Subsequent purchases would have included Malik Ikhtiyar al-Din Mufarrij Sultani, the *dawadar*, who became na'ib of the iqta° of Gujarat and later acquired the style of Farhat al-Mulk.¹¹⁹ By Firuz Shah's death, his slaves and their offspring constituted a major element in the aristocracy; we should be justified in speaking of the creation of a new elite. The activities

¹¹² Bihamadkhani, fols. 420a, 421a, 423, 424b, 425b, 432b (tr. Zaki, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 47). *TMS*, 150. Cf. Digby, 'Iletmish or Iltutmish?', 57 n.l. For Juzjanis usage, see *TN*, I, 429 and n.3 (tr. 566, 567).

¹¹³ °Afif, 267-8, 269-70, 272: the figures are given at 270. ¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 271.

¹¹⁵ *TFS*, 581. °Afif, 285, 436-7. *TMS*, 119.

¹¹⁶ *TFS*, 582. °Afif, 115, 318. Shokoohy, *Rajasthan I*, 62. On the importance of his office, see *TFS*, 600.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 528. See also °Afif, 159-61. Bihamadkhani, fol. 417a: the text is slightly corrupt, reading NWRABAD, and Zaki's tr. (23 and n.5) confuses him with Qabul Qur'an-khwan, as does *TMS*, 135, when mentioning his appointment to Bada'un.

¹¹⁸ °Afif, 454-5. Bihamadkhanl, fol. 417a (tr. Zaki, 23). *TMS*, 134. He was sent against the invading Mongols in 759/1358: *ibid.*, 127.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 133. He appears in epigraphs from 762 onwards: Desai, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 9-13, 19-21, 26-7, etc. (for a reconstruction of his career, see *ibid.*, 13-14); *idem*, 'A fourteenth-century epitaph from Konkan', *EIAPS* (1965), 9-10.

~of these slaves under his successors would gravely undermine the stability of the empire.

Even discounting the amirs whom Firuz Shah had inherited from his cousin, however, there were still several nobles of free stock. Zafar Khan (II), the muqta' of Gujarat, was the son and successor of Zafar Khan (I), whose full name, Taj al-Din Muhammad Lur Farsi, indicates that his family probably came from south-west Persia.¹²⁰ Malikzada Firuz (ancestor of the dynasty that ruled at Kalpi in the fifteenth century), who held the extensive new *shiqq* of Firuzpur, was the son of Taj al-Din Turk, who had served Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq Shah.¹²¹ The free maliks also comprised a group of Afghan amirs: Malik Ba'yyu, muqta' of Bihar; Malik Khattab, appointed to the *shiqq* of Sambhal in 782/1380; and Malik Muhammad Shah, muqta' of Tughluqpur in Etawa.¹²² Indian converts related to the sultan by marriage, too, found a place in the ranks of the aristocracy. If we can believe a seventeenth-century historian of Gujarat, Sadharan, entitled *Wajlh al-Mulk*, the ancestor of the independent sultans, was the brother of one of Firuz Shah's wives; he had accompanied the sultan to Delhi and adopted Islam.¹²³ By this time, lastly, leading figures among the local princes enjoyed a place at court. After his campaign against Damrila, the sultan took its princes, the Jam and his brother Banbhina, back to Delhi.¹²⁴ By his death Uddharan, brother of the Tomara rai of Gwaliyor, and *Sumer, the Chawhan rai of Etawa, were also both in attendance.¹²⁵

Lineage and continuity

We would wish to know more about the ancestry of most of the great nobles of the Khalji and Tughluqid periods mentioned in our sources. Isami tells us, for example, that Alp Khan, one of 'Ala' al-Din's early associates and subsequently governor of Gujarat, was of royal descent, and later alludes to the illustrious ancestry of Baha' al-Din Garshasp, whose

¹²⁰ *TMS*, 126; cf. also *SFS*, 91. Desai, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 15-17.

¹²¹ Bihamadkhani, fol. 412b (tr. Zaki, 13-14); for the date, see *TMS*, 134, and on his background, 'Afif, 480. For Taj al-Din Turk, see *TFS*, 424.

¹²² Bayyu: Bihamadkhani, fol. 417a (tr. Zaki, 22, reading 'Babbu [?]); *TMS*, 133 (BYR in error for BYW); cf. also Z. A. Desai, 'Arabic and Persian inscriptions from the Indian Museum, Calcutta', *EIAPS* (1955-6), 6-8, for his epitaph of 753/1353 (here called Ibrahim Bayyu); Q. Ahmad, *Corpus*, 34-7 (nos. 11-13). Khattab: *TMS*, 135. Muhammad Shah: Bihamadkhani, fols. 412a, 417a (tr. Zaki, 13, 23).

¹²³ Sikandar b. Muhammad, alias ('urf) Manjhu, *Mir'at-i Sikandar*, ed. S. C. Misra and Muhammad Lutf al-Rahman (Baroda, 1961), 4-10; tr. in Sir E. C. Bayley, *The local Muhammadan dynasties. Gujarat* (London, 1886), 67-70.

¹²⁴ *SFS*, 93-4. 'Afif, 247-8, 252-4. Riazul Islam, 'The rise of the Sammas in Sind', *IC* 22 (1948), 377-9.

¹²⁵ 'Afif, 281. *TMS*, 134. Bihamadkham, fol. 414b (tr. Zaki, 17). For the identification of these princes, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 394-5; K. S. Lai, *Twilight of the Sultanate*, revised edn. (New Delhi, 1980), 6-7, n.35.

~mother was Tughluq's sister.¹²⁶ But in neither case does he inform us who were the forebears of the amir in question. On balance, our ignorance of lineage probably means that the aristocracy contained fewer *parvenus* than might seem to have been the case, and we should not be unduly influenced by Barani's evident obsession with birth as a qualification for office. Barani is in any case glaringly inconsistent, in that he ignores the fact that the great noble families of Balaban's reign were descended from that sultan's fellow-slaves, who could hardly be described as of good birth; and when impugning the birth of those who rose to high office in 'Ala' al-Din's last years, he neglects to level the same charge at the upstart nobles of the early part of the reign.¹²⁷

Given the sudden and arbitrary manner in which amirs could be deprived of life and property and their families disinherited, it is easy to ignore continuity. There were always grandees whose period of service spanned different dynasties. Khwaja Jahan Ahmad b. Ayaz, wazir to Muhammad b. Tughluq, was the son of 'Ala' al-Din Ayaz, kotwal of the Hisar-i Naw at Delhi (i.e. the new fortress of Siri) under 'Ala'

al-Din Khalji and kotwal of the capital in 720/1320, when he sent his son out with the keys to welcome Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq; Ibn Battuta was told that the family was of Rumi origin.¹²⁸ Malik Bashir Mu'izzi, *na'ib-i khass-hajib* to Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah, may well be identical with the Malik Bashir Sultani who appears among the nobles of Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad thirty years before.¹²⁹ One of Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah's amirs was Aram Shah, the son of Malik Khurram Kuhijudi, who had served the Ghiyathids.¹³⁰ The father of Ahmad-i *ChhItam, °Ala' al-Din's *qirabeg*, who with his sons held office under Qutb al-Din and Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq, was Balaban's slave, Malik *Buqubuq (above, p. 101).¹³¹ Malik Husam al-Din Pindar Khalji, who served Qutb al-Din, received from Ghiyath al-Din the style of Qadr Khan, was sent at the accession of Muhammad b. Tughluq to govern Lakhnawi, and was assassinated there on the outbreak of insurrection in

¹²⁶ Alp Khan: *FS*, 250, *ki aslash bud az nutfay-i shahryar* (tr. 420). Baha' al-Din: *ibid.*, 384, *an sipahdar-i wala-nasab* (tr. 588).

¹²⁷ I. Habib, 'Barani's theory', 107. Siddiqi, 'Nobility under the Khalji Sultans', 64-5.

¹²⁸ *IB*, III, 144 (tr. Gibb, 617-18). For Ayaz, see *TFS*, 278; *FS*, 386-7 (tr. 590). The source cited by A. M. Husain, *The Rehla of Ibn Battuta* (Baroda, 1953), 54 n.3 (and in turn in Gibb's tr., 655 n.131), which makes Ahmad b. Ayaz out to be of Indian origin, must be regarded as less trustworthy. *HN*, 447, 457, mistakenly calls the father Ahmad and the son Muhammad.

¹²⁹ *TFS*, 126 (reading *BSYR*, with *BL* ms., fol. 67b, for the *YSR* of the text). *TMS*, 83.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹³¹ Buqubuq: *TFS*, 40. *Qirabeg*: *ibid.*, 331-2, 337, 379, 396, 424. *FS*, 287 (tr. 461), gives his name. His sons: *TFS*, 409, 410. For the youngest, Badr al-Din Abu Bakr b. Ahmad, also named in an inscription of 723/1323, see *TFS*, 379; G. H. Yazdani, 'Inscriptions in the tomb of Baba Arjun Shah, Petlad (Baroda State)', *E/M* (1915-16), 16-18; *ARIE* (1975-6), 145 (no. D114).

~c. 1336.¹³² His father, Jamal al-Din Khalji, *na'ib-i amir-i dad* under both Balaban and Jalal al-Din, had supported Jalal al-Din's sons in 695/1296 but was one of the very few maliks spared by °Ala' al-Din in his purge of the Jalali nobles shortly afterwards.¹³³ As we saw (p. 80), he may possibly be the Khalaj chamberlain Jamal al-Din 'Ali who had acted as Balaban's agent on a mission to the Mongols.

The service of some noble families straddled three generations or more, though not always in a strictly office-holding capacity. Barani, whose father, uncle and maternal grandfather all held office in the latter half of the thirteenth century, seems never to have been more than a boon-companion (*nadim*) to Muhammad b. Tughluq. From what he says of the descendants of the thirteenth-century wazirs Junaydi and Muhadhdhab al-Din, it appears that they were living as private citizens until the reign of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq, who restored them to favour, so that we find Husam al-Din Junaydi master-minding the assessment of the total revenue demand of the empire in Firuz Shah's reign, and his son Rukn al-Din Junaydi ('Junda') briefly serving as wazir to Abu Bakr Shah in 791/1389.¹³⁴ The *sayyid al-hujjdb* Ma'rif, boon-companion to Firuz Shah, had been merely a military officer (*pishwa*) under Muhammad's amir Sartiz; but his father was no less a figure than Wahid al-Din Qurayshi, *na'ib-wazir* and governor of Gujarat for Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah.¹³⁵ Malik Mahmud Beg, who held Sunnam and Samana under Muhammad b. Tughluq and Firuz Shah successively, and on whom the latter conferred the title of Shir Khan, belonged to a family from Bilahur that produced a series of office-holders proper. In view of Shir Khan's advanced age (somewhat implausibly set at ninety by Barani), his father Rustam-i Yahya, muqta° of Bidar, must have been promoted at some time during the Khalji era.¹³⁶ Shir Khan's own sons, Malik Abu Muslim and Malik Sha,hin Beg, are later mentioned as officers of Firuz Shah.¹³⁷ Perhaps the most striking instance of continuity is provided by the genealogy of Dawar Malik, son of a sister, and also son-in-law, of Muhammad b. Tughluq; through his father Sadr al-Din °Arif, deputy chief

¹³² *TFS*, 379, 424 (with *BYDAR* in error; cf. *BL* ms., fols. 188b, 211a), 450, 454, 480. *FS*, 396 (tr. 601). *TMS*, 98.

133 *TFS*¹ Bodleian ms., fol. 132a, calling him 'Jamal al-Din Khaljl, *na'ib-i amir-i dad*'; the corresponding passage in *TFS*, 251, specifies that he was Qadr Khan's father, but calls him simply 'Amir Jamal Khalji' (the printed text reads *JMALY* in error).

¹³⁴ Ghiyath al-DIn Tughluq: *ibid.*, *All.* Husam al-DIn: ^cAfif, 94, 460, 469-70, 481. Rukn al-Din: *ibid.*, 482; *TMS*, 143-4; and see also Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 391-2.

¹³⁵ Sayyid al-Hujjab: 'Afif, 445-6. Qurayshi: *TFS*, 397-8.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 545, 583. *TMS*, 119, 120-1. Malik Rustam-i Yahya is found among Muhammad b. Tughluq's maliks only in the BN ms. of *TFS*, Suppl. persan 251, fol. 282b. For the *nisba* Bilahuri, see *IM*, 106 (BLAHWDY in error); for Bilahur (modern Phillaur), on the right bank of the Sutlej, at 31° 1' N., 75° 48' E., *Punjab district gazetteers, XIVA. Jullundur* (Lahore, 1904), 301. Shir Khan was dead by 765/1364, when 'Malik Fakhr al-Dawla wa'l-DIn, son of Shir Khan Mahmud Beg', built a mosque at Patan: Desai, 'Khaljl and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 14-15.

¹³⁷ *TMS*, 122. One of these may have been the builder of the above-mentioned mosque.

~qadi to 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, he was a great-grandson of the chronicler Juzjani, chief qadi to two of Iltutmish's sons and under Ghiyath al-Din Balaban.¹³⁸

The survival of aristocratic families from one reign or dynasty to another was simply not newsworthy in the way that the downfall of established amirs or the promotion of 'new men' always was; it demanded less attention on the part of the chroniclers. Barani says in a few words that Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq maintained in position the nobles of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's reign; he devotes rather more space to the predilection of Muhammad b. Tughluq for lowborn servitors. Yet Ghiyath al-Din, as we have seen, did not simply nurture the aristocrats who represented the Khalji era: he also brought with him from Deopapur, and installed in office, members of his own retinue, men whose ability, courage and loyalty had been proven in his service over the past twenty years or so on the Mongol frontier. And in Muhammad's reign, conversely, a good deal of evidence is to be found that old established families were still represented among the office-holders.

We have little information about local aristocracies. The sources afford the occasional glance at a local power-base - 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's at Kara, for instance, where his capacity for intrigue was exacerbated by the influence of former associates of the Ghiyathid Malik Chhajju,¹³⁹ or Malik Kafur's at Rapri on the middle Yamuna and later at Deoglr.¹⁴⁰ But it is not until the last decades of the fourteenth century that Bihamadkhani's *Ta'rikh-i Muhammadi* enables us to trace what may truly be called 'local history', in this case of the region around Kalpi and even then the ruling dynasty was an importation from Delhi - the progeny of Malik Taj al-DIn Turk.

Otherwise the material that could have told us about Muslim notables in the provinces is meagre indeed. Barani devotes some space to the families of sayyids resident in various towns of the Sultanate in 'Ala' al-Din's time, giving especial prominence to those of Bada'un, who served as qadis there. Two members of the family, Sayyid Taj al-DIn and his nephew Sayyid Rukn al-DIn, attained the dignity of qadi at Awadh and Kara respectively, and Barani says that he was privileged to meet them. He himself was descended through his paternal grandmother from another distinguished clan, the sayyids of Kaithal. Sayyids from Gardiz (presumably now dispersed around the empire) and those of Jajner and of Bhayana are also mentioned.¹⁴¹ Members of these prestigious families emerge occasionally in the higher ranks of the aristocracy. Malik Taj al-Din Ja'far, of the line of sayyids of Jajner, is listed among the maliks of 'Ala' al-Din and Qutb al-Din and subsequently became *nd'ib-i 'ard* and governor of Gujarat under

¹³⁸ *TFS*, 351. *TMS*, 98. See also Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 309-10. ¹³⁹ *TFS*, 224.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 328, 333. Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Khalji Sultans of Delhi', 30.

¹⁴¹ Bada'un: *TFS*, 348-9. Kaithal: *ibid.*, 349-50. Gardlz and Jajner: *ibid.*, 350. Bhayana: *ibid.*, 351.

~Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq.¹⁴² And on occasions these local lineages might find their fortunes disrupted by royal violence. The sayyids of Kaithal paid dearly when one of their number, Sayyid Hasan, kotwal of Madura, successfully revolted against Muhammad b. Tughluq in 734/1334 and (as Sultan Jalal al-Din Ahsan Shah) founded the independent sultanate of Ma'bar: they were all massacred on the sultan's return from an abortive attempt to recover the province.¹⁴³ Sayyid Hasan's son Ibrahim, keeper of the purse (*kharitadar*) to Muhammad and governor of Hansi and Sarsati, was executed later on a charge of conspiracy to revolt.¹⁴⁴

In the provinces a rare shaft of light illuminates the resilience of distinguished local families even over a stretch of a few centuries. We might think it highly improbable that any Indian locality in the reign of Firuz Shah could preserve some connection with the Ghaznawid era. Yet an inscription from the Nagawr region enshrines precisely that when it commemorates five brothers who fell in battle with the Hindus near Bari Khatu in 761/1360.¹⁴⁵ They bore the surname 'Bahalim', and hence must have belonged to the clan of the powerful amir and founder of Nagawr, Muhammad Bahalim, who had rebelled against the Ghaznawid Sultan Bahram Shah in 513/1119.¹⁴⁶ It is a tantalizing thought that many more such venerable Muslim aristocracies in the regions, beyond the horizons of our literary sources, may have survived every upheaval at Delhi.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 240, 379, 424, 428; see 350 for his ancestry.

¹⁴³ *TMS*, 106 (with incorrect date 742); and see 107 for the massacre of the sayyids. *FS*, 469 (tr. 705), for Sayyid Hasan's rank: N. Venkataramanyya, *The early Muslim expansion in South India* (Madras, 1942), 123-4 n.50 and 160, therefore argues that he did not govern the entire province, *pace* *IB*, III, 328-9 (tr. Gibb, 715). He is earlier found acting as na'ib to the governor of the Damoh region in 725/1325: B. D. Verma, 'Inscriptions from the Central Museum, Nagpur', *EIAPS* (1955 6), 109-12; *ARIE* (1969-70), 84 (no. D66).

¹⁴⁴ *IB*, III, 337-9 (tr. Gibb, 718-19).

¹⁴⁵ N. M. Ganam, 'An epitaph of six martyrs from Bari Khatu in Rajasthan', *EIAPS* (1973), 10-13.

¹⁴⁶ *TN*, I, 242 (tr. 110); and see also *AH*, 378-81. Bosworth, *Later Ghaznavids*, 102-3.

~CHAPTER 10

An age of conquest

In chapter 7 an attempt was made to depict the constraints to which Muslim expansion was subject in the thirteenth century. This is not to say that territories outside the control of the Delhi Sultan at that time were untouched by Islam. Muslim traders had been active in the maritime cities of the peninsula and in Ceylon since the ninth century,¹ and these regions retained close links with the Gulf: in the early thirteenth, the khutba in different parts of 'Hind' was made in the name of the ruler of Fars.² Kanbhaya (Cambay) in Gujarat had its population of Muslim traders, scholars and lawyers for several decades before 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's forces first entered the country in 698-9/1299-1300. The presence of a flourishing Muslim community in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is demonstrated by the number • of epitaphs that have come to light.³ These Muslims had their own prefect (*hakim*) on the eve of the Khalji invasion, and 'Awfi had been qadi there for a time in the early 1220s.⁴ It was the same in the far south. Ibn Battuta's description of the Mulaybar (Malabar) coast demonstrates that communities of Muslims had settled in its- ports and constructed mosques and hospices.⁵ At the time of his visit, there were 20,000 Muslims in the army of the Hoysala king of Dvarasamudra; and a generation earlier 'Ala' al-Din's invading army had encountered Muslims among the forces of

¹ Genevieve Bouchon, 'Quelques aspects de l'islamisation des regions maritimes de l'Inde a l'epoque medievale (XIIe-XVI^e s.)', in Gaborieau, *Islam et societe en Asie du sud*, 29-36. Wink, *Al-Hind*, I,

67-83.

² Ibn Zarkub, ed. KarimI, 56/ed. Jawadi, 80.

³ Z. A. Desai, 'Arabic inscriptions of the Rajput period from Gujarat', *EIAPS* (1961), 1-24; *idem*, 'Early Kufi epitaphs from Bhadreswar in Gujarat', *EIAPS* (1965), 1-8; *ARIE* (1961-2), 33, 179 (nos. D22-29).

⁴ Desai, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 3-4. For 'Awfi's position at Kanbhaya, which was misunderstood by Nizamu'd-din, *Introduction*, 14, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 171, and II, 44.

⁵ IB, IV, 71-103 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 805-18). See generally G. F. Hourani, *Arab seafaring in the Indian Ocean* (Princeton, 1951); Stephen F. Dale, *Islamic society on the South Asian frontier: the Mappilas of Malabar 1498-1922* (Oxford, 1980), chapter 1; Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 276-80.

~the Pandya kingdom of Ma'bar.⁶ Muslim rule, then as now, has never kept pace with the Muslim diaspora.

The decisive forward thrust is associated with the era of ^cAla' al-Din Khalji (695-715/1296-1316). His seizure of the throne had been made possible by a raid of unprecedented audacity upon the distant Yadava kingdom of Deogir; and his reign as sultan was characterized by equally ambitious campaigns against independent Hindu powers in Rajasthan, in Malwa and south of the Narbada. Yet for all that we may feel confronted at this juncture by some kind of quantum leap in the process of expansion, we should beware of identifying every triumph as a landmark. Some of 'Ala' al-Din's campaigns were simply an extension of the activity of thirteenth-century sultans: his reduction of Ranthanbor, for instance, representing the recovery of a stronghold that had twice previously been in Muslim hands.

Nor are we necessarily faced everywhere with a new stage of conquest and absorption. True, the military reach of the Sultanate had been dramatically extended; Hindu fortresses which had hitherto yielded merely spasmodic tribute now became the seat of a Muslim governor or muqta'. But the push to the south often did no more than replicate the pattern discernible in the north over the previous hundred years or so. In Baranis account of the first successful invasion of Tilang, 'Ala' al-Din instructs his general, Malik Kafur, not to make any effort to take the fortress of Arangal or to overthrow its king: if treasure, jewels, elephants and horses were offered, and tribute guaranteed for future years, he was to reach a rapid settlement.⁷ Frequently the submission of a prince was accepted by the sultan or his representatives with the characteristic reassuring gesture of the hand on the back, extended to the envoys of Rudradeva of Tilang by Kafur and to the rai of Nagarkot by Firuz Shah.⁸ There is the same pronounced gap between the ideal - exercise of immediate administrative control over the entire territory of a defunct Hindu kingdom - and a reality that resided in inevitable compromise with local powers or- confined direct Muslim rule to a handful of major strongpoints. As we shall see, the last years of the Khalji era would witness the beginnings of a more forward policy.

⁶ Hoysalas: IB, IV, 195-6 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 861). Pandyas: *KF*, 149; *DR*, 72.

⁷ *TFS*, 327: a line is omitted here which is found in BL ms., fol. 162a, *ki dar giriftan-i hisar-i Arankal wa-bar andakhtan-i rai Laddar Diw mubalighi makuni wa-agar Diw RAI-YI Arankal khizana ...*

⁸ *8KF*, 104, 'AFif, 189,244. For Nagarkot, see also L. S. Chandel, 'References to Kangra and Sirmur in the early medieval Persian sources', in his *Early medieval state (a study of Delhi Sultanate)* (New Delhi, 1989), 104 and n.39; further references in Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 321.

~The campaigns in northern India

Gujarat

Mahmud of Ghazna had sacked the temple city of Somnath on the coast and the wealthy entrepot of Nahrwala (Anhilwara; modern Patan); and in 593/1197 Nahrwala had again been looted by Qutb al-Din Aybeg. But no Muslim attacks on Gujarat are recorded thereafter, either upon the Chaulukyias or upon their Vaghela kinsmen who succeeded them around 1242, until almost the end of the century. Then in 698/1299 'Ala' al-Din sent his brother Ulugh Khan and the wazir Nusrat Khan against the Vaghela kingdom. The principal goal of the expedition may have been to sack Somnath, doubtless in conscious emulation of Mahmud of Ghazna. The Vaghela king Karnadeva seems to have disputed the passage of the Muslim army as it neared Gujarat, and was defeated and fled south-east to Baglana (in the Nasik region). Somnath and Nahrwala were plundered, and Nusrat Khan sacked Kanbhaya, probably in Dhu'l-Hijja/September 1299. A Jain inscription tells us that although Satyapura (Sachor) was saved by a miracle the sultan's forces overran the Kathiawad peninsula. After this, 'Ala' al-Din's generals withdrew to Delhi with an enormous booty, their progress interrupted only by an abortive mutiny on the part of some neo-Muslim Mongol commanders.⁹

Contrary to the impression sometimes given, this campaign did not entail a Muslim conquest or the definitive overthrow of the Vaghelas. Barani's account of the campaign includes the misleading statement that Karnadeva sought asylum at Deogir with the Yadava king Ramadeva. In fact, this occurred a few years later. A bilingual inscription of 704/1304 shows Karnadeva established at Vadodara (Baroda), on the eastern marches of his kingdom, and flanked, incidentally, by two of the neo-Muslim Mongol amirs who had deserted the Delhi army.¹⁰ Moreover, 'Isami describes a second invasion of Gujarat, effected by the *qirabeg* Ahmad-i Chhitam. It seems to

⁹ See generally S. C. Misra, *The rise of Muslim power in Gujarat*, 2nd edn (New Delhi, 1982), 61-4; Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 67-73; HN, 334-6. The date of the *farman* ordering the *ca'rid* to prepare for the expedition is given as Wed. 20 Jumada I 698 in a couplet in *KF*, 47 (Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 68, mistakes this for the actual date of departure): since the 20th was in reality a Monday (23 February 1299), Hodivala (*Studies*, I, 248-9) assumed that the year intended was 697. But the correct date is in fact found in a chronogram a few lines earlier: 22 Jumada I 698/25 Feb. 1299 (*KF*, 46-7). The month Dhu'l-Hijja given by Wassaf, 447, probably refers to the attack on Kanbhaya. For the date of the sack of Somnath (June 1299), see D. B. Diskalkar, 'Inscriptions of Kathiawad', *NIA* 1 (1938-9), 695. The campaign must have extended into the year V.s. 1356 (1299-1300) given in Jinaprabha's *Tirthakalpa* almost thirty years later: G. Biihler, 'A Jaina account of the end of the Vaghelas of Gujarat', *IJ* 26 (1897), 194-5.

¹⁰ *TFS* 251. Z. A. Desai, 'A Persian-Sanskrit inscription of Kama Deva Vaghela of Gujarat', *EIAPS* (1975), 13-20; *ARIE* (1980-1), 6-7, 123-4 (no. B98). See *FS*, 255 (tr. 425), for the flight of the two Mongol amirs to Karnadeva.

~have been this expedition which sacked Sachor in 1310; and it was only now that Karnadeva fled to the Deccan and hence to Tilang and that 'Ala' al-Din appointed the first Muslim governor in the person of Alp Khan.¹¹

Even after this second assault, however, Muslim domination of Gujarat remained patchy: it may, in fact, have been undermined by the revolt of the provincial garrison troops that followed Alp Khan's execution (p. 177). In Gujarat, as elsewhere, Ibn Battuta notices 'rebels who inhabit inaccessible retreats in the mountains'.¹² An early seventeenth-century author asserts that 'Ala' al-Din established the light of Islam only in the territories lying east of a line drawn from Nahrwala to Bharuch, and that the eradication of pagan practices in the outlying parts (*atraf-u jawanib*) dated from the period of the independent sultans from the fifteenth century onwards.¹³ This may not do justice to the Tughluqid era, but it is true that local political conditions varied widely. Epigraphical evidence of Muslim rule down to Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign is concentrated in the east, in Petlad, Patan, Bharuch and Kanbhaya.¹⁴ Nawsari is found as an *iqta'* by 725/1325.¹⁵ But in 745/1344-5 Nanadeva, the chief (*muqaddam*) of Salher (Salir) and Mulher (Malir) in Baglana, appears to have been virtually independent.¹⁶ And much of the Kathiawad peninsula lay outside the writ of the sultan's governors. Gandhar's ruler paid tribute to Delhi at the time of Ibn Battuta's visit in the early 1340s; yet the Hindu ruler of Gogha (Quqa), he tells us, who had at one time professed allegiance to Delhi, did so no longer.¹⁷ Members of the Vaghela dynasty continued to rule at Dandahidisa under the overlordship of Delhi and, later still, in subordination to the independent Gujarat sultans.¹⁸ At Vamanathali

(Vanthali), whose rana Mamdalikka had been chastised by Ulugh Khan in the 1299 campaign, his dynasty, the Chudasamas, contrived to extend their power over much of the Girnar (Junagarh) region.¹⁹ When he entered Gujarat in

¹¹ Misra, *Muslim power*, 64-6, though dating this second invasion in 704/1304-5. *FS*, 286-8 (tr. 461-3). For the sack of Satyapura (Sachor) in V.s. 1366/1310, see Buhler, 'Jaina account', 195. That Karnadeva was not welcomed in Deogir suggests that his flight postdated the Yadava king's submission to Delhi in 706/1307 (below).

¹² *IB*, III, 245 (tr. Gibb, 672).

¹³ Sikandar 'Manjhu', *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 42 (tr. Bayley, 97).

¹⁴ Petlad: Misra, *Muslim power*, 67; *ARIE* (1975-6), 145 (no. D114, 723/1323; no. D115, 713/1313). Patan: Z. A. Desai, 'An early fourteenth century epigraph from Gujarat', *ELAPS* (1970), 13-15 (715/1315). Bharuch: M. Nazim, 'Inscriptions from the Bombay Presidency', *EIM* (1933-4), *Supplement*, 25-6 (721/1321-2), 27 (726/1326). Kanbhaya: A. M. Husain, 'Six inscriptions of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq Shah', *ELAPS* (1957-8), 29-34 (725/1325); *ARIE* (1973-4), 143 (no. D80, 734/1334).

¹⁵ *TMS*, 98. Q. M. Moneer, 'Two unpublished inscriptions of the time of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq', *EIM* (1939-40), 24-6.

¹⁶ TFS, 512, calling him 'Man Diw'; for the identification, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 299.

¹⁷ *IB*, IV, 58, 59, 61 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 799, 800, 801).

¹⁸ Ray, *Dynastic history*, 1046 n.l.

¹⁹ For Mamdalikka, see Buhler, 'Jaina account', 194; for the epigraphy of the dynasty, Diskalkar, 'Inscriptions of Kathiawad', 576-90, etc. (especially 578-9).

~pursuit of the rebel Taghai in 1349, Muhammad b. Tughluq arrested 'Kanhgar', rana of Ginar, and imposed his own revenue-collectors on the region.²⁰ It is indeed possible that his three-year stay in Gujarat - the first visit by a reigning Delhi Sultan - brought about an intensification of control over the province.

Rajasthan and Malwa

In the thirteenth century Ranthanbor had been the objective of several campaigns from Delhi. Its raja, Hammlradeva, who is described by 'Isami as a friend of 'Ala' al-Din, had nevertheless created a *casus belli* by giving shelter to certain of the Mongol amirs who mutinied during the first Gujarat campaign;²¹ and following the great Mongol invasion by Qutluq Qocha in 1299-1300, the sultan sent Ulugh Khan, then muqta' of Bhayana, and Nusrat Khan, muqta' of Kara, with the army of 'Hindustan' to attack the fortress. The two generals took Jhayin, but during their investment of Ranthanbor Nusrat Khan was mortally wounded. The sultan therefore set out in person to take charge of the siege operations. According to Amir Khusraw, who dates the beginning of the siege in Rajab 700/March 1301, Ranthanbor was taken on 3 Dhu'l-Qa'da/11 July.²² Hammlradeva and his neo-Muslim guests fell in the fighting. Ranthanbor and its dependencies were conferred on Ulugh Khan, who died, however, within a few months.²³ It is a measure of the firmness of the Muslim hold here that under his successor, Malik 'Izz al-Din *Bura Khan, Jhayin, renamed *Shahr-i Naw* ('New City'), could be subjected to the same system for collection of the land-tax (*kharaj*) that obtained in the heartlands of the Sultanate (see below, pp. 242-4).²⁴

During the outward march of Ulugh Khan and Nusrat Khan towards Gujarat in 698/1299, Samarasimha, raja of Chitor, had protected his kingdom by paying tribute.²⁵ It seems that he subsequently reneged on his submission, for in Jumada II 702/January 1303 'Ala' al-Din in person set out for Chitor. Barani makes only fleeting mention of this campaign, describing the siege as brief. But Khusraw says that

the place capitulated on 11 Muharram 703/26 August, and that the raja surrendered to 'Ala' al-Din.²⁶

²⁰ *TFS*, 521, 523; for the identification of Kanhgar', see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 302-3.

²¹ *TFS*, 283. *FS*, 255, 271-3 (tr. 425, 446-7). *TMS*, 11.

²² *KF*, 51, 54, for these dates, on which see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 249. On the Ranthanbor campaign, see Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 83-6, 89, 93-6.

²³ *DR*, 66. *TFS*, 283; cf. also 299 for Ulugh Khan's death.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 288, 299, 306. For the renaming of Jhayin, see *KF*, 54; more references in Gupta, 'Jhain of the Delhi Sultanate'.

²⁵ Btihler, 'Jaina account', 194. The phrasing is ambiguous: see Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 69.

²⁶ *KF*, 60, 61-2, 63. *TFS*, 299. *FS*, 281 (tr. 456), calling the raja Samarasimha in error for the latter's son and successor Ratan Singh. The date is discussed by Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 250; for the siege, see Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 99-102.

~Chitor was renamed Khidrabad in honour of the sultan's son and heir-presumptive, Khidr Khan, who became its nominal governor.²⁷ Isami makes it clear, however, that the administration was entrusted to 'Ala' al-Din's slave Malik Shahln.²⁸ The story found in Sanskrit epic and purveyed also by Firishta, according to which after 'Ala' al-Din's death the fortress was first occupied by a brother of the raja of Jalor and then passed into the hands of the rajas of Sisodia for two centuries, is not borne out by epigraphical evidence, which shows that Chitor was still ruled by governors sent from Delhi in the reigns of the first two Tughluqid sultans.²⁹

According to Amir Khusraw, the Delhi forces had been investing Siwana (Sevana) for five or six years before it fell.³⁰ Be that as it may, after 'Ala' al-Din took charge of the investment the fortress was taken in Rabi' I 708/ August-September 1308 and the raja 'Satal Deo' was killed. Siwana, renamed Khayrabad, was conferred on Malik Kamal al-Din 'Gurg',³¹ who is also credited by Sirhindi with the capture of Jalor and the overthrow of its raja, 'Kanhhar Deo' (Kanhadadeva, son and successor of Samantasimha) around the same time. Barani makes only a passing allusion to the incorporation of both places within the sultan's dominions, mentioning neither campaign; but it seems that Jalor fell in 1311 to the same army that had sacked Sachor in the previous year.³² It is clear from inscriptions of 1318 and 1323 that Jalor remained under Muslim rule into the Tughluqid era.³³

In the course of his Ranthanbor campaign of 700/1301, the Delhi Sultan's forces had overrun 'the territory (*wilayat*) of Jhayin as far as the frontier of Dhar'.³⁴ But it was not until after the fall of Chitor that 'Ala' al-Din determined, in the words of Amir Khusraw, to 'seize the kingdoms of the southern rais'. In 705/1305 his army duly advanced into the Paramara kingdom of Malwa. The Delhi forces first defeated a potentate named 'Koka Pradhan', whom Khusraw calls a 'wazir' more powerful even than the rai himself and who was at loggerheads with the king, 'Mahlak Deo'.

²⁷ *KF*, 63-4. *DR*, 67. *TMS*, 11.

²⁸ *FS*, 281, 282 (tr. 456, 457). According to *TFS*, 323, the governor was Malik Abu Muhammad, who is otherwise unknown.

²⁹ Z. A. Desai, 'Inscriptions from the Victoria Hall Museum, Udaipur', *EIAPS* (1955-6), 67-70. Cf. Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 110-12; HN, 371.

³⁰ *DR*, 69.

³¹ *KF*, 68-72. For another account of the campaign, where the raja is called 'Sital', see *FS*, 315-17

(tr. 492-4). For Kamal al-Din's nickname, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 251.

³² *TMS*, 78, but dating the fall of both Siwana and Jalor in 700, which must be too early and clashes with the testimony of Amir Khusraw. *TFS*, 323. Bhandarkar, 'Chahamanas of Marwar', 77-8, for the date and the identification of 'Kanhar' (KS'TMR in the printed text of *TMS*, and KTHR in one ms.); also Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 118-19.

³³ 1318: Desai, 'Jalor 'Idgah inscription', correcting the earlier reading of G. H. Yazdani, 'Inscription of Mubarak Shah Khalji from Jalor, Jodhpur State', *EIM* (1935-6), 49-50. 1323: M. A. Chaghtai, 'Some inscriptions from Jodhpur State, Rajputana', *EIM* (1949-50), 32. Shokoohy, *Rajasthan I*, 45-7.

³⁴ *TFS*, 277.

~Then 'Ayn al-Mulk Multani was sent against Mandu, where he besieged the raja in person. The place was taken on 5 Jumada 1/23 November 1305, and 'Ayn al-Mulk, on whom the sultan had already conferred Malwa, was rewarded with the further grant of Mandu.³⁵ Barani says nothing about the conquest of Malwa, but confirms that during 'Ala' al-Din's reign Mandal-khur, Dhar, Ujjain, Mandugarh (Mandu), 'Ala'ipur, Chanderi and Erach were all allotted to governors (*walls*) and muqta's.³⁶ Precisely when most of these places were taken is unknown. Erach, renamed Sultanpur, was in Muslim hands by 709/1309, when Malik Kafur halted there for five days en route for Arangal.³⁷ Chanderi first appears as an iqta' in 711/1312 (p. 174 above). An inscription of 1310 at Udayapura (in the present-day Vidisha district) reveals that the Paramara dynasty survived here in the northeastern part of the country; but in 739/1338 the inscription on a new mosque testified to the sovereignty of Muhammad b. Tughluq.³⁸

The Chandellas of Jejakabhukti (Bundelkhand) were in all likelihood subdued at some point during the campaigns in Malwa, since an inscription of 1309 in a village near Bamhni acknowledges 'Ala' al-Din's sovereignty, where only five years before a feudatory of Hammiravarman had been named. At any rate, an epigraph of 1315 accords the obscure king Viravarman II only a shadow of the titles borne by his predecessors.³⁹ A consequence of this, presumably, was the capture of Mahoba, although we have no evidence of Muslim occupation prior to the construction of a mosque there in 722/1322, during the reign of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq.⁴⁰ Further south, the Pratiharas appear finally to have been subjugated either by Tughluq or by his successor, to judge from inscriptions of 1325-42 found in the Damoh and Jabalpur districts.⁴¹ Beyond this region lay Gondhiyana (Gondwana), which Muhammad b. Tughluq penetrated in c. 1326, on his way back from the Deccan: Nag Nayak, 'chief of the Kolis', yielded after a lengthy siege of his stronghold, but we do not know for how long he remained submissive and the history of this immense tract is obscure.⁴²

³⁵ *DR*, 67-8. Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 249-50. For the grants to 'Ayn al-Mulk, see *KF*, 56, 59, with the date of the fall of Mandu (wrongly given in *TMS*, 77, as 700); *DR*, 69.

³⁶ *TFS* 323; for Chanderi, see also *ibid.*, 328. 'Ala'ipur must be 'Alapur, near Gwaliyor: *IB*, IV, 31 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 786).

³⁷ *KF*, 75. On Erach/Sultanpur, on the S. bank of the Betwa, at 25° 47' N., 79° 9' E., see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 252-3, and *DGUP*, XXIV. *Jhansi*, 254-6.

³⁸ *ARIE* (1961-2), 169 (no. C1637); also Ray, *Dynastic history*, 905-6, 908. For the mosque, see *ARIE* (1964-5), 23, 145 (nos. D77-78).

³⁹ P. Prasad (ed.), *Sanskrit inscriptions*, xviii-xix and 156-8. R. K. Dikshit, *Chandellas*, 177-8, citing Rai Bahadur Hiralal, 'Mahoba plates of Paramardi-deva: (Vikrama-) samvat 1230', *EI*16(1921-2), 9-15.

⁴⁰ Z. A. Desai, 'Two inscriptions of Ghiyathu'd-Din Tughluq from Uttar Pradesh', *EIAPS* (1966), 23-6.

⁴¹ Verma, 'Inscriptions from the Central Museum, Nagpur'. *ARIE* (1962-3), 96 (no. B430). *ARIE* (1967-8), 6, 27 (no. B108). *ARIE* (1969-70), 84 (no. D66).

² *FS*, 432-3 (tr. 659-61): following the suppression of Garshasp's revolt.

~*The Doab, Awadh and beyond*

'Ala' al-Din appears also to have tightened his grip on the regions east of Delhi, though we are ill informed about both the details and the chronology. In the southern Doab, Jajmaw was under Muslim occupation by 706/1307.⁴³ The appearance of Rapri, on the Yamuna, as an iqta' by 709/1309; an inscription of 'Ala' al-Din's time at Mathura, dating from soon after the first invasion of Gujarat; and the emergence of Gwaliyor by the end of the reign as a place of confinement for important prisoners of state - all this throws a faint light on the steady growth of the sultan's authority in regions where the government's hold in the thirteenth century had been tenuous.⁴⁴ More arresting are Barani's claims that under 'Ala' al-Din Katehr was subjected, like traditionally less recalcitrant districts in the heartlands of the Sultanate, to the land-tax on the basis of measurement (see below, p. 243), and that an advance base like Kabar could be incorporated in the crown lands (khalisa).⁴⁵

The early Tughluqid period is notable in particular for an intensification of Muslim settlement in the fertile region of Awadh. Iqta 's appeared here -Dalmaw, Bangarmaw, Lakhnaw (Lucknow) and Sandila - which as far as we know had not existed in the Khalji era.⁴⁶ From the beginning of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq's reign new strongpoints too were being constructed. The fortress at Zafarabad (later renamed Jawnpur), for instance, which was conferred as iqta' on the sultan's adopted son Tatar Khan, had been completed in Rabi' I 721/April 1321 by Malik Mall, who also left an inscription dated Muharram of that year/January 1321 in the Allahabad district.⁴⁷ Possibly this burst of activity was designed as a prelude to the sultan's intervention in the independent sultanate of Bengal in 724/1324, when he reinstated one of the two sons of Shams al-Din Firuz (above, p. 95), Nasir al-Din, at Lakhnawti as his subordinate and replaced the other, Ghiyath al-Din Bahadur 'Bura', at Sunarga'un, with his own

⁴³ W. H. Siddiqi and Z. A. Desai, 'Khaljl and Tughluq inscriptions from Uttar Pradesh', *EIAPS* (1964), 3-4.

⁴⁴ Rapri: *TFS*, 328; and see Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Khaljl Sultans of Delhi', 30, and Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 281. Mathura: Khan Bahadur Zafar Hasan, 'An inscription of 'Alau'd-Din Khaljl recently discovered at Muttra', *EIM* (1937-8), 59-61. Gwaliyor: *TFS*, 368; *TMS*, 72 (claiming that Ahmad-i Chap and Alughu were incarcerated there at the very beginning of 'Ala' al-Din's reign, although this is at variance with *TFS* and could well be an error); *IB*, III, 188, 333 (tr. Gibb, 642, 717).

⁴⁵ *TFS*, 288; for Kabar, see *ibid.*, 323-4.

⁴⁶ *IB*, III, 342, 349 (tr. Gibb, 721, 724). *TMS*, 93. Troops from the iqta' of Bangarmaw participated in the Tilang campaign of 721/1321: *TFS*^d, Bodleian ms., fol. 183a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 154b.

⁴⁷ Desai, 'Two inscriptions of Ghiyathu'd-Din Tughluq from Uttar Pradesh', 19-23. G. H. Yazdani, 'Inscription of Ghiyathu'd-Din Tughluq from Asrawa Khurd near Allahabad', *EIM* (1937-8), 6-7. For the grant of Zafarabad, see *TFS*, 428, 451.

~officers.⁴⁸ This was the first time the authority of the Delhi monarch had been recognized in Bengal since the death of Balaban.

Nepal is said to have acknowledged 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's overlord-ship,⁴⁹ and the sixteenth-century writer Mulla Taqiya alleges that he imposed tribute on the raja of Tirhut. This seems to be corroborated by the earlier recension of Barani's history, which suggests that Tirhut was already supplying troops in 702/1302-3 for that sultan's ill-starred expedition to Tilang.⁵⁰ But the raja must have asserted his autonomy following 'Ala' al-Din's death, for Tirhut was raided during Qutb al-Din's reign by Malik Kafur the

muhrdar (not to be confused with the late Malik Na'ib), who extorted tribute from him. Only a few years later, while returning from his Bengal campaign in 724/1324, Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq headed an attack on Tirhut of which the fullest account is given by Ikhtisan-i Dabir, an eye-witness. The raja, Harisimhadeva, fled to Nepal, and his capital fell to the Delhi forces. Isami tells us that Ahmad b. *Tulabugha was left there when the sultan returned to Delhi.⁵¹ Barani counted Tirhut as a province subject to Muhammad b. Tughluq a few years later, and coins were struck in his name at 'Tughluqpur, alias (*urf*) Tirhut' from at least 731/1330-1.⁵²

Beyond the Narbada

The Deccan, Tilang (Telangana) and Kampila

At the time of 'Ala' al-Din's raid on Deogir in 695/1296, the Yadava king Ramadeva had undertaken to pay regular tribute. But at some point -perhaps in reaction to the Delhi forces' unsuccessful campaign against Tilang in 702/1302-3 - he neglected to do so, and in 706/1306-7 'Ala' al-Din sent his favourite, the Malik Na'ib Kafur 'Hazardinari', against Deogir. On 19 Ramadan/25 March 1307 Ramadeva's army was defeated and he himself captured. 'Ala' al-Din detained him in Delhi for about six months, treating him kindly before sending him back to his capital as a subordinate ruler, with the title *rai-yi rayan* ('rai of rais') and a *chattr*. Barani observes that Ramadeva remained submissive for the rest of his life;⁵³ and when in

⁴⁸ For this campaign, see Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 74-6. *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fols. 184b-185a/Digby Coll. ms., fols. 155b-156a, furnishes a slightly fuller account than other sources.

⁴⁹ Luciano Petech, *Mediaeval Nepal (c. 750-1480)*, Serie Orientale Roma, X (Rome, 1958), 103-4.

⁵⁰ Hasan Nishat Ansari, 'Political history of Bihar under the Khaljis (A.D. 1290-1320/A.H. 690-720)', *JBR5* 54 (1968), 260-3. *TFS*^l, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 113a.

⁵¹ Ikhtisan, *Basatin*, fols. 10a-11b (tr. Askari, 'Historical value', 11-12). *FS*, 365, 416-18 (tr. 564, 628-30): the editor, Usha, points out that some lines are omitted from the account of Tughluq's campaign here. For Harisimha's flight, see Petech, *Mediaeval Nepal*, 111-13.

⁵² *TFS*, 467. *CMSD*, 117 (no. 478), 140 (nos. 579-81).

⁵³ *TFS*, 326. A more detailed account in *KF*, 64-8, with the date, on which see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 250.

~710/1310-11 Kafur arrived at Deogir en route to attack Ma'bar, Ramadeva was not only assiduous in furnishing provisions and reinforcements but ordered a subordinate rai to guide the Delhi army on to Dvarasa-mudra.⁵⁴ The route to Tilang through Deogir was safer than that by way of Sirpur as taken by Kafur in 709/1309, so that as 'Isami - himself an inhabitant of the Deccan - recognized, the possession of an advance base here was essential to campaigns elsewhere in the south.⁵⁵ For a time Ramadeva's compliance furnished the Delhi armies with just such a base; only after his death, when hostile elements took control of the Yadava kingdom, was it necessary for 'Ala' al-Din and, later, Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah to annex Deogir.

After Ramadeva's death, towards the end of 'Ala' al-Din's reign, his son Singhanadeva headed a reaction and had to be quelled by yet another expedition under Kafur, at whose approach he fled into the hills. Kafur, who was appointed as governor and who is duly said to have demanded the account-books (*jara'id*) from the clerks (*ahl-i qalam*), was under instructions to levy taxes (*mat*) on the cultivators and to build mosques.⁵⁶ From 714/ 1314-15 coins were being struck in 'Ala' al-Din's name at the Deogir mint.⁵⁷ It is therefore clear that these operations by Kafur represent the first attempt at annexation of the Yadava kingdom, a development which has sometimes been placed in the reign of Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah. But with 'Ala' al-Din's final illness and death, the bonds between Deogir and the capital slackened. The sultan recalled Kafur, who is subsequently said to have ordered his deputy 'Ayn al-Mulk to bring the Muslim

inhabitants of Deogir to Delhi.⁵⁸

Qutb al-Din's march south in 717/1317, according to Amir Khusraw, brought him the submission of 'all the rais' except 'Raghu', deputy and minister to the late Ramadeva, who raised an army but was defeated by the sultan's favourite Khusraw Khan and fled. On his way to rejoin the sultan, Khusraw Khan also defeated and executed 'Harpal Deo', Ramadeva's son-in-law and a member of the defunct Chalukya dynasty formerly ruling in

⁵⁴ *KF*, 122-4, 126. Ramadeva was not dead by this time, as alleged in *TFS*, 333: Venkatar-amanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 50-1 n.88; Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 245-6; later (*ibid.*, 255) Lal dates his death in 1312-13. Despite *TFS*, 328-9, Kafur advanced on Tilang in 1309, not by way of Deogir, but via Basiragarh (variant reading for the BYJAGRHH of the text: this is Wairagarh in the Chandrapur district) and Sarbar (i.e. Sirpur): *KF*, 80; Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 254-5; also Joshi and Husain, 'Khaljis and Tughluqs in the Deccan', 45 (though stating that Ramadeva placed troops at his disposal).

⁵⁵ *FS*, 360 (tr. 558). P. M. Joshi, 'Historical geography of medieval Deccan', in Sherwani and Joshi (eds.), *History of medieval Deccan*, I, 12.

⁵⁶ *FS*, 333-6 (tr. 513-16), is the sole source for this episode; see Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 255-7. Work on one mosque, at Naltawar in the Bijapur district, was completed in 715/ 1316: G. H. Yazdani, 'An inscription of 'Ala'-u-din Khalji from Rakkasgi in the Bijapur district', *EIM* (1927-8), 16-17.

⁵⁷ *CMSSD*, 89 (no. 305C), 91 (nos. 321-2).

⁵⁸ *TFS*, 368. *FS*, 336 (tr. 516), links Kafur's recall with the festivities for the marriage of the sultan's son Shadi Khan; see *ibid.*, 347-8 (tr. 528-9) for 'Ayn al-Mulk.

~Kalyani, who had been entrusted with authority in the region but had risen in revolt.⁵⁹ Other sources make no mention of 'Raghu' and speak as if 'Harpal Deo' was the principal antagonist. 'Isami's account suggests additional motives for the campaign, saying that Qutb al-Din was able to lay hands on the wealth amassed in the region by Malik Kafur and making Harpal out to be a former confederate of the late na'ib.⁶⁰ Deogir, temporarily renamed Qutbabad in the sultan's honour, again became a mint and was provided with an administration in the form of a wazir and revenue officials; the territory was apportioned among muqta's.⁶¹ Several years later, in 1333-4, a certain Melugideva, son of Singhanadeva, built a temple in the Dhule region and named Muhammad b. Tughluq as his sovereign: if this figure is indeed Ramadeva's grandson, the Yadavas had lingered on as the sultan's subordinates.⁶²

In the course of his last Deccan expedition, Malik Na'ib Kafur had briefly raided the kingdom of Kampila, which had been founded in the latter part of the thirteenth century. Profiting from the collapse of the Yadavas in the second decade of the fourteenth, its rulers had extended their authority over the modern districts of Bellary, Chitaldrug, Raichur and Dharwad and established Kumta and Husdurg (Anegondi) as their two principal centres.⁶³ Kafur ravaged the furthest parts of the territory and advanced as far as Kumta.⁶⁴ This same region may have been attacked by the future sultan Muhammad b. Tughluq following his second Tilang expedition, since 'Isami refers obliquely to the reduction of GuttI (embracing parts of the Anantapur and Bellary districts) and Kunti (Kumta?).⁶⁵ But the conquest of the kingdom was deferred until c. 1327, when the raja refused to surrender the rebel Baha' al-Din Garshasp to Muhammad b. Tughluq's forces, which took Kumta by storm. Husdurg, whither Garshasp and his host fled, was taken in turn; Garshasp escaped to Dvarasamudra, but the raja of Kampila was killed in the fighting.⁶⁶ Kampila was now subjected to the sultan's overlordship and Barani includes it in his list of

⁵⁹ *NS*, 62-73, 195-202; see *ibid.*, 196-7, for the earlier commission to Harpal. Joshi and Husain, 'Khaljis and Tughluqs', 50. *TFSI* Bodleian ms., fol.167a/Digby Coll. ms, fol. 143a, dates this expedition in 718/1318-19.

⁶⁰ *FS*, 360-1 (tr. 558-9). *TFS*, 389-90, likewise mentions only 'Harpal'.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 390. For coins of Qutb al-Dīn from 'Qutbabad', see *CMSD*, 98 (no. 374A). See further HN, 434-5; Joshi and Husain, 'Khaljis and Tughluqs', 51.

⁶² *ARIE* (1962-3), 24-5, 132 (no. B744).

⁶³ See M. H. Rama Sharma, 'The kingdom of Kampila', *Journal of the Bombay Historical Society* 2 (1929), 201-8; K. A. Nilakanta Sastri and N. Venkataramanyya (eds.), *Further sources of Vijayanagara history* (Madras, 1946, 3 vols.), I, 9-21; Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 74-5.

⁶⁴ FS, 335-6 (tr. 515-16).

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 31 (omitted in Husain's tr., 70). Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 120-1. On Gutti (Gooty) town, at 15° 7' N., 77° 39' E., see *IG*, XII, 327-9.

⁶⁶ FS, 427-30 (tr. 654-8). IB, III, 318-20 (tr. Gibb, 710-11). *TFS*¹, Bodleian ms., fol. 192b/ Digby Coll. ms., fol. 161a.

~provinces ruled by Muhammad,⁶⁷ although within a few years it became part of the kingdom of Vijayanagara (c. 1336).

About the extension of the sultan's influence to the coast of Maharashtra, little evidence is available. A European traveller tells us that Tana had been forcibly incorporated into the Delhi Sultanate by c. 1321,⁶⁸ but Ibn Battuta suggests that the Hindu ruler of the uplands between Dawlatabad and the Konkan ('Kukan Tana', as he calls it) was independent at the time of Hushang's revolt.⁶⁹ Judging by the same author's testimony, the rulers of the Malabar coast were independent, with the exception of the Muslim prince of Hinawr, who was then subordinate to the rising power of Vijayanagara.⁷⁰ If Ibn Battuta's claim that the Muslim rulers of the Maldives feared the Delhi Sultan, despite the distance that separated them from his dominions,⁷¹ is well grounded, it must have been *a fortiori* more true of the rulers of Malabar, whose territories lay on the fringes of the Delhi empire.

The extensive territories south and south-east of the Yadava dominions had begun to attract the attention of 'Ala' al-Din and his officers as early as c. 701/1301-2, when the sultan's brother Ulugh Khan had died while gathering troops at Ranthanbor for an expedition to Tilang and Ma'bar.⁷² Doubts have been expressed concerning the final destination of levies from Awadh and Kara which 'Ala' al-Din despatched in 702/1302-3 to attack Tilang; but epigraphical evidence reveals an engagement with the Muslims near Upparapalli (in the present-day Hyderabad State) not long before 1304.⁷³ Barani tells us simply that the troops became bogged down in the monsoon rains and the campaign was a failure.⁷⁴ Then in 709/1309 Kafur was sent to Tilang. The Delhi forces invested Arangal (Warangal), capital of the Kakatiya king Rudradeva II (the 'Laddar Deo' of Muslim authors), and had taken the outer, clay walls of the fortress when Rudradeva asked for terms. He was left in peace in return for a written agreement to provide an annual tribute.⁷⁵ In 711/1311-12 Rudradeva duly forwarded a number

⁶⁷ *TFS*, 467.

⁶⁸ Odoric of Pordenone, 'Relatio', vii, 5, in Van den Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, I, 423, and tr. in Sir Henry Yule, *Cathay and the way thither*, 2nd edn by H. Cordier, HS, 2nd series, 33, 37, 38, 41 (London, 1913-16, 4 vols.), II, 114-15.

⁶⁹ IB, III, 335-6 (tr. Gibb, 718).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, IV, 67-8 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 803-4): he calls the Vijayanagara king (Harihara) 'Haryab'.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 158 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 843). ⁷² *TFS*, 283.

⁷³ Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 24-5.

⁷⁴ *TFS*, 300; slightly fuller in *TFS*¹, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 113. K. S. Lal, 'A note on Alauddin's expedition to Warangal (1302-3 A.D.)', *JUPHS* 16, part 1 (1943), 118-24, and *History of the Khaljis*, 78-80, develops an unconvincing line of argument that this expedition was actually sent against Bengal rather than to Tilang by way of Bengal and Orissa, as Barani claims.

⁷⁵ *TFS*, 329-30; see 326-7 for the date. Wassaf, 527, briefly refers to this campaign, which he says was led by 'Malik Nabu', Zafar Khan and 'Nanak [the printed text reads BABK] the Hindi': the latter two commanders are not mentioned in other accounts of the expedition.

~of elephants to Delhi as a gesture of submission.⁷⁶ After 'Ala' al-Din's death, however, he evidently forgot his promises, for in 718/1318, towards the end of Qutb al-Din's Deogir campaign, Khusraw Khan was sent to extort tribute from Arangal. Once again Rudradeva yielded before the Delhi troops could breach the inner fort; once again he handed over treasure and elephants and entered into undertakings for the future, receiving in exchange a chatra, a durbash and a jewelled robe. Khusraw Khan had initially demanded the surrender of five districts, Bidar (Bi-darkot), Kailas, Bodhan, Alur and Koyir (Koher), but at length agreed to be content with Bidar.⁷⁷ Yet the overthrow of the Khaljis and the events leading to the accession of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq in 720/1320 evidently enabled Rudradeva to repudiate the overlordship of Delhi a third time and to reoccupy Bidar.⁷⁸ The new regime seems to have decided on his removal. In 721/1321-2 an army led by the sultan's son Ulugh Khan (the future sultan Muhammad) invested Arangal. These operations were abandoned owing to a mutiny on the part of some leading amirs (above, p. 180), but on the arrival of reinforcements from Delhi the prince returned to Tilang, taking Bidar and threatening Bodhan, whose rai yielded and accepted Islam. Then he again invested Arangal, rejecting Rudradeva's offer to resume payments of tribute. Arangal fell after a five-month investment, and Rudradeva was sent off to Delhi, only to die en route. Ulugh Khan, who remained in the south for some time, brought Tilang under subjection, appointing governors, muqta^cs and revenue officers for the new province and taking one year's land-tax (*khardj*). Arangal itself, which is found as a mint-town a few years later, was renamed Sultanpur.⁷⁹

The sultan's armies penetrated the eastern coastal regions only rarely. Khusraw Khan raided Motupalli (Marco Polo's 'Mutfili') on his way from Tilang to Ma'bar in 718/1318;⁸⁰ and in the wake of his second Tilang expedition Ulugh Khan invaded Jainagar, routing the king's army and gaining a considerable plunder.⁸¹ Al-^cUmari was told that he had conquered the country, and lists Jainagar among the provinces of the Sultanate.⁸² But

⁷⁶ *TFS*, 334.

⁷⁷ *NS*, 114-35, gives the most detailed account: see 128, 132 for the territorial stipulations; the printed text reads BDRKWB, BSWDN and KWBR. *FS*, 361-3 (tr. 560-2). Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 83-6, discusses the conflicting testimony in *NS* and *FS* regarding this campaign.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 97-8.

⁷⁹ *TFS*, 446-50. *TMS*, 95. *FS*, 392-6, 400-2 (tr. 597-603, 606-9; some lines omitted at 608), alone mentions Bodhan. For Rudradeva's death, see 'Afif, 395; also Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 337-8, and Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 119-20 and n.38. For coins from 'Sultanpur' (729/1328-9 onwards), see *CMSSD*, 118 (no. 482), 120 (no. 486), 142 (no. 593A).

⁸⁰ *TMS*, 85. For this territory, see Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, 394-7/tr. Yule and Cordier, II, 359-61 and n.1 at 362; Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 787-8. Motupalli lies at 15° 43'N., 80° 20'E.

⁸¹ *FS*, 402-3 (tr. 609-11). *TFS*, 450, is laconic.

⁸² *MA*, ed. Spies, 5, 6 (German tr. 24, 26)/ed. Fariq, 11, 14 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 29, 30).

~an inscription of 724/1324 from Rajahmundri, in the Godaviri delta and doubtless close to the

Jajnagar kingdom's southern frontier, may well be the only memorial of Ulugh Khan's 'conquests' here.⁸³ The relationship was purely a tributary one. When Sultan Firuz Shah invaded Jajnagar some decades later, the rai, Virabhanudeva III of the Eastern Ganga dynasty, claimed that he and his father had both been servants of the court of Delhi.⁸⁴ But 'Afif, whose father had accompanied the sultan, observes that the country contained no Muslims.⁸⁵

The far south

The wealth of the Coromandel coast, known to the Muslims as Ma'bar, was proverbial, and had attracted comment from Marco Polo at the turn of the century.⁸⁶ In 710/1310-11 Malik Na'ib Kafur advanced on Ma'bar by way of Dvarasamudra, whose Hoysala king, Ballala III, was just about to exploit the civil war in Ma'bar (below): taken by surprise, he submitted and acted as guide to the sultan's forces.⁸⁷ This subservience persisted, for when Kafur withdrew north in the wake of the Ma'bar campaign he took with him to Delhi Ballala III's son Vira Ballala, who did obeisance to 'Ala' al-Din and was rewarded with a robe (*khil'at*), chatr and treasure before being sent back with honour to Dvarasamudra.⁸⁸ Thereafter we know little of Ballala III's activities. Although he seems to have asserted his autonomy after the fall of the Khalji dynasty, he was not disposed to defy Muslim armies. When Garshasp took refuge with him from Kampila in c. 1327, he made no attempt to emulate the raja of Kampila but duly handed over the fugitive to the representatives of Muhammad b. Tughluq.⁸⁹

Kafur, who reached the borders of Ma'bar in Shawwal 710/March 1311, was less successful here than in Dvarasamudra, despite the opportunities offered by the civil war within the kingdom. According to rumours that reached Persia, the king had been murdered in 709/1309-10 by his son Sundara Pandya, who resented being supplanted in the succession by an illegitimate brother Vira Pandya, and a struggle then ensued between the brothers.⁹⁰ At Kafur's approach Vira Pandya fled from his capital at Viradhavelan (Amir Khusraw's 'BirdhuT), and Kafur abandoned the search

⁸³ G. H. Yazdani, 'Inscription of Ghiyathu'd Din Tughluq from Rajahmundry', *EIM* (1923-4), 13-14.

⁸⁴ *SFS*, 67 (tr. Roy, 'Jajnagar expedition', 72); and see also 'Afif, 171.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 165; for 'Afif's father, 163.

⁸⁶ Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, 381-6/tr. Yule and Cordier, II, 338-40.

⁸⁷ *KF*, 127; date of Kafur's departure *ibid.*, 116. *FS*, 293-5, 297 (tr. 468-70, 471).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 298 (tr. 473). Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 67 and n.129.

⁸⁹ *FS*, 431 (tr. 658-9). *IB*, III, 321 (tr. Gibb, 711), does not mention Ballala by name. J. Duncan M. Derrett, *The Hoysalas: a medieval Indian royal family* (Oxford, 1957), 162-4. Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 143-4.

⁹⁰ Wassaf, 530-1. *KF*, 127, briefly refers to the parricide and the conflict. For the date of Kafur's arrival, see *ibid.*, 143: five days after his departure from Dvarasamudra (*ibid.*, 142).

~for him when it became clear that the king had taken refuge in the jungle. Sundara Pandya in turn abandoned his residence at Mathura (Madura) prior to the arrival of the sultan's army. But in Dhu'l-Hijja 710/April 1311 Kafur withdrew from the country.⁹¹ The Delhi forces had been impeded by the monsoon rains, and reports reached Persia that a large army had been mustered against them.⁹² In the wake of Kafur's attack, the brothers continued their conflict, in which Ma'bar's neighbours, the sultans included, were only too happy to intervene. Sundara Pandya was defeated and took refuge with 'Ala' al-Din's forces (presumably at Deogir), with whose help he had, by the beginning of 1314, re-established himself in the South Arcot district.⁹³ In c. 718/1318 Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah, fresh from the suppression of a rebellious Muslim governor at Deogir, sent Khusraw Khan against Ma'bar; the city of Pattan was taken and sacked,

and the Delhi forces acquired an enormous plunder.⁹⁴

The real advance of the sultan's armies in this region, however, dates from the reign of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq. Muslim sources tell us nothing of the conquest, although Sirhindi asserts that Ulugh Khan was sent against Ma'bar as well as Tilang in 721/1321. According to a Pandyan chronicle, however, the reduction of Ma'bar, along with the capture of a king called Parakramadeva, occurred in the Saka year 1246 (1323);⁹⁵ although the temple at Srirangam may not have been destroyed until 1327.⁹⁶ King Sundara Pandya and other members of his dynasty seem still to have been acknowledged in parts of the kingdom in the 1330s and even later, and it appears that the southernmost dominions of the Pandyas were never absorbed into either the province of Ma'bar or the independent sultanate that replaced it after 1334.⁹⁷

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 148, 150, 152-3, for Vira Pandya's flight; 154-5 for the abandonment of the search; 160 for Sundara Pandya's flight from Madura; 166 for Kafur's withdrawal. 'Birdhul' (Uyyakkonddan Tirumalai, a few miles from Uraiyur) is identified by V. Venkatasubha Aiyar, 'Srirangam inscription of Kakatiya Prataparudra: Saka 1239', *EI 21* (1947-8), 311; Derrett, *Hoysalas*, 233. For the failure of the campaign, see Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 65-7.

⁹² *KF*, 150-1. Wassaf, 528.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 531: Wassaf, the sole Muslim source to mention Sundara Pandya's appeal to 'Ala' al-Din's forces, gives the false impression that it occurred during Kafur's invasion of 1311. Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 88-90 and n.16.

⁹⁴ *FS*, 369-71 (tr. 569-72). See Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 93-4, for these operations: as he points out, *TMS*, 84-5, links up the two quite separate campaigns against Tilang and Ma'bar.

⁹⁵ *TMS*, 93. Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 122-5; see also *ibid.*, 70 and n.136, for the date. *HN*, 472.

⁹⁶ G.W. Spencer, 'Crisis of authority in a Hindu temple under the impact of Islam: Srirangam in the fourteenth century', in Bardwell L. Smith (ed.), *Religion and the legitimation of power in South Asia* (Leiden, 1978), 20-3 and n.18.

⁹⁷ Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 156 n.15. *ARIE* (1980-1), 5, 77 (no. B199). K. G. Krishnan, 'New light on Madurai Sultanate', in *PSMI*, 156-7.

~War aims and achievements

The initial purpose of the campaigns into peninsular India was to obtain plunder and the guarantee of tribute. In the advice to 'Ala' al-Din which Barani puts into the mouth of his own uncle 'Ala' al-Mulk, the sultan is urged to leave in the hands of the rais and ranas no elephants, horses or wealth and to require these things every year.⁹⁸ Vanquished Hindu rulers were regularly mulcted of their treasure. The enormous tribute which Khusraw Khan imposed on Rudradeva of Tilang, even when reduced, stood at 48 *laks* (4,800,000) of gold coins." Temples, too, yielded up large quantities of gold, like that at Birdhul or the golden temple at the place called both 'Barmatpuri' and 'Marhatpuri' by Amir Khusraw, which Kafur left in ruins during his Ma'bar campaign.¹⁰⁰ Plunder on such a scale rapidly acquired a legendary character. Barani claims that in his own day some of the riches disgorged by Ramadeva in 695/1296 were still to be found in Muhammad b. Tughluq's treasury, while the amount obtained from Dvarasamudra and Ma'bar in 710/1311 was indeed phenomenal, allegedly totalling 96,000 *manns* of gold as well as gems and pearls - a booty that evidently made a profound impression on Delhi's older residents.¹⁰¹

In Ma'bar Hindu princes and temples were not the only victims of predatory Muslim commanders. During the 718/1318 campaign Khusraw Khan is accused of despoiling a wealthy and respectable Muslim merchant who had not judged it necessary to flee before an army led by his coreligionists. This person, whom Barani calls Khwaja Taqi and who appears in Tsami's more detailed account as Siraj-i Taqi, charge

d'affaires (*farman-nuwa*) in Pattan,¹⁰² belonged to the dynasty which controlled the island of Qays in the Persian Gulf. According to Wassaf, his uncle Taqi al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman (d. 702/1302-3), wazir and counsellor to the king of Ma'bar, had been responsible for the importation of war-horses from Qays and adjacent regions.¹⁰³ Wassaf also tells us that Siraj al-Din's property had been looted during an invasion of Ma'bar by Kafur in 715/1315 (possibly the one in support of Sundara Pandya: see p. 207), just before the death of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji, but that it had been restored to him when he complained. Since Siraj al-Din's father is here said to have enjoyed friendly relations with 'Ala' al-Din,¹⁰⁴ it is possible that Khusraw Khan's actions a few years later reflect a change in policy; but no doubt the conqueror was simply greedy for Siraj al-Din's wealth.

⁹⁸ *TFS*, 270. 99 *NS*, 128, 132. ¹⁰⁰ *KF*, 156-9, 160. *DR*, 72.

¹⁰¹ *TFS*, 223, 333-4. Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 103-5, discusses the large quantities of gold obtained in 1311. It is unlikely that we can base our calculations, as he did, on the Delhi *mann* of the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, which ranges from 11.25 to 12.824 kg.: see Walther Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte* (Leiden, 1955), 22-3.

¹⁰² *TFS*, 398-9. *FS*, 369-70 (tr. 570-1).

¹⁰³ Wassaf, 302-3, 505. On the dynasty, see Aubin, 'Les princes d'Ormuz', 89-99.

¹⁰⁴ Wassaf, 646-7.

~Elephants, horses and specie loom large as both plunder and tribute in the chroniclers' accounts. Precise figures for the horses obtained on these southern campaigns are sometimes given in the sources. 'Ala' al-Din had obtained several thousand on his Deogir campaign of 695/1296.¹⁰⁵ Kafur brought back 20,000 horses from Arangal in 709/1310 and 5000 Yamani horses from Ma'bar two years later.¹⁰⁶ Rudradeva handed over 12,000 Arabian (*tazi*) horses to Khusraw Khan and promised to send 1000 every year in future.¹⁰⁷ In comparison, the figures for elephants sometimes seem rather modest: from Gujarat in 698/1299, 20; from Ramadeva, thirty or so in 695/1296 and a further seventeen in 706/1307; forty from Jajnapur in 1324.¹⁰⁸ From Rudradeva of Tilang in 709/1309 Kafur extorted a hundred, while after he had crossed the Narbada during his Ma'bar expedition in 710/1311 the king sent him another twenty-three, which Kafur forwarded to 'Ala' al-Din at Delhi.¹⁰⁹ In the course of Khusraw Khan's attack, Rudradeva offered 100 elephants, and the victor stipulated that 100 should be sent annually.¹¹⁰ The acquisition of large numbers of high-quality elephants appears to have been a major aim of the invasion of Ma'bar in 710/1311. It is mentioned as such in Khusraw's *Diwal Rani* and by 'Isami in his account of the sultan's instructions to Kafur. Certainly Kafur came to give priority to the seizure of elephants even over the capture of Vira Pandya, and Khusraw describes his fury at finding only two or three of the beasts in Madura.¹¹¹ Yet despite such disappointments the Ma'bar campaigns yielded significantly larger numbers of elephants than did raids further north. Amir Khusraw says that Kafur brought back to Delhi 512 of them, although this may have made things more difficult for those who came after him, since Khusraw Khan in 718/1318 captured hardly more than a hundred.¹¹²

The transition from a policy of plunder and levying tribute to one of imposing direct rule, already made in the Deccan a few years previously, is visible during the attack on Arangal in 721/1321, when Ulugh Khan rejected Rudradeva's offer of submission and pressed ahead with the siege.¹¹³ One may well ask, nevertheless, to what extent these far-flung provinces were

¹⁰⁵ *TFS* 223.

¹⁰⁶ *KF*, 101, 163. *TFS*, 330, numbers 7000 horses among the booty from Arangal in 709/1310; *ibid.*, 333, for 20,000 from Ma'bar in 710/1311.

¹⁰⁷ *NS*, 120, 128, 132.

¹⁰⁸ Gujarat: *TMS*, 76. Deogir: *TFS*, 223, 326. Jajnapur: *ibid.*, 450; hence *TMS*, 96.

¹⁰⁹ *DR*, 70; *TFS*, 330. *FS*, 291 (tr. 466), specifies twenty-three on the former occasion, but these are clearly the elephants despatched in 1311: *KF*, 120; Venkataramanyya, *Early Muslim expansion*, 39-40 and n.56. *TFS*, 334, mentions their arrival at Delhi (though giving the total as twenty).

¹¹⁰ *NS*, 120, 128, 132. See also *FS*, 362 (tr. 561), for the initial surrender of 100 elephants.

¹¹¹ *DR*, 70. *FS*, 293-4 (tr. 468). *KF*, 155, 160.

¹¹² 1311: *ibid.*, 161: the total of 612, of which thirty-six were taken from Dvarasamudra, found in *TFS*, 333, is probably an error; so too is the round figure of 700 in *FS*, 298 (tr. 472). 1318: *TFS*, 398, 400.

¹¹³ *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 183b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 155a. *TFS*, 447.

~ever truly annexed. Vast distances separated Delhi from its new provinces: Ibn Battuta believed, with pardonable exaggeration, that Tilang was three months' journey from the capital and Ma^cbar six.¹¹⁴ Such distances gave rise to the most alarming delays in the transmission of news. The fourteenth-century sultans extended the postal relay system to the outlying regions of their empire.¹¹⁵ But sometimes it broke down; armies receded beyond the horizon of communications and appeared to have been swallowed up in some limbo zone. In 721/1321-2 the commanders outside Arangal mutinied because a delay of a few weeks, in which couriers failed to get through from Delhi, spawned rumours that Sultan Tughluq had been overthrown.¹¹⁶ There is sometimes a starkly unreal quality about the links that bound such remote territories to their imperial master.

The Deccan recognized the Delhi Sultan for less than thirty years; eastern Tilang, Kampila and Ma^cbar, for an even briefer interval. And yet the transient rule of the sultans bequeathed to the Deccan one legacy, of major importance. Because this region had a strategic value relative to the other southern kingdoms, the Khalji and Tughluqid monarchs made positive efforts to bring about Muslim colonization of the former Yadava dominions. As a consequence, this territory alone - when barely more than a generation, astonishingly enough, had elapsed since its conquest - had received a solid engrafting of Islam. The other southern provinces swiftly repudiated the sultans' faith along with their sovereignty and reverted to the infidel. But the impress of some years' subjection to Delhi would remain, even so, in the culture and titulature of the Vijayanagara court, where the fourteenth-century monarchs styled themselves 'sultans among Hindu kings'.¹¹⁷

Striking testimony to the government's authority in the Deccan emerges from an incident during the mutiny in Tilang in 721/1321-2, when Mujir al-Din Abu Rija, the *mushrif* of Deogir, met the mutineers at Kalyani at the head of a large number of landholders (*zamindars*) - presumably the Hindu landed gentry.¹¹⁸ Muhammad b. Tughluq's own efforts from 727/1326-7 to turn Deogir, now renamed Dawlatabad, into the second capital of his empire (below, pp. 258-60), could perhaps be seen, at one level, as the most impressive witness to the strength of Muslim rule here. But even in the Deccan, where it became firmly established, Muslim rule was uneven and extended to only a limited number of strongpoints by the time the province seceded from Delhi.

The consolidation of Muslim rule and implantation of Islam are processes largely hidden from us. A significant role may have been played by warrior

¹¹⁴ *IB*, III, 192, 208, 328 (tr. Gibb, 644, 652, 715). ¹¹⁵ E.g., *TFS*, 330-1.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 447-8.

¹¹⁷ Phillip B. Waggoner, "'Sultan among Hindu kings': dress, titles, the Islamicization of Hindu culture at Vijayanagara', *Journal of Asian Studies* 55 (1996), 851-80.

¹¹⁸ *FS*, 398-9 (tr. 604-5).

~Sufis whose activities are described in later hagiographical sources. An account has survived of

the career of one such warrior saint, Ma'bari khandayat, in Bijapur in the wake of Kafur's Ma'bar campaign of 710/ 1311, and Professor Eaton has made out a good case for accepting the outline as authentic and for identifying Khandayat as one of the Muslims formerly in the service of the Pandyas.¹¹⁹ The militant sufi 'Abd-Allah Shah Chungal, to judge from the mid fifteenth-century inscription on his tomb, seems to have entered Malwa at the head of a military following and played much the same role in the conversion of that province; his activities too are in all probability to be assigned to the era of 'Ala'al-Din.¹²⁰ But it should be borne in mind that not all sufis resorted to force, for Ibn Battuta learned that the infidels of Sylhet had been won for Islam by the peaceful agency of Shah Jalal.¹²¹

We seldom hear of specific territories being granted as iqta's during the years immediately following the conquest, although Sagar, south of Gulbarga, was conferred before 1326 on Baha' al-Din Garshasp, a cousin of Muhammad b. Tughluq;¹²² and the gradual build-up of Muslim authority in the Deccan can be determined only to a limited extent on the basis of epigraphical evidence. Inscriptions show, for instance, that Jalna, only a few miles from Deogir, was under Muslim occupation by 724/1324 and that Bhadga'un (in eastern Khandesh) received a mosque in 728/1328;¹²³ Bijapur was already the seat of a Muslim governor by 1320, when a mosque was built in the town.¹²⁴ Otherwise, to form some idea of the number of centres under Muslim control we must rely on 'Isami's account of events in the Deccan in the 1340s. There we learn, for example, that Dangiri and Chanchiwal, in the north-west of the former Yadava realm, had to be taken from Hindu chiefs by Bahmanid troops in c. 1350.¹²⁵ But the strongpoints of which we hear tend mostly to be concentrated in the south and south-east of the province, in an arc between Deogir and the erstwhile Kakatiya capital of Arangal. Here Gulbarga, Bidar, KalyanI and Koyir (Koher) appear as a compact group of Muslim-held fortresses.¹²⁶ Bidar - like Bodhan to the north - had been taken from Rudradeva by Ulugh Khan in c. 1322, and in KalyanI we find mosques being constructed in the 1320s.¹²⁷ On the other hand,

¹¹⁹ Richard M. Eaton, *Sufis of Bijapur 1300-1700* (Princeton, NJ, 1978), 27-30.

¹²⁰ G. H. Yazdani, 'The inscription on the tomb of 'Abdullah Shah Chungal at Dhar', *EIM* (1909-10), 1-5; and see *ARIE* (1971-2), 80 (no. D71). More generally, see David N. Lorenzen, 'Warrior ascetics in medieval Indian history', *JAOS* 98 (1978), 61-75.

¹²¹ *IB*, IV, 216-17 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 870). Eaton, *Rise of Islam*, 73-6.

¹²² *FS*, 424-5 (tr. 651).

¹²³ Jalna: *ARIE* (1964-5), 23, 153 (no. D161). Bhadga'un: Moneer, 23-4.

¹²⁴ M. Nazim, *Inscriptions of Bijapur*, MASI 49 (Delhi, 1936), 25.

¹²⁵ *FS*, 560 (tr. 834).

¹²⁶ Gulbarga: *ibid.*, 485 (tr. 726). Bidar and Koyir: *ibid.*, 476 (tr. 715).

¹²⁷ 723/1323: *ARIE* (1965-6), 155 (no. D246), correcting the earlier reading of G. Yazdani

~Map 4: The conquest of Gujarat, Malwa and the south

the neighbouring fortresses of Maram, Akalkot and Mahandari (Ma-hendri) were still in the possession of infidel rais at the onset of the Bahmanid era.¹²⁸ Towards the Western Ghats, Satara and Miraj were in Muslim hands by the 1340s.¹²⁹ But just south of Miraj, Balga'un (now Belgaum) and Hukayri (Hakeri), at that time the iqta^c of the future Bahmanid Sultan, Hasan Gangu, are described repeatedly by 'Isami as a marcher lordship (*sarhadd*).¹³⁰ Close by these tracts lay Mandhol (present-day Mudhol), Jamkhandi, Terdol and Bagarkot (now Bagalkot), the territories of the independent Hindu prince Narayan, who would prove a redoubtable antagonist for the infant Bahmanid regime.¹³¹

Barani says that in 709/1309 the chiefs (*muqaddams*) of Tilang abandoned the strongholds along

the route taken by the sultan's army; whether

'Inscriptions from Kalyani', *EIM* (1935-6), 1-3. 726/1326: *ARIE* (1965-6), 14-15, 157 (no. D271).

¹²⁸ *FS*, 562 (tr. 836). See H. K. Sherwani, *The Bahmanis of the Deccan* (Hyderabad, AP, 1953), 53.

¹²⁹ Satara: *FS*, 519-20 (tr. 770). Miraj: *ibid.*, 540-2 (tr. 811-12).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 521, 526, 532 (tr. 772, 778, 785). ¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 590-1 (tr. 871-2).

~garrisons were immediately installed in such places we are not told.¹³² But some fortresses put up resistance. Kafur had to halt at Sirpur, which he took and entrusted to the brother of its chief.¹³³ Kotgir, which Mujir al-Din Abu Rija was besieging several years later, at the time of the mutiny against Ulugh Khan, seems nonetheless to have remained in enemy hands, for in the early 1340s Qutluq Khan, who governed the Deccan on behalf of Muhammad b. Tughluq, took Kotgir from a Hindu 'rebel' and stationed there one of his own lieutenants. The Chandagarh (Chanda, i.e. Chan-drapur) region, which he sent his son to plunder at around this time, was clearly independent under its own Hindu princes.¹³⁴

Muslim military superiority

'The Hindu always falls prey to the Turk', wrote Amir Khusraw in his *Nuh Sipihri*⁵ A little later, having likened the Turk to the lion and the Hindu to the gazelle, he claims that the Turks, whenever they bestir themselves, can vanquish the Hindus and may seize and buy and sell them.¹³⁶ 'A mere six or seven thousand Muslim horsemen,' Barani makes Sultan Balaban tell his sons, 'could rout one *lak* of Hindu paiks and archers (*dhdnuks*).'¹³⁷ Marco Polo, commenting that the men of Ma'bar - whose only defence in battle was shield and spear - made wretched warriors, was doubtless citing Muslim informants.¹³⁸ The superiority of the Muslim troops is almost a commonplace in our (Muslim) sources. Satisfactory explanations for it are less forthcoming. There is clearly a link between the assertion of Muslim paramountcy throughout the greater part of the subcontinent and 'Ala' al-Din's administrative reforms, which enabled the sultan to raise larger numbers of troops on lower pay and which will be examined in a later chapter.¹³⁹ At times 'Ala' al-Din's troops also profited from the fact that their Hindu adversaries were bitterly divided, as in Malwa in 705/1305 or -at least after their first unsuccessful attempt - in Ma'bar.

Observers within the Sultanate, however, thought they could account for the sultans' victories over the Hindu on technical grounds also. The Hindus were not good marksmen, according to Khusraw;¹⁴⁰ there was no force in

¹³² *TFS*, 329. ¹³³ *KF*, 80-2; for the identification, see p. 202, n.54 above.

¹³⁴ *FS*, 397-8, 482-3, 500-1 (tr. 603-4, 723-5, 747-8). The identification of the last seems fairly certain, since the Muslim army is said to have gone by way of Akola ('Ankula' in the text).

¹³⁵ *NS*, 89, *Hindu buwad sayd-i Turkan hamisha*. Cf. the view attributed to Ballala III in *KF*, 131, *hargaz Hindu plsh-i Turk ... tab nayarad*.

¹³⁶ *NS*, 130, 131. ¹³⁷ *TFS*, 52.

¹³⁸ Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, 389/tr. Yule and Cordier, II, 342. For other allusions to Muslim superiority in the sources, see Aziz Ahmad, 'Epic and counter-epic in medieval India', *JAOS* 83 (1963), 470-1.

¹³⁹ *TFS*, 303ff., 326.

¹⁴⁰ *KF*, 135 *Hindiiianra klsh-i durust riist* (speech put into the mouths of Ballala III's envoys). Cf. also the description of the envoys themselves, *ibid.*, 137, *kaman-war-i kazh-nishin*.

~their arrows, remarked Ibn Battuta.¹⁴¹ It has been proposed that the sultans' Indian opponents never adopted mounted archery.¹⁴² This may perhaps have been true of certain Hindu armies. 'Isami, for instance, characterizes the troops of Deogir led by Ramadeva's son in 695/1296 and those of Jajnagar whom Ulugh Khan defeated in c. 1322 as 'all spear-wielders and swordsmen', though the phrase could owe more to style than to critical observation.¹⁴³ The Delhi forces conceivably enjoyed a superiority in terms of certain types of weaponry. 'Isami's account of Kafur's Arangal campaign gives some prominence to the crossbow (*ndwak*; see p. 16 above), and when Ulugh Khan attacked Arangal for the second time he is said to have taken both the outer and inner defences by dint of firing *ndwaks* and stones from catapults.¹⁴⁴ The *nawak* certainly figures prominently in the catalogue of weaponry employed by the sultan's troops.¹⁴⁵ An anecdote of 'Isami's, in which a *guruha* fired by a 'Turk' not only penetrated the wheel of a wagon but embedded itself in the earth beyond right up to the feather, suggests that this particular weapon (expressly called an arrow, and hence presumably a crossbow-bolt) was calculated to strike terror into the enemy.¹⁴⁶

It is fair to say, on the evidence of the narrative sources, that the sultan's forces were seldom granted the opportunity of a pitched battle. On the few occasions when it did happen, the Delhi army is portrayed as having won an almost effortless victory - as when the army of Malwa challenged 'Ayn al-Mulk in 705/1305, or when Ramadeva's son marched out to challenge Kafur in 706/1307 or when Vira Pandya's *rawats* met Kafur outside Birdhul four years later.¹⁴⁷ But Rudradeva is expressly said to have avoided a pitched battle in 721/1321-2.¹⁴⁸ The reason for this apparent Muslim advantage may have been a chronic inability on the part of many Hindu rulers to match the sultan's armies in terms of horses; and the eagerness of the monarchs of peninsular India to obtain horses in large numbers from Arabia and the Persian Gulf was notorious.¹⁴⁹ There are already indications in the middle of the thirteenth century of an imbalance in this respect

¹⁴¹ IB, III, 134 (tr. Gibb, 613).

¹⁴² P. K. Gode, 'The mounted bowman on Indian battle-fields - from the invasion of Alexander (B.C. 326) to the battle of Panipat (A.D. 1761)', in his *Studies in Indian cultural history* (Hoshiarpur and Poona, 1960-9, 3 vols.), II, 57-70. Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 82-3. For mounted combat, see Digby, *War-horse*, 12 and n.5.

¹⁴³ FS, 234, 402 (tr. 403, 609).

¹⁴⁴ Kafur: *ibid.*, 290-1 (Husain's tr., 465, does not bring out the sense). Ulugh Khan: TFS, 449; TMS, 95.

¹⁴⁵ E.g. KF, 55, 56, 57, 58-9, 80-1, 93, 128, 136, 150. Perhaps this is the arrow that pierces seven plates of iron: *ibid.*, 96.

¹⁴⁶ FS, 230 (tr. 397-8); see *ibid.*, 54 (tr. 108), for a *gur/ta [sic]* which transfixed a deer during one of Mahmud of Ghazna's campaigns. By contrast, the *guri/ta-yi maghribi* mentioned in KF, 90, was clearly fired from a mangonel.

¹⁴⁷ KF, 65-6, for Deogir; 151-2 for Birdhul. ¹⁴⁸ TFS, 446.

¹⁴⁹ Digby, *War-horse*, 29-32. Wink, *Al-Hind*, II, 83-7.

~between the Muslims and Hindu rulers, as when Juzjani alleges that the Jajapella king Chahadadeva possessed a mere 5000 horse as against 200,000 foot or when he mentions only paiks and elephants in the army that the king of Orissa brought into Muslim Bengal in 642/1244.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, at the very end of the century Hammlradeva of Ranthanbor is credited with 'countless infantry' but just 12,000 horse.¹⁵¹ Yet, while such figures suggest that the Delhi forces enjoyed a greater striking power than their Hindu opponents, in other cases the proportion of cavalry to infantry would seem to have been roughly similar on both sides. Karnadeva of Gujarat, for instance, had 30,000 horse as against 80,000 foot in his army, and Koka in Malwa had 40,000 horse and one *lak* of foot.¹⁵²

Whatever the case, the *leitmotiv* of the Khalji and Tughluqid campaigns both north and south of the Vindhya is one of sieges. An inscription of 1261 at Ajayagarh calls the Chandella king Trailokyavarman 'a very creator in providing strong places', and it has been suggested that this provides a genuine hint as to the tactics followed in resisting Muslim incursions.¹⁵³ It may be that Muslim siege warfare of the early fourteenth century represents an advance on that of the Shamsid and Ghiyathid eras, but unfortunately neither the thirteenth-century sources nor those for 'Ala' al-Din's reign furnish enough information to warrant firm conclusions, and Professor Lal's case that the Muslims enjoyed a definite superiority in this respect must be regarded as unproven.¹⁵⁴ Amir Khusraw says that the walls of Ranthanbor were demolished by *maghrabis* (mangonels); but we know, on the other hand, that Chitor surrendered and that Mandu was taken through the treachery of a Hindu deserter, who showed 'Ayn al-Mulk a way into the fortress. At the investment of Siwana the sultan's troops constructed a *pdshib*, a graded platform made out of earth, mounting to the level of the walls, and this was clearly important in their success.¹⁵⁵ So too the *pashib* raised by Khusraw Khan for the investment of the inner fortress at Arangal in 718/1318 was instrumental in bringing Rudradeva to ask for terms.¹⁵⁶ At other times, however, the role of the *pdshib* is difficult to assess, since it is also clear that such a device had earlier been employed at Ranthanbor and had suffered considerable damage from the enemy cata-

¹⁵⁰ Jajapellās: *TN*, I, 485 (tr. 691): for this and other relevant evidence, see Digby, *War-horse*, 49. Orissa-. *TN*, II, 15 (tr. 739).

¹⁵¹ *TMS*, 77. ¹⁵² The figures are from *ibid.*, 76.

¹⁵³ P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 100-5 (verse 7). Ray, *Dynastic history*, 727.

¹⁵⁴ K. S. Lal, 'The striking power of the army of the Sultanate', *JIH* 55 (1977), part 3, 100-1.

¹⁵⁵ Ranthanbor: *DR*, 65-6. Chitor: *KF*, 62; *FS*, 281 (tr. 456). Mandu: *KF*, 58; *DR*, 68, mentions a 'breach'. Siwana: *KF*, 50-1, 70; *TMS*, 78, indicates that the fortress was stormed. Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 112, renders *pashlb*, somewhat loosely, as 'earthworks'; for this and other devices, see Athar Ali, 'Siegecraft techniques of the Delhi Sultans during 13th and 14th century [*sic*] *PIHC* 51. *Calcutta 1990* (Delhi, 1991), 217-26, and his 'Military technology', 171-3.

¹⁵⁶ *NS*, 111-14.

~pults.¹⁵⁷ At Arangal in 709/1309 the besiegers did not wait for the completion of the *pashib* before launching their assault on the outer, mud wall.¹⁵⁸

In the current state of our knowledge, questions about the capacity of the sultans' armies to vanquish their Hindu opponents are unanswerable. But if the inferiority of such antagonists was more often than not taken for granted, developments elsewhere had put it in a new perspective. 'Where should the army that defeats the Mongol host be afraid of fighting the Hindu?' asked 'Isami sardonically.¹⁵⁹ Long before the time at which he wrote, the sultans had been given greater reason to hate and fear the other infidel enemy, to the north-west.

¹⁵⁷ *KF*, 50-1. *TFS*, 277. ¹⁵⁸ *KF*, 91. ¹⁵⁹ *FS*, 284 (cf. tr. 459).

~CHAPTER 11

The Chaghadayid invasions

The southward advance of the Central Asian Mongols

Chapter 6 surveyed the disintegration of the unitary Mongol empire, culminating in the creation of a confederacy of princes under Ogodei's grandson Qaidu in Central Asia in opposition to the qaghan Qubilai. Although Qaidu's own campaigns seem always to have been directed against Qubilai's lieutenants

and supporters in Mongolia, he also pursued, if less directly, an expansionist policy south of the Oxus. The rulers of Chaghadai's ulus, whom he nominated, appear to have acted as his subordinates: the last and most important of them was Du'a, Baraq's son, who became khan in c. 681/1282.¹ Under Qaidu's aegis Du'a, in Rashid al-Din's words, 'gradually gathered together the armies of Chaghadai';² and their forces collaborated both in eastern Persia and in Afghanistan. Qaidu's son Sarban and one of Du'a's chief noyans, Yasa'ur, were stationed south of the Oxus by 690/1291.³ That the allies were already seeking, at this early date, to assert their influence among the Neguderis is clear from Qaidu's dealings with the renegade Ilkhanid general, Nawruz, who operated on his behalf in Afghanistan from 690/1291 until he rejoined the Ilkhan in 694/1294.⁴ Wassaf, whose account of these events is geographically more specific than Rashid al-Din's, has Nawruz taking up his quarters in 'Sistan' (i.e. Ghur and Gharchistan), where he won over the Negiideri forces, and says that he particularly relied on them; at another juncture Nawruz is referred to as their chief (*hakim*).⁵ It looks very much as if Qaidu relied on Nawruz

¹ Jamal al-Qarshi, 138-9. *JT*, II, 192-3 (tr. Boyle, 154/tr. Verkhovskii, 100). Biran, *Qaidu*, 32-3.

² *JT*, II, 172 (tr. Boyle, 141/tr. Verkhovskii, 92).

³ Sarban: *JT*, ed. Karl Jahn, *Geschichte Gazan Han's*, GMS, ns, XIV (London, 1940), 26 (fuller than *JT*, III, ed. Alizade). Yasa'ur near Balkh: *JT*, I, part 2, ed. I. N. Berezin, 'Sbornik letopisei', *TVOIRAO* 15 (1888), 217; tr. O. I. Smirnova, *Sbornik letopisei*, I, part 2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 275.

⁴ *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Geschichte Gazan Han's*, 24-6, 29, here fuller than *JT*, III, 268-72 (tr. Arends, 150-2). On Nawruz, see generally Biran, *Qaidu*, 57-9.

⁵ Wassaf, 253, 314; for this sense of the term 'Sistan', see Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 91.

~as his agent in maintaining a fragile control over parts of Afghanistan. Towards the end of the thirteenth century, however, that control markedly intensified.

It may have been in response to Nawruz's defection that Qaidu instituted the military dispositions outlined by Wassaf. Sarban was put in overall command of forces totalling five tiimens (50,000), three of them from Qaidu's own armies and two belonging to Du'a. His lieutenants included the Ogodeyid prince Kuresbe; Temur, son of Ebugen, a descendant of one of Chinggis Khan's brothers; and Du'a's son Qutlugh Qocha.⁶ Of Sarban's colleagues, the last-named, for our purposes, is the most important. According to Rashid al-Din, Du'a recalled the Chaghadayid prince 'Abd-Allah and set Qutlugh Qocha over the Neguderis in his place.⁷ The Neguderi commander Abachi, who in the early 1290s had obeyed Nawruz, now appears as Qutlugh Qocha's subordinate.⁸ Rashid al-Din says that Qutlugh Qocha spent the summer in the confines of Ghur and Gharchistan and wintered in 'the territory of Ghaznain and that direction'; QashanI says that he resided in Binl-yi Gaw, which the sources, as we have seen, traditionally link with the Negiideris; while Wassaf describes his headquarters as the valley of the 'Arghantua' (Arghandab).⁹ He came to rule a vast principality, which extended from the Oxus down to the hot regions around the latitude of Qandahar.¹⁰ He struck coins at Ghazna in his own name,¹¹ and his exalted status emerges from Rashid al-Din's allusion to him in terms that suggest he was practically joint ruler of Chaghadai's ulus with his father Du'a, an impression also in evidence in the Indian chronicle tradition.¹² He appears to have had at his disposal considerable reserves of manpower, since Wassaf sets his forces at five tumens; though 'Isami exaggerates in claiming that at the time of his invasion of India in 699/ 1299-1300 (below) there were 200,000 men on his muster-roll.¹³

⁶ Wassaf, 509-10. For Kuresbe, see *JT*, II, 14 = II, part 1, ed. Alizade, 38-9 (tr. Boyle, 28/tr. Verkhovskii, 17). For Temur, see *SP*, fols. 103b-104a; *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, fols. 9b, 10b, 11b: this branch of the dynasty is omitted in *JT*, I, part 2, ed. Berezin, in *TVOIRAO* 13 (1868), 86-95 (tr. Smirnova, 51-4). Both princes accompanied Sarban's army in 1302-3 (below): QashanI, 18.

⁷ *JT*, III, 152 (tr. Arends, 94), with the date 698/1299, which is probably too late; at II, 177 (tr. Boyle, 144), the text is corrupt, and for the correct reading see Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 84 n.2.

⁸ Sayfi, 379-82. Wassaf, 368. KirmanI, *Simt al-'Ula*, 89. Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 88. He was probably the unnamed Neguderī chief (*shah*) killed by the Ilkhan's troops in 1301: Wassaf, 417-18.

⁹ *JT*, II, 173 (tr. Boyle, 142/tr. Verkhovskii, 93). Qashani, 201. Wassaf, 367.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 368, listing 'Balkh and its dependencies (*madafat*), Shaburghan, Juzjan, Badakhshan, Kishm, Tayaqan, Dara-yi Suf, Dara-yi Gaz, Flruzkuh, 'Aliyabad, Malikabad, Marw (Merv) and its appendages (*lawahiq*), Andkhui, Faryab, Taliqan, Maruqaq and Panjdih'. For the localization of some of these places, see map 2; also Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 92 n.4.

¹¹ Thomas, 175-6. E. Blochet, 'Les monnaies mongoles de la collection Decourdemanche', *Revue de l'Orient Chretien* 11 (1906), 119-20.

¹² *JT*, I, part 2, ed. Berezin, in *TVOIRAO* 13 (1868), 125 (tr. Smirnova, 69). *AHG*, II, 796.

¹³ Wassaf, 367. *FS*, 256 (tr. 427).

~From these forward bases, both Sarban and Qutlugh Qocha, according to Rashid al-Din, mounted repeated attacks on the Ilkhan's eastern provinces.¹⁴ Wassaf describes the Herat region as a bone of contention between the Ilkhan's forces and Qutlugh Qocha's Mongols.¹⁵ But the latter's raids, like those of the Negiideris earlier, penetrated much more deeply into Persia, as when in 700/1301 (actually after Qutlugh Qocha's death) one tumen of his forces ravaged Fars and Kirman and even rode as far as Hurmuz.¹⁶ Both on that occasion and in 702/1302-3, when Sarban attempted to link up with Qutlugh Qocha's troops in a joint attack on Khurasan,¹⁷ the Central Asian Mongols, who sought to profit from the absence of the Ilkhan Ghazan in Syria, were worsted by his brother, the viceroy Kharbanda.¹⁸

At what stage responsibility for assaults on the Sultanate passed from the Negiideri bands to the armies of Qaidu and Du'a, it is difficult to say. When Balaban's grandson Kaykhusraw sought assistance from the Mongols at Ghazna following the enthronement of his cousin Kayqubad in 685/1287, says 'Isami, he was unsuccessful because the Mongols were preoccupied with internal disputes.¹⁹ This could conceivably refer to the early stages of Qaidu's intervention in Afghanistan; but the evidence at our disposal is inadequate. Even after the definite appearance of Qaidu's commanders on the scene, there were still small-scale initiatives by what were presumably Negiideri contingents acting independently. In c. 698/1298-9 'Ala' al-Din sent his general Zafar Khan against a body of Mongols who had occupied Siwistan in lower Sind, perhaps seeking to take advantage of the recent overthrow of Jalal al-Din Khalji's sons and their supporters at Multan. The invaders were dislodged, and their chief *S6gedei was captured with his brother and brought to Delhi.²⁰ 'Isami describes him as a 'Turk' and one of his companions as a 'Baluch',²¹ suggesting that the episode represents a

¹⁴ *JT*, II, 11 (= II, part 1, ed. Alizade, 28), 173 (tr. Boyle, 25, 142/tr. Verkhovskii, 14, 93).

¹⁵ Wassaf, 368.

¹⁶ The date in *JT*, III, 152 (tr. 94), and supported by the lost chronicle of Hurmuz: W. F. Sinclair, *The travels of Pedro Teixeira*, HS, 2nd series, 9 (London, 1902), 160-1 (but at 161 n.1, Sinclair mistakes the marauders for the Ilkhan's forces). Fuller account in Wassaf, 368-71, with confused dating.

¹⁷ *JT*, II, 11-12 = *JT*, II, part 1, ed. Alizade, 28-30 (tr. Boyle, 25-6/tr. Verkhovskii, 14-15). Qashani, 18.

¹⁸ Wassaf, 368. Qashani, 19.

¹⁹ *FS*, 196-7, *Mughalra dar an waqt ba ahl-i khwlsh * magar bud digar muhimml ba-pish* (tr. 329).

²⁰ *TFS*, 253-4, placing the invasion in the same year as the sultan's Gujarat campaign, i.e. the

third year of the reign (*ibid.*, 251), 697-8/1298-9; on the chronology of that expedition, see above, p. 195 and n.9. *AHG*, II, 787, 790, dates the occupation of Siwistan in 697 and its recovery in 698.

²¹ *FS*, 251 (tr. 421-2). The name of the invading chief, usually given as 'Saldi', appears in *TFS*¹, Bodleian ms., fol. 133a, as SKNY, probably an error for SKTY, i.e. Sogetei. In the critical apparatus to his edition of *FS*, Usha in fact proposes SGDY. On the etymology of Sogetei/Sogedei, see Pelliot and Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan*, 129-30, 255-6.

~local foray from the southern parts of what is now Afghanistan. We know that Nasir al-Din, the malik of Sistan, had sent an expedition in 695/1295-6 to 'the hot country (*garmsir*) and the environs of Bust and Tiginabad' and had cleared the region of 'brigands' (*duzdan-u runud*).²² Sogedei's forces were possibly fugitives from the more southerly camping-grounds of the Negiideris, which were in a state of ferment prior to the advent of Qutlugh Qocha and had become a prey to neighbouring dynasts. Incursions from this area may have continued into the early years of the fourteenth century. We learn of a second Mongol assault on Siwistan in 703/1303, coinciding with Taraghai's investment of Delhi (below, p. 223), and a later one still, which was repulsed in the Than (Thar) region by Alp Khan, the governor of Gujarat, acting in concert with Tughluq, the muqta' of Deopalpur and future sultan.²³

Qaidu died in present-day Kazakhstan in 702/1303 and was succeeded by his eldest son Chapar. The new sovereign, whose accession did not pass unchallenged, was prepared to be guided by his sponsor Du'a, who proposed that the Central Asian Mongols recognize Qubilai's successor, the qaghan Temur, and inaugurate a general peace throughout the Mongol world. The initiative met with a willing response, too, from his father's enemies. When in 704/1304 Temiir Qa'an's ambassadors arrived at the Ilkhan's court along with those of Chapar and Du'a to announce the good news, they were welcomed by Kharbanda, who had recently succeeded Ghazan and now reigned as Oljeitu Sultan.²⁴ As a result of this mission, in which were represented also the Mongols of Qutlugh Qocha and other subordinate princes,²⁵ the Ilkhan's dominions were incorporated in the peace established among the rulers of the various Mongol khanates. It was to this general reconciliation that Khurasan owed the respite from Chaghadayid aggression which it now secured for almost a decade.

Crisis: the invasions of Qutlugh Qocha and Taraghai

Not so the Delhi Sultanate. In his letter to the qaghan Temur, Chapar had advocated a settlement in order that the energies of Chinggis Khan's descendants might be released for conflict with their external enemies, and had mentioned as the specific target of the Central Asian Mongols the

²² Anonymous, *Ta'rikh-i Sistan*, 408 (tr. Smirnova, 379).

²³ *TFSI* Digby Coll. ms., fol. 113b. *FS*, 288-9 (tr. 463-4). Since Gujarat had just undergone a second invasion by the Delhi forces (above, pp. 195-6), the Mongol attack occurred no earlier than 1309-10.

²⁴ See generally Biran, *Qaidu*, 69-74. I prefer the date given for Qaidu's death by Qashani, 32, which is supported by Rashid al-Din's statement that the news reached Ghazan in Iraq early in Sha'ban 702/late in March 1303: *JT*, III, 356 (tr. Arends, 199).

²⁵ Wassaf, 475: the date given here, Jumada I 705/November-December 1305, is too late and, unless simply an error, must refer to a later embassy than the one which prompted Oljeitu's letter to Philip IV (Biran, *Qaidu*, 71 -2).

~territories of Sind and Hindustan.²⁶ For on the frontiers of these regions, no less than of Khurasan, the forces of Qaidu and Du'a had assumed the direction of military operations, with the result that Mongol pressure on India had considerably increased. Rashid al-Din says of Qutlugh Qocha's forces that 'they must forever be doing battle with the sultan of Delhi, and the army of Delhi has many times defeated them'.²⁷ The reign of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji (695-715/1296-1316) witnessed several Mongol invasions, two of them on a scale far surpassing those of previous decades and threatening the capital itself.

The Mongols appear to have been kept well informed of circumstances within the Sultanate, and it seems that, just as in their dealings with the Ilkhan, Qaidu and Du'a profited from distractions on 'Ala' al-Din's other frontiers in order to mount heavy assaults on his empire. Indeed, the sultan's policy of aggrandizement at the expense of Hindu powers (see chapter 10) afforded them considerable opportunity.

The earliest unequivocal evidence of operations in India by the Central Asian Mongols belongs to 697/1297-8, when Qaidu's noyan Keder²⁸ invaded the Panjab, ravaging the territory as far as the neighbourhood of Qasur. But Sultan 'Ala' al-Din's brother Ulugh Khan crushed the invaders at a locality named Jaran Manjur near the banks of the Sutlej on 22 Rabi' II/6 February 1298. The Mongol dead numbered 20,000, and the prisoners were taken to Delhi to be executed.²⁹ A greater threat was posed by Qutlugh Qocha's forces. Their first major strike occurred in 699/1299-1300, during the absence of the Delhi army on the first Gujarat campaign, with which Egyptian sources expressly link it.³⁰ Qutlugh Qocha, accompanied by

²⁶ Wassaf, 454.

²⁷ *JT*, II, 173 (tr. Boyle, 142/tr. Verkhovskii, 93).

²⁸ He served under Sarban in Khurasan in 702/1302-3 (Qashani, 18), and is listed by Wassaf, 511, among those of Qaidu's noyans who crossed the Oxus with Sarban in 706/1306 to submit to the Ilkhan. The name is almost certainly Mo. *keder*, 'obstinate', 'quarrelsome': Lessing, *Mongolian-English dictionary*, 441. *KF*, 36, calls his forces 'Qaidu's carrion-eaters' (*murdar-khwar*).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 33-6, for the fullest *account*- a briefer notice in *DR*, 59-60. *TFS*, 250, which places the invasion in 696/1296-7 and does not name the Mongol leader, gives the sultan's commanders as Ulugh Khan and Zafar Khan. Jaran and Manjur, named in all these sources (though arbitrarily changed to 'Jalindhar' by the editors of *TFS*), appear from a later reference in *TMS*, 218, to have lain in the Jalindhar region: Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 407; *ibid.*, 246-7, he identifies the two elements as Jagraon and Macchiwara, respectively S.W. and S.E. of Ludhiana. For Qasur, on the old north bank of the Beah, at 31° 8' N., 74° 28' E., see *IG*, XV, 149-50.

³⁰ Ibn al-Dawadari, IX, 57; hence Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Blochet, 556-7. The link between the sultan's own plundering campaigns and Qutlugh Qocha's attack is also implicit at Qashani, 189. The Egyptian sources suggest that it fell in 699. *TFS*, 254, places it 'at the end of the aforementioned year', i.e. of the third year of the reign (697-8), which would suggest the late summer of 1298; but the Mongols surely arrived in the cold season. Bihamadkhani, fol. 386b, erroneously makes the invasion coincide with the Ranthanbor campaign. Wassaf, 312, gives 694 in error; Rashid al-Din, *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 59, Pers. text Taf. 25 (German tr. 50), is vague.

~his brother Temur Buqa,³¹ advanced directly on Delhi. 'Ala' al-Din met the Mongols at Kili, a place whose location is now unknown but which apparently lay some fifteen miles north of the capital.³² His right wing, led by Zafar Khan, crushed the Mongol left but on the way back from the pursuit was ambushed by the enemy rearguard under the noyan Taraghai and annihilated. Yet the Mongol army then retired.³³ Barani's explanation - that their appetite for further conflict had been reduced by the strenuous resistance of Zafar Khan, whose name was to become a byword among them - is hardly satisfactory.³⁴ The real reason appears to be that, as we learn from contemporary sources, Qutlugh Qocha had been mortally wounded: he died during the long return journey to his base.³⁵

Over the next few years Mongol bands numbering 10,000 or 15,000 horse continued to make plundering raids on the Panjab, but caused no general alarm and retired on each occasion without a pitched battle.³⁶ But when in 702/1302-3 'Ala' al-Din's forces were again scattered on distant campaigns, Taraghai, now in command of Qutlugh Qocha's army,³⁷ felt strong enough to threaten Delhi a second time. This invasion appears to have posed an even greater danger than that of Qutlugh Qocha. 'Ala' al-Din was reduced to following the defensive tactics he had eschewed during the earlier attack, barricading himself and his army in the Siri plain. The Mongols' position extended from the Yamuna as far as the plain of Lohrawat; but although they launched raids into the suburbs of the old city, where they penetrated as far as

the Hawd-i Khass, they were unable to move there in force for fear of exposing their flank. This stalemate situation lasted for about two months; then Taraghai suddenly withdrew to his own territory.³⁸

³¹ So called in *FS*, 260 (tr. 431). This is correct: although he does not appear in *JT* or in *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, he is listed among Du'a's sons in *SP*, fol. 120a.

³² Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 271, for a discussion. Of the sources he does not cite, *FS*, 259 (tr. 430), says merely that Kili was in the Doab; but *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 145a, and RRL ms., 219, makes the sultan march seven *kurohs* (1 *kuroh* - approx. 2 miles) from Delhi to the battlefield. On the strength of the word-play in *DR*, 60, the spelling 'Kaili' is advocated in *ED*, III, 548 n.4; but this is hardly conclusive, as Khusraw's puns are often just visual.

³³ *TFS*, 260-1. *FS*, 262-5 (tr. 430-41); *ibid.*, 265-9 (tr. 441-3), 'Isami speaks of a further confrontation the next day between the Mongols and the sultan's main force. The spelling 'Targhi' usually found in secondary literature is incorrect: this is Tu. *taraqai*, 'bald' (Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 69, 568), and the meaning is confirmed by Khusraw's pun in *KF*, 37, *sar-i asla*'.

³⁴ *TFS*, 261.

³⁵ Qashani, 193, 201. *DR*, 61, *agarchi hall az shamshlr jan burd * wa-lik az sahm-i harba raftana murd*: this detail, which is omitted in *ED*, III, 548, is reproduced in Bihamadkhani, fol. 387b (with the verse), *TMS*, 72-3, and Bada'uni, I, 185. For the meaning of *raftana[n]*, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 268.

³⁶ *TFSI* Bodleian ms., fol. 145b/RRL ms., 220.

³⁷ Wassaf, 510 (describing the events of 705/1305-6), *lashgar-i Qutlugh Khwajara midanist*. Qashani, 36, calls Taraghai the amir of Qutlugh Qocha's *ordo* (camp).

³⁸ *TFS*, 301-2; *TFSI*, Digby Coll. ms., fols. 113b-1 14a, but Bodleian ms., fols. 145b-146a, omits the duration of the siege. *FS*, 285-6, 291-2 (tr. 460-1, 466-7), recounts two invasions by Taraghai, the first lasting forty days and the second one month. He accompanied a later raid, in 1305 (below), when he certainly did not reach the capital.

~The invasions of Qutlugh Qocha and Taraghai represented crises of the first magnitude. The size of their armies varies considerably in Barani's accounts, but the lowest figure he gives for Qutlugh Qocha's force is ten tumens or one *lak* (100,000); he supplies no statistics for 'Ala' al-Din's army, which may have been outnumbered, since reports reaching Egypt put it at a mere 30,000.³⁹ In 703/1303 Taraghai may have brought with him as many as 120,000 men, whereas in one manuscript of Barani's first recension the sultan is said to have withstood the siege with only 10,000 horsemen and 50,000 foot.⁴⁰ Although Qutlugh Qocha's Mongols did not penetrate as far as the outskirts of the city, Delhi felt the impact of the invasion, since refugees from the surrounding countryside drove up the price of foodstuffs when wary traders were unwilling to venture near the city.⁴¹ At the time of Taraghai's attack, Delhi suffered all the rigours of a blockade. 'Ala' al-Din, himself busy with the reduction of Chitor, had only belatedly realised the magnitude of the crisis.⁴² There was no hope of reinforcements: not only were the garrisons at Multan, Deopapur and Samana distracted by a Mongol inroad into Siwistan (p. 220 above), but Taraghai had secured all the Yamuna crossings, so that the divisions of 'Ala' al-Din's forces returning from Tilang were obliged to halt at Kol and Baran.⁴³

Taraghai's retreat was widely regarded as one of the miracles of the age;⁴⁴ and certainly the sources offer no explanation. It may well be that, on the basis of his previous experience of the sultan's military tactics, he had anticipated a pitched battle and had come unprepared for an investment;⁴⁵ more probably, his attention was demanded by events beyond the Oxus, which we shall examine below. His invasion roused 'Ala' al-Din to repair various fortresses lying in the path of the Mongol advance: Kaithal was refortified, and an inscription on the Barsi Gate at Hansi enables us to date

³⁹ Ibn al-Dawadari, IX, 57, and Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Blochet, 557, for the Delhi army. For the Mongols, see *TFS*, 256, although earlier, 254, the figure is twenty tumens; the mss. of *TFS*^l differ, Digby

Coll. ms. agreeing here with the printed text, while Bodleian ms., fol. 145a, and RRL ms., 219, give the number of tumens respectively as 'ten or fifteen' and 'ten or twelve'.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 114a, for the sultan's forces. For Taraghai's army, see *ibid.*, fol. 113, with first 'ten or twelve tumens' and then 'twelve'; RRL ms., 220, gives 'one *lak* and 20,000' (the phrase employed later in *TMS*, 73); Bodleian ms., fol. 145b, has 20 or 30,000, suggesting that a phrase has dropped out. *TFS*, 300, has at one point twelve tumens (but cf. BL ms., with 'two or three tumens') and at another '30 or 40,000' (BL ms. again differs, with '20 or 30,000'). *FS*, 285 (tr. 460), has the ludicrously high figure of 200,000 for the Mongols.

⁴¹ *TFS*, 254-5.

⁴² *TFS*¹, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 113/Bodleian ms., fol. 145b/RRL ms., 220. Less than a month elapsed before the Mongol army reached the Yamuna about 10 m. N. of the capital.

⁴³ *TFS*, 300-1.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 302. *TFS*¹, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 114a/Bodleian ms., fol. 146a/RRL ms., 221.

⁴⁵ Biran, *Qaidu*, 89-90, proposes that Chaghadayid armies were 'relatively unskilled in siege tactics'. I am not convinced by the argument of Iqtidar Alam Khan, 'Coming of gunpowder to the Islamic world and North India: spotlight on the role of the Mongols', *JAH* 30 (1996), 27-45, on the strength of a single reference in *KF*, that the Mongols were using gunpowder in siege warfare in India by 1300.

~the restoration here in Rabi' II 703/November 1303.⁴⁶ The sultan also enacted various fiscal and administrative measures, designed to increase the armed forces and to avert any repetition of the crisis (see chapter 12); but however salutary these proved, the people of Delhi had good reason to be thankful also for the internecine strife which erupted around this time in Central Asia.

The collapse of Qaidu's confederacy and the rise of the Chaghadayids

It was ironic that Chapar, alone of all the Mongol rulers, failed to reap any benefit from the general peace that he had promoted. His submission to the qaghan placed him on an equal footing with his erstwhile subordinate, Du'a, who further undermined his position by encouraging the disaffection of various princes in Chapar's ulus.⁴⁷ In the war that broke out in 705/1305 Du'a was supported not only by many Ogodeyid princes, notably Kuresbe and his brothers, but also by the frontier forces of the qaghan in the east: Chapar was compelled to submit to Du'a and received a much smaller appanage.⁴⁸ We are concerned less with these wars as a whole than with their ramifications in Afghanistan and along the upper Oxus, where the first blow appears to have been struck in the summer of 705/1305 by Taraghai, acting on secret orders from Du'a. Repulsed by Sarban's forces, he made for India.⁴⁹ But following an attack by Du'a's son Esen Buqa, whom his father had sent out to rule Qutlugh Qocha's ulus, Sarban abandoned his bases in Baghlan and in 706/1306, accompanied by Temur, son of Ebugen, and Keder, moved into Khurasan to seek the protection of the Ilkhan Oljeitu.⁵⁰ Scattered details in our sources confirm the impression that Afghanistan was in turmoil. Taraghai's attempt to flee to India in 705/1305, says Wassaf, had been obstructed by Qutlugh Qocha's wives, who would not let him pass on account of his hostility to Sarban, and he therefore joined the Neguderis.⁵¹ Not long afterwards he was killed when Esen Buqa was obliged to go to 'Hindustan' - presumably the Indian borderlands - to quell dissension (*mukhalafat*) within Qutlugh Qocha's army.⁵²

Conflict continued in Central Asia following the death of Du'a in 1306 and during the brief reign of his son Konchek, who died in 1308, and peace was restored only in 709/1309 when Esen Buqa was summoned from Bini-yi Gaw to be khan of an ulus that now comprised not only his father's

⁴⁶ Wahid Mirza, 'Some Arabic and Persian inscriptions from the East Punjab', *EIAPS* (1953-4), 8-9. Mehrdad Shokoohy (ed.), *Haryana I* (London, 1988), 31-3.

⁴⁷ Qashani, 33-5. ⁴⁸ See generally Biran, *Qaidu*, 73-7.

⁴⁹ Wassaf, 510. Qashani, 36, having begun to describe this struggle, then abruptly breaks off.

⁵⁰ Wassaf, 510-11. Qashani, 54, reports the arrival of Sarban and Temur at Oljeitu's court in Rajab 706/Jan. 1307, but according to Wassaf, 512, Sarban remained in Khurasan and died soon afterwards.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 510, *ba-Qara'unas muJhaq shud*. ⁵² *Ibid.*, 517.

~territories but most of Qaidu's also.⁵³ Within a few years, however, this calm was dissipated by events that had their roots, once more, in the frontier zone of Afghanistan. After the brief rule of Esen Buqa's younger brother It Qul over the Negiideris,⁵⁴ we find the region under the control of Da'ud Qocha, the son or nephew of Qutlugh Qocha. Like Qutlugh Qocha himself, Da'ud Qocha moved between the banks of the Oxus and 'the furthest parts of Shaburghan', on the one hand, and the hot regions (*garmslr*) of Ghazna, Bini-yi Gaw, Bust, Tiginabad and the Indus valley on the other. He proved an energetic ruler, nourishing designs on Herat and attempting to bring to heel two chiefs, Abachi's sons Temur and *Lakchir. Since they are described as leading 'the remnants (*baqaya*) of the Negiideris', it may be that part of the Neguder forces had profited from the recent upheavals to escape from the Chaghadayid orbit. At any rate, Temur and *Lakchir sought help from the Ilkhan Oljeitii, whose forces in 712/1312 fell on Da'ud Qocha and sacked his headquarters at Tiginabad.⁵⁵

Oljeitu's response to the Neguder appeal was consistent with the pronounced interest he had displayed from the outset in his eastern frontier, replacing the local dynasty in Kirman by an Ilkhanid appointee, reasserting control over Quhistan, and in 706/1307 taking Herat, which for some years had defied his overlordship. According to reports that reached Egypt the main object of the Ilkhan's ill-starred campaign of that year to subdue Gilan was to facilitate communications with Khurasan.⁵⁶ It is tempting to link this burst of military activity with the embassy which Oljeitii sent to Delhi in 710/1310-11, demanding the submission of 'Ala' al-Din and the hand of a Khalji princess in marriage. This seems to have been an isolated contact, however, and it certainly bore no fruit, since the envoys were detained and eighteen members of their suite were crushed beneath the feet of elephants.⁵⁷

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 513-14, 518-20. Qashani, 147-50. Barthold, *Four studies*, I, 131-3.

⁵⁴ Qashani, 150. *SP*, fol. 120a ('YTQWLY), and *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, fol. 32b, list him among Du'a's sons. The name is Tu. *it*, 'dog', + *qul*, 'slave': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 34, 615.

⁵⁵ Qashani, 152-3, 201-2, describing these events twice. Sayfi, 595-8, *sub anno* 713 and calling Da'ud Qocha Du'a's son in error: he alone mentions the sack of Tiginabad. Da'ud Qocha is not mentioned in *SP*, but appears in *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, fol. 32b, as the son of a brother of Qutlugh Qocha named Qutlugh. Neguder chiefs: Qashani, 152; also 201, *baqaya-yi Qaraunas-i Nikudari*. For the second brother's name (LKMYR in the printed text), Istanbul ms. Ayasofya 3019, fols. 67a, 89a, reads *LKHYR*.

⁵⁶ Kirman: Qashani, 43; Qazwini, *Ta'rikh-i Guzida*, 536. Quhistan: Qashani, 54. Herat: Sayfi, 461-97, 503-43; Spuler, *Mongolen in Iran*, 93-4. Gilan: Ibn al-Dawadari, IX, 149; Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Blochet, 641; Boyle, 'Dynastic and political history', 400-1. Cf. Spuler's view of his foreign policy: *Mongolen in Iran*, 89-90.

⁵⁷ Wassaf, 528; this is misrepresented as a friendly embassy in Aziz Ahmad, 'Mongol pressure', 187-8, and his *Studies*, 16. Akbar's minister Abu'l-Fadl 'AllamI mentions an embassy sent by Oljeitii to Qutb al-DIn Mubarak Shah Khalji and headed by no less a figure than Rashid al-DIn: *A'in-i Akbari*, ed. H. Blochmann, BI (Calcutta, 1872-7, 2 vols.), II, 206; tr. H. S. Jarrett, BI (Calcutta, 1891-4, 3 vols.), III, 348. But it is unlikely that the Ilkhan would have employed such a high-ranking minister for such a mission. On Rashid al-Din's own correspondence, see p. 154 above.

~Da'ud Qocha's flight across the Oxus and his appeal to Esen Buqa unleashed a war between Chaghadai's ulus and the Ilkhanate which lasted for some years. The forces of the qaghan, whose frontier

had advanced considerably westwards since the collapse of Qaidu's empire, also engaged in hostilities with Esen Buqa, and the number of embassies between Persia and China suggests that Toluid solidarity had re-emerged as a factor in the politics of the Mongol world. At one point the Golden Horde too became embroiled with Chaghadai's ulus.⁵⁸ The Central Asian Mongols temporarily forfeited control of the strategic regions of Afghanistan which gave them access to India. We do not even know whether Da'ud Qocha was reinstated in his old camping grounds.⁵⁹

When Oljeitu died, his youthful successor Abu Sa'id (716-36/1316-35) was confronted by a revolt on the part of a renegade Chaghadayid prince, Yasa'ur, who had quarrelled with Esen Buqa and had been allowed by the Ilkhan to settle south of the Oxus. Yasa'ur threatened Herat and invaded Sistan, where in 717/1317-18 he killed the Ilkhan's adherent, the Negiideri amir Temur. But in 720/1320, before Abu Sa'id's advancing forces had located him, Yasa'ur perished in an attack by Kebek, Esen Buqa's brother and deputy in Transoxiana. His ambitions had been sufficiently dangerous to induce his Chaghadayid kinsmen and the Ilkhans temporarily to collaborate in his removal.⁶⁰

For a time, it had appeared as if the Ilkhans might exercise authority in eastern Khurasan and Afghanistan, whether via compliant Negiideri leaders such as Abachi's son Temiir or mediated in the treaty arrangements with refugee princes from Central Asia like Yasa'ur.⁶¹ Oljeitu's death, however, followed by the elimination first of Temiir and then of Yasa'ur, facilitated the revival of Chaghadayid power here. This fresh advance may date from an invasion of eastern Persia in 722/1322 by Kebek, who had now followed Esen Buqa as khan of Chaghadai's ulus (c. 718-726/1318-1326).⁶² His

⁵⁸ Spuler, *Mongolen in Iran*, 97-8. Barthold, *Four studies*, I, 133. T. T. Allsen, 'The Yuan dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th century', in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China among equals: the Middle Kingdom and its neighbours, 10th-14th centuries* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), 259-60. For the participation of the Golden Horde, see MA, ed. Lech, 79 (German tr. 144-5).

⁵⁹ The anonymous continuation (*dhayl*) of *JT*, Istanbul ms. Nuruosmaniye Kutuphanesi 2799 (old numbering: 3271), fol. 25b, claims that he was, but is not supported by Qashani or by Sayfi.

⁶⁰ Russell G. Kempiners, Jr, 'Vassaf's *Tajziyat al-Amsar wa Tajziyat al-A'sar* as a source for the history of the Chaghadayid khanate', *JAH* 22 (1988), 178, 185-6. Kato Kazuhide, 'Kebek and Yasawr - the establishment of the Chaghatai Khanate', *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 49 (1991), 97-118. Spuler, *Mongolen in Iran*, 98-101. For Temiir, see Sayfi, 677.

⁶¹ Kempiners, '*Tajziyat al-Amsar*', 184-5.

⁶² al-'Ayni (d. 855/1451), *Ta'rikh al-Badr fi Awsaf Ahlil-'Asr*, BL ms. Ar. 985 (Add. 22360). fol. 13a; also in V. G. Frhr. von Tiesenhausen, *Sbornik materialov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordv*, I (St Petersburg, 1884), Ar. text 494, tr. 524-5. Cf. the anonymous *dhayl* of *JT*, fol. 57a.

~successor Tarmashirin (726-35/1326-34), yet another of Du'a's sons, was attacked by the Ilkhan's forces and defeated in the region of Kabul and Zabul in c. 726/1326; Ghazna was sacked.⁶³ But the reverse did not, it seems, bring about a change of masters. Ibn Battuta, passing through Chaghadai's ulus on his way to India in 733/1332-3, refers to Ghazna as part of Tarmashirin's dominions, although it was largely in ruins. It was subject to the khan's chief amir Boroldai, who was based at Parwan in the Hindu Kush but had his officers (*nuwwab*) in Ghazna.⁶⁴ The indications are that the Ghazna region remained within the Chaghadayid sphere of influence until the rise of Termir-i Lang.

The later incursions

Inroads into the subcontinent by the armies of Du'a and Qaidu did not cease during the upheavals that followed the latter's death. Early in 705/in the autumn of 1305 Du'a's forces under 'Ali Beg⁶⁵ and *Tartaq entered India. Undeterred by the desertion of Taraghai, who turned back after crossing the Jhelam,⁶⁶ they pushed deep into the Panjab, ravaging the Siwalik foothills, and then overran Bada'un and Awadh. The *akhurbeg* Malik Nanak, who held the iqta's of Sunnam and Samana and who was accompanied

by a number of other amirs, including Tughluq, routed the invaders on 12 Jumada 11/30 December in the neighbourhood of Amroha. 'Ali Beg and *Tartaq were taken to Delhi, but their lives were spared and they were kept for a time in honourable captivity.⁶⁷

The details of the last Mongol attacks of 'Ala' al-Din's reign are somewhat blurred. It seems that Amir Khusraw, writing only a few years afterwards, describes one invasion by an army comprising three main divisions, and that subsequent authors, beginning with Barani, misinterpreted him and assumed that there were a number of separate incursions, each falling in a different year. The Mongols were apparently under the

⁶³ Qazwini, *Ta'rikh-i Guzida*, 617.

⁶⁴ IB, III, 42, 82-3, 87 (tr. Gibb, 561, 585-6, 589). Aubin, 'Khanat de Cagatai', 17-18. For Ghazna's ruined state, see IB, HI, 88 (tr. 590).

⁶⁵ 'Ali Beg, called a descendant of Chinggis Khan in *TFS*, 320, belonged in fact to the Qonqurat tribe and was married to a Chinggisid princess: hence the style *kuregen*, 'son-in-law', given him by Wassaf, 526. His wife was a great-grand-daughter of Ogodei: *SP*, fol. 127a, adding *aknun dar Dilli ast*; hence *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, fol. 42b, *ba-Dilli raft*. Wassaf confirms that his troops were Du'a's (*tua'i*).

⁶⁶ *KF*, 37-8, *sahm-i baylak-zanan-i ghuzza dar dil gudhardnld wa-ham az 'aqab khala kard* ('he let the ... arrows of the *ghazis* pierce his resolve, and turned about'). This figurative phrase has been misinterpreted to mean that he was killed, e.g. by ED, III, 72, and Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 144.

⁶⁷ Wassaf, 527 (with the year 708 in error). *KF*, 38-9, supplies the date. Only *TFS*, 320, specifies the locality. See also *FS*, 303-5 (tr. 479-82); Wassaf, 526-7. One ms. of *KF* reads NAYB in error for NANK, and later authors duly name the sultan's general on this occasion as Malik Na'ib (Kafur): thus *TMS*, 73, and Bada'uni, I, 185, who wrongly equates Malik 'Manak' (above, p. 175) with Malik Na'ib.

~overall leadership of Kopek, who commanded Du'a's forces south of the Oxus,⁶⁸ and his two colleagues are named as Iqbal and Taibu. Entering the Sultanate in the vicinity of Multan and plundering along the banks of the Ravi, the Mongols moved on Kuhram and Samana, but then turned south towards Nagawr.⁶⁹ Malik Kafur 'Hazardinari, Tughluq, and other amirs were sent against the invaders, who were surprised near a river which Khusraw calls the 'Ali-Wahan' but which figures in Barani's account as the Ghaggar. The Mongol vanguard was completely routed, and Kopek taken prisoner. Kafur then crushed the forces which were following at some distance, and Iqbal and Taibu fled back across the Indus.⁷⁰

Barani then furnishes details of two other incursions. First, three or four tumen-commanders invaded the Siwalik region, but the Delhi army occupied the river-crossings and cut off their retreat. Having extended their lines of communication deep into a waste country, the Mongols were easily overcome. On the sultan's orders, the survivors were massacred in the fortress of Nara'ina. Lastly Iqbal, whom Barani calls Iqbalmanda, invaded India, but was defeated and killed in the vicinity of the 'Ali-Wahan.⁷¹ The term 'Siwalik', which in its broadest sense embraces the territory from the foothills down to Nagawr; the reference to Nara'ina, not far east of Nagawr; and the recurrence of 'Ali-Wahan - all these details suggest that the three episodes noticed in the *Ta'nikh-i Firuz-Shahi* were in reality part of the same invasion as recounted by Amir Khusraw.⁷²

Although they penetrated more deeply into the sultan's territories, and in 1305, at least, beyond the Ganges, these later attacks posed less of a menace than those of Qutluq Qocha and Taraghai. In each case the Mongol army appears to have been smaller. 'Ali Beg and *Tartaq brought 50,000 horse, according to Khusraw, though other sources supply lower numbers.⁷³ The figure of 100,000 given by 'Isami for the army of Kopek and his colleagues

⁶⁸ *JT*, II, 570 (tr. Boyle, 313/tr. Verkhovskii, 202). *FS*, 318, calls him *sar-ahang-i an kishwar* ('the vanguard of that country'). He was with Sarban in Khurasan in 1302-3: Qashani, 18.

⁶⁹ *KF*, A2. *DR*, 61.

⁷⁰ They are listed with Kopek in the brief account *ibid.*, 61-2. Fuller narrative in *KF*, 43-4. The correct form of Taibu's name, which appears as TABW or TYHW in *DR* and as TAYBW in *KF*, is discussed by Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 248, 372. It could represent either *tabu*, 'five', or *tayibu*, 'quiet', 'calm': Lessing, 761, 767. The river 'Ali-Wahan is mentioned also in *FS*, 319 (tr. 496); see *TFS*, 321, for the Ghaggar.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 321-2. The word before °Ali-Wahan, which in the printed text reads TNBDH, proves, on comparison with the mss., to be a corruption of DHNDH. This was assumed to be the Dhandh: see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 397. But the word occurs in *TFSI* in a quite different context (Bodleian ms., fol. 137b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 103b), as a synonym for *dih*, 'village'. Barani also inserts *amir* before 'Ali-Wahan, and *AHG*, II, 816-17, explains that Amir 'Ali commanded at Dhandh as a subordinate of Tughluq. We cannot rely on this, given *AHG's* frequent errors regarding earlier invasions.

⁷² The verdict of Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 147-9.

⁷³ *KF*, 38. Wassaf, 526, has three tumens, though this is difficult to reconcile with the figure of 60,000 for the heads of slain Mongols. *TFS*, 320, has 30 or 40,000: of the mss. of *TFS'*. Digby Coll. ms., fol. 121b, gives the same figure, while Bodleian ms., fol. 146b, and RRL ms., 221, have simply 'several thousand'.

~is clearly exaggerated, in view of the fact that they turned south from Samana because they lacked the strength to proceed further.⁷⁴ Barani's reference to 'three or four tumen-commanders',⁷⁵ although it occurs in a passage which is probably confused, gives a more realistic idea of the size of these invading armies. By this time the Mongol heartlands on the upper Oxus and in Transoxiana were torn by civil war. To some extent organized expeditions may have been superseded by the inroads of fugitives seeking to settle on a more permanent basis, as was happening both in Khurasan and on the Chinese frontier.

As a result of 'Ala' al-Din's victories, says Khusraw, the Mongols withdrew into 'the mountains of Ghazna' and were unable to pass through Sind.⁷⁶ During these years the Delhi forces may have moved over to the offensive. According to Barani, Ghazi Malik Tughluq, who had at some point received the additional iqta' of Lahore, not only kept the Mongols at bay but took the offensive against them, heading an expedition every winter into their territory. Later he credits Tughluq with twenty victories over them.⁷⁷ No details are supplied, and his assertions might be questioned were it not for other testimony regarding Tughluq's exploits. Amir Khusraw, in his *Tughluq-Nama*, written to commemorate Tughluq's enthronement in 720/1320, alludes to eighteen victories, mostly over the Mongols; while Ibn Battuta saw an inscription in the mosque at Multan in which Tughluq himself laid claim to twenty-nine victories over the Mongols alone.⁷⁸ Whether these campaigns were responsible for the devastation of an extensive tract between Ghazna and India, which al-'Umari's informants attributed to the strife between the 'king of India' and the 'king of Turkestan and Ma wara' al-Nahr',⁷⁹ is uncertain.

That the Sultanate now enjoyed immunity from major Mongol attacks for some years was due in large measure to conditions in Afghanistan, which are momentarily but vividly illuminated for us by a remarkable document preserved in Amir Khusraw's *Rasa'il al-I'jaz*.⁸⁰ It purports to be a memorial (*'ard-ddsht*) from the chamberlain (*hdjib*) Badr to Sultan 'Ala' al-Din's son Khidr Khan, narrating a winter campaign against the Mongols of Ghazna. The Delhi forces, led by an unnamed grandee who is designated simply as the *khdn-i a'zam*, had allegedly occupied the city of Ghazna,

⁷⁴ *KF*, 42. *FS*, 318 (tr. 495), for the alleged 100,000.

⁷⁵ *TFS*, 321.

⁷⁶ *KF*, 113.

⁷⁷ *TFS*, 322-3; and see 416 for the twenty victories. Later, 490, Barani ascribes these twenty victories to Tughluq and his brother (Rajab) - doubtless in an effort to curry favour with Rajab's son Firuz

Shah.

⁷⁸ *Tughluq-Nama*, 138. IB, III, 202 (tr. Gibb, 649).

⁷⁹ *MA*, ed. Spies, 8 (German tr. 30)/ed. Fariq, 16 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 32).

⁸⁰ *RI*, IV, 144-56; for a brief abstract, see ED, III, 566-7. The document has been studied by Askari, 'Material', 18-20, and by M. Y. Z. Siddiqi, 'Arzdasht of Badr Hajib', *MIM* 2 (1972), 291-7.

~where the khutba was read in 'Ala' al-Din's name.⁸¹ Badr's memorial has justifiably aroused considerable suspicion among scholars.⁸² Such a major triumph as the capture of Ghazna - uncorroborated in any other source - is improbable. The document nevertheless contains enough circumstantial detail to suggest that it is based on a genuine intelligence report from the north-west frontier to the sultan's government.⁸³ Badr refers to the fratricidal war that was raging between Du'a and Qaidu's people,⁸⁴ and describes how it had spread to the Mongol army based at Hashtnagar and Peshawar, with the result that chaos reigned between Ghazna and the Indus.⁸⁵ He goes on to say that Esen Buqa had moved north in response to a message from Konchek: before his departure, he had presented Badr with several gifts for his master Khidr Khan, by way of a conciliatory gesture. The memorial may safely be dated, therefore, to the years 706-7/1306-8, when Konchek was head of Chaghadai's ulus.⁸⁶ For all the problems attached to it, the document does at least furnish first-hand evidence that the principality built up by Qutluq Qocha south of the Oxus had begun to disintegrate.

Defeat meant for many Mongol warriors an unpleasant form of execution. The crushing of Mongol captives beneath the feet of elephants has made 'Ala' al-Din notorious, although these tactics are first encountered in the reign of Mu'izz al-Din Kayqubad.⁸⁷ Following the incursion by 'Ali Beg and *Tartaq a durbar was held in which captured Mongols were executed in this fashion as a spectacle for the citizens of Delhi; and nemesis took the same form subsequently both for Kopek and for Iqbal's officers.⁸⁸ An unsavoury practice which does date from around this time was the construction of towers at Delhi with the heads of the slain. According to Barani, such a tower could still be seen in front of the Bada'un Gate in his own day;

⁸¹ *RI*, IV, 148, 150-1.

⁸² See, e.g., Day, 'North-west frontier', 106-7 n.20, and in his *Some aspects*, 55 n.22. Askari, 'Risail [sic]-ul-Ijaz', 122, appears to believe the report is Khusraw's own invention.

⁸³ See Khusraw's own comment on the document: *RI*, IV, 18.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 151-2. The printed text reads: DWAYR *Ia'in* TBR QYD W MY AN *gardunan-i kafir tigh uftada ast*. But for the first word, IOL Persian ms. 570 (Ethe, no. 1219), fol. 223b, and BL ms. Add. 16842, fol. 404b, read DW, and the subject can only be Du'a 'the Accursed' (*Ia'in*). The next few words are problematic: a line is possibly omitted not only in the mss. but -since Khusraw was himself transcribing a document - in the original, QYD W MY AN can only be *Qaydu'iyyan*, 'Qaidu's people'.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 153-4 (HYBT NPYR to be corrected to HSTNTR from IOL ms., fol. 224a, and BL ms. Add. 26841, fol. 382b); for Hashtnagar, 16 m. N.W. of Peshawar, see IB, tr. Gibb, 591 n.212.

⁸⁶ *RI*, IV, 154, 155. The Mongol leader's name appears both here and *ibid.*, 147, as 'Ys BrA, a form which prevented Askari ('Material', 18 n.50) from identifying him; but the best mss. have clearly 'YSN BrA. His name is Tu. *esen*, 'healthy', + *buqa*, 'bull': Clauson, *Etymological dictionary*, 248, 312. Konchek's name appears as QPCK. The margin of 1307-14 allowed by Siddiqi, 'Arzdasht', 292, is unnecessarily wide.

⁸⁷ *QS*, 96-8: on this occasion it was only one among several kinds of grisly death on offer.

⁸⁸ *TFS*, 321, 322'. *FS*, 322, on the other hand, says that Kopek was initially spared and was later beheaded (verses omitted in Husain's tr., 500).

~although the sources differ as to whether it was built from the skulls of Kopek's soldiers or those of 'Ali Beg.⁸⁹ No doubt successive invasions permitted the tower to be completed in two stages. If we are to believe Khusraw, who dwells on the marauders' fate with particular pleasure, similar towers arose in other cities of the Sultanate and Mongol prisoners' remains were also incorporated in the new fortifications at Delhi.⁹⁰ Whether such exercises were as effective in deterring the Mongols from future inroads as they were in entertaining the populace of the capital, we cannot tell.

Barani asserts that the respite from Mongol attacks lasted until the end of the reign of Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah (720/1320);⁹¹ and Khusraw claims that Qutb al-Din contemplated the conquest of Ghazna but was dissuaded by his amirs.⁹² But Barani's statement that the Mongols had been so cowed by Tughluq as not to dare to invade India during his reign⁹³ is contradicted by his own evidence, for he tells us of one raid which occurred shortly after the Deccan campaign of 721/1321-2. A fuller account of this attack is provided by 'Isami, who says that the sultan sent reinforcements to his nephew and lieutenant at Samana, Baha' al-Din Garshasp. Garshasp attacked the Mongol rearguard, which had remained behind at a base camp in the foothills, and routed them, slaying their commander, *Shir (Shira). Thereupon he ambushed and destroyed the rest of the invading army, under three commanders named Hindu, Zakariyya and Orus, close to the left bank of the Beah as they returned from plundering the Doab. Among the prisoners was Zakariyya, who was taken to Delhi in triumph.⁹⁴

Muhammad b. Tughluq and the Mongols

Soon after his accession (724/1324), Muhammad b. Tughluq headed an expedition to the north-west. While the sultan halted at Lahore, his troops took Kalanawr and Peshawar and had the khutba read there in his' name. Within a few weeks, Muhammad's generals were obliged to retreat owing to lack of grain and fodder, and rejoined the sultan, who remained at Lahore for two or three months in order to pacify the region before returning to Delhi. It may have been at this time that the sultan set in motion the repair of the fortress of Kalanawr, which appears in al-'Umari's incomplete list of his territories.⁹⁵ Another consequence of this campaign seems to have been

⁸⁹ Kopek's troops: *TFS*, 321; *KF*, 45-6. 'Ali Beg's: *FS*, 305 (tr. 481); Wassaf, 527. Towers had been built earlier from the heads of slaughtered Hindus: *Taj*, fol. 137b. ⁰ *KF*, 28. *RI*, I, 17, *dar aqasi-yi mamalik niz burjhd-yi digar ham bar In nahj sarasar ba-ras-I falak rasanidand*.

⁹¹ *TFS*, 322, 323; cf. also 387.

⁹² *NS*, 54-5.

⁹³ *TFS*, 441.

⁹⁴ *FS*, 405-9 (tr. 611-18). The brief account in *TFS*, 450, says that two Mongol leaders were captured.

⁹⁵ *FS*, 423-4 (tr. 649-50). *TMS*, 101, for Kalanawr, though dating its restoration in the wake of Tarmashirin's invasion. *MA*, ed. Spies, 6 (German tr. 26)/ed. Fariq, 14 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 30).

~the incorporation of the Peshawar region into Muhammad's dominions, since Ibn Battuta describes Hashtnagar as 'the last inhabited place on the confines of the land of the Turks [i.e. the Mongols]' and elsewhere indicates that it was a frontier post where the sultan's customs officials levied duty on imported horses.⁹⁶

Yet a third effect of Muhammad's expedition was to bring down upon the Sultanate an invasion by the khan Tarmashirin, who resided in the western half of Chaghadai's ulus, possibly at Tirmid on the middle Oxus. The authenticity of this invasion was long doubted, on the grounds that it is not mentioned in the standard text of Barani's *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi*, and it was suggested that Tarmashirin paid a friendly visit to India to seek Muhammad's assistance. The unearthing of an earlier recension, however, in which the

invasion is in fact described, has undermined this hypothesis.⁹⁷ Tarmashirin clearly profited from the poor state of frontier defence in the wake of Kushlii Khan's revolt at Multan (below, p. 257).⁹⁸ At a date which Barani places within the two or three years after Delhi's citizens had been transferred to Dawlatabad, and which Sirhindi gives as 729/1328-9,⁹⁹ the Chaghadayid forces overran a considerable area, capturing several fortresses and taking prisoners throughout the regions of Lahore, Samana and Indri. They then advanced into the Doab. The sultan mustered a large force, which he stationed north of Delhi, setting up his headquarters at Indrapat, close to the Yamuna,¹⁰⁰ so that unlike 'Ala' al-Din in 703/1303 he controlled at least one of the crossings. A division of his forces under Yiisuf-i Bughra, who had been sent to relieve Mirat, routed part of Tarmashirin's army and captured his nephew. The Mongols shortly withdrew, followed by Muhammad and his army: Isami says that the sultan halted at Thanesar and sent troops in pursuit; Sirhindi, that he advanced as far as Kalanawr.¹⁰¹ This was the last major Chaghadayid invasion prior to Temur's conquest of Delhi at the end of the century.

⁹⁶ IB, II, 373, and III, 90 (tr. Gibb, 478, 'Shashnaqar', 591, 'Shashnagar').

⁹⁷ Jackson, 'The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate', 119-26, surveys the evidence. For the older view, see especially A. M. Husain, *The rise and fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq* (London, 1938), 100-8, and *Tughluq dynasty*, 119-43.

⁹⁸ *TFS*, 479.

⁹⁹ *TFSI* Digby Coll. ms, fol. 160b/Bodleian ms., fol. 192a. *TMS*, 101.

¹⁰⁰ Best text in *TFS*^l, RRL ms., 287; cf. Bodleian ms., fol. 192a/Digby Coll. ms., fols. 160b-161a. Bihamadkhani, fol. 400a, specifies Indrapat. This attempt to control the crossing seems more plausible than the statement in *FS*, 463 (tr. 698), that Muhammad's army stretched from Siri to the Bagh-i Jud.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 463-5 (tr. 699-701). *TMS*, 101. A less reliable account of the episode is furnished by a Timurid chronicler, who alleges that Tarmashirin was bought off by the sultan and that he ravaged Gujarat as he withdrew: Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. A. Urunbaev (Tashkent, 1972), fols. 80b-81a. For his failure at Mirat, see Ghiyath al-Din 'Ali Yazdi, *Ruz-Nama-yi Ghazawat-i Hindustan*, tr. A. A. Semenov, *Dnevnik pokhoda Timura v Indiiu* (Moscow, 1958), 129, 131; Shami, *ZN*, I, 194; Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. M. M. Iahdad, BI (Calcutta, 1885-8), II, 129, 132/ed. Urunbaev, fols. 328a-329a.

~Muhammad endeavoured to form a coalition against the Chaghadayids with the Ilkhan Abu Sa'id. A local historian writing in southern Persia a few years later has transmitted an account of a friendly embassy from the sultan to the Ilkhan in 728/1327-8, and the letter it conveyed, in which Muhammad sought military collaboration against Tarmashirin, has also survived.¹⁰² Nothing came of these negotiations, as far as we are aware, apart from an equally cordial reply from the Ilkhan, but Muhammad allegedly continued to send annual embassies down to Abu Sa'id's death.¹⁰³ Subsequently, according to Ibn Battuta, Muhammad and Tarmashirin too were on friendly terms and exchanged letters and gifts. Professor Siddiqui ascribes this to the khan's conversion to Islam, which seems to have occurred after 729/1328-9.¹⁰⁴ But the reconciliation may be connected with his conflict in the eastern half of the khanate with his brother Dore Temur, who was overthrown late in 1331.¹⁰⁵ Within a few years, Tarmashirin himself was overthrown and killed, ushering in a period of instability within the Chaghadayid khanate. The new khan, Dore Temur's son Buzun, though described by Ibn Battuta as a Muslim, apparently preferred the Mongol customary law, the *Yasa*, to the *Shari'a*, and was in any case unable to establish his authority before he in turn was displaced in 1335 by a pagan cousin, Changshi, who was hostile to Islam.¹⁰⁶ These upheavals, al-'Umari was informed, provided the Sultanate with a respite from Mongol attacks.¹⁰⁷

His co-religionists' plight furnished Muhammad with an alternative means of extending his influence beyond the Indus. The *manshur* drafted on his behalf in 734/1333-4 and sent to Transoxiana to invite sayyids, shaykhs, 'ulama', bureaucrats and soldiers to come to India and enter the sultan's service is preserved in the early fifteenth-century *insha* collection, *Fara'id-i*

¹⁰² Shabankara'i, 287-8, naming Ikhtisan (above, p. 153) among the party; brief mention in Fasih-i

Khawafi, *Mujmal-i Fas'ih* (845/1441-2), ed. Mahmud Farrukh (Tehran, 1339 Sh./ 1960, 3 vols.), III, 39. *Bayad-i Taj al-Din Ahmad Wazir*, ed. Iraj Afshar and Murtada Taymuri (Isfahan, 1353 Sh./1974), 404-8, for the letter; also I. H. Siddiqui, 'Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's foreign policy, a reappraisal', *IC* 62 (1988), part 4, 10-12. The details of another embassy by Ikhtisan to Abu Sa'id (dating his return at the time of Muhammad's death!) in Bihamadkhani, fol. 405b, are chronologically dubious.

¹⁰³ Shabankara'i, 88, 288 (naming the ambassador as 'Adud al-Din of Yazd: see above, p. 184). For the Ilkhan's reply, see *Bayad*, 408-9.

¹⁰⁴ IB, III, 43 (tr. Gibb, 562). Siddiqui, 'Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's foreign policy', 14. *MA*, ed. Lech, Ar. text 38, simply dates his conversion as 'since 725' (tr. 117 has 'seit 750' in error).

¹⁰⁵ *Yuan Shih*, cap. 35, cited in *MA*, ed. Lech, 241 n.167.

¹⁰⁶ Barthold, *Four studies*, I, 135-6. al-Safadi, *Waft*, X, 383, dates Tarmashirin's death in 735. For Buzun, see Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Urunbaev, fol. 81a. *MA*, ed. Lech, Ar. text 22 (German tr. 105), describes the Chaghadayid khanate as in a state of upheaval (*mutakhabbat^{am}*) until Changshi's accession, for the date of which see Aubin, 'Khanat de Cagatai', 24-5 n.34.

¹⁰⁷ *MA*, ed. Lech, Ar. text 40 (tr. 118 renders *wa-ikhtalafat kalimat ahl hadhihi'l-bilad 'ala mulukiha* as 'Die Inder waren mit ihren Fiirsten uneins'; but the subject is the people of Chaghadai's ulus).

~*Ghiyathi*.¹⁰⁸ That it was effective is clear from the number of notables from Transoxiana who arrived in the Sultanate at approximately the same time as Ibn Battuta (above, p. 185). It is in this context too that we must place the fresh influx of Mongols into the Sultanate. Soon after Buzun's seizure of power, Muhammad had welcomed Tarmashirin's son *Pashaitai, his daughter and her husband Nawruz Kuregen; and within a short time the number of Mongols from Tarmashirin's dominions in the Sultanate is set by Ibn Battuta at 40,000.¹⁰⁹ In the 1340s refugees were arriving in great numbers. Every winter, according to Barani, Mongol commanders of tumens and hundreds, their wives (*khatunan*) and sons (*ughliyan*) arrived in India and received presents of money, jewels and horses.¹¹⁰ Elsewhere the same author says that Muhammad caused any amirs from Khurasan and Mughalistan who entered his service to take an oath of allegiance with the caliphal diploma prior to the conferment of gifts.¹¹¹ Since the 'Abbasid embassy did not reach Delhi until 744/1343-4 at the earliest (see below, p. 272), this indicates that immigrants from the Mongol world were still arriving several years after Tarmashirin's death. But the greater significance of Barani's information is that these immigrants were Muslims; otherwise oaths involving the caliphal diploma would have been meaningless. Their flight from Transoxiana may have been connected with the overthrow, in c. 743/1342, of the ephemeral Muslim khan Khalil, allegedly a son of Yasa'ur (above, p. 226), an obscure episode for which the somewhat dubious account furnished by Ibn Battuta is regrettably our sole evidence.¹¹²

Muhammad profited from the disturbances within Chaghadai's ulus and used the enormous patronage at his disposal in order to cement harmonious relations with Mongol chiefs and other rulers in Khurasan. In his first recension, Barani goes so far as to claim that 'the whole of Mongol territory (*Mughalistan*) on this side of Transoxiana became Sultan Muhammad's obedient client (*banda-yi parwarda*)'.¹¹³ If Ibn Battuta is to be believed, even Mu'izz al-Din Husayn, the Kartid malik of Herat, at some point became

¹⁰⁸ *FG*, SK ms. Fatih 4012, fols. 456a-457b; at fol. 457a he refers to their tribulations. Aubin, 'Khanat de Cagatai', 22.

¹⁰⁹ IB, III, 43, 46 (tr. Gibb, 562, 564). For Nawruz, see also *TFS*, 533; *SFS*, 4 (tr. Basu, *JBORS* 22 [1936], 96). The name of Tarmashirin's son appears as 'Bashai' in the mss. of IB, but the form in *Mu'izz al-Ansab*, fol. 32a, suggests Bashaitai, 'man of the Pashai', a people and region of the Hindu Kush and situated roughly N. of Kabul: see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 799-800.

¹¹⁰ *TFS*, 499; and cf. also *TFS^l*, Bodleian ms., fol. 199/Digby Coll. ms., fols. 165b-166a.

¹¹¹ TFS,494-5.

¹¹² IB, III, 48-51 (tr. Gibb, 565-7). On this, see W. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Turken Mittelasiens*, tr. Th. Menzel (Hildesheim, 1935; repr. 1962), 206-7; Jürgen Paul, 'Scheiche und Herrscher im Khanat Cagatay', *Der Islam* 67 (1990), 284-91.

¹¹³ TFS1, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 166a; the text in Bodleian ms., fol. 199b, is corrupt here and reads WBRDH for *parwarda*. TFS, 505, speaks more vaguely of the homage of the rulers (*dabitan*) of Mughalistan.

~Muhammad's client: the malik was evidently concerned that his adoption of the style of sultan in 750/1349 should not prejudice his relations with Delhi.¹¹⁴ Possibly Husayn's usefulness lay partly in his recently acquired control over the Mongols of the puppet Ilkhan Togha Temur, who from their bases in the Herat region were in the habit of raiding India.¹¹⁵ By the end of his life, Muhammad had entered into amicable relations with the noyan Qazaghan, who since 747/1346-7 had been the real power in the western half of Chaghadai's ulus. Qazaghan, a Muslim of Qara'unas stock (as the Tughluqs themselves may have been: above, p. 178), furnished him with 4-5000 Mongol troops for his final campaign against rebels in Sind.¹¹⁶

Plunder or conquest?

Regarding the war-aims of the Mongols, the sources are ambivalent. It is significant that Amir Khusraw neglects to mention the invasions of Qutlugh Qocha and Taraghai in his *Khaza'in al-Futuh*, presumably because neither episode redounded to 'Ala' al-Din's credit. On both occasions the Mongols appeared in large numbers; on both occasions they advanced by forced marches and caught the sultan perilously off guard. Qutlugh Qocha's forces are expressly said to have abandoned their usual practice of plundering the territory on their route.¹¹⁷ One or two contemporary references indicate that Qutlugh Qocha and Taraghai actually aimed to conquer the Sultanate,¹¹⁸ and the idea has been taken up in turn by historians writing in this century.¹¹⁹ A policy of long-term conquest might well have been explained by Aziz Ahmad's proposal that the Chaghadayids sought an outlet in India because they were restive under Qaidu's tutelage and were caught, moreover, between the armies of the qaghan in the east and of the Ilkhans.¹²⁰ It is true that the late thirteenth-century Chaghadayid khanate presents an appearance of being largely hemmed in by other Mongol states, and that Rashid al-Din makes the khan Baraq, for instance, complain at the quriltai of 667/1269 that his ulus, in contrast with those of his kinsmen, had no

¹¹⁴ IB, III, 74 (tr. Gibb, 580). *FG*, I, 146-9, 182-5, and SK ms. Fatih 4012, fols. 196b-197b. Aubin, 'Khanat de Cagatai', 32-3. Siddiqui, 'Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's foreign policy', 19.

¹¹⁵ IB, III, 70, 71 (tr. Gibb, 578); on him, see P. Jackson, 'Togha Temür', *Enc. Isl.*

¹¹⁶ TFS, 524 For Qazaghan, see Beatrice Forbes Manz, *The rise and rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge, 1989), 33-4, 43-4. Bihamadkhani, fol. 328b, speaks of their friendship.

¹¹⁷ TFS, 254, *giragir*; cf. TFS¹, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 94a, *kuch ba-kuch-i mutawatir*. But the later SFS, 187 (tr. Page, 34), refers to Qutlugh Qocha's forces entering the Topra region, near the Sirmur hills.

¹¹⁸ Qutlugh Qocha: Wassaf, 312; *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 59, Pers. text Taf. 25 (German tr. 50); Qashani, 189. Taraghai: *FS*, 292 (tr. 467). See also *AHG*, II, 796; Bada'uni, I, 184.

¹¹⁹ Haig, in *Cambridge history of India*, III, 102. Dharam Pal, 'Ala'-ud-Din Khilji's Mongol policy', *IC* 21 (1947), 258. Lal *History of the Khaljis*, 134. HN, 338.

¹²⁰ Aziz Ahmad, 'Mongol pressure', 186, and in his *Studies*, 15. Cf. also Pal, 'Ala'-ud-Din Khilji's Mongol policy', 257.

~room for manoeuvre.¹²¹ Yet the idea that such constriction explains the expansionism of later

decades runs counter to the evidence in three respects. Firstly, Du'a and Qaidu appear to have acted in close cooperation right down to the latter's death. In the second place, the Ilkhan's eastern provinces offered as fruitful an opportunity for expansion as did the Indian borderlands; the Ilkhans were, if anything, on the defensive and Ghazan at least evinced a far greater interest in the frontier with the Mamluks. Nor, thirdly, is there reason at this stage to posit pressure from the Far East. Qubilai had jettisoned his policy of expansion in Central Asia during the 1280s - that is, before Qaidu and his allies began to assert their control over the borderlands of India - and Uighuristan was abandoned to the Chagha-dayids by c. 1300.¹²²

The Mongol invasions of India in 699/1300 and 703/1303, therefore, were probably no more than plundering expeditions on the scale necessary for such a formidable objective as Delhi; though even then the purpose may have been to 'soften up' the region as a preparation for campaigns of conquest in future years. The evidence, regrettably, does not permit us to go further. We need not be influenced, incidentally, by the presence, on a number of occasions, of women and children in the Mongol armies. Thus women are said to have ridden with Qutlugh Qocha during his march on Delhi; *Sogedei's troops were taken prisoner with their wives and offspring; and of the 18,000 prisoners who fell into the hands of Alp Khan at Thari, some 3000 were women. Not long afterwards, more women and children were spared and sent to Delhi to be sold in the slave markets when their menfolk were massacred at Nara'ina.¹²³ None of this need surprise us. Thirteenth-century European and Chinese sources show Mongol women riding to war alongside their menfolk.¹²⁴ In any case, if the Mongol attacks were essentially seasonal migrations between summer pastures in the uplands of Ghur and Ghazna and winter quarters in the Panjab and beyond, then we should expect the entire 'horde' to be on the move rather than just the male warriors.

It is already clear in the thirteenth century that the Mongol campaigns in India were designed to amass great numbers of slaves.¹²⁵ Sali Noyan's

¹²¹ *JT*, III, 110-11 (tr. Arends, 72).

¹²² Dardess, 'Mongol empire to Yuan dynasty', 142-3. Allsen, 'Yuan dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan', 255, 258-9.

¹²³ Qutlugh Qocha: *FS*, 256 (tr. 427). Sogedei: *TFS*, 254. Thari: *FS*, 289 (tr. 464). Nara'ina: *TFS*, 321-2. Note also women and children with 'Abd-Allah's invading army in 691/1292: *ibid.*, 219.

¹²⁴ Paul Ratchnevsky, 'La condition de la femme mongole au 12e/13e siecle', in Walther Heissig *et al.* (eds.), *Tractata Altaica Denis Sinor sexagenario ... dedicata* (Wiesbaden, 1976), 511-Thomas Spalatensis, 'Historia pontificum Salonitarum', in A. F. Gombos (ed.), *Catalogus fontium historiae Hungaricae* (Budapest, 1937-43, 4 vols. with continuous pagination). 2236-7.

¹²⁵ Lahore (639/1241): *TN*, II, 165 (tr. 1135). Numerous captives, both Muslim and Hindu, left behind in 643/1245-6: *ibid.*, II, 55-6 (tr. 813).

~Campaigns in Kashmir and India yielded Hulegu a great booty in Indian slaves, according to Rashid al-Din, who says that their descendants were still to be found in his own day on the royal estates (*inju*) in Persia.¹²⁶ We owe the unflattering descriptions of the Mongols by Amir Khusraw to the circumstance of his being taken prisoner in 684/1285 on the defeat and death of his master Muhammad b. Balaban.¹²⁷ That the seizure of slaves continued to be an important aim cannot be in doubt. Isami's account of the Mongol raid on the Than region suggests that the invaders fell prey to Alp Khan's forces because they were unduly encumbered with booty and prisoners.¹²⁸ Regarding other forms of plunder, the sources have less to say. We know that the Mongols ravaged not only Muslim territories but those of the Khokhars, whose *talwaras* (or *talwandis*) were looted and burned in 697/1298 during Keder's attack.¹²⁹ Here one item of booty may have been horses, since the Khokhar territory was among those parts of the Panjab that produced choice mounts.¹³⁰ We can also presumably take it for granted that the Mongols came in the hope of acquiring gold and silver, and in this connection we may have an explanation for India's enhanced attractiveness. With the ambitious raids on independent Hindu kingdoms in the south from 695/1296 onwards, Delhi's rulers were known to be amassing great quantities of specie, of which the Mongols, consequently, must have been tempted to relieve them.

¹²⁶ *JT*, I, part 1, 189 (tr. Khetagurov, 110). For prisoners taken in the Kashmir campaign, see also *JT*, III, 22 (tr. Arends, 21), and ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Ar. text Taf. 61 (German tr. 56).

¹²⁷ The fullest account is in *DR*, 36-7. See also *WH*, IOL ms. 412, fol. 78 (cited in Bada'uni, I, 153); and the brief allusion in *DGK*, 70. Mirza, *Life and works*, 60-2.

¹²⁸ *FS*, 289 (tr. 464). For other references to Hindu captives, see Zafarul Islam, 'The *Fatawa Firiiz Shdhi* as a source for the socio-economic history of the Sultanate period', *IC* 60, part 2(1986), 104 n.27.

¹²⁹ *KF*, 33. Cf. also the statement put in Balaban's mouth in *TFS*, 51.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 53; and see Digby, *War-horse*, 27-8 and n.63.

~CHAPTER 12

The military, the economy and administrative reform

The army

In 656/1258, when an expedition was being prepared to dislodge the Mongol army of Sali Noyan from Sind, the muqta's of Kara and Awadh failed to bring their contingents.¹ On other occasions, too, it is significant that Juzjani depicts the Delhi Sultan mustering troops from 'Hindustan' or 'from the regions' (*az atraf*) in order to repel Mongol attacks.² At this stage, in other words, the forces of the Sultanate still appear to have been undifferentiated in terms of their respective fields of operation. Sultan Balaban is credited with the establishment of a separate army designed specifically to combat the Mongols. It comprised divisions under his two sons, Muhammad in Sind and Bughra Khan at Samana, of whom the latter at least had been given the task of recruiting fresh troops, and additional forces headed by the *barbeg* Begbars from Delhi: the combined total, we are told, was less than 17 or 18,000 horsemen.³ Even so, there are indications in the sources that the troops with which Jalal al-Din and 'Ala' al-Din met the invading Mongols in the 1290s had no experience of an opponent other than the Hindus.⁴ This is presumably why 'Ala' al-Din is credited with efforts to recruit fresh troops with which to oppose the Mongols. The expeditions into peninsular India were another matter, and it fell to 'Ala' al-Din, again, to raise and organize for this purpose another force, distinct from the troops he maintained in the face of the Mongol threat.⁵

The evidence, slight as it is, presupposes a substantial increase in the total size of the Sultanate's army.⁶ Figures for the number of troops on the sultan's muster-roll surface with regrettable infrequency in the sources, and

¹ *TN*, II, 76-7 (tr. 846-7).

² *Ibid.*, I, 471, 486, and II, 171 (tr. 667, 692-3, 1156).

³ *TFS*, 81; for Bughra Khan, see also 80.

⁴ *FS*, 213 (tr. 376). *TFS*, 257, *hasham-i Hindustan*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 302, 326.

⁶ Much of what follows is to be found in P. Jacksorr, 'Delhi: the problem of a vast military encampment', in R. E. Frykenberg (ed.), *Delhi through the ages: essays in urban history, culture and society* (Oxford and Delhi, 1986), 20-22.

~ may not be very reliable when they do.⁷ When Hiilegii's envoys visited Delhi in 658/1260, Balaban intimidated them by staging a review of some 200,000 foot and 50,000 horse. How many of these were the centre forces stationed in and around Delhi, and to what extent Balaban had drawn on levies from

the iqta's, we cannot say: Juzjani describes the troops as being brought both 'from the provinces and from about the regions of the capital' (*az atraf-u hawali-yi hadrat-i a'la*).⁸ Subsequently, Balaban as sultan was able to review an army of 200,000 men at Awadh, on his way to crush Toghril's revolt in Bengal. Not all of these were fighting men, however. 'Barani's characterization of them - as 'cavalry, foot, paiks, archers [*dhdnuk*], pavilion-bearers [*kaywani*], irregulars [*khwudaspā*; literally 'with own horse'], archers, ghulams, servants [*chdkir*], traders and bazaar people'⁹ - does not inspire confidence. One is reminded of Bernier's slightly contemptuous observation, apropos of Awrangzib's empire, that the numbers of the army of the 'Mogol' were inflated by the inclusion of 'servants, sutlers ... and all those individuals belonging to *bazars*, or markets, who accompany the troops'.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the idea that the Sultanate was militarily strong enjoyed a wide currency. The late thirteenth-century Maghribi geographer Ibn Sa'id thought that the Mongols were unable to conquer India because of the numbers of men and elephants at the sultan's disposal.¹¹

The following- reigns appear to have- witnessed a steady expansion of the sultans' military establishment: Word reached Mamluk Egypt of a build-up of military forces under 'Ala' al-Din Khalji. We can probably discount the figure of six or seven *laks* (600,000 or 700,000) of horse furnished in ' Barani's first recension for the total numbers available to 'Ala' al-Din (as also to his enemy, the Mongol prince Qutluq Qocha) at the time of the battle of Kili, which definitely smacks of hyperbole; according to the revised version, the sultan could raise 200,000 or 300,000 horsemen.¹³ Other figures come from Mongol Persia. Wassaf and Rashid al-Din believed that the Delhi forces stood at over 300,000;¹⁴ and in his final volume, completed some twenty or more years later, Wassaf cites 475,000 as the current size of

⁷ See Kolff, *Naukar*, 2-4, regarding the problematic figures given for Mughal armies.

⁸ *TN*, II, 83 (tr., 856, modified).

⁹ *TFS*, 86. For *kaywanis*, see *IB*, III, 415 (tr. Gibb, 753); also *TFS*, 400; 'Afif, 322.

¹⁰ Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul empire, 1656-68*, ed. Archibald Constable (London, 1891), 219-20.

¹¹ Ibn Sa'id, *Kitab al-Jughrafiyya*, 163-4.

¹² Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Kortantamer, *Ar. text 29, jannada'l-junud wa'l-'asakir* (German tr. 109).

¹³ *TFS*^d, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 96a. *TFS*, 267. But it should be noted that Khusraw makes Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq say that there were 200,000 men on the muster-rolls: *Tughluq-Nama*, l.

¹⁴ Wassaf, 309; *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, *Ar. text Taf. 54, Pers. text Taf. 18* (German tr. 43); Qashani, 183.

~the sultan's army.¹⁵ The figure of 400,000 horse gleaned by the cosmographer Dimishqi (d. 727/1327), fits neatly in between.¹⁶ Under Muhammad b. Tughluq, who is said to have built up an unprecedentedly large force within a relatively short space of time, the figures transmitted westwards, as we shall see (pp. 260-1), are still more impressive.

The priority given to the maintenance of such vast armies entailed certain problems. In the first place, the troops had to be kept occupied and in training. Barani describes how Balaban instituted annual winter hunting expeditions for this purpose. They are said to have aroused Hulegu's admiration; and the Mongol hunt, in which the game was enclosed within a vast but contracting circle (*nerge*), and of which Juwayni furnishes the classic account, was indeed designed as a form of annual winter manoeuvres.¹⁷ But it should be noted that hunts very similar to those of the Mongols - even incorporating the *nerge* - had been organized by the Delhi Sultans' Ghurid precursors;¹⁸ Mongol influence is therefore hardly incontestable. Be that as it may, we occasionally glimpse Balaban's successors on large-scale hunting expeditions;¹⁹ and under Firuz Shah, who was especially addicted to hunting, a considerable tract in Katehr was reserved for the chase.²⁰ The most effective means of keeping the troops in training, however, was undoubtedly regular

campaigning against the Hindus. One of Barani's complaints about the vast host raised by Muhammad b. Tughluq for the conquest of 'Khurasan' is that it was not found possible to occupy it with holy war during the first of the two years before it was disbanded.²¹ In all probability, Barani is guilty of inconsistency here, since as we shall see part of the army was sent to Qarachil; but the remark does indicate the importance attached to the problem of a large inactive standing army.²²

Two further problems posed by the maintenance of large armies related to pay and provisions. 'Ala' al-Din determined both to maintain a standing (*mustaqim*) army and to do so on low pay.²³ The salaries cited - 234 *tangas* for a *murattab*, and seventy-eight *tangas* for a *duaspa* - mean little to us, since we have no data on the level of remuneration previously available to the Sultanate's troops; and indeed the ranks themselves are not defined. The

¹⁵ Wassaf, 528. The figure is ultimately reproduced by Firishta (I, 199-200) in connection with 'Ala' al-Din's reforms: the intermediate source is not clear, and does not appear to be Khwand-Amir.

¹⁶ *Nukhbat al-Dahr fi 'Aja'ibi'l-Barr wa'l-Bahr*, ed. A. F. Mehren, *Cosmographie de Chems ed-din Abou Abdallah Mohammed ed-Dimichqui* (St Petersburg, 1866), 180.

¹⁷ *TFS*, 55. Hiilegu in fact died before Balaban's accession. For the Mongol hunt, see *TJG*, I, 19-21 (tr. Boyle, 27-9); Morgan, *The Mongols*, 84-5.

¹⁸ *TN*, I, 364-5 (tr. 385-7). Barani employs the term *nerge* in connection with one of 'Ala' al-Din's hunts: *TFS*, 272-3.

¹⁹ E.g. Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah: *FS*, 364-5 (tr. 563-4). Muhammad b. Tughluq, sometimes accompanied by 'not more than 100,000 horsemen': *MA*, ed. Spies, 19 (German tr. 44)/ed. Fariq, 36 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 44).

²⁰ 'Afif, 321; and cf. 455. ²¹ *TFS*, 411. ²¹ See also *FJ*, 107. ²³ *TFS*, 303-4.

~obscurity of Barani's account is further accentuated by the vagaries of the printed edition of the *Ta'rikh*. S.H. Hodivala came nearest to elucidating what 'Ala' al-Din is actually supposed to have said, which is: 'I shall require two horses and the corresponding equipment from a *murattab*, and one horse and the equipment appropriate for one horse from a *duaspa*.'²⁴ In his first recension, Barani expressly equates the *murattab* with a heavy-armoured (*bar-gustuwani*) horseman and the *duaspa* with one who is not equipped with horse-armour.²⁵ The *murattab* thus emerges as a trooper who was expected to provide two mounts, and the *duaspa*, paradoxically, as one whose second horse was supplied by the state. In the circumstances, the seventy-eight *tangas* paid to the *duaspa* must reflect the lower investment in essential war-gear which was required of him. That the *murattab* was the better equipped of the two emerges also from Barani's rhetorical observation elsewhere, in the context of successful defence against the Mongols, that one *duaspa* would bring in ten Mongols yoked together, while a single Muslim cavalryman (clearly the *murattab* is intended here) drove a hundred before him.²⁶

In the time of Iltutmish and Balaban troopers in the centre (*qalb*) were paid by assignments on villages in the districts around Delhi and in the Doab (see p. 95). 'Ala' al-Din discarded this system. Indeed, if a later author is to be believed, the sultan disapproved of the practice of assigning villages to ordinary cavalymen on the grounds that it nurtured local attachments and gave rise to regional rebellion.²⁷ Whether this was really the impulse behind his reform, we cannot be certain, but it would be in keeping with his known concerns about conspiracy and revolt. At any rate, apart from a brief period under Muhammad b. Tughluq (below, p. 262) the troops were henceforward paid in cash until the reign of Firuz Shah. The final problem was how 'Ala' al-Din was to pay his troops. Very early in his reign he had confiscated the property of the vast majority of his uncle's amirs and resumed their iqta's into the khalisa. At some later point, probably in the wake of Hajji Mawla's rising in Delhi, the sultan further resumed all private property (*milk*) and all existing grants, including *wuquf* (those to religious or charitable establishments) and *in'am* grants (which were exempt from any obligation of service). Barani says that the only people left with money were the maliks, amirs, office-holders, Multanis and *sahs* (Hindu bankers and moneylenders).²⁸ Although by

these means the sultan would have considerably augmented the resources at his disposal, we

²⁴ Cf. with *TFS*, 303, the BL ms., fol. 150b: *du asp-u istidad-i andaza-yi an az* [here both the ms. and the printed text insert a redundant *w*] *murattab talbam wa-yak asp-u isti'dad-i* [printed text inserts *bar*] *andaza-yi yak asp az duaspa* [ms. has *du asp* in error; printed text has simply *u*] *talbam*. See further Hodivala, *Studies*, I, xv and 280. The wages of each rank are again specified at *TFS*, 319.

²⁵ *TFS*^l, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 115a. The term *murattab* is also encountered in TN, II, 26.

²⁶ *TFS*, 320. ²¹ c Afif, 95. ²⁸ *TFS*, 283-4.

~have to assume, therefore, that much of this wealth would have had to be granted out again to those in favour. In the interests of expanding his forces and of maintaining them on low pay, therefore, 'Ala' al-Din had recourse to other expedients. These involved (1) major changes in the taxation system and in the collection of grain, and (2) measures designed to ensure low prices.

Taxation and the grain supply

We do not know what proportion of the crop the cultivator surrendered to the ruler prior to the Muslim conquest of northern India: the terms employed for taxation in cash and in kind are as vague as they are numerous.²⁹ During the early Sultanate period, the *ranas* and *rdutas* were left to collect revenue from their headmen (*khuts*, *muqaddams*) in order to raise the tribute to be paid to the sultan's representatives (see pp. 99-100). The *kharaj* of which our sources speak was not in this period, therefore, the Islamic land tax which it usually denotes. That tax, it has been suggested, was probably levied in the former Ghaznawid territories in the western Panjab, and may have been extended to the immediate vicinity of Delhi by the end of the thirteenth century; if so, our sources do not record such a development.³⁰ 'Ala' al-Din, however, imposed the Islamic *khardj* over a considerable area of northern India, setting it at 50 per cent.³¹ This was the maximum allowed by the Hanafi school which was dominant in the Sultanate;³² but 'Ala' al-Din's rigour lay not so much in the percentage at which the *khardj* was set, but in the manner in which it was levied and in the additional taxes imposed on the cultivators.

Barani is our principal source for 'Ala' al-Din's fiscal measures, although other writers provide odd details and Professor Irfan Habib has argued convincingly that their combined testimony on, price control, at least, affords Barani an impressive degree, of support.³³ One difficulty is that Barani refers to these reforms twice, in two quite distinct contexts: first as part of a deliberate policy of reducing the power of Hindu chiefs and headmen, and then several pages later, when he links the changes to the sultan's need to make fullest use of his resources in order to maintain his unprecedentedly large army. Yet clearly the same measures are involved. Under the new system, the revenue due was determined by means of measurement (*misdhat*) on the basis of the *biswa* (i.e. one-twentieth of a

²⁹ For an examination of such terms, see Gopal, *Economic life*, chapter 2.

³⁰ I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 60-1. ³¹ *TFS*, 287.

³² Nicolas P. Aghnides, *Mohammedan theories of finance* (New York, 1916; repr. 1969), 379-80. Similarly, IB, IV, 223 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 872), says that the infidels of 'Habanq' (near Sylhet) paid half their produce to their Muslim rulers.

³³ Irfan Habib, 'The price regulations of 'Ala' uddin Khalji - a defence of Zia' Barani', *IESHR* 21 (1984), 394-7.

~*bigha*): that is to say, the yield (*wafa*) per *biswa* was estimated, and the amount due from the cultivator was arrived at by multiplying this figure by the number of *biswas* he held; of this total, half was required. For the most part, the *kharaj* was to be paid not as a share of the crop but in cash, and Barani alleges that the collectors demanded the tax so insistently that the peasants were compelled to sell their crop to the grain merchants (*kdrwa-niyan*) as it stood in the field (*bar sar-i kisht*).³⁴ One consequence of the new

system of assessment was that the contribution of the individual became all the more important. As a letter of Ibn Mahru reveals in the middle of the fourteenth century, the peasant, though technically free (*hurr asl*), was now effectively bound to the soil, since were he to abscond the total *kharaj* due from the village would suffer a reduction.³⁵

In addition to a *kharaj* assessed on a new basis, 'Ala' al-Din imposed two further taxes: the *chara'i*, or grazing-tax, and a *sukunat-ghari* (or *-garhi*), a tax on dwellings.³⁶ We are told little about either impost in the standard version of the *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi*, but learn more about the *chara i* in the first recension, where the quantity of livestock yielded (per village?) is said to comprise four oxen (*sutur*), two buffaloes (*gaw-i mish*), two cows (*mada-gaw*) and twelve sheep.³⁷ Whether the *chara'i* was levied on - among others - the transhumant peoples of the eastern Panjab, whose lifestyle was predominantly pastoral, is uncertain. We have to assume that the dwelling-tax fell on the urban population as well as on peasants. It should be noted that unlike the *kharaj* such taxes enjoyed no sanction in Islamic law.

The two recensions of Barani's work differ when they come to name the official who was given responsibility for implementing the reforms. In the first, it is Malik Yaklakhi; in the second, Sharaf al-Din Qa'ini. Both are entitled *nd'ib-wazir*.³⁸ Over a period of some years (six, according to Barani's first version), the *nd'ib-wazir* saw to it that the *kharaj* on the basis of measurement, together with the grazing- and dwelling-taxes, were applied uniformly to a vast area, as if it were a single village. The tract in question is defined as 'all the villages in the regions of the capital, the townships (*qasabat*) of the Doab country, the land from Bhayana to Jhayin, from Palam to Deopapur and Lahore, all the territory of Sunnam and Samana, and from Rewari to Nagawr, from Khor to Ganuri, and from Amroha, Afghanpur and Kabar, from Damhai to Bada'un, Kasrak and *Kotla, and the whole of Katehr'. Qa'ini is further credited with strenuous measures to eliminate bribery and embezzlement among local

³⁴ *TFS*, 287, 288, 305, 307. For the phrase *wafa-yi biswa*, see Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 97-8; Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 61. The *bigha* later adopted in British India approximated to five-eighths of an acre: Yule and Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, 79 (j.v. 'beegah').

³⁵ *IM*, 61-3. I. Habib, 'Economic history of the Delhi Sultanate', 297-8, and 'Agrarian economy', 54.

³⁶ *TFS*, 287, 288. ³⁷ *TFS*^l, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 112a.

³⁸ *Ibid.* *TFS*, 288. For the latter's *nisba*, see above, p. 173, n.16.

~functionaries, to the extent of inspecting the records (*bahi*) of the village accountant (*patwari*).³⁹

A significant proportion of this region was incorporated into the khalisa, as the territories of Kol, Baran, Mirat, Amroha, Afghanpur and Kabar and the whole of the Doab were resumed from the existing muqta's and brought under the sultan's revenue ministry.⁴⁰ Within the Doab khalisa specifically, the *kharaj* was to be paid entirely in grain, which was to be conveyed to the sultan's grain reserves in the capital; in the Jhayin region, on the other hand, the tax was to be paid half in cash and half in grain, and the grain to be stored in Jhayin and its townships.⁴¹ The enormous stores of grain kept in Delhi made a strong impression on Ibn Battuta some decades later.⁴² These reserves of grain were designed for periods of famine, which afflicted the capital from time to time, notably in Jalal al-Din Khalji's reign, when the reserves had been exhausted;⁴³ though the sultan will also have had in mind the more recent crisis provoked by the Mongol attack of 703/1303 led by Taraghai (above, pp. 222-3). We cannot dismiss the possibility, too, that 'Ala' al-Din's vigorous campaign against the manufacture and consumption of wine and drugs, which if effective would have entailed a loss of revenue to the state, did not spring simply from religious and moral impulses. He may have aimed simultaneously at encouraging concentration within the agrarian sector on cereal production.⁴⁴

³⁹ *TFS*, 287-9; *TFS*^l, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 112a, adds 'and the whole of Hindustan as far as Bengal'. Khor (BL ms. KHR) appears in error as KRH (Kara) in the printed text, which also has JHABN for JHAYN and DBHAY for DHMHAY. Khor, an old town mentioned also at *TFS*, 485 (text has KHWD in error),

stands at 27° 39' N., 79° 28' E.: Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 296; *IG*, XXII, 229. For Damhai, on the route from Bada'un to Delhi, at 28° 12' N., 78° 16' E., see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 269. From the context, *K5tla (thus *TFS*); mss. of the later recension read KWYLYH) must be the Kopila of Timurid sources, which Lal, *Twilight*, 34, identifies as Hardwar.

40 *TFS* 323-4. For Afghanpur, see I. Habib, *Atlas*, 27 and map 8A.

⁴¹ *TFS*, 305-6. For this interpretation of seemingly conflicting statements by Barani, see I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 61-2.

⁴² *IB*, III, 148 (tr. Gibb, 621): he was under the impression, however, that the stores dated from Balaban's day.

⁴³ *FS*, 217-19 (tr. 383-4). *TFS*, 212. For the opening of the granaries during times of dearth under 'Ala' al-Din himself, see *KF*, 21.

⁴⁴ *TFS*, 284-6. Barani alleges, however, that the aim was to reduce the incidence of convivial gatherings of the nobles which might lead to conspiracy. According to Sir George Watt, *A dictionary of the economic products of India* (London and Calcutta, 1889-93, 6 vols. in 9), VI, part 4, 273-4, the grapes of the N.W. provinces and Awadh are hardly suitable for the manufacture of wine; and *IB*, III, 129 (tr. Gibb, 610), confirms that the grape was rare in India, being found in the Delhi region and one other province whose name is blank in all the mss. Nevertheless, other sources suggest that wine production was prominent in Awadh and in Kol and Mirat, all of them regions which were the object of 'Ala' al-Din's economic reforms: *TFS*, 157; Mirza, *Life and works*, 72. It is noteworthy that at least one intoxicating drink, *bagni*, was made from grain: Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 276.

~price control

The accumulation of stocks of grain was only partly designed as an insurance against dearth; it was also an essential component of 'Ala' al-Din's policy of price control.⁴⁵ In order to maintain a large standing army on relatively low pay, it was necessary to secure low prices of essential items. The government therefore fixed maximum prices for a number of commodities. These comprised basic foodstuffs - wheat (*hinta*), barley (*jaw*), rice (*shall*), pulse (*mash*, *nukhud*) and *moth*; cloth, sugar, sugar-cane (*nabat*), fruit, animal fat (*rawghan-i sutur*) and wax (*rawghan-i chiragh*); and slaves, horses and livestock.⁴⁶ To oversee the maintenance of low grain prices, Malik Qabul Ulughkhani was appointed as intendant of the market (*shihna-yi manda*), assisted by an intelligence officer (*band*), and all the merchants (*karwaniyan*) were subject to his jurisdiction. The leading merchants, according to Hamid Qalandar, were advanced money from the treasury and were paid their expenses. On the other hand, Barani says that they had to give sureties and were obliged together with their wives and families, to take up residence in the villages along the banks of the Yamuna. Their operations, too, were closely supervised. Hoarding and regrating of grain - whether by cultivator, merchant or broker (*baqqdl*) - were forbidden, under strict penalties which included confiscation of the grain in question. In order to ensure that cultivators sold the requisite quantities of grain to the merchants in the fields (*bar sar-i kisht*) and that the merchants brought it promptly to the sultan's markets, certificates were issued by the local officials confirming that the transaction had taken place.⁴⁷ The marketing of commodities other than grain was centred on a new institution called the *Sarai-yi 'Adi*, which was established in a vacant area inside the Bada'un Gate and for which a group of prosperous Multanis were made responsible. Orders were issued that no goods were to be sold anywhere but in the *Sarai-yi 'Adl*, on pain of confiscation.⁴⁸

Overall responsibility for the maintenance of low prices was entrusted to a certain Ya'qub, who combined the office of chief inspector of revenue

⁴⁵ See generally Dharam Pal, 'Ala'-ud-Din's price control system', *IC* 18 (1944), 45-52; P. Saran, 'The economic policy and price control of Alauddin Khalji', *Bharatiya Vidya* 11 (1950), 195-215 (repr. in his *Studies*); Shaikh Abdur Rashid, 'Price control under Alauddin Khalji', in *Proceedings of the All-Pakistan History Conference. First Session, held at Karachi ... 1951* (Karachi, [n.d.]), 203-10; I. Habib, 'Non-

agricultural production and urban economy', in Raychaudhuri and Habib, *Cambridge economic history*, 83, 86-7.

⁴⁶ Basic foodstuffs: *TFS*, 305. Cloth etc.: *ibid.*, 309, 310. Horses: *ibid.*, 312-13. Slaves: *ibid.*, 314. Livestock: *ibid.*, 315. Habib, 'Non-agricultural production', 87, points out that the price of wheat quoted by Barani is confirmed by Hamid Qalandar, *Khayr al-Majalis*, ed. K. A. Nizami (Aligarh, [1959]), 185 (cf. also 241).

⁴⁷ *TFS*, 305, 306-8. Hamid Qalandar, *Khayr al-Majalis*, 241, cited in I. Habib, 'Non-agricultural production', 83. On Malik Qabul, see Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 100: he had presumably been a slave of the sultan's brother Ulugh Khan.

⁴⁸ *TFS*, 309-10. See also *KF*, 21-2.

~(*ndzir*) with those of *ra'is* of the capital and *muhtasib* of the whole empire.⁴⁹ He in turn appointed for each market an overseer (*shihna*) whose task was to keep prices under surveillance.⁵⁰ The *ra'is*'s department (*diwan-i riydsat*) was to keep a register (*daftar, tadhkira*) of the names of all traders, both those of the capital and those of the provinces. Written undertakings were required from them that they would convey agreed amounts of certain commodities annually to be sold in the Sarai-yi 'Adl.⁵¹ Twenty *laks* (2,000,000) of *tangas* were advanced by the government to Multanis who were to convey goods from the provinces in order to ensure cheap prices if the merchants delayed to bring their wares to the Sarai-yi 'Adl.⁵² For the purchase of luxury items, it was necessary to obtain a certificate (*parwana*) from the *ra'is*, in order that traders or wealthy citizens might not buy up goods cheaply in the capital and sell them elsewhere at a high profit.⁵³ The * entire system rested on a network of spies, who reported abuses to the sultan.⁵⁴

'Ala' al-Din's policies were reinforced by harsh penalties. To some extent the victims were middlemen: horse-traders and horse-brokers, for instance, whose operations tended to inflate prices, were in many cases fined or expelled from the capital and imprisoned in distant forts.⁵⁵ For his part, the uncompromising stance of the *ra'is* Ya'qub made him an object of terror to those who infringed the market regulations. Lashings and imprisonment were common. Flesh was cut from the faces of some offenders, notably dealers who attempted to offset their low profits by selling short weight; they were additionally ejected from the bazaar.⁵⁶ Despite these draconian punishments, however, the government failed to eradicate fraudulent trading.⁵⁷

Purpose and effect of 'Ala' al-Din's policies

Barani is emphatic that 'Ala' al-Din's control of prices was a source of wonder to his contemporaries;⁵⁸ and indeed the policy - involving the enforcement of maximum prices for a wide range of commodities and in some cases the elimination of middlemen - appears to have been a remarkable piece of government interventionism, all the more impressive in the conditions that obtained during the early fourteenth century. We should therefore be inclined to approach Barani's testimony warily, if other witnesses did not confirm that the effectiveness of 'Ala' al-Din's price control was a byword among later generations. Ibn Battuta, visiting the Sultanate in the 1330s and early 1340s, heard 'Ala' al-Din praised in this connection as one of the best of previous sultans, and mentions in particular

⁴⁹ *TFS*, 317.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 317-18.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 309, 310-11.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 309, 311.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 311-12.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 315, 319; see also 308 for spies in the *manda*.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 313-14.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 316, 319.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 317.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 305, 308, 312, 339, 340-1.

~the prices of meat, woven cloth and grain. Hamid Qalandar, writing in c. 755/1354, likewise pays tribute to the sultan's achievement in reducing the cost of grain and to the low wages paid in his reign.⁵⁹

The overall effect of 'Ala' al-Din's measures was to transfer a significantly larger share of the agricultural surplus from the countryside to the towns and from the Hindu chiefs to the Muslim governing class. But the essentially militaristic thrust of his economic policy is made explicit by Barani, who specifies that the entire revenue demand (*mahsul*) of certain khalisa territories was set aside for the pay (*wajh*) of the army (*hasham*) and the expenses of the imperial manufactories (*karkhanas*).⁶⁰ He also links the control of prices (in the first recension, the price of horses in particular) with the need to recruit soldiers on low pay.⁶¹ That the needs of the army were uppermost in the sultan's mind is also clear from the categorization of horses into four classes, of which the lowest comprised those which would not pass muster.⁶² Modern scholarly opinion has posited in addition other stimuli, though the weight ascribed to each varies. The hypothesis advanced by Dharam Pal, who viewed the sultan's policy as also a reaction to inflationary forces generated by the influx of gold from the south, lacks plausibility.) given that the reforms seem to have been instituted within two or three years of 'Ala' al-Din's accession and therefore to have predated Kafur's exploits beyond the Vindhya.⁶³ Shaikh Abdur Rashid believed that 'Ala' al-Din's measures were intended to benefit not merely the state but 'the consumer at large'; and for what it is worth Hamid Qalandar does impute, humanitarian motives to the sultan, who allegedly sought to confer benefits on his people at large.⁶⁴

The most convincing analysis, however, is that of Kehrer. The drafting of peasants for the army and for 'Ala' al-Din's construction projects served to diminish the production of food and cloth; while the recruitment of a certain number of foreign mercenaries would have occasioned an absolute increase in consumption. Furthermore, in addition to the fall in supplies, there was a growing problem of distribution: the concentration of great numbers of non-producing consumers - the troops - in the capital and its environs accentuated difficulties in transportation from the provinces. To remedy these problems, the government had two alternatives: controlling prices artificially and increasing the supply of money.⁶⁵ Where 'Ala' al-Din

⁵⁹ IB, 111,184-5 (tr. Gibb, 640-1). Hamid Qalandar, *Khayr al-Majalis*, 240-1.

⁶⁰ *TFS*, 323-4. On the significance of *mahsul* as 'revenue demand' rather than 'produce', at least from the time of Afif, see Moreland, *Agrarian system*, 232 n.1, 249.

⁶¹ *TFS*, 304; cf. also 340. For horses, see *TFS*^l, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 115a.

⁶² *TFS*, 313, *anchi dar diwan nagudharad*.

⁶³ Pal, 'Ala'-ud-Din's price control system', 46. Cf. Saran, 'The economic policy', 202. Chronological indications: *TFS*, Digby Coll. ms., fol. 109a.

⁶⁴ Hamid Qalandar, *Khayr al-Majalis*, 241. Abdur Rashid, 'Price control'.

⁶⁵ Kenneth C. Kehrer, 'The economic policies of Ala-ud-Din Khalji', *Journal of the Panjab University Historical Society* 16 (1963), 55-66.

~had recourse to the first of these expedients, Muhammad b. Tughluq, as we shall see, would resort to the second.

'Ala' al-Din's tax reforms subjected the *khuts* and *muqaddams* to the same assessment as the peasants within their localities. The revenue was to be levied 'without discrimination' (*bi tafawuti*), so that for this purpose the headman (*khut*) was treated in exactly the same way as the inhabitants of his village: Barani says explicitly that there was to be no difference 'between the *khut* and the *baldhar* (the sweeper).⁶⁶ Moreover, the chiefs' perquisites (*huquq*) were abolished, including their exemption from the *chard'i* and *ghari* taxes, and it was no longer possible for them to pass their own tax burden on to those who were less well off than themselves.⁶⁷ They thus suffered a twofold loss. Barani claims approvingly that the 'Hindus' (by which he means the rural Hindu aristocracy) forfeited their surplus wealth and that their wives found it necessary to earn wages by taking work in Muslim households. Steps were taken to reduce the potential for rebellion. The *chawdhuris*, *khuts* and *muqaddams* were compelled to give up riding and bearing arms and could no longer 'eat the betel-leaf (*tanbul*) - a reference to the ceremony whereby *rawats* (*rautas*) rallied to the support of some leader, whether a Hindu prince or a rebel Muslim amir like Malik Chhaju in 689/1290 (p. 125 above). A single official of the local revenue collectorate (*sarhang-i diwdn-i qasabdt*), we are told, might now rope together twenty or so of them and extract the tax from them by means of blows and kicks. In his first recension, Barani adds that any Hindu's house in which arms were discovered became the sultan's property.⁶⁸ At a later juncture he endeavours to express the subjection of this rural aristocracy in equally vivid terms when he depicts them guarding the highways on the sultan's behalf and keeping watch on., caravans and travellers.⁶⁹

Whether humiliation of the Hindu chiefs was the main impulse behind the reforms, however, as Barani claims, is to be doubted: it was more probably a by-product of the government's efforts to increase its revenue and to leave no pockets of immunity. But lest we incline to doubt the truth behind Barani's vivid statements, 'Afif's account of the birth of the future sultan Firuz Shah corroborates the earlier historian's testimony regarding conditions under 'Ala' al-Din. Ghazi Malik Tughluq, at that time (c. 706/ 1306-7) muqta' of Deopulpur, approached the local chief, Rana Mal Bhatti, and sought his daughter in marriage for his brother Rajab. Meeting with a proud refusal, Tughluq - allegedly on the advice of 'Afif's

⁶⁶ *TFS*, 287. For *khut*, see above, p. 124 n.2; for the meaning of *balahar* ('village menial'), I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 48.

⁶⁷ *TFS*, 287, 291.1. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 55.

⁶⁸ *TFS*¹, Digby Coll. ms, fol. 112a. *TFS*, 288; for the ceremony of taking up the betel-leaf, see *ibid.*, 182, and Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 265.

⁶⁹ *TFS*, 324; cf. also 340.

~great-grandfather, who was his representative in the Abuhar district -entered Rana Mai's territory (*talwandi*) and proceeded to extort the whole year's tax (*mal*) in cash at once, rather than in instalments (*ba-martaba*) as was the usual practice. All the *muqaddams* and *chawdhuris* of the territory were beaten, and Rana Mal's people were in great straits. When she discovered from her weeping grandmother that she was the cause of this affliction, Rana Mal's daughter told her father to surrender her to the Muslim amir and to imagine that she had been carried off by the Mongols (why this should have afforded him any consolation is not readily apparent). She thus became the wife of Rajab and subsequently the mother of Firuz Shah. 'Afif assures his readers that Rana Mal had no choice, for 'this was the era of 'Ala' al-Din and they were in no position to make any murmur or outcry'.⁷⁰

It is clear from this anecdote that Ghazi Malik extorted the tax direct from the headmen. Professor Irfan Habib sees this as part of a process whereby the older rural aristocracy of ranas and rautas was subverted. Yet at the same time a new superior rural class was emerging, and he has proposed that at its apex stood the *chawdhuri*, defined by Ibn Battuta as 'the chief of the infidels' in each *sadi*; the *sadi* was a unit of a hundred villages and doubtless corresponded to the *pargana*, a term first employed by 'Isami and Ibn Mahru in the middle of the fourteenth century and more commonly used by 'Afif.⁷¹

Parallel with a reduction in the perquisites of Hindu intermediaries went a growing encroachment by the sultan's bureaucracy on the position of the Muslim muqta's. 'Ala' al-Din's expansion of the khalisa

had curtailed the area to be granted out as iqta's; though to a large extent this was compensated for by the availability of iqta's in newly conquered territories' like Gujarat, Malwa and the Deccan. But the application of the new method of *kharaj* assessment to territory which, like Awadh, was still held as iqta' would certainly have brought about a closer supervision of the local finances by the sultan's own functionaries.⁷²

'Ala' al-Din's successors

According to Barani, of all 'Ala' al-Din's measures Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah retained only that concerning the consumption of wine (although even

⁷⁰ 'Afif, 37-8. That Firuz Shah was born not in 709/1309-10 (as 'Afif, 36, claims) but in 707/ 1307-8 is clear from 'Afif's other statements that he became sultan at the age of forty-five (*ibid.*, 20) and that he was fourteen at Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq's accession and eighteen at that of Muhammad b. Tughluq (*ibid.*, 41-2); see also Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 390-1.

⁷¹ I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 56-9. For the *chawdhurl*, see IB, III, 388 (tr. Gibb, 741); and for the *pargana*, FS, 450, 597 (tr. 680, 881); IM, 23, 146; 'Afif, 99, 236, 288, 295, 297, 339, 432, 437, 479, 483, 500; also 272 for *parganadars*.

⁷² I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 70.

~this was flouted).⁷³ Price control was abandoned. Qutb al-Din proved unable to enforce it, and his reign thus witnessed a substantial rise in the prices of grain and other foodstuffs; vendors set their own rates for fabrics; the regulations surrounding the Sarai-yi 'Adl were discontinued, and the Multanis became absorbed in their own commercial interests.⁷⁴ The spy network fell into abeyance, and the *Diwan-i Riyasat* no longer had any authority.⁷⁵ Even the *kharaj* did not remain at the level 'Ala' al-Din had decreed, although the extent of the reduction is uncertain. Barani asserts merely that Qutb al-Din abolished 'the heavy land taxes (*kharajha*) and burdensome requisitions from the people' and that as a consequence of the reduction of the *kharaj* the 'Hindus' (again meaning, presumably, the headmen and chiefs) enjoyed ease and affluence.⁷⁶ Two other pillars in the edifice constructed by 'Ala' al-Din were removed when much of the land recently taken into the *khalisa* was granted out once more and the soldiers' pay, along with other charges on the government's resources, like the stipends of the 'ulama', were increased, doubtless in response to the rise in prices.⁷⁷

Like 'Ala' al-Din, Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq began his reign by boosting the contents of his treasury. Although 'Ala' al-Din's grants were confirmed, the new sultan cancelled all those made by his predecessor Khusraw Shah, and instituted, as it were, *quo warranto* proceedings into the rest. 'Isami, whose ancestors thereby forfeited two villages in the Delhi region that they held by tax-free grant (*in'am*) from earlier sovereigns, does not conceal his outrage at this conduct - for which, in his view, the sultan soon paid the penalty with his life.⁷⁸ Yet by Barani Tughluq's reign is depicted as one of moderation towards both the peasantry and the amirs. The sultan demonstrated his concern for the livelihood of ordinary peasants and for the extension of cultivation.⁷⁹ The *khardj* was no longer to be assessed in terms of estimated yields, but was to be based on the actual yield (*hasil*): the cultivators, says Barani, were thereby relieved of the difference between the real produce and the non-existent (*bud-u nabud*). The amount taken as *kharaj* was not to be raised by more than one-tenth or one-eleventh annually. It is accordingly clear that an increase in the rate of the *khardj* was seen as desirable; but it was to be achieved in stages.⁸⁰

Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq permitted the muqta's to supplement their stipends (*mawajib*) by retaining up to one-fifteenth or one-twentieth of the *khardj* levied within their territory, as a perquisite of their office.⁸¹ But on

⁷³ TFS, 384: slightly later (385) he contradicts himself with the statement that not a single 'Ala' al-Din measure was retained.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 319, 384-5.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 385.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 383, 385. *FS*, 355 (tr. 552), might suggest that Qutb al-Din merely remitted the *kharaj* for the first year of his reign.

⁷⁷ *TFS*, 382-3.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 438-9. *FS*, 390-1 (tr. 594-6).

⁷⁹ *TFS*, 442.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 429-30.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 431, 432.

~the other hand we find the sultan warning his amirs not to encroach on the pay of their soldiers: this shows both that a part of the revenues of the *iqta'* was set aside for the maintenance of the troops and that the *muqta'* at this date still had access to the portion of the revenues which was earmarked for his men.⁸² This was to change under Muhammad b. Tughluq, whose policy further undermined the powers of the *muqta'* and may well have underlain many of the rebellions of his reign.

The economy and the expansion of the Sultanate

The idea that the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate accelerated the process of urbanization over much of northern India, as well as fostering the development of a money economy and an expansion in craft production, is now widely accepted. Under 'Ala' al-Din, whose mint output seems to have outstripped that of his predecessors, the increase in the *kharaj* and its realization in cash further contributed to the monetization of the economy.⁸³ We have no figures for the tax yield from the empire as a whole prior to the reign of the Tughluqid Sultan Firuz Shah. In the Shamsid and Ghiyathid eras the Sultanate already included flourishing ports like Lahari on the lower Indus, which Ibn Battuta was informed was worth sixty *laks* (i.e. 6,000,000 silver *tongas*) per annum to Muhammad b. Tughluq;⁸⁴ there is no reason to believe that it would have yielded, say, less than half this amount in the latter half of the thirteenth century. Although, of course, the sultans forfeited the extensive revenue of Bengal from its secession in 685/ 1287 until its recovery by Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq in 724/1324, this would have been more than offset by the conquests of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji and his successors, which greatly increased the material and fiscal resources of the Sultanate. The fertility of Awadh and Zafarabad, over which, as we have seen (p. 200), the sultan's hold seems to have intensified in the early fourteenth century, would be a byword at a time when the regions west of the Yamuna were in the grip of famine during Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign.⁸⁵ Ibn Battuta comments, too, on the density of cultivation around Dhar and the prosperity of Ujjain, and on the great value of the land revenue of the Dawlatabad province to the sultan's treasury; and indeed Muhammad fixed the revenue of the 'Marhat' territory at six or seven *krors* (i.e. sixty or seventy million *tongas*).⁸⁶

⁸² *Ibid.*, 431. Irfan Habib, 'The social distribution of landed property in pre-British India', *Enquiry* 2, part 3 (Winter 1965), 48; see also his 'Agrarian economy', 70.

⁸³ I. Habib, 'Economic history of the Delhi Sultanate', 289-98. H. C. Verma, *Dynamics of urban life in pre-Mughal India* (New Delhi, 1986), chaps. 2, 4 and 5. Shireen Moosvi, 'Numismatic evidence and the economic history of the Delhi Sultanate', *PIHC* 50. *Gorakhpur 1989* (Delhi, 1990), 207-18.

⁸⁴ *IB*, III, 112 (tr. Gibb, 602)

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 342 (tr. Gibb, 720-1). *TFS*, 485, 486.

⁸⁶ *IB*, IV, 42, 45, 49 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 791, 793, 795). Muhammad b. Tughluq: *TFS*, 501. For the *kror* (= 100 *laks*), see Yule and Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, 276 (s.v. 'crore').

~India had long been portrayed as insatiably consuming the wealth of lands further west.⁸⁷ Acquisition of the ports of Gujarat, especially, enabled the Delhi government to tap the flourishing commerce of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf; and it is perhaps no accident that in 'Ala' al-Din's time we first encounter the *malik al-tujjar*, 'king of the merchants', who was responsible to the sultan for overseeing commercial activity, or that one of al-'Umari's informants was a Karimi merchant -i.e. a member of an important corporation of traders based in Egypt -who had twice visited Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah.⁸⁸ To the anonymous author of the *Sirat-i Firuz-Shahl*, Kanbhaya was 'the rendezvous of merchants, the haven of travellers by land and by sea';⁸⁹ and the affluence of its mercantile class was vividly demonstrated in the magnificence of their mansions.⁹⁰ At the beginning of the century Gujarat had attracted praise in Rashid al-Din's history of India, and Marco Polo had earlier heard impressive tales of its manufactures.⁹¹ We know that the province produced fine cotton cloths (exported to China); was a place of transshipment for diamonds and other precious stones; and imported black slaves from East Africa. A *farman* of 709/1309-10 reproduced in Amir Khus-raw's *Rasa'il al-Ijaz* lists numerous high-value commodities found at Kanbhaya.⁹² The revenue-demand (*mahsul*) of Gujarat in the late 1360s is set at two *krors* (twenty million *tangas*) by 'Afif; it is worth comparing this sum with that given for the Doab (eighty *laks*, i.e. eight million *tangas*) at approximately the same time.⁹³ And yet the Sultanate did not benefit merely from the possession of outlets onto the Arabian Sea. By Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign there is fragmentary evidence that his dominions were attracting traders from as far afield as Western Europe, who profited from the encouragement of Mongol rulers to travel by the

⁸⁷ Wassaf, 300. See also *JT*, III, 493 (tr. Arends, 281).

⁸⁸ *TFS*, 352. *MA*, ed. Spies, Ar. text 35 (German tr. 62)/ed. Fariq, 64 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 60). The *malik al-tujjar* of Iltutmish's day mentioned in *TN*, II, 41 (tr. 790), of course, was not the Delhi Sultan's own agent, but represented merchants from Persia, Iraq, Khwarazm and other territories outside the empire. On the Karimis, see Gaston Wiet, 'Les marchands d'epices sous les sultans mamlouks', *Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne 1* (1955), 81-147; S. D. Goitein, 'The beginnings of the Karim merchants and the character of their organization', in his *Studies in Islamic history and institutions* (Leiden, 1966), 351-60; M. S. Labib, 'Les marchands Karimls en Orient et sur l'Ocean Indien', in M. Mollat du Jourdain (ed.), *Societes et compagnies de commerce en Orient et dans l'Ocean Indien* (Paris, 1970), 209-14.

⁸⁹ *SFS*, 21, *marja'-i tujjar-u ma'man-i suffar* (tr. Basu, in *JBORS* 23 [1937], 99). See also the author's reaction to Kanbhaya in *IM*, 133.

⁹⁰ *IB*, IV, 53, 55 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 797, 798).

⁹¹ *JT*, ed. Jahn, *Indiengeschichte*, Pers. text Taf. 13, Ar. text Taf. 51 (German tr. 36). Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, I, 420-1, 422-3/tr. Yule and Cordier, II, 393-4, 398-9.

⁹² *RI*, IV, 141-3. See generally Simon Digby, 'The maritime trade of India', in Raychaudhuri and Habib, *Cambridge economic history*, 139-40, 142, 149; V. K. Jain, *Trade and traders in Western India (AD 1000-1300)* (New Delhi, 1990), 98-105.

⁹³ 'Afif, 221,296.

~overland route through Urgench and Ghazna, for a group of Venetians is known to have visited Delhi in 1338.⁹⁴

Changing priorities

Alongside the marked increase in the revenue from conquered territory, however, the sultans' government relied on the fruits of predatory campaigns against the Hindu powers of the subcontinent. The Mongol threat appears to have modified the order of priorities within the framework of military policy, for as early as 645/1247 Juzjani has Ulugh Khan Balaban advocate the looting of Hindu territory not merely in order to chastise the infidel but to amass booty which could then be used to maintain a defensive army in the face of Mongol invasions.⁹⁵ The fact that Juzjani wrote as a contemporary, and still more his proximity

to Ulugh Khan, make it very likely that these sentiments illustrate the adoption of a conscious policy by Delhi's rulers following the intensification of Mongol pressure after 1241. They contrast sharply with the more simplistic analysis of Barani, who depicts Balaban (now sultan) as refusing to launch campaigns against the Hindus as long as the Mongol menace persisted.⁹⁶ This statement is in any case rendered suspect by the passage that follows: a ringing denunciation of the expansionist policy, leading as it does to the overtaxing of resources and possibly rebellion, with the ultimate consequences of bloodshed and harsh punishments.⁹⁷ Clearly what Barani had in mind here was not Balaban's reign at all, but the recent chaos caused by the expansionist designs of Muhammad b. Tughluq.

A certain degree of military activity against the Hindus was vital both to keep the armed forces in proper training and also to harvest the resources with which to reward them; otherwise it would have been far more difficult to maintain a large army to repel the Mongols. Hence we have good reason to distrust Barani again when he describes how Taraghai's invasion prompted 'Ala' al-Din Khalji to give up 'campaigning and taking fortresses' (*lashgarkashi-u hisargiri*).⁹⁸ We know in any case that this was simply not so: even were we to disregard the expeditions which 'Ala' al-Din personally headed against Siwana and Jalor, and which Barani fails to mention, the notice he gives of Malik Na'ib Kafur's campaigns in the south would alone indicate that the above statement is worthless. It might have been interpreted to mean that in the face of Mongol pressure 'Ala' al-Din confined himself to plundering raids and abandoned the policy of outright annexation instanced in the fate of Ranthanbor and Chitor; but this inference is precluded, again, by the annexation of Malwa from 705/1305 onwards and

⁹⁴ R. S. Lopez, 'European merchants in the medieval Indies: the evidence of commercial documents', *Journal of Economic History* 3 (1943), 174-80.

⁹⁵ *TN*, II, 57 (tr. 816).

⁹⁶ *TFS*, 50-1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 51-2, 53.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 302.

~of Deogir in c. 1314. Nevertheless, under 'Ala' al-Din the two arms of military policy - plundering operations and the imposition of direct rule - appear at least to have been kept in tension. The succeeding reigns, by contrast, witnessed a steady move towards the absorption of vast tracts of territory into the empire.

~CHAPTER 13

Stupor mundi: the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq

The reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq throws up perhaps more problems than any other in the history of the Sultanate. At the sultan's accession the authority of Delhi was acknowledged over a larger area of the subcontinent than under any previous monarch. It is to this process of expansion that Barani refers when he describes the unprecedented scope and efficiency of the revenue department in Muhammad's early years.¹ And yet the reign appears to be dominated by an extraordinary number of revolts. By the sultan's death in 752/1351 Bengal and every tract south of the Vindhya had declared their independence, and none of these provinces was ever recovered.

In the revised version of his *Ta'rikh*, Barani blames the disasters of the reign on the sultan's chimerical designs.² But it needs to be borne in mind that by the accession of Muhammad b. Tughluq, a policy of direct rule was progressively replacing that of plundering and levying tribute on Hindu kingdoms. The absorption of such vast areas of territory brought its own problems in its wake; and they were very probably a major factor underlying the acute economic difficulties which overwhelmed the Sultanate in the 1330s. Launching regular attacks on enemy territory in order largely to finance a sizeable standing army for other purposes was one matter; it was quite another to maintain garrisons and a civil administration in a

conquered province, with all the expense involved in annual accounting and transportation of revenues.³ Newly acquired provinces, moreover, could not be treated in the same rapacious manner that characterizes warfare in enemy country. The Delhi Sultans therefore suffered a twofold loss. It would have been most keenly felt, perhaps, in respect of gold bullion, which had loomed so large in the looting campaigns of 'Ala' al-Din and Kafur. The problems were exacerbated by Muhammad b. Tughluq's extraordinary expenditure and proverbial generosity.⁴

Wider economic trends, too, about which we are imperfectly informed,

¹ *TFS*, 468-9.

² *Ibid.*, 471.

³ As Barani in fact realized: *ibid.*, 51-2.

⁴ Firishta, I, 239, says that he was spending the treasure amassed by 'Ala' al-Din Khalji.

~may have contributed to the problems during Muhammad's reign. It is easily forgotten that two great Mongol powers - the Ilkhanate and the Chaghadayid polity in Central Asia - also underwent considerable upheavals during the second quarter of the fourteenth century, as did the Golden Horde slightly later,⁵ and that the Mamluk Sultanate was a prey to monetary crises during the third reign of Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad b. Qala'un (709-741/1310-1341).⁶ This suggests that the Delhi Sultanate and its neighbours and major trading-partners may have been enveloped in a common economic turbulence; but firm conclusions must await further research.

Opposition from Tughluq's old adherents

The sultan's initial attempts to intensify his authority in the provinces seem to have lain behind three insurrections during the years 727-8/1326-8. On the face of it, the revolts of his cousin Baha' al-Din Garshasp, at Sagar in the Deccan, and of Kushlii Khan in Sind are puzzling. Both men had played a central role in the revolt of Tughluq against Nasir al-Din Khusraw Shah in 720/1320 and were among the many adherents of the Tughluqid regime who were confirmed in office at Muhammad's accession. It looks as if Muhammad's own policies may have alienated these leading amirs whom he had inherited from his father. Tughluq had banned informers (*munhiydn*) from the iqta's, but Ibn Battuta tells us that Muhammad employed a network of spies who reported his amirs' actions to the sultan;⁷ at what stage the practice had been reintroduced, however, we cannot be certain. More importantly, Barani's statements that during the first few years of the reign the accounts even of far distant provinces were audited on just the same basis as were those of the Doab, and that a hundred or two hundred orders arrived daily in the office of the *kharitadar* for transmission to the walis and muqta's,⁸ are a sign that the new sultan was from the outset exercising a far closer supervision over the affairs of the provinces than his predecessors had done. The great provincial governors, for whom Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq had been *primus inter pares*, must have received the distinct impression that his son aimed to preside over a centralized despotism.

More particularly, the creation of a second capital at Dawlatabad (formerly Deogir) in the Deccan may have played its own part in prompting

⁵ Boyle, 'Dynastic and political history', 413-16. Barthold, *Zwolf Vorlesungen*, 205-9, and *Four studies*, I, 134-8. P. Jackson, 'Chaghatayid dynasty', *Enc.Ir.*, V, 346. Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde: die Mongolen in Rutland 1223-1502*, 2nd edn (Wiesbaden, 1965), 109ff.

⁶ Hassanein Rabie, *The financial system of Egypt A.H. 564-7411 A.D. 1169-1341* (Oxford and London, 1972), 189-97. Jere Bacharach, 'Monetary movements in medieval Egypt, 1171-1517', in J. F. Richards (ed.), *Precious metals in the later medieval and early modern worlds* (Durham, NC, 1984), 167.

⁷ *TFS*, 429, for Tughluq. *IB*, III, 343-4 (tr. Gibb, 721), for Muhammad's spies.

⁸ *TFS*, 470.

~these two insurrections. About the affair at Sagar we are told very little; but in view of its proximity to Dawlatabad, Garshasp conceivably felt threatened by the establishment there of a new bastion of central power. We know more about Kiishlu Khan's rising. According to Sirhindi, the sultan sent an officer to superintend the removal of Kushlu Khan's family and household to court (i.e. to Dawlatabad), and the officer's arrogant behaviour stung the amir's son-in-law into murdering him.⁹ Both insurrections were crushed. Garshasp was defeated by Ahmad b. Ayaz, taking refuge first with the Hindu ruler of Kampila and then with the Hoysala king Vira Ballala III, who handed him over to the sultan's forces for execution. Muhammad personally moved against Kiishlii Khan, who was defeated and killed.¹⁰

The third rising, that of Ghiyath al-Din Bahadur Bura in Bengal, seems to represent nothing more than a bid by the previously sovereign dynasty to throw off Tughluqid overlordship. At his accession, Muhammad had released Bura from prison, conferred a chatr on him, and sent him to Sunarga'un, where he was to enjoy the status of joint ruler with Muhammad under the watchful eye of the sultan's adopted brother Bahram Khan, from Lakhnawti. Bura revolted - probably in or after 728/1327-8, when his coins still carry Muhammad's name - but was overthrown by Bahram Khan with the aid of reinforcements from Delhi.¹¹ The fate of Bura's brother Nasir al-Din is unknown: there may be some connection with an attempt by 'the amirs and grandes of Lakhnawti' who were with the sultan in Delhi at the time of Tarmashirin's invasion (c. 729/1328-9) to return to their own country and stir up rebellion.¹² But in any event it appears that for the next few years Bengal was administered by officers appointed by the Delhi Sultan.

⁹ *TMS*, 99-100.

¹⁰ Garshasp: *TFSI* Digby Coll. ms., fol. 161a (Bodleian ms, fol. 192b, has KYTHL in error for KNPL); *FS*, 424-31 (tr. 651-9); *IB*, III, 318-21 (tr. Gibb, 710-11). Kushlu Khan: *TFS*, 478-9; *FS*, 435-43 (tr. 663-72); *IB*, III, 321-4 (tr. Gibb, 711-12), ascribing the rift with the sultan to Kiishlii Khan's refusal to exhibit the skins of Garshasp and Bahadur Bura; but see below. The date of Garshasp's rebellion is known from an inscription of Nov. 1326: P. B. Desai, 'Kalyana inscription of Sultan Muhammad, Saka 1248', *El* 32 (1957-8), 165-70. Kiishlu Khan's revolt is dated in 'the latter part of that year' [727] in *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 191b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 160a. The Lahore campaign in Jumada II 728/April 1328 (*Siyar*, 215) must have been part of Muhammad's operations against Kushlu Khan.

¹¹ *IB*, III, 316-17 (tr. Gibb, 709-10); also IV, 213 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 869). He erroneously makes it out to be anterior to Kiishlii Khan's revolt, however, since he has the skins of Garshasp and Bura circulated round the empire at the same time. *FS*, 422, 444 (tr. 648, 673), is brief. For coins of Bahadur Bura, see *CMSD*, 130 (no. 505C). I. Prasad (*Qaraunah Turks*, 150), Husain (*Tughluq dynasty*, 223) and Nizami (in *HN*, 506) all date his revolt in 730/1329-30.

¹² Only in *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 192a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 161a.

~The creation of a second capital at Dawlatabad and military build-up at Delhi

In the first recension of his work, Barani, who in the standard version supplies no date for the so-called transfer of the capital to Dawlatabad, places it in 727/1326-7.¹³ The abandonment of the project can be dated to the time of Muhammad's visit to Dawlatabad in c. 736/1335-6, on his way back from the abortive expedition to suppress the rebellion in Ma'bar, when we are told that he granted permission to those who wished to return to Delhi.¹⁴ Although the element of compulsion cannot be denied and conditions on the journey to Dawlatabad were surely difficult, even 'Isami alludes in passing to the fact that those citizens of Delhi who cooperated received gold from the treasury. Barani amplifies this by stating that the shaykhs, 'ulama' and riotables of the capital were allotted cash and villages in the Deogir territory, and that the government purchased from the ordinary citizens their houses in Delhi.¹⁵ Arbitrary the project may have been; but its enforcement was not conducted in a totally unfeeling manner.

Who was required to move south, however, and to what extent Delhi was left deserted, have been a matter of dispute. In his first recension Barani depicts two stages, of which the former comprised the transfer of the sultan's mother, Makhduma-yi Jahan, and her household, together with those of the

grandees; the latter exodus, following on Kushlii Khan's revolt (and therefore to be placed in or after 728/1327-8), involved the people of the townships (*qasabdt*) around the capital as well as those of Delhi.¹⁶ But claims in the sources that the city was completely emptied of its inhabitants are deeply suspect. Husain cites the testimony of Sanskrit inscriptions of 1327-8 indicating that Hindus continued to live in the vicinity of the old capital;¹⁷ and Sirhindi refers to the 'vulgar and riff-raff (*mardum-i 'awamm-u awbash*) left behind to plunder the goods of the citizens.¹⁸ In his first recension, Barani says that the sultan had the 'ulama' and shaykhs of the 'districts and townships' (*khitat-u qasabdt*) brought to live in the city and given pensions and stipends.¹⁹

In order to understand Muhammad's so-called transfer of capital, it is necessary to recognize that for our sources 'the people' (*khalq*) denoted the

¹³ *Ibid.*, Bodleian ms., fol. 190b/Digby Coll. ms, fol. 159b.

¹⁴ TFS, 481. For the date of Muhammad's departure on the Ma'bar campaign (9 Jumada I 735/5 Jan. 1335), see IB, III, 427, in conjunction with Venkata Ramanayya, 'Date of the rebellions', 141 and n.1 (correcting the year 1341 given in Gibb's tr., 758).

¹⁵ FS, 446 (tr. 676). TFS^l, Bodleian ms., fols. 191b, 192a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 160. Cf. also TMS, 102.

¹⁶ TFS^l, Bodleian ms., fols. 191, 192a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 160. TMS, 102, speaks of the inhabitants of Delhi and the *qasabat*.

¹⁷ Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 146-8: these epigraphs are now most readily accessible in P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 22-31 (nos. 1:10 and 1:11). Roy, 'Transfer of capital'. 170-1, however, dismissed the inscriptions as irrelevant.

¹⁸ TMS, 102. ¹⁹ TFS^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 192a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 160b.

Map 5: The cities of Delhi

~more illustrious Muslim families of the capital.²⁰ And even the term *shahr*, 'the city', when employed in the context of Delhi, is susceptible of two meanings. When Barani talks of 'the city', he sometimes means simply the old city of Delhi - Qil'a Rai Pithura, the city of Aybeg and Ilutmish - as opposed to the entire complex of settlements and royal residences -Kilokhri, Siri, Hazar Sutun and Tughluqabad - that had grown up in the intervening decades.²¹ During the very time that he is known to have been transferring personnel from Delhi to the Deccan, Muhammad was engaged in ambitious new construction projects within the Delhi region. He built in 727/1326-7 a new fortress, 'Adilabad, not far from Tughluqabad, and linked the old city of Delhi to Siri with walls that enclosed an area henceforth known as Jahanpanah.²² It is evident from Ibn Battuta's

²⁰ As observed by Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 149, 152 n.2.

²¹ E.g., TFS, 449-50.

²² Hilary Waddington, 'Adilabad: a part of the "fourth" Delhi', *Ancient India* 1 (1946), 60-76. Anthony Welch and Howard Crane, 'The Tughluqs: master builders of the Delhi Sultanate', *Muqarnas* 1 (1983), 128-9. For the date 727, see Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 167 and n.2, citing Badr-i Chach.

~account that Muhammad, like his Khalji predecessors, resided in the palace of Hazar Sutun, which had been built by 'Ala' al-Din outside Siri and lay within Jahanpanah. According to the same author, the sultan had intended at one point to surround all four 'cities' (old Delhi, Siri, Jahanpanah and Tughluqabad) with a single wall, but relinquished the idea in view of the expense involved.²³

It is hard to reconcile this extensive programme with the notion that Muhammad envisaged the

abandonment of the entire Delhi conurbation. What really seems to have occurred is that the principal Muslim residents of the *old* city, with their large households, were despatched to Dawlatabad.²⁴ Excepted were the military. The exodus is known to have included the households of the grandees and provincial governors; but during the two years in which the sultan remained in Delhi following the suppression of Kushlu Khan's insurrection, says Barani, 'the amirs, maliks and troops' were with him, while their families were in Dawlatabad.²⁵ The old city was not deserted, precisely because it was being turned into a military encampment, a development closely connected with the recruitment of an enormous army for Muhammad's so-called 'Khurasan project' which will be discussed later. This is surely what 'Isami is referring to when he asserts that the city was repopulated with those whom he scornfully terms 'rustics' from the surrounding territory (*parganat*) and who were clearly Hindus.²⁶ The two projects - the invasion of Khurasan and the partial emigration to Dawlatabad - had to coincide, as one source indicates they did,²⁷ in order to minimize the increase in consumption in Delhi and the setting of impossible targets for the grain producers. Nor does it appear that the sultan had miscalculated here, since Barani ascribes the disbandment of the Khurasan force after one year not to a shortage of supplies but to a dearth of funds to pay the troops.²⁸

Regarding the size of the Khurasan force, Barani supplies conflicting details. In his first recension, he cites a figure of 470,000 on the testimony of the *na'ib-i 'arid* himself, Zahir al-Juyush; the later version tones this down to 370,000 and does not mention his informant.²⁹ This has been taken as the total number of men in the sultan's army, which recalls the comparable figures for 'Ala' al-Din's reign and thus renders Muhammad's Khurasan force much less remarkable.³⁰ But whichever number we choose to accept, these figures clearly apply, rather, to a specially raised force, over and above the usual total for the military establishment.³¹ Al-'Umari was told that

²³ For Hazar Sutun, see IB, III, 220, 399 (tr. Gibb, 660, 746); for the wall, *ibid.*, III, 147 (tr. Gibb, 619, 621).

²⁴ TFS 473 *khawass-i khalq ... mardum-i guzida wa-chida*. See also Husain, *Rise and fall*. 11 Off.; *Tughluq dynasty*, 146ff.

²⁵ TFS, 479.

²⁶ FS, 450, 453 (tr. 680-1,684-5).

²⁷ *Siyar*, 111.

²⁸ TFS^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 201b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 167a. TFS, 477.

²⁹ TFS^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 201b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 167. TFS, 477.

³⁰ Digby, *War-horse*, 24 and n.41a.

³¹ This is the testimony at least of Firishta, I, 240.

~Muhammad's troops in the capital and in the provinces totalled 900,000. Al-Safadi, however, who reproduces this figure on the authority of an official envoy from Delhi to the Egyptian Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad, 'Abd-Allah 'Daftar-khwan', is sceptical, adding that the true number is reputed to be nearer 600,000.³²

That the mustering of such a vast army posed difficulties for the government was due particularly, it seems, to a change in the system of remuneration. As al-'Umari was told, all the troops now received pay from the sultan's (revenue) ministry (*diwan*).³³ It was also during these years that Muhammad introduced the token currency - actually a low-denomination bronze (*muhr-i mis*) coinage - which Barani again links implicitly with the recruitment of large numbers of troops and Sirhindi with the need for cash advances to Delhi's new inhabitants.³⁴ The plan has also to be viewed against the background of the quickening pace of commerce (pp. 252-3 above) and of pressure on the gold-silver parity of 10:1 that underpinned the monetary system. The dethesaurization of large quantities of gold seems to have upset this ratio,

accentuating the problem of a shortage of silver that had grown more acute by Muhammad's reign. Indications are seen in his earlier issues of debased silver *tangas* since 727/1326-7 and in the urgency with which Qadr Khan, his governor in Bengal (a region which through commerce enjoyed access to plentiful supplies of silver in Yiin-nan and Burma), would amass large quantities of coined silver for despatch to Delhi prior to his assassination and the rebellion of the province in *c.* 1361/1335-6.³⁵ The Qarachil expedition and Muhammad's attack on Nagarkot in 738/1337 were doubtless also actuated by a need for silver. That the gold-silver ratio had temporarily worsened is shown by the remark, in a geographical work composed in Persia in *c.* 740/1339, that Muhammad had terminated the practice of hoarding treasure and was spending his gold reserves. His heavy expenditure had caused a fall in the price of gold, so

³² *MA*, ed. Spies, 12-13 (tr. 37)/ed. Fariq, 24 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 37). Al-Safadi, *Wafi*, III, 173 (tr. Khan, 187); but cf. his *A'yan al-'Asr*, fol. 3a, which reads 700,000' for 900,000: his informant may have been the *hajib* 'Abd-Allah who arrived in Persia as Muhammad's ambassador in 1327-8: Shabankara'i, 288. Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani (d. 852/1449), *al-Durar al-Kaminafi A'yani'l-Mi'ati' l-Thamina* (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1348-50/1929-32, 4 vols.), III, 461, follows *Wafi* but cites only the lower number of 600,000. The figure of forty *laks* (four million) given for the infantry, lastly, by Ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, ed. Kortantamer, *Ar. text* 27 (German tr. 104), is doubtless due to a confusion of units and should perhaps stand at 400,000; his figure for cavalry is 300,000.

³³ *MA*, ed. Spies, 13 (German tr. 37, 38)/ed. Fariq, 24, 25 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 37-8).

³⁴ *TFS*, 475; also *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 201b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 167b, where it is linked with the sultan's generous gifts as well as the raising of troops. *TMS*, 102.

³⁵ Simon Digby, 'The currency system', in Raychaudhuri and Habib (eds.), *Cambridge economic history*, 97-8, especially the quotation from *TMS*, 104-5. Moosvi, 'Numismatic evidence,' 215-16. *CMSD*, 162-6. For sources of silver, see John Deyell, 'The China connection: problems of silver supply in medieval Bengal', in Richards (ed.), *Precious metals*, 207-27.

~that it was no longer economical to export it to India and the direction of this traffic was now reversed.³⁶

We have to ignore most of the somewhat jejune account given by 'Isami, who refers to coins made of iron and leather as well as bronze; though his assertion that the coins were current over a period of three years is corroborated by those relatively numerous pieces that have survived, which bear dates from 730 to 732.³⁷ Barani's fuller narrative suggests that the scheme failed owing to widespread forgery of the coins in the countryside by Hindu chiefs and their agents, who accordingly used them to pay the land-tax. In this fashion great quantities of bronze coins reached the treasury, giving rise to a loss of confidence and a depreciation of their value; the government was obliged to recall the coins and to issue gold and silver *tangas* in exchange.³⁸ But Barani's frequent claims that the treasury was emptied as a result of the project (or indeed Muhammad's other policies) must be treated with caution. Had this been so, Muhammad would have been in no position to redeem the bronze coins; still less would he have been able to advance huge sums to the peasantry for the purpose of restoring cultivation (see below).

It is nevertheless a measure of the strain placed on the sultan's finances by the Khurasan project that 'Ala' al-Din's system was abandoned, the army being paid partly in cash and partly in *iqta's*,³⁹ and that in order to pay his considerably increased army Muhammad imposed on his subjects in the Doab a heavier burden of taxation than even 'Ala' al-Din had done. Any increase in taxation, following so swiftly on Tarmashirin's devastation of the province (see above, p. 232),⁴⁰ would have provoked severe discontent; but the precise nature of the measure is unclear. Barani's claim in the standard version of his *Ta'rikh* that the *kharaj* underwent a ten- or twentyfold (*yaki ba-dah wa-yaki ba-bist*) increase was rightly dismissed by Moreland as a mere rhetorical device.⁴¹ The *kharaj*, as far as we know, already stood at the fifty per cent established by 'Ala' al-Din, the legal maximum according to the Hanafi school. But there are further hints. Firstly, Barani suggests in his earlier recension (which is even vaguer regarding the proportion of the increase) that what the peasants found so intolerable was that they were now being required to pay at least a part of the assessment in cash (*zar*, 'gold'); and in the second place he refers to other numerous and heavy

exactions (*abwab*).⁴² The uncanonical taxes

³⁶ Hamd-Allah Mustawfi Qazwini, *Nuzhat al-Qulub*, ed. and tr. Guy Le Strange, *The geographical part of the Nuzhat al-Qulub*, GMS, XXIII (Leiden and London, 1915-19, 2 vols.), I (text), 230, *an zarhara sarf mikunad*, and II (tr.), 222.

³⁷ *F*S, 459-61 (tr. 693-5). *CMSD*, 139-46 (nos. 574-616).

³⁸ *TFS*, 475-6; *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fols. 201b-202b/Digby Coll. ms., fols. 167b-168a.

³⁹ *TFS*, 476-7.

⁴⁰ Referred to explicitly in this context by *TMS*, 113.

⁴¹ *TFS*, 473. Moreland, 48 n.1; also I. Prasad, *Qaraunah Turks*, 71-3. *TMS*, 101-2, has *yaki ba-blst*, but later (113) says one in ten or one in twenty.

⁴² *TFS*, 479, *shada'id-i mutdlaba wa-bisyari-yi abwab*; see also 473. *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 192b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 161a.

abolished by Muhammad's successor included a whole range of imposts, over and above the house tax (*gharl*) and grazing tax (*chara i*) which had been instituted by 'Ala' al-Din (above, p. 243).⁴³ It is accordingly possible that many of these imposts were innovations dating from Muhammad's reign and that the phrasing in Barani's later recension is meant to signify a considerable increase in the total number of taxes levied rather than in the percentage of income taken by the state. Lastly, Sirhindi speaks of all three taxes being levied with much greater rigour: the yield assessed was a standard one rather than the actual harvest, and the value was calculated according to decreed prices and not those current in the market.⁴⁴

The Khurasan project and relations with the Mongols

The object of Muhammad's heavy expenditure on the military in the years from 1329 onwards was the taking of the offensive against the Mongols. There had long been a tendency for the sultans to look over their shoulder at the prospect of expansion beyond the Indus, inclinations which were doubtless encouraged by the numerous refugees from these regions at their court. The spectacular success of the Delhi Sultanate in reducing and governing an unprecedentedly large proportion of peninsular India may well have furnished a fresh inducement for Muhammad in particular to turn his attention to the north-west. We have seen (p. 231) how at the very beginning of his reign he headed an expedition to the Mongol frontiers; although Tarmashirin's invasion seems to have been the immediate impulse behind the 'Khurasan project'.

Barani's misleading use, at one point in the standard recension, of the phrase 'Khurasan and Iraq' for the territories that were the object of Muhammad's designs⁴⁵ has needlessly confused the issue. The term 'Khurasan' is itself ambiguous. For the inhabitants of India during the Sultanate period, and even as late as Babur's era, it denoted loosely the territories west of the Indus.⁴⁶ Ishwari Prasad and Agha Mahdi Husain therefore concluded that Muhammad planned to attack the Ilkhanate.⁴⁷ But 'Khurasan' also designated the regions that today comprise northern Afghanistan and were at this time subject to the Chaghadayid khans. In his first recension Barani is more specific, referring to the object of Muhammad's ambitions as the 'upper country' (*aqalim-i bala* or *bala-dast*); and at one point in the later version he, in common with other sources, speaks of

⁴³ *FFS*, 5 (tr. Roy, 453).

⁴⁴ *TMS*, 101-2: he was under the false impression that the *chara' i* and the *gharl* had been introduced by Muhammad. I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 63.

⁴⁵ *TFS*, 476.

⁴⁶ *IB*, III, 229 (tr. Gibb, 664). *Babur-Nama*, I, 202.

⁴⁷ I. Prasad, *Qaraunah Turks*, 118-24; Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 138-43. But cf. Aziz Ahmad, 'Mongol pressure', 189, though he erroneously dates the Khurasan project after Tarmashirin's death.

~the sultan's plan to conquer 'Khurasan and Transoxiana (Ma wara' al-Nahr)'.⁴⁸ From this we can be certain that Muhammad intended to attack the old enemy, the Chaghdayids; with the Ilkhanate his relations were in fact amicable (above, p. 233). Professor Siddiqui has suggested that one reason for the abandonment of Muhammad's plans was the onset of friendly relations between the sultan and Tarmashirin, although Barani, intent on surveying the sultan's internal policies, makes no mention of this.

Barani says that part of the Khurasan force was sent to Qarachil.⁴⁹ Like 'Khurasan', this is a highly unspecific term, which in its broadest sense denotes the entire Himalayan range.⁵⁰ But it is clear that in the particular context of Muhammad's ambitions the sources are referring to a major Hindu principality. In an article published some years ago, I proposed that the objective of the sultan's army was Kashmir, which is known from indigenous sources to have undergone at least two invasions during the second quarter of the fourteenth century.⁵¹ There are admittedly difficulties with this identification, but Muhammad allegedly envisaged sending a Muslim divine to Kashmir around this very time,⁵² and some tract in the north-west must be in question, given the connection with the Khurasan project which Barani makes so emphatically:

It occurred to Sultan Muhammad that since the preliminaries (*pish-nihadha*) for the conquest of Khurasan and Transoxiana had been effected (*dar kar shuda ast*), the Qarachil mountains, which lay on the direct route (*dar rah-i nazdik*), as a boundary and a screen between the empire of India and the empire of China, should be subjected to the banner of Islam, so that the path of the army's advance and the entry of horses should be made easy.⁵³

It is to be noted that the mention of China, which misled the seventeenth-century compiler Firishta into believing that Muhammad planned the conquest of that country,⁵⁴ is purely incidental. From Barani's phrasing, it looks as if one purpose was to protect the route by which *bala-dasti* war-horses entered the Sultanate. It is thus hard to see how the sultan would have been interested, for example, in sending part of the Khurasan force into the Kumaon-Gahrwal region.⁵⁵ Whatever the case, the Delhi forces were lured into the mountains and there annihilated by the enemy; only a fraction of the army returned. Sirhindi sets the total strength of the force at 80,000 horse, excluding servants (*chakir*) and slaves; 'Isami gives one *lak*

⁴⁸ *TFS*, 477. *TFSI* Bodleian ms., fol. 200a/Digby Coll., fol. 166b, reads 'Khurasan, 'Iraq and Ma wara' al-Nahr', but cf. fol. 201b/fol. 167a, *aqalim-i bala-dast. Siyar*, 271 ('Khurasan and Turkistan'). Siddiqui, 'Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's foreign policy', 9-10.

⁴⁹ *TFS*, 477.

⁵⁰ E.g. *IB*, III, 325, 438-9 (tr. Gibb, 713, 763).

⁵¹ Jackson, 'The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate', 135-42; but cf. Siddiqui, 'Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's foreign policy', 15 and n.45.

⁵² *Siyar*, 228.

⁵³ *TFS*, 477 (to be corrected from BL ms., fol. 236b).

⁵⁴ Firishta, I, 240. I. Prasad, *Qaraunah Turks*, 126-8, 134-6, was rightly sceptical.

⁵⁵ As proposed by Prasad, *ibid.*, 128-31, and by Nizami (HN, 522), who (misquoting Barani) dismisses any connection between the Khurasan project and the Qarachil enterprise.

~(100,000) of horse, of whom 5-6000 returned.⁵⁶ The figure given by Barani in the course of a very brief account in his first recension is significantly lower, at 30,000 or 40,000; his assertion in the revised text that the survivors totalled a mere ten horsemen is an obvious hyperbole.⁵⁷ Subsequently,

alleges Ibn Battuta, Muhammad was able to come to terms with the inhabitants of Qarachil, who undertook to pay him tribute: that they had become tributary to Delhi is further confirmed by al-'Umari, though he does not mention the sultan's failure to overcome them by military means.⁵⁸

Peasant revolt and economic dislocation

Muhammad's enhanced revenue demands provoked a widespread revolt among the cultivators in the Doab, who burned their crops, drove off their cattle and took refuge in the jungles. Having first ordered his revenue officers (*shiqqddrdn*) and military commanders (*fawjdarān*) to plunder the recalcitrant territories, the sultan subsequently took the field in person and mounted punitive attacks on Baran and Kol. The uprising probably occurred in c. 1332-3, but it appears that Muhammad headed two expeditions into 'Hindustan' and that his operations in the vicinity of Qinnawj and Dalmaw (where he was absent at the time of Ibn Battuta's arrival in Delhi in 734/1334) likewise formed part of his attempt to suppress the Doab rebellion.⁵⁹ The failure of grain to reach Delhi from the Doab gave rise to famine, and the situation was exacerbated by the onset of a lengthy period of drought following the sultan's return from his Ma'bar expedition.⁶⁰ Barani speaks of its impact on Delhi, many of whose inhabitants either perished or fled into the countryside; and it is surely to this date (*sc.* 735-6/ 1335-6) that we must ascribe the comment by Ibn Battuta that he found the capital relatively deserted.⁶¹ It appears, however, that a far wider area came to be affected by famine, for when Muhammad had passed through Malwa en route for Ma'bar, he had found the network of runners (the *dhawa*) along the route abandoned, and similarly we read of famine in the town-

⁵⁶ *TMS*, 114. *FS*, 467 (tr. 703).

⁵⁷ *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms, fol. 193a/Digby Coll. ms, fol. 161b. *TFS*, 477-8.

⁵⁸ *IB*, III, 327-8 (tr. Gibb, 714). *MA*, ed. Spies, 5 (German tr. 23)/ed. Fariq, 11 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 29).

⁵⁹ This is clearer in *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fols. 192b-193b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 161b, than in *TFS*, 479, 480; for the Qinnawj campaign, see *IB*, III, 144 (tr. Gibb, 617).

⁶⁰ *TFS*, 473; a clearer chronological indication at 482. I cannot agree with Nizami (in *HN*, 524), who sees high taxation in the Doab as a response to famine in Delhi rather than as its ultimate cause.

⁶¹ *TFS*, 482. *IB*, III, 316 (tr. Gibb, 708): the remark, made in the context of the transfer of capital, seems to apply to his initial entry into Delhi, rather than to a subsequent visit, which is why Husain, *Rise and fall*, 121-3, and *Tughluq dynasty*, 171-3, dismissed it as based on hearsay.

~ships of the eastern Panjab, where the sultan was obliged to campaign against refractory peasants later, in c. 738/1337-8.⁶²

The sultan's efforts to encourage cultivation, after his return from the south, by having wells dug in the vicinity of Delhi and by advancing seed and *loans* (*sondhar*) to peasants were unavailing.⁶³ Campaigns into Katehr to plunder the grain for the use of his troops and of the people of Delhi were merely short-term palliatives.⁶⁴ Two years after his return to Delhi from the south, Muhammad was obliged to permit a large-scale emigration from the capital to the fertile Awadh region, and himself set up a temporary residence on the Ganges, at a locality named Sargadwari.⁶⁵ His stay here of some two and a half years seems to have alleviated the problems to some extent; and if Sirhindi is correct in claiming that the drought lasted for seven years,⁶⁶ the sultan's return to Delhi would have coincided with its end, i.e. c. 741/1340-1. Measures to restore cultivation were still deemed necessary during the last years of the reign, although the enormous cash advances to potential cultivators were not put to proper use and Barani believed that had Muhammad returned alive from Sind the guilty parties would have been executed.⁶⁷

We know that Muhammad's devaluation of the currency gave rise to a considerable degree of inflation, entailing *something* like a fivefold rise in prices.⁶⁸ The Sultanate's *economic* problems were doubtless accentuated by the policy of the Chaghadayid khanate, since following his conversion

Tarmashirin had abolished those commercial duties not sanctioned by the Shari'a (*mukus*) and thus attracted to Transoxiana merchants from Egypt and Syria in great numbers.⁶⁹ This may have diverted a certain proportion of the Egyptian trade north of the Hindu Kush, and might explain Muhammad's abolition of the *mukus* within his own dominions (below, p. 272). The incentive could equally have been a general decline in foreign trade as a result of the debasement; but it is significant that the Chaghdayid *dinar* enjoyed a high reputation on account of its fineness.⁷⁰ Possibly Muhammad's monetary policy had affected the balance of trade between India and Central Asia.

⁶² Malwa: *TFS*, 481-2. E. Panjab: *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 194b/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 162b; *TFS*, 483-4, refers only to the peasants' refusal to pay the *kharaj*, but does not link it with famine; IB, III, 372-3 (tr. Gibb, 734), for famine at Agroha.

⁶³ *TFS*, 482, 484. IB, III, 299 (tr. Gibb, 700).

⁶⁴ *TFS*\ Bodleian ms., fol. 195a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 163a; *TFS*, 484-5, speaks merely of pasturage (*charakhur*).

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 485-6. ⁶⁶ *TMS*, 113.

⁶⁷ *TFS*, 498-9. 'Afif, 92.1. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 65-6.

⁶⁸ Digby, *War-horse*, 39-40.

⁶⁹ *MA*, ed. Lech, Ar. text 41 (German tr. 119). Al-Safadi, *W'afi*, X, 383, alone mentions the abolition. For *mukus*, in origin customs duties, see generally W. Bjorkman, 'Males', *End-Isl.* ■ P. G. Forand, 'Notes on *'usr* and *maks*', *Arabica* 13 (1966), 137-41.

⁷⁰ *MA*, ed. Lech, Ar. text 47 (German tr. 123).

~Military weakness and endemic rebellion

From Barani's testimony, it appears that prolonged unrest in the Doab acted as a spur to the next wave of revolts in more distant provinces from c. 1334 onwards, notably those in Ma'bar, Bengal and Tilang.⁷¹ The revolt of Sayyid Jalal al-Din Hasan, apparently kotwal of Madura, who assumed the title of Sultan Jalal al-Din Ahsan Shah, was probably the first and is believed to have occurred in 734/1333-4. Muhammad's representatives were killed, and the troops supposedly garrisoning the province did nothing.⁷² This crisis was closely followed by the loss of Bengal. Fakhr al-Din (also known as 'Fakhra') was the former armour-bearer (*silahdar*) of the sultan's adopted brother Bahram Khan, and had already made an unsuccessful bid to seize power at Sunarga'un on his master's death. The rising was checked by Qadr Khan, Muhammad's representative at Lakh-nawti; but not long afterwards a prolonged struggle broke out for control of the province. First Qadr Khan's troops mutinied, slew him and went over to the rebel Fakhr al-Din, who established his residence at Sunarga'un. Then Fakhr al-Din's lieutenant at Lakhnawti was killed by Qadr Khan's former *'arid*, 'Ali Mubarak, at the head of loyalist troops. When the sultan proved unable to comply with his request that a new governor be dispatched from Delhi, 'Ali Mubarak found himself obliged to assume the royal title himself as Sultan 'Ala' al-Din 'Ali Shah in order to rally support against the hostile activities of Fakhr al-Din. Both 'Ali Shah in the middle of the 1340s and Fakhr al-Din's son and successor, Ikhtiyar al-Din Ghazi Shah, in the early 1350s would be overthrown by a third candidate for the sovereignty, a former retainer (*chakir*) of 'Ali Mubarak named Ilyas Hajji, who reigned as Sultan Shams al-Din.⁷³ Like 'Ali Shah, Ilyas seems to have recognized the authority of Delhi, since a *farmdn* of Muhammad's successor Firuz Shah

⁷¹ The link is explicit in the first recension: *TFS*^l, Bodleian ms., fol. 193/Digby Coll. ms., fols. 161b-162a.

⁷² Meagre details in *TFS*, 480, except that Muhammad is said to have been campaigning around Qinnawj when the news arrived. *FS*, 469 (tr. 705). IB, III, 144 (tr. Gibb, 617). For the date, see S. A. Q.

Husaini, 'The chronology of the first two sultans of Madura', *Proceedings of the Pakistan History Conference, 5th session, Khairpur 1955* (Karachi, n.d. [1958]), 193-7, and 'The history of the Madura Sultanate', *JASP* 2 (1957), 91-5, citing a coin of Ahsan Shah dated 734. J. Burton-Page, 'Djalal al-Din Ahsan', *Enc. Isl.*², is therefore 73 in need of updating.

73 *TMS*, 104-5, provides the fullest account, though with incorrect dates. *TFS*, 480, and *FS*, 472 (tr. 709), are laconic. *IB*, IV, 213-14 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 869), garbles the details and does not mention Ilyas, on whom see *SFS*, 47 (tr. Basu, *JBORS* 27 [1941], 92); this last source calls 'Ali Shah the armour-bearer of Dinar, one of Qadr Khan's eunuchs. For a survey of events, see Abdul Karim, 'Circumstances that led to the independence of Bengal (1338 A.D.)', *Proceedings of the Pakistan History Conference, 5th session*, 209-22. Coins of All Shah go down to 744: *CCIM*, II, 150 (nos. 22-3). GhazI Shah struck coins in 751: *ibid.*, II, 149 (no. 21). Ilyas had begun to reign by 743/1342: Dani, 'Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah', 55; Eaton, *Rise of Islam*, 86.

~Would later claim that he had remained submissive until after Muhammad's death.⁷⁴

It may have been the presence of actively loyal troops in Bengal that induced Muhammad to give priority to the suppression of Ahsan Shah in Ma'bar. At the head of a sizeable force, he moved south in 735/1334-5 and passed through the Deccan. But on its arrival in Tilang, the army was struck by some kind of epidemic (*wuba*), and the sultan was obliged to retreat; he himself fell gravely sick when he reached Dawlatabad, recovering only after his return to Delhi. That the campaign had been a major disaster was apparent to Ibn Battuta, who dates from this juncture the falling-away of outlying provinces.⁷⁵ The failure to recover Ma'bar gave the signal to other would-be dissidents, and encouraging rumours of Muhammad's death circulated widely. Already, as the sultan marched southwards, one of his officers, Taj al-Din Hushang (the son of Kamal al-Din 'Gurg'), muqta' of Hansi, fled to the Vindhya and thence into the Konkan; Qutlugh Khan, Muhammad's old tutor and governor of the Deccan, moved against him and eventually induced him to yield with a promise of safe-conduct.⁷⁶ Around the same time a Mongol commander named Hiilechu occupied Lahore in alliance with the Khokhar chief Gul Chand, the one-time ally of Muhammad's father; the rebels were defeated and the city retaken by the wazir Khwaja Jahan.⁷⁷ The seizure of Multan by the Afghan chief Shahu, which 'Isami makes part of this insurrection in the western Panjab, is treated by other sources as a separate episode. Muhammad, who had now returned to Delhi, viewed this revolt as sufficiently threatening to warrant dealing with it himself; but Shahu made off on his approach and sent a message of submission.⁷⁸ More serious were the loss of Kampila, which now became the nucleus of the kingdom of Vijayanagara, and a rising in Tilang, whence the governor, Malik Maqbul, was expelled by Kapaya Nayak and fled to Delhi, arriving a matter of days after the sultan himself.⁷⁹

The loss of Tilang, the province whose reduction during the previous reign had been his personal achievement, dealt Muhammad an especially severe blow. He is said to have wanted to mount an expedition to recover it, but to have been prevented from doing so because of the famine.⁸⁰ If 'Isami is to be trusted, half the army commanders and a third of the troops had perished in the epidemic;⁸¹ while the view both of Barani and of Ibn

⁷⁴ *IM*, 16.

⁷⁵ *IB*, III, 334-5 (tr. Gibb, 717).

⁷⁶ *FS*, 469-70 (tr. 706-7). *TMS*, 106. *IB*, III, 335-6 (tr. Gibb, 717-18).

⁷⁷ *FS*, 471 (tr. 707-8), erroneously making this part of the same episode as Shahu's revolt (below). *IB*, III, 331-3 (tr. Gibb, 716-17).

⁷⁸ *TFS*, 482-3. *IB*, III, 362 (tr. Gibb, 729).

⁷⁹ Brief reference to both revolts in *FS*, 606 (tr. 902). Tilang: *TFS*, 484. For the limited material on the emergence of Vijayanagara, see Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 248-9.

80 TFS1 Bodleian ms., fol. 195a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 163a, says that he was inwardly (*dar*

batin) afflicted. *TFS*, 484, is briefer. ⁸¹ *FS*, 469, 471 (tr. 706, 708). *IB*, III, 334 (tr. Gibb, 717), says merely that the greater part of

~Battuta's informant was that the Qarachil campaign had gravely weakened the army of the Sultanate.⁸² We have here the two circumstances that bedevilled Muhammad's government for several years to come: a heavy reduction in the number of troops at his disposal, combined with a considerable loss of revenue owing to a decline in cultivation, so that the sultan was unable to rebuild his forces.

The revolts of the middle period of the reign that we have considered so far smack of opportunistic responses to a prolonged crisis, whether on the part of disaffected amirs or by Hindu elements on the periphery of the Sultanate. But are there any signs of a deeper malaise affecting the ruling class itself? In contrast with the system that obtained in the Mamluk empire, there was now a direct link between the imperial treasury and the ordinary trooper, and the amirs had lost the capacity to bind troops to their own interests with *iqta'* grants from their assignments, which were intended exclusively for their personal maintenance.⁸³ In addition, Ibn Battuta reveals that the military command had become completely separated from the fiscal administration of the *iqta'* so that within the territory of Amroha, for instance, a *wali al-kharaj*, responsible directly to the sultan, is found alongside the amir.⁸⁴ This assault on the position of provincial commanders, it has been plausibly suggested, was one factor underlying the revolts in Gujarat and the Deccan that plagued the sultan's last years.⁸⁵

Loss of revenue accompanying the secession of a number of major provinces also had the insidious effect of increasing pressure on Muhammad to demand larger sums from the regions that remained loyal. Officers who had entered into contracts for the farming of revenue seem to have undertaken to transmit unrealistically high sums to the sultan. Ibn Battuta was told of a Hindu who contracted to farm the revenues of the entire Deccan province for seventeen *krors* (170,000,000 *tangas*), but was unable to meet his obligations and was flayed alive on Muhammad's orders.⁸⁶ The story cannot be tied in with any episode recounted elsewhere, but it illustrates the impact that such arrangements made on contemporaries. The impossibility of supplying the government's needs in this fashion could at times engender rebellion by hitherto loyal servitors. Two risings which occurred during Muhammad's stay at Sargadwari fall into this category. Nizam Ma'in, who farmed the revenues of Kara, and Shihab Sultani, styled Nusrat Khan, who had undertaken to extract one *kror* (10,000,000 *tangas*) from Bidar and its *iqta'* over three years, were both

the army that had accompanied the sultan perished. Cf. also *FS*, 472 (tr. 709), where the loss of provinces is put down to Muhammad's lack of troops, and 510-11 (tr. 759).

⁸² *IB*, III, 327 (tr. Gibb, 714). *TFS*, *All*, 478.

⁸³ *MA*, ed. Spies, 13 (German tr. 37, 38)/ed. Fariq, 24, 25 (tr. Siddiqi and Ahmad, 37-8). For conditions in Ayyubid and Mamluk Egypt, see Rabie, *Financial system*, 32-8.

⁸⁴ *IB*, III, 436, 439 (tr. Gibb, 762, 763). Conermann, *Beschreibung Indiens*, 146, 147-8.

⁸⁵ Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 71-3.

⁸⁶ *IB*, IV, 49 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 795).

~pushed into rebellion by their failure to raise the sums promised; Nusrat Khan is said to have been unable to recover even a third or a quarter of the farm. Nizam Ma'in's feeble bid for independence was snuffed out by the sultan's governor of Awadh, 'Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru, and his brothers. Nusrat Khan was dealt with by the ubiquitous Qutlugh Khan, who gathered troops from Dawlatabad but eventually persuaded him to surrender under guarantee of safe-conduct.⁸⁷

There are other signs that Muhammad's regime was becoming the prisoner of its own reputation

for harshness. Barani asserts more than once that the uncompromising punishments inflicted at Delhi occasioned fear and disaffection elsewhere in the empire, which played their own part in fomenting revolt.⁸⁸ The rising of 'Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru in Awadh provides an illustration. Suspecting that Qutlugh Khan's officials were embezzling some of the tax revenues in the Deccan, the sultan contemplated recalling his old tutor and transferring to Dawlatabad Ibn Mahru, who had recently demonstrated his loyalty and efficiency by shipping large quantities of grain and other goods from Awadh to Sargadwari and Delhi at the height of the famine. In his first recension, Barani has Muhammad eagerly anticipating the increased sums that an administrator of Ibn Mahru's calibre might obtain from the much wealthier Deccan.⁸⁹ Unfortunately, the sultan also learned that large numbers of Delhi's residents had fled from the capital to Awadh, attracted by its prosperity and by Ibn Mahru's mild government, and demanded that they be sent back. Ibn Mahru, who was warned of Muhammad's anger over this, inferred that the planned transfer to the Deccan was simply a ruse to dispose of him, and he and his brothers decided to pre-empt their execution by rebellion. Muhammad defeated them on the Ganges, not far from Qinnawj. Ibn Mahru's brothers were killed in the fighting or disappeared, and he himself was taken prisoner; but it is a measure of his stature, and of the sultan's understanding of the reasons for his revolt, that he was not long afterwards restored to favour.⁹⁰ He was later appointed governor of Multan at the time of Muhammad's final campaign against the rebel Taghai and his Sumra allies in Sind.⁹¹

⁸⁷ TFS, 487, 488.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 472, 484, 499-500, 517.

⁸⁹ *TFS*^d, Bodleian ms., fol. 196a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 163b.

⁹⁰ IB, III, 341-54, 357 (tr. Gibb, 720-6, 727), provides a detailed account of the campaign, in which he participated, but is unaware of the impulses behind the revolt. So too is *FS*, 472-5 (tr. 709-14). *TFSI* Bodleian ms., fols. 195b-196a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 163, and *TFS*, 486-7, 489-91, analyse Ibn Mahru's motives. The suspicions about revenue from the Deccan are mentioned only in *TFS*, 500-1: Hardy, 'Didactic historical writing', 53-5, compares the two recensions at this point. There is a brief account of the revolt in *TMS*, 109-10. 'Afif, 406-8, for Ibn Mahru's restoration to favour.

⁹¹ *IM*, 106, 107. Despite the doubts expressed by Abdur Rashid in his introduction (27), Ibn Mahru's reference to the sultan's having spared him makes it certain that these two letters date from Muhammad's reign rather than that of Firuz Shah. He also says that at the time of his appointment he has been ordered to supply troops and ships, which places the date of the letters around the time that Muhammad crossed the Indus not long before his death:

~describing how Muhammad's forces took up position near Qinnawj for the encounter with Ibn Mahru, Ibn Battuta alludes to the antipathy between the rebel, who was of Indian extraction, and the 'amirs of Khurasan and foreigners' accompanying the sultan.⁹² From c. 734/1333-4, as we have seen, Muhammad was intent on making clients of local rulers in Khurasan and neighbouring regions and thus achieving by means of patronage what he had been unable to accomplish through the Khurasan project. This was in turn part of a wider policy of favouring foreigners over the indigenous aristocracy (above, pp. 184-5). Whether this in itself was enough to incite members of the Indian Muslim aristocracy to revolt, we cannot know; but it may well have played a role in the unrest of the sultan's later years. We are perhaps on surer ground in identifying resentment towards Muhammad's pagan Hindu agents as one of the mainsprings of disaffection. In c. 1341 there was a rising in Siwistan, in which the local Sumra ruler Unar (Ibn Battuta's 'Wunar') and a military officer named Qaysar-i Rumi slew the Hindu bureaucrat 'Ratan' whom the sultan had appointed as muqta' of the province. Unar soon deserted his associates, and Qaysar and his followers were put down without difficulty by the governor of Multan, 'Imad al-Mulk Sartiz.⁹³ Similarly, as we shall see, Bhiran, the pagan muqta' of Gulbarga, would be the first victim of the rising of 'Ali Shah Kar in the Deccan.⁹⁴ Yet until the middle of the 1340s Muhammad seems to have retained the support of the military class as a whole. Barani describes Nusrat Khan as a grain-dealer (*baqqal*), and scornfully contrasts Ibn Mahru and his adherents, who were 'clerks and grain-dealers' (*nawisan-dagan-u baqqalan*), with the sultan and the seasoned troops who had served both him and his father Tughluq and who could hardly have been expected to desert him.⁹⁵ The implication is that Muhammad was a military man's sovereign.

Muhammad took various steps during the early 1340s that were undoubtedly designed to rally support behind his regime. Although Barani gives the impression that the sultan entered into relations with the puppet 'Abbasid Caliphate at Cairo during his stay at Sargadwari,⁹⁶ we know from Egyptian sources that he had already been in contact with the Caliph al-Mustakfi bi'llah as early as 731/1330-1, and that at least three embassies had been

TFS, 523. The date 9 Shawwal, when Ibn Mahru was despatched to Multan, must therefore belong to 751 (10 December 1350). Nevertheless 'Afif makes out that Firuz Shah appointed Ibn Mahru to the province (below, p. 303).

⁹² *IB*, III, 344, 349 (tr. Gibb, 721-2, 724).

⁹³ Described only *ibid.*, III, 105-8 (tr. Gibb, 599-600). This episode must have fallen not just prior to IB's arrival in India, as its place in the narrative suggests, but before the visit to Slwistan in 742/1341 mentioned later, III, 447 (tr. Gibb, 766-7). One reason for dating the Slwistan revolt this late is that Sartiz was not appointed to Multan until after Shahu's rising, i.e. c. 1337 (above, p. 183, n.86).

⁹⁴ *TFS*, 488. Cf. also *FS*, 485-6, 487-8 (tr. 726-8, 730-1). Nizami (in *HN*, 565) reaches similar conclusions about the role of hostility towards the sultan's Hindu servitors.

⁹⁵ *TFS*, 488, 490. ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 491-2.

~sent from Delhi.⁹⁷ In 741/1340-1 Muhammad substituted the name of al-Mustakfi (who had in fact died in the previous year) for his own on the coinage and in the khutba.⁹⁸ It was in this same year, according to Ibn Battuta, that he abolished all uncanonical taxation (*mukus*);⁹⁹ and perhaps also that he took to presiding in person over the *mazalim* tribunal for the redress of his subjects' grievances.¹⁰⁰

Not until 746/1345-6 did Muhammad's envoy, Hajji Rajab Burqu'i, return to Delhi with the personal robe of the Caliph al-Hakim bi-amri'llah, al-Mustakfi's son and successor, and a diploma conferring on the sultan the rank of the caliph's lieutenant; he was accompanied by the Egyptian grand qadi, the *shaykh al-shuyukh* Rukn al-Din al-Malati, head of the convent of Siryaqus. In the meantime, in 744/1343, an unofficial envoy from Cairo, Hajji Sa'id Sarsari, had brought Muhammad a diploma, a banner and a robe. The ceremonial surrounding these occasions, when the sultan adopted a stance of extreme humility, clearly made a powerful impression on Barani.¹⁰¹ By such propagandistic gestures the sultan hoped, perhaps, to recover the support of the 'ulama' and others of the 'religious class' and hence, presumably, to legitimize his position in the face of would-be rebellious amirs.

Confrontation with the *amiran-i sada*

Within the next year or two, however, the situation once again deteriorated. Muhammad had come to believe that the local commanders in Gujarat and the Deccan, the amirs of a hundred (*amiran-i sada*), were responsible for the fiscal problems of his government, and decided to supersede them by bringing the revenues of the two provinces under closer control by the centre. According to Barani, the sultan in 745/1345 believed that large sums

⁹⁷ Jackson, 'The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate', 131-2 n.74.

⁹⁸ *CMSD*, 122-4 (nos. 491-491H), 147-8 (nos. 617-622A).

⁹⁹ *IB*, III, 288 (tr. Gibb, 694), for the abolition of *mukus*; at III, 117 (tr. Gibb, 605), this is said to have coincided with Muhammad's recognition of the caliph, but is dated two years after IB's arrival in India, i.e. c. 736/1335-6. A list of taxes abolished in Muhammad's reign - *manduh*, **tarka*, *mal-i mavjud*, *chahar bazar*, *dard'ib*, *gudharha* and *khadj-i muhtarifa-yi muslim* - is given in *IM*, 79; for those abolished by Firuz Shah, see *SFS*, 124; *FFS*, 5 (tr. Roy, 453); I. H. Qureshi, *The administration of the Sultanate of Dehli*, 4th edn (Karachi, 1958), 244-7 (appendix H).

¹⁰⁰ IB, III, 288-9 (tr. Gibb, 694-5).

¹⁰¹ *TFS*, 492-6; and cf. also 460. There is a fuller and clearer account in *SFS*, 280-2; tr. in Shaikh Abdur Rashid, 'Firuz Shah's investiture by the Caliph', *MIQ* 1 (1950), 69. See also IB, I, 363-70, and III, 248-9 (tr. Gibb, 225-8, 674), who distinguishes the status of the two envoys Hajji Sa'id and Hajji Rajab. For the arrival of Rajab's party in Cairo in 744 and for Rukn al-Din, see al-Shuja'i, *Ta'rikh al-Ndsir Muhammad ibn Qala'uni'l-Salihi wa-Awladhihi*, ed. and tr. Barbara Schafer, *Die Chronik as-Sugd'i's*, QGIA, II (Wiesbaden, 1977-85, 2 vols.), I (text), 257-8, and II (tr.), 290-1; the date Rabi I 743 for Rukn al-Din's departure from Cairo given by al-Maqrizi (d. 845/1442), *al-Suluk li-Ma'rifat Duwali' l-Muluk*, ed. M.M. Ziada *et al.* (Cairo, 1934- in progress), II, part 3, 887, must be an error.

~had been held back for years by the officials in Bharuch;¹⁰² and in his account of the revolt of 'Ali Shah Kar ('the Deaf ') at Bidar, 'Isami, who is particularly well informed about the Deccan and accordingly furnishes much greater detail than other writers, suggests that the rebellion was sparked off by new revenue-raising arrangements.

'Ali Shah, a Khalaj officer and a nephew of Sultan 'Ala' al-Din's general Zafar Khan, is described as an *amir-i sada* of Qutlugh Khan¹⁰³ who had rendered signal service by fighting against Nusrat Khan and by reducing the district of Koyir. He continued to serve faithfully and transmitted the stipulated monies, until a Hindu named Bhiran, who held the iqta' of Gulbarga, grew aware of the sums being retained from Koyir and prevailed upon Qutlugh Khan to let him farm the revenues, undertaking to increase them by 50 per cent. 'Ali Shah reacted by seizing Bidar and Gulbarga and killing Bhiran, and assumed the royal title as Sultan 'Ala' al-Din. After some time Qutlugh Khan, aided by reinforcements from the sultan, was able to induce him to surrender.¹⁰⁴ His uprising, which occurred in a region whose officers Muhammad viewed with suspicion, looks like a localized rehearsal for the wider insurrection against the sultan during his last years.

At some point early in 745/in the spring-summer of 1344 the sultan took the decision to separate the enormous Deccan province currently supervised by Qutlugh Khan into four divisions (*shiqqs*). Qutlugh Khan was to be recalled and replaced as wazir at Dawlatabad by Imad al-Mulk Sartiz, hitherto governor of Multan; in the interval the command at Dawlatabad was to be exercised by Qutlugh Khan's brother 'Alim al-Mulk Nizam al-Din, the governor of Bharuch. According to Barani, the men chosen to command the *shiqqs* all had a reputation for shedding blood, and both he and 'Isami allege that the people of the Deccan, who had come to regard Qutlugh Khan's regime as a safeguard against the ordeals experienced in Muhammad's other territories, were dismayed at the amir's departure.¹⁰⁵

The principal target of the new administration, however, was the *amiran-i sada*. Barani says that the men sent from Delhi were under instructions from the sultan to regard these officers as the chief instigators of unrest. We might be tempted to discount reports of Sartiz's previous exactions in the

¹⁰² *TFS*, 513.

¹⁰³ Thus only *ibid.*, 488, where he is described as the son of Zafar Khan's sister (as also in *TMS*, 108); though *TFS*, 508, calls him the son of a brother.

¹⁰⁴ By far the most detailed account in *FS*, 483-500 (tr. 725-47); see 479 (tr. 718-20) for his service against Nusrat Khan. The information in *TFS*, 488-9, and IB, III, 357-8 (tr. Gibb, 727-8), is limited. Barani dates the revolt during Muhammad's stay at Sargadwari, whereas IB places it after his return to Delhi.

¹⁰⁵ *TFS*, 501-2. *FS*, 503 (tr. 749-50); and see also 462 (tr. 696-7), where the security of the people of the Deccan, however, is attributed ultimately to the presence there of the saint Shaykh Zayn al-Din. IB, III, 336-7 (tr. Gibb, 718), comments on the confidence inspired by Qutlugh Khan and on his liberality. The date of the order recalling Qutlugh Khan to Delhi is given as 1 Sha'ban 745/8 Dec. 1344 by Badr-i Chach, *Qasa'id*, ed. Hadi 'Ali, 64/ lithograph ed. M. 'Uthman Khan (Rampur, 1872-3, 2 vols.), II, 407.

~Multan province, which according to the correspondence of his successor there, Ibn Mahru, had still not recovered a few years later.¹⁰⁶ But it is surely no accident that 'Aziz Khammar, the sultan's newly appointed governor of Dhar and one of the four *shiqq-commanders*, had made a name for himself as an oppressive revenue-collector in the Amroha district, in which capacity he had clashed with the local military commander.¹⁰⁷ Now, soon after his arrival at Dhar, 'Aziz summarily executed some eighty *amiran-i sada*. When this news reached their counterparts in Gujarat and the Deccan, they rose in revolt.¹⁰⁸ Ibn Battuta likewise mentions instructions for the killing of military commanders, but he makes the revolt start in Gujarat, where Malik Muqbil allegedly received orders to put them to death. We should not necessarily accept the testimony of Ibn Battuta (who does not employ the term 'amirs of a hundred') that the victims were all Afghans: he seems to have been misled by the fact that the leaders of the ensuing revolt - Qadī Jalal in Gujarat and Isma'il *Mukh in the Deccan - both belonged to that race. He is certainly in error, moreover, in linking Muhammad's orders to massacre 'Afghans' with his campaign against the Afghan Shahu in Sind, which had occurred some eight years or so prior to these developments (see above, p. 268).¹⁰⁹

The atrocity perpetrated by 'Aziz Khammar turned the explosive situation in the south into one of open rebellion. Whereas hitherto Muhammad had been confronted by the recalcitrance of individual grandees and their retinues, he now faced a widespread insurrection embracing the officer class in two major provinces. When the news reached the *amiran-i sada* in Dabhoi and Baroda, they attacked and routed Malik Muqbil, the *na'ib-wazir* of Gujarat, and plundered a convoy of treasure he was escorting on its way to Delhi. Kanbhaya was surrendered to them, and they were able to take Asawul.¹¹⁰ 'Aziz Khammar, who moved against them from Dhar and was joined by Muqbil, was defeated and captured by the insurgents and put to death. Returning to Kanbhaya, Qadi Jalal and his adherents settled

¹⁰⁶ *IM*, 78-9, 88.

¹⁰⁷ *IB*, III, 436-40 (tr. Gibb, 762-3): this seems to have transpired at the time of Muhammad's absence on the Ma'bar campaign.

¹⁰⁸ *TFS* 1, Bodleian ms., fols. 202b-203a/Digby Coll. ms., fol. 168a, is more explicit here than *TFS*, 503-4, 507. *IB*, III, 364 (tr. Gibb, 730-1), also links the revolts in Gujarat and the Deccan. For these revolts, see generally I. Prasad, *Qaraunah Turks*, 208-53; Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 283-97; *HN*, 540-55.

¹⁰⁹ *FS*, 504 (tr. 750), for royal orders. *IB*, III, 362, 364-6 (tr. Gibb, 729, 730-1). *TFS*, 514, at one point appears to support the equation, by speaking of the rebels at Dawlatabad as 'these Afghans'; but *BL* ms., fol. 254a, reads not *in afghAnan* but *in afghan*, i.e. the singular, denoting the leader Isma'il *Mukh. *SFS*, 20, calls the rebel officers in Gujarat simply 'army chiefs' (*saran-i guruh*). For other Afghan officers in the Gujarat and Deccan revolts, see Siddiqui, 'The Afghans and their emergence', 255-6.

¹¹⁰ *FS*, 503-6 (tr. 750-3), provides the fullest account; and see also *TFS*, 507. *TMS*, 111, gives a brief notice (*sub anno* 748 in error). *IB* does not mention the plundering of the convoy.

~down to besiege the city.¹¹¹ Muhammad, who had been preparing to head an army against the rebels since learning of the attack on Muqbil in the latter half of Ramadan 745/late January 1345, halted at Bharuch. Here he instituted oppressive measures for the extraction of the arrears of revenue, ordering Malik Maqbul, the *na'ib-wazir* of the empire, who had pursued the enemy as far as the banks of the Narbada, to kill the *amiran-i sada* of Bharuch under his command. The back of the Gujarat revolt appeared to be completely broken. Qadi Jalal and his lieutenants narrowly escaped being handed over to the sultan by Nanadeva ('Man Deo'), the Hindu raja of Baglana, Salher and Mulher, and fled to Dawlatabad, where the *amirdn-i sada* were by now similarly in arms against the sultan.¹¹²

In the Deccan Muhammad's policies had provoked a major crisis. Two of the sultan's principal agents were known to be already on their way to Dawlatabad to conduct an inquiry into the loyalties of the province; and in addition the sultan sent two other amirs to 'Alim al-Mulk Nizam al-Din with instructions to have the more important *amiran-i sada* of that region brought under guard to Bharuch. The proposed victims of the purge set off from Dawlatabad, but realized Muhammad's intentions and turned back. 'Alim

al-Mulk was arrested, and the two royal agents were put to death. The province fell under the control of the *amirdn-i sada*; Ismail *Mukh, a brother of the Afghan Malik Malik who had held a command in Tughluq's reign, was proclaimed sultan as Nasir al-Din.¹¹³

On receipt of this news, Muhammad advanced by forced marches to the Deccan and inflicted a heavy defeat upon the rebels. He took up his quarters in the royal palace at Dawlatabad, and his troops invested the fortress of Dharagir, where Ismail *Mukh and his chief adherents had taken refuge.¹¹⁴ But as the sultan busied himself with setting the affairs of the region in order, he received reports of a fresh rising in Gujarat, led by a Turkish slave named Taghai. Taghai, formerly Muhammad's *shihna-yi bargah*, had been banished by the sultan to the Yemen as a punishment for some misdemeanour, but had been caught up in the fighting at Kanbhaya while awaiting embarkation. Having played a crucial role in the city's defence against Qadi Jalal, he was restored to favour. In the sultan's absence, however, he fell out with Muhammad's lieutenant at Asawul, Tatar Malik, and made common cause with the *amirdn-i sada* of Gujarat. The rebels entered Nahrwala, slew its governor, sacked Kanbhaya, and laid siege to Bharuch. When

¹¹¹ *FS*, 506-10 (tr. 753-9). *TFS*, 509, reports the sultan's receipt of the news of 'Aziz's defeat and death. *IB*, III, 364 (tr. Gibb, 730), is very brief.

¹¹² *FS*, 512-14, 522 (tr. 760-4, 773-4). *TFS*, 511-13, has the rebels being defeated by Malik Maqbul near Dabhol and Baroda; Barani alone describes Muhammad's conduct at Bharuch. For the identity of 'Man Deo', see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 299.

¹¹³ *TFS*, 512, 513-14. A fuller account in *FS*, 516-21 (tr. 766-73). *IB*, III, 365-6 (tr. Gibb, 731), is relatively brief and calls the rebel leader Malik Mall's son in error.

¹¹⁴ *FS*, 530-6 (tr. 783-91). *TFS*, 514-15. *IB*, III, 368-9 (tr. Gibb, 732-3): this is his latest information on the revolt.

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Muhammad advanced on Bharuch, Taghai fled to Kanbhaya, where he defeated a force that the sultan had sent in pursuit and killed its commander, Ytisuf-i Bughra, before taking flight again when Muhammad hurried after him.¹¹⁵

While receiving the submission of various local ranas and chiefs in Girnar (Junagadh; the modern Kathiawad), Muhammad was recalled to the Deccan by the news that his amir 'Imad al-Mulk Sartiz, whom he had deputed to reduce Gulbarga following the victory over Ismail *Mukh, had been defeated and killed by another group of *amiran-i sada* under one of Ismail's lieutenants, Hasan Gangu, styled Zafar Khan. The troops the sultan had left at Dharagr had fallen back on Dhar, and Hasan Gangu had made a triumphal entry into Dawlatabad. Isma'il *Mukh renounced the royal title in favour of his deliverer: Hasan Gangu, who was enthroned on 24 Rabi' II 748/3 August 1347 as 'Ala' al-Din Bahman Shah, thereby became the first sovereign of the independent Bahmanid dynasty that ruled in the Deccan until the sixteenth century. According to Barani, Muhammad summoned various commanders from Delhi and planned to send them to regain the Deccan, but abandoned the idea when he heard reports of the great numbers rallying to Hasan Gangu's standard. It seemed advisable to deal first with Taghai and to postpone turning his attention to the south until later.¹¹⁶

Muhammad spent the next three monsoons in ineffectual pursuit of Taghai, moving from Nahrwala to Kathiawad and back again, before making an abortive attempt to assault Thatta, with whose Sumra princes the rebel had taken shelter. The sultan was preparing for a second attack on Thatta when he fell ill and died on the banks of the Indus on 21 Muharram 752/20 March 1351.¹¹⁷ His achievements during these last years should not be underestimated. By concentrating on the overthrow of Taghai, a task which was not in fact completed in his lifetime, he had at least accomplished the subjugation of Gujarat - including regions that do not seem to have acknowledged his predecessors - and ensured that the province remained part of the Sultanate for another two generations. But any larger enterprise was beyond the

depleted resources at his disposal. An alleged conversation between the sultan and Barani, in which Muhammad complained that a new revolt erupted in one direction every time he turned towards another,

¹¹⁵ There is valuable information on the origins of Taghai's revolt in *SFS*, 19-21, 23-4 (tr. Basu, *JBORS* 23 [1937], 97-102). *TFS*, 515-16, 517-20, gives a narrative. *FS*, 538-9 (tr. 793-4), is brief.

¹¹⁶ *TFS* 520-I, 522, but giving only a short notice of events in the Deccan; see also 515 for the despatch of Sartiz towards Gulbarga. *FS*, 540-54 (tr. 811-28), provides a full account of Hasan Gangu's operations, with the date of his accession.

¹¹⁷ His movements have now been elucidated, on the basis of material in *TFS*¹, by Simon Digby, 'Muhammad bin Tughluq's last years in Kathiavad and his invasions of Thattha', in Khuhro (ed.), *Sind through the centuries*, 130-8.

~conveys his exasperation.¹¹⁸ The disaffection of the *amiran-i sada*, which Muhammad himself had done so much to foster, was too intense and geographically too widespread to be overcome, given the sultan's fiscal problems and the decline in the impressive military establishment he had presided over in the early years of his reign.

¹¹⁸ *TFS*, 521. *FS*, 538 (tr. 794), similarly catches the dilemma confronting Muhammad at Dawlatabad when he first heard news of Taghai's rebellion.

~CHAPTER 14

The sultans and their Hindu subjects

The Delhi Sultans were first and foremost Islamic rulers. Fakhr-i Mudabbir calls Iltutmish 'the sovereign of Islam' (*padishah-i Islam*).¹ Juzjani saw Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah as the 'Sultan' (or 'Sultan of the Sultans') 'of Islam', or as 'Emperor of the Peoples of Islam'.² Alternatively, the monarch could be hailed as 'Sultan of the Turks and Persians (*'Ajam*)³ - ruler, in other words, over the war-lords, soldiers and scholars who made up the immigrant Muslim population. In the eyes of the Sultanate's chroniclers, the Muslims constituted what in more recent times would be termed a *Staatsvolk*. The monarch was emphatically not sultan of the Hindus or of, say, the people of Hariyana; it has been observed that in our Muslim sources Hindus 'are never interesting in themselves, but only as converts, as capitation tax-payers, or as corpses'.⁴ All the sultans with one exception proclaimed the spirit in which they approached their task by assuming on their coins and in their inscriptions the style (*kunya*) of *Abu'l-Muzaffar* ('Father of the Victorious One'); the exception, Muhammad b. Tughluq, styled himself *al-Mujahid fi Sabili'llah* ('The Warrior in the Path of God'). For many Muslim observers, the ultimate justification for any ruler within the Islamic world was the protection and advancement of the faith. For the sultans, as for their Ghaznavid and Ghurid predecessors, this entailed the suppression of heterodox Muslims, and Firuz Shah attached some importance to the fact 'that he had acted against the *ashab-i Ithad-u Ibahat* ('deviators and latitudinarians').⁵ It also involved plundering, and extorting

¹ *AH*, 15.

² *TN*, I, 273, and II, 91, 166, 185 and n.3; cf. also II, 91, *padishah-i ahl-i ayman*, 205, *padishah-i Musulmanan*.

³ *Taj*, fol. 217b. *TN*, I, 297 (tr. 231); cf. also I, 275, 366 (tr. 183, 388). Shu'aib, 'Inscriptions from Palwal', 2, 3; Yazdani, 'Inscriptions of the Turk Sultans', 15; *RCEA*, X, 72-3 (no. 3703).

⁴ Hardy, *Historians*, 114.

⁵ *FFS*, 6-8 (tr. Roy, 454-6). *SFS*, 129 ff. See also *KF*, 20, and *TFS*, 336, for 'Ala' al-Din's treatment of *ashab-i Ibahat*. *Qaramita* - probably Isma'ilis - had attempted a coup in Delhi during Raddiyaa's reign: *TN*, I, 461-2 (tr. 646-7); *FS*, 122 (tr. 236-7), seems to date this to Iltutmish's era.

~tribute from, independent Hindu principalities. That the Muslim ruler had a further duty to eradicate infidelity and humiliate his Hindu subjects was a view expressed with particular frequency and stridency by Barani, both in the *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* and in his *Fatawa-yi Jahandari*, a mirror for princes composed a few years later.⁶ To what extent these policies were actually implemented within the Sultanate is the question to which we now turn.

Hindus in the service of Islam

It comes as no surprise to find Hindus carrying on their normal avocations in the service, and for the benefit, of their Muslim rulers. The Turko-Persian nobility in the thirteenth-century Sultanate accumulated enormous debts to Hindu bankers and brokers, the 'Multanis' and *sdhs*, who could still be numbered among the sultan's wealthiest and most important subjects in the wake of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's economic reforms.⁷ A Hindu chieftain, Sadharana, is said to have served as 'Ala' al-Din's treasurer.⁸ Moving down the social scale, the sultans depended, for their ambitious construction projects, on a host of Hindu labourers (70,000 of them in the service of 'Ala' al-Din, if we can believe Barani),⁹ who were doubtless usually slaves. But these projects also relied on the expertise of a lesser number of master craftsmen, like 'Mokha Mehta, son of Keta Mehta the Indian' who is commemorated in an inscription dated 740/1340 in the mosque at Baroda,¹⁰ and the masons recruited to repair the Qutb Minar.¹¹ Such skilled artisans seem to have been rewarded with immunities, as was the Hindu carpenter to whom the sultan's governor of Bijapur in 1320 granted an estate free of taxes and other incidents for his services in the construction of the great mosque.¹² Members of the Hindu clerical class, too, were needed to staff the administration, even if under the supervision of Muslim ministers and officials: a Hindu clerk in the service of Qutb al-Din Khalji wrote a treatise on the operation of the mint in 1318,¹³ and another, Gujar Sah, was responsible for overseeing the introduction of a new coin, the *shashgani*,

⁶ See especially *FJ*, 165.

⁷ *TFS*, 120, 284. For the Multanis, see further *ibid.*, 311, 385; and for the *sahs* of Deogir, *IB*, IV, 49 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 794-5).

⁸ Pandit Ram Karna, 'Ladnu inscription of Sadharana of Vikrama samvat 1373', *El* 12 (1913-14), 19 (verse 13).

⁹ *TFS*, 341.

¹⁰ *ARIE* (1963-4), 125 (no. 85); for the Sanskrit portion of this epigraph, see *ARIE* (1961-2), 143 (no. 1311).

¹¹ P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 21-2, 32-5 (nos. 1:9 and 1:14).

¹² Nazim, *Inscriptions of Bijapur*, 25.

¹³ V. S. Agarwala, 'A unique treatise on medieval Indian coins', in H. K. Sherwani (ed.), *Dr. Ghulam Yazdani commemoration volume* (Hyderabad, AP, 1966), 87-101. G. H. Khare, 'Dravyapariksha of Thakkura Pheru - a study', *JNSI28* (1966), 25-37.

~under the Tughluqid Firuz Shah.¹⁴ The sultans relied, lastly, on members of the Hindu menial class for the execution of Muslim and Hindu rebels alike.¹⁵

It was the same in the military sphere, where the sultans, like their Ghaznawid predecessors, maintained bodies of Hindu as well as Turkish troops. The slave infantry-guards and paiks in the sultan's entourage may well have come to enjoy the kind of privileged status that had belonged to Turkish ghulams for much of the thirteenth century. Prior to the Khalji era the evidence is sketchy: we know, for instance, only that Balaban, prior to his accession, was attended by a body of a thousand paiks.¹⁶ 'Ala' al-Din Khalji is known to have recruited some two thousand paiks at Kara for his expedition to Deogir in 695/1296,¹⁷ and

they presumably remained in his service when he became sultan later that year. In the face of a bid by his nephew Ikit Khan to kill him and seize the throne, 'Ala' al-Din was defended by an Indian slave, Nanak (subsequently raised to the rank of malik), and by his paiks.¹⁸ When after his death his minister Malik Kafur, himself a converted Hindu slave, set aside the late sultan's adult sons and tried to rule through one of the younger princes, it was 'Ala' al-Din's old paiks again who in 715/1316 killed Kafur and secured the throne for Qutb al-Din; although as a result, says Barani, they started to give themselves intolerable airs and had to be suppressed.¹⁹ Qutb al-Din himself, however, like his father, may have maintained a body of paiks.²⁰ Even the sternly Muslim Firuz Shah, whose mother was the daughter of a Bhatti chieftain from the Panjab, employed members of his maternal kin: on one occasion, when his life was threatened by a conspiracy, he was attended by his uncle, Rai Pheru ('Bhiru') Bhatti, who lent him his sword.²¹ In only a few instances - that of Khusraw Khan, for example, in sharp contrast with his Parwari followers - do we know that these Indian servitors converted to Islam.

Patronage of Hindus is associated particularly with the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq. Jain sources repeatedly mention the sultan's favour towards Jain scholars.²² Of the lowborn officers listed by Barani whom Muhammad appointed to administrative positions, some were Hindus (above, pp. 185-6). It is very probable that by Muhammad's death the position of the capital's Brahmins, at least, as representatives of the Hindu population had been in some way regularized, since we are told that on Firuz Shah's entry into Delhi Brahmins were among those admitted to perform obeisance to the new sovereign;²³ this is not mentioned in connection with any earlier accession.

¹⁴ 'Afif, 344-9.

¹⁵ E.g. TN, II, 82 (tr. 855); IB, III, 298, 339-40 (tr. Gibb, 700, 719-20).

¹⁶ *TFS*, 55.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 222.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 273. For Nanak, see above, p. 175.

¹⁹ *TFS*, 376-7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 392.

²¹ 'Afif, 103-4.

²² Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, chapter 11, with full references.

²³ *TFS*, 546. 'Afif, 88.

~We have only meagre evidence for the attitudes of the Sultanate's Hindu subjects towards their Muslim rulers. The significance of inscriptions in which the victorious (and sometimes fictitious) exploits of the 'Saka' kings are extolled is open to question.²⁴ An anecdote related by Ibn Battuta may carry greater weight. He tells how a Hindu chief brought a charge against Muhammad b. Tughluq himself that he had killed his (the chief's) brother without cause, and cited him to appear before the qadi. The sultan duly went, unarmed and on foot, having in advance forbidden the qadi to show him any of the deference due to his rank, and remained standing while the qadi gave judgement against him and ordered him to make reparation to his accuser.²⁵ This is an isolated instance, and the purpose of the story is to highlight the sultan's humility and sense of equity; but it harmonizes with the general picture of Muhammad as a ruler who, in the first half of his reign, took care to cultivate the Hindu. And if it embodies authentic fact, it demonstrates that one Hindu, of some standing, recognized the authority of the Muslim qadi.²⁶

As early as Iltutmish's reign, the sultans are soon found adopting practices that were distinctively Indian, as for example riding elephants on ceremonial occasions, consulting astrologers and taking horoscopes in advance of important occasions like an enthronement, and so on. Cultural borrowings of this

kind by Muslim rulers cannot be taken, of course, as a sign of accommodation with the infidel; they represent merely an adaptation to Indian conditions (in much the same way as the first-generation immigrants Fakhr-i Mudabbir and Juzjani employ the name of the Hindu month Ahar).²⁷ Nevertheless, the fact that in some degree they conducted their public lives in an Indian idiom may have facilitated the acceptance of Muslim monarchs by Hindu chiefs.²⁸

The problem of 'protection' and the *jizya*

Generally speaking, then, Hindus of diverse categories seem to have shown themselves indispensable to the exercise of Islamic government and to the maintenance of Islamic institutions. But what was their status under Islamic rule? According to the Shari'a, the 'people of the Book' (*ahl al-kitab*) - those possessing scriptures which were seen as an inadequate expression of the truth contained in the Qur'an - were to be treated as 'protected peoples' (*ahl al-dhimma* or *dhimmis*), once they had capitulated and accepted Muslim

²⁴ Palam *baoli* inscription of V.s. 1333/1276, in P. Prasad, *Sanskrit inscriptions*, 3-15 (no. 1:4).

²⁵ IB, III, 285 (tr. Gibb, 692-3).

²⁶ Hardy, 'Growth of authority', 194.

²⁷ Horoscopes etc.: *TN*, I, 449 (tr. 623); *TFS*, 142, 456; *FS*, 393-4 (tr. 598-9); *TMS*, 79. Ahar: *SA*, 31 (text reads 'HA in error'); *TN*, II, 21 (tr. 748).

²⁸ Hardy, 'Growth of authority', 201, and 'Authority of Muslim kings', 49.

~government.²⁹ The term 'people of the Book' was originally meant to apply to the monotheistic Christians and Jews, but the mention in the Qur'an of a third, somewhat obscure people, the Sabians, enabled the Muslim authorities to extend the category of *dhimmis* to the Zoroastrians in Iran. *Dhimmis* had the right to practise their own faith, but they were not allowed to proselytize or to construct new places of worship. They were also subject to the *jizya*, a capitation-tax in lieu of the military service performed by adult male Muslims. In addition, at different times in different parts of the Islamic world rulers had introduced discriminatory laws regulating the dress of *dhimmis*, forbidding them to ride horses or to bear weapons, and so on. Muslim legal scholars differed over the rights *dhimmis* might enjoy, thus the Hanafi school, which was dominant in the Sultanate, is alone in setting the blood-money for a *dhimmi* at the same level as that for a Muslim.³⁰

Whether the polytheists who confronted the Muslim conquerors within the Indian subcontinent could be classed as a 'people of the Book' might appear at first sight to be a moot question. But in fact Baladhuri's *Futuh al-Buldan*, one of the principal sources for the Muslim conquest of Sind in the early eighth century, tells us that the Arab general Muhammad b. Qasim treated the idol-houses (*budd*) on a par with Christian churches, Jewish synagogues, or Zoroastrian fire-temples.³¹ The term *dhimmi* was extended to embrace Hindu princes and their peoples who submitted and offered tribute, so that we read of the acceptance of *dhimma* status by the inhabitants of Dvarasamudra in 711/1311-12, the ruler of Tilang in 718/1318, and the rai of Nagarkot in c. 766/1364-5.³² The list of those prepared to recognize the Sultanate's Hindu subjects as *dhimmis* includes not merely Hasan-i Nizami, Juzjani, 'Afif, Ibn Mahru, 'Abd al-Hamid Ghaznawi and the anonymous author of the *Sirat*, but also Barani, who as we shall see was by no means well disposed towards even the submissive infidel, and the supposedly uncompromising Tughluqid Sultan Firuz Shah in his *Futuhat*, drafted originally as an inscription and hence for public consumption.³³ Even a legal text of Firuz Shah's reign includes several references to *dhimmis*, by which it clearly means Hindus.³⁴

²⁹ For what follows, see Cl. Cahen, 'Dhimma', *Enc. Isl.*²; Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton, 1984), chapter 1 (*for jizya*, see especially 14-16).

³⁰ E. Tyan, 'Diya', *Enc. Isl.*², III, 341. For a classic restatement of the disabilities to which *dhimmis* were subject according to the 'Covenant of 'Umar', see Sayyid 'Ali Hamadani (d. 786/1385), *Dhakirat al-Muluk*, ed. Sayyid Mahmud Anwari (Tabriz, 1358 Sh./1979), 285-7; tr. in De Bary, 489-90.

³¹ Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan*, ed. De Goeje, 439/ed. al-Munajjid, 538.

³² Dvarasamudra: *KF*, 132, 135, 136. Tilang: *NS*, 116, 129. Nagarkot: *SFS*, 82. Cf. also *DR*, 46.

³³ *Taj*, fols. 149a, 155a. *TN*, II, 79. 'Afif, 180, 264. *IM*, 63, 102. *DA*, fols. 32b, 33b-34a (tr. Rashid, 64, 65-6). *TFS*, 290, 586. *SFS*, 129, 167. *FFS*, 9, 10, 16 (tr. Roy, 456, 458, 462).

³⁴ *Fatawa-yi Firuz-Shahi*, IOL Persian ms. 2987 (Ethe, no. 2564), fols. 410a, 412a, 414, 416a, 418b, 419a.

~That the Indian polytheists who submitted to Islamic rule qualified, therefore, as 'protected peoples' seems to have won acceptance among a fairly wide spectrum of the educated Muslim community within the subcontinent. But the precise nature of the disabilities to be imposed on the infidel was a more difficult matter. Early in the thirteenth century, Fakhr-i Mudabbir dedicated to Iluttmish his *Adab al-Harb wa'l-Shaja'a* or *Adab al-Muluk*, a manual of statecraft for kings which is largely concerned with military matters. In chapter 26 he reviews the principles and practice of Islamic governments regarding their non-Muslim subjects, and lists the restrictions under which such people should live: their adornment (*zayn*), dress (*jama*) and deportment (*nishast*) are to be different from those of Muslims. He also lists the categories of people who should pay the jizya, which includes Jews, Christians, Sabians, Zoroastrians (*mugh*) and 'idola-tors' (*butparastan*).³⁵ This could be taken as evidence that Hindus were acceptable in the eyes of the Ghurid conquerors of India as payers of the poll-tax; though it has been pointed out that the *Adab al-Harb* is not a legal text and that it contains no explicit statement that Hindus are to be classed as dhimmis.³⁶

Given the political circumstances prevailing in Muslim-ruled India in Fakhr-i Mudabbir's time, how, where and upon whom was the jizya levied? We might expect some assistance in tackling the problem from the accounts that have come down to us of the Muslim conquest of Sind in the eighth century, and which could have served the thirteenth-century conquerors for precedent. Unfortunately, the conquest of Sind preceded the emergence of a clear differentiation between the jizya and the kharaj. The earliest chronicles therefore afford us no real assistance. Baladhuri's *Futuh al-Buldan* says, in the course of an otherwise full narrative, merely that Muhammad b. Qasim imposed the kharaj - either the land-tax or just tribute - on the vanquished city of Alor.³⁷ Not until a century later, in the caliphate of al-Mu'tasim (218-27/833-42), do we find the Muslim governor of Sind taking jizya, in this case from the Jats.³⁸ It is true that a later source, the *Chach-Nama*, which purports to be a Persian translation, drawn up in Sind in 613/ 1216-17, of an Arabic history of the Islamic conquest of the region, shows jizya being levied at the very outset. Here Muhammad b. Qasim is alleged to have agreed that the inhabitants of Brahmanabad were to be regarded as dhimmis and imposed on them a graduated tax in accordance with the tradition (*sunan*) of the Prophet.³⁹ The reliability of the *Chach-Nama* is admittedly open to question. Dismissed by S. H. Hodivala in 1939 as 'every whit as unhistorical as the similar lucubrations of Sanskrit poems and

³⁵ *AH*, 404-5.

³⁶ Hardy, 'Growth of authority', 205-6.

³⁷ Baladhuri, *Futuh al-Buldan*, ed. De Goeje, 439/ed. al-Munajjid, 538.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, ed. De Goeje, 445-6/ed. al-Munajjid, 544.

³⁹ *CN*, 158-9. See also N. A. Baloch, 'Early advent and consolidation of Islam in the lands of Pakistan', *HI* 3 (1980), 66.

~Rajput bards,⁴⁰ the work has more recently been rehabilitated, and it is now believed to incorporate material from a lost Arabic historical tradition, most probably the ninth-century chronicle of al-Mada'inl. Nevertheless, the data on the poll-tax are undoubtedly, anachronistic; and Dr Peter Hardy has proposed that this kind of testimony in the *Chach-Nama* was designed to justify what had become standard practice by the early thirteenth century. If he is right, this means at least that the jizya was being levied in

Sind on the very eve of the creation of the Delhi Sultanate.⁴¹

It is some measure of the problems surrounding the jizya that one of our most important sources, Juzjani's *Tabaqat*, neglects even to mention it. The term surfaces fitfully in the sources for the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Sultanate, but it evidently carries a variety of meanings.⁴² At times the usage is bizarre, as when the jizya is allegedly taken from a rebel Muslim commander in the breakaway Deccan Sultanate or demanded from a Muslim mystic (*darwish*).⁴³ The phrase *kharaj-u jizya* has contributed to the confusion. Amir Khusraw uses it in a general sense, to mean tribute payable, for instance, by the enemy's paiks, and such is clearly the sense also in Barani's *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi*.⁴⁴ According to the *Fatawa-yi Jahandari*, Hindu rais levy the jizya and the kharaj from their own people.⁴⁵ In none of these instances can we discern the lineaments of the Islamic poll-tax.

Fakhr-i Mudabbir distinguishes two kinds of jizya. One is the tribute (*gazid*) agreed upon as the price for a cessation of hostilities. The other type of jizya is the sum levied by a Muslim sovereign upon the wealth - the houses, estates and moveables (*khdna-u diya'-u 'aqar*) - of individual infidels, and is graded. The annual rates given in the *Adah al-Harb* are precisely those specified in the *Chach-Nama*, namely forty-eight silver *dirhams* for the richest, twenty-four for those of middling wealth, and twelve for the poorest.⁴⁶ Ghaznawi, who here evidently follows Fakhr-i Mudabbir and gives the same figures, equates the first type of jizya with the *kharaj-i muqasima* (i.e. the land-tax proper). He also writes of two kinds of tribute: that rendered when a Muslim army has actually taken up its quarters in the infidel kingdom, which he classes merely as booty (*ghanima*), and that offered prior to a Muslim invasion, which he calls *jizya*. At another point he is prepared to class as jizya even money and gifts despatched

⁴⁰ Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 83-4.

⁴¹ See P. Hardy, 'Is the *Chach-nama* intelligible to the historian as political theory?', in Khuhra (ed.), *Sind through the centuries*, 116-17; *idem*, 'Djizya, iii. India', *Enc Isl.*²; also Yohanan Friedmann, The origins and significance of the *Chach-nama*, in Friedmann (ed.), *Islam in Asia*, I, 23-37; Wink, *Al-Hind*, I, 192-6.

⁴² For what follows, see especially Hardy, 'Djizya'; I. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 67.

⁴³ *FS*, 602 (tr. 888). Amir Hasan Dihlawi, *Fawaidal-Fu'ad*, 233.

⁴⁴ *RI*, I, 33, and IV, 140. *TFS*, 291, 574. *TMS*, 147. This is what misled Lal (below, n.49).

⁴⁵ *FJ*, 166.

⁴⁶ *AH*, 404. *CN*, 158.

~intermittently by infidel princes.⁴⁷ It is clearly jizya in the sense of tribute - a share of the land-revenue, surrendered by a Hindu rai - that was imposed, for instance, on King Rudradeva of Arangal in the course of Malik Kafur's expedition in 710/1310-11 and again when Khusraw Khan invaded his dominions in 718/1318.⁴⁸

Certain historians have assumed that the jizya was levied on the subject Hindu population throughout the era of the Delhi Sultanate.⁴⁹ This seems unlikely. One relevant consideration is that the jizya was a tax in lieu of military service and that - unlike Jews and (at least during this period) Christians in other Islamic polities - Hindus, as we have seen, frequently fought in the ranks of Muslim armies; this would have warranted the suspension of the tax in Muslim India.⁵⁰ More relevantly, it has been argued that the logistics of collection, involving enormous numbers of tax-payers and given the relatively unsophisticated administrative apparatus of even a medieval Islamic state, must have presented an insuperable obstacle.⁵¹ On such grounds, it has seemed natural to conclude that the jizya did not exist as a distinct tax but was subsumed within the kharaj or land-tax.⁵² Ghaznawi indeed envisaged that the two might be consolidated as a single tax; though he urged that the respective proportions should be clearly defined.⁵³

Perhaps a distinction can be drawn between the Hindus of the rural areas and those living in the Muslim-held towns and fortresses. In the case of the former, the jizya may have been perceived as forming part of the land-tax or tribute rendered up by the chiefs;⁵⁴ and this would make sense of the perplexing remark cited above, from Barani's *Fatawa*, that Hindu kings (i.e. those tributary to the Muslim sovereign) exacted kharaj and jizya from their own subjects. On the other hand, Barani attributes to Jalal al-Din Khalji a speech in which he refers to the paltry sums he accepts as *sadaqa* from the

⁴⁷ DA, fols. 35a-36b (tr. Rashid, 67-8).

⁴⁸ 1311: KF, 111. 1318: NS, 84, 121. For jizya as tribute, see also QS, 35, 63; NS, 84, 121; FS, 275, 402 (tr. 450, 608-9); cf. also 35-7 (tr. 84-5), for a similar usage apropos of the Ghaznavid era, and 596 (tr. 879), where we are clearly dealing with the payment of two years' kharaj and the promise of future tribute (*sa-u baj*). Likewise, IB, IV, 231 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 877), speaks of jizya being paid to the Muslim ruler of Sumatra by his infidel neighbours.

⁴⁹ Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 184-5 (context is 'Ala' al-Din's reign). U. N. Day, *Administrative system of Delhi Sultanat (1206-1413 A.D.)* (Allahabad, 1959), 106; in his *The government of the Sultanate* (New Delhi, 1972; 2nd edn 1993), 91-2, Day is more non-committal, though without implying that the tax was introduced at a late stage. Zafarul Islam, 'Firuz Shah's attitude towards non-Muslims - a reappraisal', IC 64 (1990), part 4, 66, sees the jizya imposed in Firuz Shah's era as 'a revived impost'.

⁵⁰ Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic culture*, 80-1: the context is the reign of the Mughal emperor Akbar.

⁵¹ Hardy 'Djizya', and 'Authority of Muslim kings', 48.

⁵² Nizami, *Some aspects of religion and politics*, 314-15. See also Qureshi, *Administration of the Sultanate*, 119.

⁵³ DA, fol. 34a (tr. Rashid, 66).

⁵⁴ This suggestion was made by Habibullah, *Foundation*, 250.

~Hindus of the capital. *Sadaqa* normally denotes the alms paid by Muslims, of course, and its use here is a piece of irony, to suggest that the Muslim sovereign is in receipt of the unbeliever's charity. The payment referred to may be the jizya.⁵⁵ Conceivably the urban Hindu populace - artisans, members of guilds, shopkeepers, and so on - who were in more direct contact with the Muslim fiscal authorities, had to pay on an individual basis, i.e. a true poll-tax. It is surely no accident that Fakhr-i Mudabbir, in the passage quoted earlier, speaks of the imposition of the canonical jizya in the context of the surrender of a town.⁵⁶ As far as I am aware, this solution to the problem has not been proposed before, but I offer it for what it is worth (which, in the absence of strong textual backing, is not much). Whatever the truth, however, we first meet with incontrovertible evidence of the jizya as a discriminatory tax on individual non-Muslims only in the reign of Firuz Shah (752-90/1351-88).

Firuz Shah's anonymous biographer assures us of that sultan's concern to impose no more than the canonical taxes, including 'the jizya of the Hindus' (*jizya-yi Hunud*).⁵⁷ According to Afif, he was the first monarch to impose the jizya on the Brahmans, who had hitherto been exempt. (It is uncertain whether this means that the jizya had actually been levied on other Hindu groups prior to Firuz Shah's time, or merely that the sultan had himself excepted the Brahmans on a previous occasion, when imposing the tax on the rest of Hindu society.) The Brahmans were scandalized and assembled outside his palace, threatening to burn themselves to death. The sultan told them that they had better get on with it, since this was the only way they would avoid payment - a somewhat cavalier response which gave no grounds for optimism. But a crisis was averted when the principal Hindu residents of the capital came forward with the offer to pay the tax on the Brahmans' behalf. Firuz Shah in turn was ready to be more conciliatory, and taxed the Brahmans at the lowest point on the scale, though using a *tanga* of different value.⁵⁸ In his autobiography, Firuz Shah mentions the jizya among the canonical sources of revenue permitted to a Muslim ruler, speaks of the

Hindus as submitting to the tax in return for protection of their property, and claims to have won over countless Hindus to the true faith with an edict promising them release from the jizya if they would convert.⁵⁹

^cAfif appears to specify that the rates he cites (ranging from twenty to forty *tongas*) applied in Delhi. There is also evidence, however, from at least one province for the imposition of the jizya during Firuz Shah's reign. The tax is referred to twice in the correspondence of one of the sultan's officers, ^cAyn al-Mulk Ibn Mahrti, governor of Sind. In the first case ^cAyn al-Mulk

55 *TFS*, 217. Cf. the remark in *FJ*, 167, that the infidels pay 'a few *tangas* by way of jizya'.

56 *AH*, 404.

57 *SFS*, 125.

58 ^cAfif, 382-4. For the significance of this passage, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 336-7.

59 *FFS*, 6, 9, 16-17 (tr. Roy, 453, 456, 462).

responds to protests at an increase in the jizya levied on Hindu shopkeepers.⁶⁰ Later he refers to the fact that the sultan had allocated to a military officer, as his stipend, the jizya paid by the peasants of a certain district. The terms used show (a) that the tax was related to the protection of the dhimmi and (b) that the owner (*malik*) of the land (in this case the qadis of Thanesar) had no claim upon it.⁶¹ This excludes any possibility that we are dealing with the ordinary land-tax. The balance of the evidence, consequently, is that in the latter half of the fourteenth century, if not before, the jizya was levied as a discriminatory tax on non-Muslims;⁶² though even then it is difficult to see how such a measure could have been enforced outside the principal centres of Muslim authority.

Latitude towards Hindu religious practice

There is little information in the sources about the attitude of the sultans towards Hindu religious observance in general; and most of the evidence comes from the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq, who was hardly typical. Muhammad was notoriously interested in Hindu practices. He is charged by 'Isami, admittedly no friend of the sultan, with attending the Hindu religious festival of Holi and (as Ibn Battuta confirms) with frequenting the company of jogis.⁶³ Ibn Battuta observes that the sultan's permission was required for the ceremony of *sati* ('suttee'), the burning of a widow on her husband's funeral-pyre.⁶⁴

Otherwise, the limited material at our disposal is concerned with the construction or repair of Hindu temples. We saw earlier how in strict Islamic law it was not permissible for Hindus to build new idol-temples or to restore those that had been destroyed. That this was being disregarded, however, - in ^cAla' al-Din Khalji's reign is clear from Jain works which praise Alp Khan, his governor in Gujarat, for permitting the reconstruction of temples destroyed during the Muslim conquest.⁶⁵ Fuller testimony is provided by an inscription of 1326 from the Deccan. During the rebellion of Baha' al-Din Garshasp, the governor of Kalyani, Ahmad Jajneri, was called away; and in the ensuing upheavals a Hindu temple at Kalyani was damaged and the Siva *linga* was broken. Local Hindu notables, headed by the person in charge of the management of the temple, therefore approached the governor on his return and sought his permission for the repair of the temple and the resumption of the worship of the god. Ahmad Jajneri consulted his secretary, whose name is certainly not a Muslim one, and granted permission, adding that since the worship of the god was a duty it

⁶⁰ *IM*, 48.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 62-3.

⁶² See also Zakir Husain, 'Some original Tughluq documents and their significance', *PIHC* 50. (*Gorakhpur 1989*) (Delhi, 1990), 222.

⁶³ *FS*, 515 (tr. 765). *IB*, IV, 36, 38-9 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 788, 789-90).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 137 (tr. Gibb, 614).

⁶⁵ Misra, *Rise of Muslim power*, 68-9.

was right that the petitioners should pursue it. This testimony has been cited as indicating the existence of a striking degree of tolerance.⁶⁶ But it comes, of course, like the material relating to Alp Khan, from a region that had only recently come under direct Muslim rule, and one where the sultan's authority must have been highly precarious. It does not tell us what might have been the response had a similar situation arisen in a core territory like Hariyana.

We have, in fact, other evidence for the latitude enjoyed by local Hindu religious authorities at this time. Ibn Battuta writes of an embassy from 'the king of China' (i.e. the Mongol Yuan emperor) to Muhammad b. Tughluq, requesting permission for the reconstruction of a temple in the Sambhal region which had allegedly been sacked by a Muslim army. The envoys were told in reply that permission to restore such temples within Muslim territory could be given only to those who paid the *jizya* (and not, in other words, to infidels resident in the *Dar al-Harb*).⁶⁷ The authenticity of this embassy is questionable, and it is in any case conceivable that Ibn Battuta, as an outsider, misconstrued the state of affairs. But the likelihood is that his testimony regarding the reconstruction of idol-temples is reliable. For indeed Firuz Shah claims that prior to his accession *new* temples had been built in Delhi and its environs - contrary, of course, to the *Shari'a*.⁶⁸ Of this there survives, unfortunately, only meagre direct evidence. An inscription shows that a new temple was built at Revasa, in the Nagawr region, in 1326;⁶⁹ a fragment of a bilingual inscription, in Sanskrit and Persian, of uncertain date but very probably from the Sultanate period, records the purchase of twelve *bighas* of land near the Qil'a Kuhna in Delhi itself and the erection of the temple of Sri Krishna Bhagwan.⁷⁰

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that such foundations received endowments from the Muslim authorities. Alp Khan is said to have made a donation towards the repair of Jain temples in Gujarat;⁷¹ but otherwise the large numbers of documents that attest the conferment of land and tax exemptions by Muslim kings on Brahmins, Jains, jogis and Parsis and on temples to Siva and Visnu tend to originate from the Mughal emperors and their contemporaries in the successor-states to the Delhi Sultanate. Although many of these confer new revenues, some are clearly renewals or extensions of grants made by Muslim rulers of an earlier era.⁷² There are signs of donations of tax-free land (*madad-i ma'ash*) to Brahmins during at

⁶⁶ P. B. Desai, 'Kalyana inscription of Sultan Muhammad', 165-70. See HN,503; also W. H. Siddiqi, 'Religious tolerance as gleaned from medieval inscriptions', in *PSMI*, 54, where the governor is mistakenly identified, however, as Ahmad-i Ayaz, the sultan's future wazir.

⁶⁷ *IB*, IV, 1-2 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 773).

⁶⁸ *FFS*, 9-10 (tr. Roy, 456-8).

⁶⁹ *Progress Report of the ASI (Western Circle)* (1909-10), 52, cited in Welch and Crane, *The Tughluqs: master-builders*, 160 n.11.

⁷⁰ *ASIR* (1909-10), 131.

⁷¹ Misra, *Rise of Muslim power*, 69.

⁷² Ernst, *Eternal garden*, 48-9.

least the period of the Lodi sultans, and it may be that such grants were made by their predecessors also. Professor Siddiqi sees this as the sultans' response to the need to bring 'the countryside with its

influential chiefs **under** effective control'.⁷³

Generally speaking, Firuz Shah's policies weighed more heavily upon the subject Hindu population than those of his predecessors. ^cAfif tells how the sultan burned a Brahman at the palace gates.⁷⁴ Firuz Shah himself, in describing the new temples that had arisen under his predecessors, claims to have set about destroying them and replacing them with mosques, and in **one** instance to have repopulated a township with Muslim settlers.⁷⁵ Two points must be emphasized here. Firstly, these were all new edifices: there was no question of destroying temples and shrines which had already existed before the Islamic conquest and whose devotees lived peacefully **under** Islamic government. And secondly, these events all transpired in the vicinity of Delhi. The sultan's writ would hardly have extended to enforcing such a policy over a wider radius. This is clear from his conduct in sparing **the** idol of Jawalamukhi at Nagarkot, a step that was, in fact, perfectly in keeping with the policy of earlier Muslim rulers. But it was difficult to reconcile with his iconoclastic image, and gave rise to rumours spread by 'certain infidels' - and which 'Afif was at pains to refute - that the sultan had paid his respects to the idol and unfurled a chatr over its head.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, whatever qualifications are made as to scale, it cannot be denied that Firuz Shah's reign witnessed a reaction against previous regimes. After his death, the Hindus' situation may have deteriorated further in certain regions: a temple at Ketlai, in the Gurga'un district, was destroyed in 795/1392 and replaced by a mosque.⁷⁷

Hindu-Muslim relations: an assessment

In relating military encounters with the Hindu, the narrative sources abound in unflattering, if conventional, allusions: one of the most frequent is the description of the enemy as 'crow-faced (*zagh-chihra*)',⁷⁸ But at times a more neutral tone is heard. Juzjani hoped that the qualities of King Laksmanasena of Bengal, who had gained a reputation for justice and

⁷³ I. H. Siddiqui, 'Wajh-i Ma'ash grants under the Afghan kings (1451-1555)', *MIM* 2 (1972), 21, 36. For the Mughal era, see B. N. Goswamy and J. S. Grewal (eds.), *The Mughals and the Jogis of Jakhbar* (Simla, 1967): evidence from the regional sultanates in the pre-Mughal period is given *ibid.*, 20.

⁷⁴ ^cAfif, 379-81.

⁷⁵ *FFS*, 9-10 (tr. Roy, 456-8).

⁷⁶ ^cAfif, 186-7. The sparing of the idol is mentioned briefly in *SFS*, 83.

⁷⁷ *ARIE* (1963-4), 146 (no. D286).

⁷⁸ Annemarie Schimmel, 'Turk and Hindu: a poetical image and its application to historical fact', in Speros Vryonis, Jr (ed.), *Islam and cultural change in the Middle Ages* (Wiesbaden, 1975), 107-26: see esp. 109-16.

generosity, would earn him alleviation of his torments in Hell.⁷⁹ When Toghril Khan Yuzbeg, the muqta^c of Lakhnawti, repudiated the sovereignty of Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud (c. 652/1254), says the same author, his action incurred the disapproval of Hindus and Muslims alike within the Sultanate.⁸⁰ Amir Khusraw has been singled out as one who in his *Nuh Sipihr* drew attention to the kinship between certain Hindu religious beliefs and those of Islam.⁸¹ At the tragic death of Balaban's son Muhammad in battle with the Mongols, wrote Khusraw, 'the Hindu lost his blackness and the Turk his whiteness'. Literary device this may be; but the implication is that Khusraw, like Juzjani, thought the Hindu's view could be taken on board. And it seems that the Hindu merited a place in the divine dispensation when compared with other pagans. The Mongols, who were viewed as harbingers of the last things (p. 113 above), were described in much more opprobrious terms than were the Hindus in Indo-Muslim writings. Khusraw derived some satisfaction from the fact that Providence had used ^cAla' al-Din's infidel general Nanak to defeat the infidel Mongols.⁸² Legal texts of the fourteenth century reveal a concern about the relations of ordinary Muslims with the Hindu population. The *Fatawa-yi Firuz-Shah*, in particular, pronounces on the proper conduct of social intercourse with Hindus, the right treatment of Hindu parents by a Muslim son, the equal rights of

Hindu and Muslim creditors, and so on.⁸³

All this might seem to stand in sharp contrast with the tone adopted by Barani. A theme that recurs frequently in Barani's writings is that the infidels must on no account be allowed to live in ease and affluence. In the preface to his life of the Prophet, *Na't-i Muhammadi*, he cites a dispute that allegedly took place at the court of Ilutmish a century and a quarter earlier. When the 'ulama' declared that the Hindus had no right to be treated as 'Peoples of the Book' and should be given only the choice between death and Islam, the sultan's wazir Junaydi is said to have agreed with them. But, he continued, such a course would be highly impolitic, given that the Muslims were still few in number, and its implementation should be deferred until they were in a stronger position. The 'ulama' thereupon insisted that the sultan should at least refrain from treating Hindus with honour or permitting idolatry in the capital. But it was because of this failure to slaughter the Hindus, says Barani, that polytheism had taken root.⁸⁴ This is echoed in another hypothetical conversation from the same

⁷⁹ *TN*, I, 425 (tr. 555-6).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 32 (tr. 764).

⁸¹ Yohanan Friedmann, 'Medieval Muslim views of Indian religions', *JAOS* 95 (1975), 216-17.

⁸² *WH*, IOL Persian ms. 412, fol. 135a. *KF*, 38. *DR*, 61. The comparison with the treatment of the Mongols is made in Hardy, 'Growth of authority', 193.

⁸³ Z. Islam, '*Fatawa Firuz Shahi* as a source', 105-7.

⁸⁴ Barani, *Na't-i Muhammadi*, RRL Pers. ms. 1295, fols. 195b-196a; tr. in S. Nurul Hasan, 'Sahifa-i-Na't-i-Muhammadi of Zia-ud-Din Barani', *MIQ* 1 (1950), 101-3 (Pers. text at 104-5).

era which is found in Barani's *Ta'rikh*. The sign that a ruler protects the true faith, Sayyid Nur al-Din Ghaznawi tells Ilutmish, is that when he spies a Hindu his face grows red and he wants to bury him alive. If the polytheists are so numerous that the Muslim ruler cannot possibly eradicate them, then at the very least he should strive to insult them and bring disgrace, dishonour and ignominy upon them.⁸⁵ And the same theme recurs in a speech attributed to one of 'Ala' al-Din Khalji's advisers, Qadi Mughith al-Din of Bhayana. In answer to a question from the sultan about the status of the Hindu in the Sharia as regards taxation, the qadi asserts that when the tax-collector demands silver from the Hindu he should mildly, humbly and respectfully hand over gold; and if the tax-collector throws dirt in his mouth, he should open his mouth to receive it.⁸⁶

Such views are commonly encountered in polemical writing against the infidel in different parts of the Islamic world at different times.⁸⁷ But there are other notions that are peculiar to Barani himself. For Barani, it is one of the primary duties of Muslim kings to redeem the inherently sinful and evil nature of kingship by rooting out paganism, polytheism and idolatry.⁸⁸ The Hindus are the worst enemies of God and his Prophet.⁸⁹ Indeed, the Prophet had commanded that they were to be looted and enslaved or killed.⁹⁰ The Brahmans in particular, who are the leaders and instigators of idolatry, should be massacred.⁹¹ Only the Hanafi school of law allows that the Hindus qualify to pay the *jizya*; the founders of all the other schools insist that the sole choice to be offered to Hindus is Islam or death.⁹² Much of this is blatantly unhistorical. In his *Fatawa-yi Jahandari*, which masquerades as a political testament from Mahmud of Ghazna, Barani makes further statements that are equally dubious. Had Mahmud invaded India just once more, he would have slaughtered all the Brahmans and beheaded 200,000 or 300,000 Hindu chiefs (an intriguing demographic statistic).⁹³ Mahmud is said to have confided to Qadir Khan, the Qarakhanid ruler of Kashghar, his fear that on the Day of Judgement he would be asked why he had not killed the Brahmans⁹⁴ - and this when the real Mahmud had been condemned by contemporary Muslim chroniclers for employing infidel Hindu troops against fellow Muslims during his campaigns in Persia.⁹⁵

Yet Barani's antipathy towards the infidel Hindu can be overstated. For all his railings, he is evidently aware that the contradiction between the demands of orthodox Islam and the situation in India

cannot be resolved.⁹⁶ Moreover, he does permit himself the occasional neutral reference to the

⁸⁵ TFS, 41-2.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 290.

⁸⁷ For examples, see Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 32ff.

⁸⁸ TFS, 41. See generally Hardy, 'Oratio recta', 319.

⁸⁹ TFS, 42, 290; *Na^ct-i Muhammadi*, fols. 195b-196a, tr. Nurul Hasan, 102 (Pers. text 104, 105).

⁹⁰ TFS, 290-1.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 42. *FJ*, 165.

⁹² TFS, 291. Cf. also *FJ*, 18.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 230.

⁹⁵ Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 89, 110.

⁹⁶ I. Habib, 'Barani's theory', 111-13.

Hindus. He thinks it worth mentioning that during the famine of 1291 in Delhi Hindus came in groups of twenty or thirty to throw themselves into the Yamuna.⁹⁷ And he observes that Hindus as well as Muslims prayed for Muhammad b. Tughluq on his accession and rejoiced at the advent of Firuz Shah in 752/1351 and at his safe return from his first Bengal expedition a few years later.⁹⁸ These remarks suggest that, although Barani would not for one second have considered his *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi* as a history of the entire population of the Sultanate, he did not, even so, deem the non-Muslim section of that population to be totally beneath the historian's notice. Perhaps the most arresting indication of a different frame of mind from the polemics outlined above is his statement that he is now ready to contemplate the life of a Brahman.⁹⁹ In other words, he does not at this juncture, as one might expect, hold up as his goal the calling of a sufi. It is possible that in his old age, and confronted by a sharp decline in his material condition, Barani found something to commend in the degree of self-abnegation attained by certain leading exponents of the rival faith.

Whatever the case, Barani's fulminations against gentle treatment of the non-Muslim must be seen for what they are. Not merely were his writings drafted largely from memory by a man advanced in age; not merely do they exhibit at times a lamentable ignorance of history; they are also the product of a courtier who had fallen from favour after the death of Muhammad b. Tughluq and who bitterly resented his change of fortune. Barani wrote, moreover, as the representative of a family that had served Balaban's officers and 'Ala' al-Din Khalji. His paternal ancestors may have been Turkish; more probably they were of Persian stock. His father's mother was of the illustrious lineage of the sayyids of Kaithal.¹⁰⁰ Barani accordingly prides himself on his high birth and has no time for those of lowly origin. Significantly, his list of Muhammad b. Tughluq's lowborn servitors includes not only Hindus but also those who, to judge from their names, had embraced Islam. Professor Irfan Habib has in fact pointed out that, unlike 'Isami, Barani did not attack the sultan for his favour towards Hindus and that his objection to the promotion of these men - Hindu and Muslim alike - was based above all on their humble origins.¹⁰¹ In some measure, certainly, Barani's assertions about the status of the infidel are part of his more general indictment that men of low birth had benefited (and more than he himself had done) from his late master's patronage. But in fact Barani, in his denial that the essentials of Islam can be implanted in the minds of Indian converts, seems to share the prejudice of 'Isami, for whom 'a Hindu ghulam will flee in the end, though he attain the rank of chief *sadr*'.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ *TFS*, 212.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 457, 547, 596. I. Habib, 'Barani's theory', 113.

⁹⁹ *TFS*, 200.

100., *Ibid.*, 350.

101 *Ibid.*, 504-5; and cf. *FS*, 486, 515 (tr. 728, 765). I. Habib, 'Barani's theory', 110.

¹⁰² *FS*, 552 (my translation); cf. also 370 (tr. 571). *FJ*, 105.

It may be possible to identify more general causes of antagonism towards the infidel on the part of Muslim writers and rulers. One may have been a fear of apostasy on the part of ordinary Muslims. Here a parallel offers itself with Western Christian attitudes towards Islam in the Middle Ages. A common theme in Christian polemical writings on Islam and the Muslims is the low standard of sexual morality encouraged by the rival faith, whether on the level of polygamy, concubinage, ease of divorce, and ideas about paradise on the one hand or, on the other, the charge of dark and unnatural practices which would have been harder to substantiate but was no less sinister for being left vague.¹⁰³ In harping on such matters, Christian authors unconsciously testified to the attractive force of a religion that in their eyes was calculated to appeal to the sensual and the self-indulgent. We can, I suggest, detect a parallel phenomenon within Muslim circles in India. Beneath the surface of the political events on which our narrative sources focus lay a substratum of everyday Muslim-Hindu intercourse. Both Muslim and Hindu musicians performed at the celebrations for the marriage of Prince Khidr Khan.¹⁰⁴ Hindus are said to have mingled with Muslims in the crowds that gathered to celebrate the festival of Barat (14 Shaban).¹⁰⁵ Hindus and Muslims sometimes rubbed shoulders at the entrance to the hospices (khanaqahs) of sufi shaykhs.¹⁰⁶ Conversely, many Muslims attached themselves to a group of jogis at Khajuraho (Kajarra) in order to acquire their skills.¹⁰⁷ Muhammad b. Tughluq was only the most eminent figure to share in Hindu festivities: Ibn Battuta saw Muslims in the throng accompanying a widow on her way to be burned, and both Firuz Shah and his biographer accuse ordinary Muslims of participating in Hindu religious rites.¹⁰⁸ The Brahman executed on Firuz Shah's orders was charged not merely with hosting idolatrous ceremonies in his house that were attended by Muslims, but also with inducing a Muslim woman to apostatize.¹⁰⁹

Muslims had been known, moreover, to flee into infidel territory. Some were prominent nobles like those implicated in the conspiracy during the Tilang campaign of 721/1321-2; but there were always renegades like the Muslims, Ibn Battuta claims to have met when captured by Hindus near Jalali.¹¹⁰ For just as Hindu troops fought under the banner of Muslim sultans, so did Muslim soldiers fight for infidel rulers - whether it was the Muslims in the army of the Pandya king of Ma^cbar in 710/1310-11 or, some three decades later, the 20,000 Muslims, 'rascals, criminals and runaway slaves', who are reported in the service of the Hoysala king Ballala III, or

¹⁰³ Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: the making of an image* (Edinburgh, 1960), 135-61.

¹⁰⁴ *TMS*, 79.

¹⁰⁵ ^c Afif, 366.

¹⁰⁶ Troll (ed.) *Muslim shrines*, 7, 14.

¹⁰⁷ *IB*, IV, 40 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 790).

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 137 (tr. Gibb, 614). ^c Afif, 380. *FFS*, 9-10 (tr. Roy, 457). See also Ernst, *Eternal garden*, 27 and 289 n. 107.

¹⁰⁹ ^c Afif, 379-81.

110. IB, IV, 10-11 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 777).

the 'worthless' (*nabakar*) Muslims under the banner of Narayan when he marched against the founder of the Bahmanid dynasty.¹¹¹ In the circumstances, there was perhaps an uneasy sense that the Muslim minority in an overwhelmingly pagan land might be seduced into infidelity. Mihrabi's *Hujjat al-Hind*, a treatise that has survived from the end of the fourteenth century, aims at countering just such apostasy in the countryside.¹¹²

The sultans were undoubtedly also a prey to pressures of a different sort. Historians of the Islamic world, notably Professor Bernard Lewis, have demonstrated that Muslim rulers can never be treated as monolithic in their approach to their non-Muslim subjects. Their policies fluctuated according to circumstance: an external military threat posed by the co-religionists of the subject group in question; the need on the part of the ruler to reassure the Muslim population if it was felt that other confessional groups had benefited from excessive leniency or favour; or simply the desire of a new sultan to buttress an authority that was of doubtful legitimacy with the support of orthodox jurists and preachers.¹¹³ Circumstances of this order cannot be ignored either in an analysis of Hindu-Muslim relations within the Delhi Sultanate. Take, for example, the patronage of Hindus by Muhammad b. Tughluq. Muhammad also made greater efforts than any other Delhi ruler to attract into his service Muslims from every part of the Islamic world (pp. 184-5, 233-4). The paradox here is more apparent than real. These were two arms of a policy which aimed at creating a counterweight to the Indian Muslim nobility, since the Tughluqid dynasty had come to power only a few years previously in the teeth of determined Indian Muslim opposition. We should also bear in mind that a dramatic extension of Muslim power had occurred. The wars of the past three decades had eliminated most of those major independent Hindu kingdoms which might have presented a competing focus of allegiance. It is instructive in this respect to compare the position of Christians in, say, Egypt or Anatolia, where the Muslims could not afford to forget their relations with interested foreign powers. The Delhi Sultan was able to promote Hindu servitors as he did, or patronize Hindu religious establishments when it suited him, precisely because India contained no rival *imperium* like Byzantium or the states of Catholic Europe.¹¹⁴

Firuz Shah, in turn, may well have been a more orthodox and pious figure than his late cousin; but extraneous factors also surely underlay his policies. The sultan's accession had not gone unchallenged; and he was

111 *KF*, 149, and *DR*, 72, for the Pandya army; IB, IV, 195-6 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 861), for that of Ballala III; *FS*, 592 (tr. 873), for Narayan. Other examples in Bouchon, 'Quelques aspects', 30.

112 Peter Hardy, 'Islam and Muslims in South Asia', in Raphael Israeli (ed.), *The crescent in the east: Islam in Asia Major* (London, 1982), 43.

¹¹³ Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 32-61 *passim*.

¹¹⁴ A point well made by Ernst, *Eternal garden*, 50-1.

clearly conscious, moreover, of a need to distance himself from the extravagances of Muhammad, who had clashed with the Islamic 'religious establishment' and executed not a few of its members. It is also important, in this connection, that policies towards dhimmis are not seen in isolation from other measures. They were often linked with attempts to suppress heterodox Muslims or with the abolition of uncanonical taxes, both actions for which Firuz Shah took care to be known and for which he is lauded by his biographer 'Afif.¹¹⁵ A clampdown on the dhimmi, rather than being seen as an end in itself, has to be viewed as part of a broader policy.

I have tried, in examining the all too meagre evidence at our disposal, to offer a perspective on Hindu-Muslim relations which might indicate that conventional formulations will not do. It is impossible to tell how far Barani typified, in his attitude towards the Hindus, the class of Muslim *literati*; and even his outlook was a curious amalgam. But his very stridency at times suggests, and the evidence of other sources

confirms, that there was a wide gulf between Islamic law and the inclinations and practices of rulers and the military class. The sultans were faced with a situation which had not confronted Muslim rulers elsewhere for a few centuries. 'Do you not see,' Barani makes Jalal al-Din Khaljl ask,

'how every day the Hindus ... pass beneath my palace, beating their drums and blowing on their conches, and make their way to the Yamuna to practise their idolatry, and how they fulfil the requirements of polytheism and paganism before my eyes ... - I, who have myself called the ruler of the Muslims and sovereign of Islam? ... Shame on me and on my kingship ... that I permit my name to be recited from the pulpit every Friday and the preachers with their lying tongues to proclaim me as the defender of Islam, when under my rule the enemies of God and of the faith, in my sight and in my capital, live in affluence and ease and surrounded by a thousand luxuries ... and strut about among Muslims and openly practise idolatry' 116.

The speech is apocryphal like all the others, but the words Barani has put into the sultan's mouth have an authentic ring: they describe not what ought to be, but what is. The decisions made by the sultans, of how to comport themselves towards the infidels who represented the majority of their subjects, were informed by more complex considerations than we have often supposed. We surely have to begin with the presumption that within their own dominions, for some of the time, they managed to approach the problem, not as iconoclastic holy warriors, but with a degree of delicacy. Perhaps for them the paramount distinction was not that between Muslim and Hindu (important as that may have been) but between peaceful subject and agent of government on the one hand and troublemaker and rebel on the other.

115 *FFS*, 5-6 (tr. Roy, 453-4). °Afif, 373-9. See generally Z. Islam, 'Firuz Shah's attitude'.

116 *TFS*, 216-17.

CHAPTER 15

Stasis and decline: Firuz Shah and his successors

The contracted Sultanate

To judge from the remarks of the 'official' chronicler, it was a matter of some pride at Firuz Shah's court that Ilyas Shah, the upstart sultan of Bengal, had begun his career as merely the servant of an officer of one of Muhammad b. Tughluq's servitors (see above, p. 267).¹ He was, moreover, a tyrant, and Firuz Shah could not be impervious to the appeals of his wretched subjects for deliverance.² So too, the patents which the new sultan received from the °Abbasid Caliph - judging, again, by the treatment they are accorded in the *Sirat* - had an important share in buttressing the exclusive legitimacy of his government. The Egyptian *shaykh al-shuyukh* Rukn al-Din al-Malati, who had brought a diploma for Muhammad from al-Hakim, left India early in Firuz Shah's reign, arriving back in Cairo early in 754/1353 after an absence of nearly ten years.³ But that same year an embassy arrived in Delhi from the Caliph al-Mu°tadid bi'llah, bringing Firuz Shah a mandate (*manshur*) for the government of India and conferring on him the titles *Sayf al-Khilafat* ('Sword of the Caliphate') and *Qasim Amir al-Mu'minin* ('Partner of the Commander of the Faithful'). In 764/1362-3 the next caliph, al-Mutawakkil ila'llah, despatched another mission to Delhi with a mandate in which Firuz Shah was addressed as *Sayyid al-Salatin* ('Lord of Sultans') and declared to be the caliph's *wali*. Similar embassies followed in 766/1364-5 and, according to the *Sirat*, each year thereafter.⁴ Al-Mutawakkil was at pains to stress that to obey the sultan was to obey

¹ *SFS*, 47.

² *Farman* of Firuz Shah reproduced in *IM*, 16; tr. in Maulavi °Abdu'l Wali, 'Life and letters of Malik °Aynu'l-Mulk Mahru and side-lights on Firuz Shah's expeditions to Lakhnauti and Jajnar', *JASB* ns 19 (1923), 279. *SFS*, 34 (tr. Basu, *JBORS* 23 [1937], 111). °Afif, 137-40, 143.

³ al-Maqrizi, *Suluk*, II, part 3, 887. His figure of ten years and nine months must be incorrect (above, p. 272).

⁴ *SFS*, 282-5 (tr. Rashid, 'Firuz Shah's investiture', 70-1). ^cAfif, 274-6, mentions only one caliphal embassy to Firuz Shah, from al-Mu^ctadid. *TMS*, 126, has the first one (but from al-Hakim) in 757/1356; see also 127.

the caliph himself; that the sultan was empowered to wage *jihad* against rebels; and that neither he nor his two predecessors had issued a mandate to any Indian ruler other than the Delhi sovereign.⁵ The caliph thus constituted Firuz Shah his intermediary in dealing with other Muslim princes in the subcontinent. The territories listed in al-Mu^ctadid's diploma included not merely Bengal, Ma^cbar, Tilang, Deogir, Kawlam (Quilon), Hinawr, Bakanawr and the rest of the coastal regions (*sawahil-i bahr*), but also 'the island of Sarandib' (Ceylon), 'the Jawat' (Greater and Lesser Java), the Qarachil mountains, 'the Afghan territory (*hudud-i Afghaniyya*) and its mountains as far as Kashmir, and Zawulistan as far as the frontiers of the Turks and Ma wara' al-Nahr'.⁶ This was, at best, a programme for future conquest (and reconquest).

In the early part of the reign, ^cAfif learned from his parents, there had been a period of seven years in which Firuz Shah spent a total of merely thirteen days in Delhi: each time he returned from some protracted campaign, he was off again almost as soon as he entered the capital.⁷ This restlessness may have sprung from a consciousness of the grave territorial losses inflicted on the Sultanate in the time of Muhammad b. Tughluq. The welcome news of Taghai's death at the hands of loyalist commanders in Gujarat had reached Firuz Shah on the day of Khwaja Jahan's submission.⁸ But the rebel's Sumra allies were still at large; and we are given the impression that the sultan was deeply sensitive to the humiliations suffered by his cousin in Sind and determined on vengeance.⁹ Nor could he remain oblivious of the loss of provinces south of the Vindhya.

The reality, of course, was that Firuz Shah was in no position to retrieve the territories lost in his predecessor's reign. Ma^cbar had to be consigned to oblivion. Envoys from Ma^cbar who waited on the sultan following his return from the Thatta campaign claimed that their ruler had been defeated and put to death by Bukka, the king of Vijayanagara, and that the Muslims were in desperate straits. Firuz Shah temporized, observing petulantly that when he had sent them a *farman* at his accession the people of Ma^cbar had failed to acknowledge his authority and now implored his aid because they were hard pressed; he would march south once his troops were rested.¹⁰ At another point, we are told, the sultan set off hunting in the direction of

⁵ *SFS*, 283-4 (tr. Rashid, 70-1).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 283 (tr. Rashid, 70, omits Deogir *inter alia*). Bakanawr is the Fakanur of IB, IV, 78-9 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 808). For the two Javas, i.e. Sumatra and Java proper (sometimes called Mul Jawa in Islamic sources), see *ibid.*, TV, 228-47 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 876-84); Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 755-8.

⁷ ^cAfif, 399.

⁸ *SFS*, 19, 27-8 (tr. Basu, *JBORS* 23 [1937], 105-6).

⁹ ^cAfif, 191-2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 261-3. Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 326-7, proposes that the dead ruler, called a kinsman of Hasan Gangu, was Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah, the penultimate sultan of Ma^cbar. For the rulers of Ma^cbar during this period, see S. Abdul Qadir Husaini, 'The Sultanat of Madura', in HN, 1023-5.

Dawlatabad, but turned back at Bhayana in view of 'the interests of the kingdom' and headed an expedition to Nagarkot instead.¹¹ At the time of his second attack on Thatta, Bahram Khan Mazandarani, son-in-law of Hasan Gangu, in the course of a struggle with the latter's son, sent word inviting Firuz Shah to come south and take over at Dawlatabad; but the sultan, who was currently refitting his army in Gujarat, decided to give priority to Thatta and the opportunity was lost.¹² Subsequently, Firuz Shah announced his intention of marching on Dawlatabad, i.e. to overthrow the Bahmanids, only to be dissuaded by the wazir

Khan Jahan on the grounds that it was unacceptable to make war on Muslims.¹³ Nevertheless, the Bahmanids may have continued to fear an invasion from the north, since according to Afif the effective administration of his governor Zafar Khan (II) in Gujarat (in the late 1370s) caused trembling (*larza*) in Dawlatabad.¹⁴ Those military enterprises that Firuz Shah did embark on have scarcely commended him to modern historians. Dr Banerjee characterizes him as 'not even a mediocre military leader'; for Professor Saksena he was 'not the stuff conquerors are made of'; and Professor Riazul Islam declares that 'as a general he was thoroughly incompetent'.¹⁵ These views find ample support from the sultan's operations in Bengal.¹⁶ Large armies were mustered in 754/1353 against Shams al-Din Ilyas Shah, who had twice encroached upon the Delhi Sultan's territory, and in 760/1359 against his son and successor Sikandar. During both invasions, the Delhi forces holed up the enemy in the island fortress of Ikdala,¹⁷ only then to abandon the campaign. On the first occasion, Firuz Shah managed to defeat Ilyas's forces in a pitched battle and to occupy the town of Ikdala but, moved by the lamentations of Muslim women in the citadel, he rejected his generals' advice to storm it.¹⁸ In the campaign against Sikandar, Firuz Shah was bought off with gifts and made peace on condition that his client Zafar Khan was installed as ruler of Sunarga'un; but the affair drifted into farce when Zafar Khan, conscious that he lacked any real power-base in Sunarga'un, opted instead to return with the sultan to Delhi.¹⁹ As the Delhi army retired via Jajnagar, it lost its way, and it was six months before the sultan rejoined his heavy baggage at Kara.²⁰ In the wake of each campaign, the Bengal ruler sent elephants and other gifts to Firuz Shah, and Afif

¹¹ Afif, 185-6.

¹² *Ibid.*, 224-5. See Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 322, for the chronology.

¹³ Afif, 263-6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 499.

¹⁵ Banerjee, *History of Firuz Shah*, 28; see also 26, 32-3. Saksena, in HN, 582. Riazul Islam, 'Firuz Shah Tughluk', *Enc. Isl.*, II, 924.

¹⁶ For Firuz Shah's Bengal campaigns, see Banerjee, *History of Firuz Shah*, 28-36, and HN, 582-5, 589-91.

¹⁷ For the location of Ikdala, now a village in the Dinajpur district and situated about 23 m. N. of Pandua and 42 m. N. of Lakhnawti, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 311-12.

¹⁸ Afif, 118-19.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 156-8, 162.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 172-3. Saksena (in HN, 593) discounts this story, which is found in no other source.

claims that the sultan remained on friendly terms with Sikandar, exchanging presents annually with him until his own death.²¹

It was not until c. 767/1365-6 that the sultan moved against the Indus delta, now the domain of the two Samma princes, Ala' al-Din Jawna, who bore the title of *jam*, and his nephew Banbhina.²² Their villainy (*fasad*), according to the *Sirat*, had lasted for a generation.²³ Ibn Mahru's correspondence shows that Banbhina had raided Gujarat and had attacked the Panjab with Mongol assistance, probably during Firuz Shah's second absence in Bengal. The government was endeavouring to bolster the position of the Sumra prince, Hammir Duda, who was likewise under threat from the Sammas.²⁴ The *Sirat*, composed only a few years later, would have us believe that the Jam and his nephew were forced to sue for peace and that Firuz Shah generously granted them terms, but other authors are less sanguine. In Afif's version, the tone of which is echoed by Sirhindi, Firuz Shah's operations had been a failure. An epidemic had carried off three-quarters of his horses, and rising grain prices caused a famine among the troops, so that after a few weeks of skirmishing he withdrew into Gujarat to refit his army. During the retreat the entire fleet fell into

the hands of the enemy, and en route for Gujarat the guides led the Delhi army into the Rann of Kachh, a saline wilderness where the troops suffered dreadfully. When Firuz Shah finally reached Gujarat, its governor was dismissed for his failure to furnish provisions and fresh troops.²⁵ But at length the sultan was able to return to Sind, and timed his arrival so as to appropriate the harvest on which the Samma forces had relied. Nevertheless, they offered a desperate resistance, and a prolonged conflict was averted only by the intervention of the local saint Jalal al-Din Bukhari, which may have been as timely for the Delhi army as it was for the Sammas. The Jam and Banbhina submitted and the sultan took them back with him to attend his court at Delhi, leaving the Jam's son and Banbhina's brother Tamachi as joint rulers to represent his interests.²⁶ Trouble continued from this quarter, however, and Firuz Shah later had to send the Jam to suppress a revolt by Tamachi.

²¹ °Afif, 161. *TMS*, 126, 128. *TFS*, 597, also refers briefly to gifts from Ilyas.

²² For the operations in the Indus delta, see generally Banerjee, *History of Firuz Shah*, 36-40; HN, 595-9. The date is discussed in Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 322, on the basis of the statement in °Afif, 191, that four full years had elapsed since Firuz Shah's return from Jajnapur (dated 762/1361 in *TMS*, 130).

²³ *SFS*, 84.

²⁴ *IM*, 100-3, 230-5; tr. in Riazul Islam, 'Rise of the Sammas', 361-2, 368. N. B. Ray, 'Interesting side-light on Firuz Shah Tughlaq's expedition to Tatta', *JASB, Letters*, 3rd series, 4 (1936), 285-92, gives the first of these letters in full, but Hammir Doda's name is garbled so that the translation omits all mention of him: see *ibid.*, 286 n.2, for the date of this letter.

²⁵ *SFS*, 86-7. °Afif, 200, 201, 207-8, for the epidemic and the famine; 203-5, 220, for the decision to refit the army in Gujarat; 207 for the loss of the fleet; 208-19 for the Rann; 219-20 for the governor's dismissal. *TMS*, 131. Bihamadkhani, fol. 410b (tr. Zaki, 9).

²⁶ Riazul Islam, 'Rise of the Sammas', 377-9, citing two versions of the saint's table-talk, the *Malfuzat-i Makhdum-i Jahaniyan* and the *Siraj al-Hidaya*.

The Sammas appear eventually also to have vanquished the Sumra prince Hammir Duda, who is found in exile in Gujarat before the end of Firuz Shah's reign.²⁷

Nor were Firuz Shah's military triumphs over Hindu powers on such a scale as to redeem his reputation. Every year, says °Afif in one of his encomiastic passages, the people of the Dar al-Harb were raided and plundered.²⁸ The purpose, as so often in the past, was to obtain overdue tribute. En route for Bengal in 754/1353, the sultan had taken the opportunity to assert his authority over the local Hindu chiefs when he reached Awadh and to exact arrears of tribute from the rais of Kharonsa and Gorakhpur, of whom the latter, Sirhindi tells us, handed over twenty *laks* (2,000,000) of silver *tangas*.²⁹ The limited nature of the sultan's aims emerges from his dealings with Jajnapur (Orissa). Having mounted a brief attack on the kingdom of Shankara (Sarangarh), whose ruler fled,³⁰ he advanced into Jajnapur, whose rai, Virabhanudeva III, had ceased to send tribute.³¹ When Firuz Shah had uprooted the idol of Jagannath and obtained a considerable booty, including a number of elephants, the Hindu king sent an offer of submission, and the two monarchs performed a diplomatic minuet in which the rai claimed to have been the sultan's obedient subject from the first and the sultan alleged that he had entered the country only for the purpose of hunting elephants.

Firuz Shah's most successful campaign - though hardly a triumph³² - seems to have been that against Nagarkot. The Hindu prince who had submitted to Muhammad b. Tughluq in 738/1337 had died, and his son and successor repudiated the overlordship of Delhi. The sultan moved against him in c. 766/1365, and subjected the fortress to an investment of several months. At length the rai yielded and undertook to resume tribute payments. Firuz Shah treated the place with consideration, and notably refrained from destroying the idol of Jawalamukhi at the rai's express request.³³ The Nagarkot region remained submissive thereafter, and would

²⁷ °Afif, 254. Riazul Islam, 'Rise of the Sammas', 380. Inscription dated 784/1382 at Fath Masjid, Paranjri, Sabarkantha district, in Desai, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 21-2.

²⁸ °Afif, 180.

²⁹ *TFS*, 587-8. *TMS*, 124-5. °Afif, 111, mentions merely that the sultan conferred a *chattr* on the rai of 'Chaparan': for the identification of this Hindu prince with Barani's rai of Gorakhpur, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 311.

³⁰ *TMS*, 129. Bihamadkhani, fols. 409b-410a (tr. Zaki, 8), describing Shankara as 'one of the great cities of Jajnagar'. The city was identified by Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 387, and II, 149, on the basis of *IM*, 30. Sarangarh lies 32 m. N.W. of Sambalpur, at 21° 36' N., 83° 7' E.

³¹ Thus according to the *fath-nama* reproduced in *IM*, 28. Both *SFS*, 54ff. (tr. Roy, 'Jajnagar expedition', 62, 63-4), and °Afif, 163, comment on the prosperity of Jajnagar. For the identification of the rai, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 318. The campaign is discussed in Banerjee, *History of Firuz Shah*, 40-2, and in *HN*, 591-3.

³² R. C. Jauhri, 'A medieval invasion of Nagarkot (1363 A.D.)', *JIH* 44 (1966), 571-6.

³³ *SFS*, 82-3. °Afif, 186-90. For the date, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 322.

serve as a valuable base for Firuz Shah's son Muhammad during the civil war of the early 1390s.

The acquisition of large numbers of elephants was clearly one of the desired objects of these expeditions. Forty-seven were captured from Ilyas, forty were presented by Sikandar, and thirty-three were taken in Jajnagar. According to Ibn Mahru, the rai of Jajnagar had ceased to send elephants to the sultan, and the account of this campaign in the *Sirat* reflects the high priority given to the capture of elephants.³⁴ In addition, Bengal was agriculturally wealthy - a Chinese visitor in the 1340s testifies that reclamation had brought under the plough vast new tracts in the delta³⁵ - and Ilyas had in 1346 made a lucrative raid on Nepal.³⁶ Firuz Shah also brought back large quantities of silver, to which, as we saw (p. 261), Bengal had access in plenty and which was still in short supply within his own dominions.³⁷ Perhaps the sultan, who allegedly observed to Tatar Khan in 754/1353 that his predecessors had reduced Bengal but had proved unable to control it in view of the nature of the terrain,³⁸ aimed no higher than replenishing his treasury and the *pllkhana*.

The great majority of the operations against the Hindus of which °Afif speaks did not involve the sultan's participation, being presumably conducted under the aegis of the local *muqta*'s; and Sirhindi praises the great amirs in the direction of 'Hindustan' for chastizing 'rebellious infidels' and maintaining the authority of Delhi.³⁹ But conditions may have deteriorated during the sultan's last twelve years, when he is supposed to have abandoned military activity but we suddenly see him campaigning personally in Katehr and Etawa for the purpose of securing tribute; °Afif, taking his cue from Firuz Shah himself, dresses up these attacks as hunting expeditions.⁴⁰ In 787/1385-6 the sultan constructed the new fortress of Firuzpur at Biuli (Beoli), some fifteen miles from Bada'un, as part of his defence measures in the region.⁴¹ In Etawa, during a campaign in 779/ 1377-8, the two *muqaddams*, Sumer and Uddharan, were taken to Delhi, and fortresses were built at Akhal (renamed Tughluqpur) and *Patlahi. A new fortress at Firuzpur (near Kanar) became the centre of a new *shiqq*, incorporating Tughluqpur and Rapri, which was entrusted to Malikzada

³⁴ *IM*, 28. *SFS*, 54, 58, 63 (tr. Roy, 'Jajnagar expedition', 61-2, 65). °Afif, 123, 161, 163, 167. 171; cf. also 172, 175, for the total of seventy-three elephants from Bengal and Jajnagar. *IM*, 32, gives fifty-three as the number of elephants surrendered by the rai of Jajnagar. *TFS*, 592, 594, gives the total number of elephants taken on the first Bengal expedition as forty-four.

³⁵ W. W. Rockhill, 'Notes on the relations and trade of China with the eastern archipelago and the coast of the Indian Ocean during the fourteenth century', *T'oung Pao* 16 (1915), 435-6. citing the *Tao-i chih-lueh* of Wang Ta-yiian (1350).

³⁶ K. P. Jayaswal, 'An unrecorded Muhammadan inscription of Nepal', *JBORS* 22 (1936). part 2, 93-5. Dani, *Muslim inscriptions of Bengal*, 129.

³⁷ *TFS*, 597. Simon Digby, 'The Broach coin-hoard as evidence of the import of valuta across the Arabian Sea during the 13th and 14th centuries', *JRAS* (1980), 129, 135-6 n.4.

³⁸ ^cAfif, 119.

³⁹ *TMS*, 133.

⁴⁰ ^cAfif, 493, 497.

⁴¹ *TMS*, 135. For the location of Beoli, see Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 389.

Firuz (later wazir to Sultan Tughluq Shah II), son of Taj al-Din Turk: it was to become the nucleus of the principality of Kalpi.⁴²

The sultan and the nobility

Both ^cAfif and Sirhindi point to the fact that Firuz Shah's era witnessed only one revolt (namely, by a Muslim noble), that of Shams al-Din Damghani in 782/1380-1, and the former expressly draws a contrast with the turbulence of Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign.⁴³ Damghanl, appointed na'ib of the iqta^c of Gujarat in 778/1377, failed to realize the enormous sums for which he had contracted, omitted to despatch to court any of the revenue he had raised, and rose in open rebellion. His extortionate measures, however, had alienated those on whose support his revolt depended, the *amiran-i sada* of Gujarat, who remained loyal to the sultan; they attacked and killed him. Apart from this episode, which ^cAfif dismisses as a farce,⁴⁴ the absence of revolt by Muslim nobles bears out the picture of the reign furnished by our sources, as an era of contentment among the aristocracy.⁴⁵

Yet such remarkable quiescence was obtained at a price. Unlike his predecessor, Firuz Shah was notoriously uninterested in the details of day-to-day fiscal administration,⁴⁶ and almost from the beginning left the conduct of affairs to the wazir Khan Jahan. The new wazir proved to be the main pillar of the regime. During Firuz Shah's absences on campaign, he contrived to overawe the capital with demonstrations of military force, and skilfully concealed from the citizens the lack of news from the sultan when the Delhi army got lost on the way back from Jaj Nagar and again when Firuz Shah found himself in the Rann of Kachh.⁴⁷ But as Barani had pointedly observed, Khan Jahan enjoyed more extensive powers than had been vouchsafed to any previous wazir, and ^cAfif quotes the sultan himself as saying that Khan Jahan was the real ruler of Delhi.⁴⁸ When the wazir clashed with ^cAyn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru, who was then serving as accountant-general (*mushrif-i mamalik*), he got his own way by threatening to leave for Mecca. The sultan capitulated and gave Khan Jahan permission to employ and dismiss whomsoever he wished. Ibn Mahru thus forfeited his post; though when shortly granted the iqta's of Multan, Siwistan and Bhakkar, he secured from Firuz Shah the concession that the finances of these territories would lie outside the wazir's jurisdiction.⁴⁹

Firuz Shah seems to have assigned a significantly higher proportion of

⁴² Bihamadkhani, fol. 412b (tr. Zaki, 13-14). *TMS*, 133-4.

⁴³ ^cAfif, 492-3; 497 for the date of the revolt, which is discussed in Hodivala, *Studies*, I, 388-9. *TMS*, 132, gives 778, the year of Damghani's appointment.

⁴⁴ ^cAfif, 499-502.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 288, 297-8.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 341-2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 173, 211-14, 398-9.

⁴⁸ *TFS*, 578-9. °Afif, 400; cf. also 411.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 408-14.

the Sultanate's territories as iqta^c, thus reducing the extent of the khalisa. The nobility as a whole, moreover, now enjoyed greater privileges than in the time of Muhammad b. Tughluq. We may perhaps explain the fact that the salaries of khans and maliks were now considerably higher than in the previous reign as a measure designed to protect them against inflation (see below, p. 316).⁵⁰ But already, within the first six years of Firuz Shah's era, Barani could observe that the revenue from the iqta's was not audited with the same rigour as before; and °Afif tells us specifically that the sultan departed from previous practice in having the annual gifts presented by the provincial governors valued and offset against the revenue-demand from their territories. Certain of the amirs, notably the 'arid °Imad al-Mulk Bashir, accumulated enormous fortunes.⁵¹

It was the sultan's policy also to allow the heir of an amir, a muqta^c or an official to inherit his father's position, title, and iqta's or other emoluments. In some measure this pattern of inheritance had obtained previously -certainly in the thirteenth century (pp. 101-2 above), even if it had perhaps been attenuated under °Ala' al-Din and discontinued by the first two Tughluqids. But under Firuz Shah it undoubtedly became the norm. When Khan Jahan (I) died, for instance, his office of wazir and his title both passed to his son Jawnan, who was henceforth known as Khan Jahan (II); Zafar Khan, the refugee amir from Bengal, was succeeded in his iqta^c of Gujarat by his son Darya Khan, who was likewise given the title of Zafar Khan (II); and the rank and title of the "arid °Imad al-Mulk Bashir passed on his death to his son Ishaq.⁵² Such examples could be multiplied, and they extended to all levels of the bureaucracy.⁵³ Even in an emergency, as when he transferred Malik Nasir al-Mulk Mardan Dawlat from the east to the Multan frontier to deal with the Mongol threat, Firuz Shah did not disregard the hereditary principle: Nasir al-Mulk's iqta's of Kara and Mahoba were simply assigned to his adopted son Sulayman.⁵⁴ Nasir al-Mulk's son Malik Shaykh followed him for a short time in the command at Multan; and after his death, Sulayman was transferred to Multan, where he in turn was soon succeeded by his own son Khidr Khan.⁵⁵

The allusion to the system of hereditary offices in the *Futuhāt-i Firuz-Shahi* indicates that the sultan took some pride in it, and it is laid to his credit also by the author of the *Sirat*.⁵⁶ But that such a policy was likely to

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 296-7'. Habib, 'Agrarian economy', 73.

⁵¹ *TFS*, 555-6. °Afif, 268-9. For Bashir's wealth, see *ibid.*, 438, 439-40, 445.

⁵² Khan Jahan: *ibid.*, 425-6. Zafar Khan: *ibid.*, 286, 499; *TMS*, 131. °Imad al-Mulk: °Afif, 445. *SFS*, 153-4, gives a list of such hereditary appointments, headed by Khan Jahan (I).

⁵³ For two instances from the *diwan-i wizarat*, see °Afif, 482.

⁵⁴ *TMS*, 133.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 182. HN, 632, may be wrong in emphasizing that the appointments of Mardan's successors dated from after Firuz Shah's death; Khidr Khan, who received his title in 791/ 1389, had previously, as muqta^c of Multan, himself borne the style of Nasir al-Mulk: *TMS*. 146, 147.

⁵⁶ *FFS*, 18 (tr. Roy, 463). *SFS*, 153-5.

implant in the *diwan-i wizarat*, for example, officials who were unequal to their task was the complaint of Shams al-Din Abu-Rija when auditor-general (*mustawfi-yi mamalik*).⁵¹ When applied to

provincial governorships, it would in time have the effect of creating entrenched regional interests and the autonomous principalities which emerged in the era of Firuz Shah's grandsons.

The first civil war

Of the events of the crisis that began in the twilight years of Firuz Shah's reign, we learn a good deal from two authors, Sirhindi and Bihamadkhani.⁵⁸ But the wherewithal to explain it is more elusive; and here 'Afif, through occasional references to the troubles in his *Ta'rikh-i Firuz-Shahi*, provides greater insight. It seems that the activities of Shams al-Din Abu Rija, who had made enemies of all the amirs and whose disgrace in 786/1384 preceded the crisis, had already thrown the state into confusion,⁵⁹ perhaps because the nobility saw its fiscal autonomy as under threat. It needs also to be borne in mind that Firuz Shah was by now relatively advanced in age (he was eighty-three lunar years old when he died in 790/1388) and had been ill since 786/1384, and according to 'Afif most or all of his contemporaries among the grandees had predeceased him.⁶⁰ The links that bound together the sultan and the new generation of amirs had presumably slackened. But what especially brought disaster on the empire was, in 'Afif's view, the rivalry between the wazir, Khan Jahan (II), and Firuz Shah's son Muhammad.⁶¹

During the sultan's last years, the wazir was able to exercise virtually untrammelled power and used the opportunity to remove various amirs and maliks who opposed him.⁶² The death of Firuz Shah's grandson Fath Khan in 778/1376 had been a heavy blow to him,⁶³ and Bihamadkhani claims that he selected as his heir his great-grandson, Fath Khan's son Tughluq Shah (see appendix VI).⁶⁴ When in 789/1387 the wazir endeavoured to turn the subservient sultan against his only surviving son, Prince Muhammad, a crisis arose; he was obliged to flee from Firuzabad and was subsequently killed in Meo territory. Those of the wazir's adherents who were executed after his overthrow included Malik Bihzad-i Fathkhani, presumably a former slave of Prince Fath Khan,⁶⁵ and it may be that we are dealing

⁵⁷ 'Afif, 474-5.

⁵⁸ For what follows, see generally HN, 618-22; Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 441-50.

⁵⁹ 'Afif, 455-6, 457, 459, 492, 498.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 444-5, 497 (where the majority are said to have died in 781/1379-80), 498. For a list of leading nobles who died before 772/1370-1, including Khudawand Khan, Da'ud Khan b. Bayyu, Ibn Mahru and Ikhtiyar al-Din-i Nuwa, see *SFS*, 154. For the year of Firuz Shah's birth, see above, p. 249, n.70.

⁶¹ 'Afif, 427.

⁶² *TMS*, 135-6.

⁶³ 'Afif, 494.

⁶⁴ Bihamadkhani, fol. 414a (tr. Zaki, 16).

⁶⁵ *TMS*, 137.

simply with two groups that had coalesced around Muhammad and around the descendants of his eldest brother. Muhammad was now made wazir and then enthroned as joint sultan in Sha'ban 789/August 1387. At this stage, we are told, he enjoyed the sympathy of not only the amirs and the people of the capital but also Firuz Shah's slaves.⁶⁶ This group may have joined him out of hatred for the wazir, since the principal slaves are said to have been alarmed at an earlier date by the growing power of Khan Jahan (I).⁶⁷ But after five months the slaves turned against Muhammad, according to Sirhindi, out of antipathy towards his favourites, Sama' al-Din (now entitled Mu'în al-Mulk) and Kamal al-Din (Dastur Khan), the two sons of Malik 'Umar, the *'arid-i bandagdn-i khass*; although 'Afif, obscurely, attributes the change of allegiance to the enormous sums left by the old sultan's *'arid*, Malik Bashir 'Imad al-Mulk.⁶⁸

Muhammad in turn was expelled from the capital and retired to Nagarkot, and the old sultan now recognized as co-ruler Tughluq Shah, who was enthroned as Sultan Ghiyath al-Din when Firuz Shah died on 18 Ramadan 790/20 September 1388. On 21 Safar 791/20 February 1389, however, Tughluq Shah and his wazir, Malikzada Firuz (Firuz Khan) b. Taj al-Din Turk (ancestor of the later rulers of Kalpi), were killed in a rising by the *na'ib-wazir* Rukn al-Din Junda (p. 190 above), who put Abu Bakr Shah, a grandson of Firuz Shah, on the throne. Junda was promoted to wazir, but shortly plotted to remove Abu Bakr in turn, perhaps proclaiming another of Firuz Shah's grandsons, Firuz Shah b. Zafar,⁶⁹ and was killed. Over the next two years Muhammad, based first at Samana and then at Jalesar in the Doab, sent troops to ravage the territory surrounding Delhi and himself made three unsuccessful attempts on the capital.

The situation, as Sirhindi observed, was one of stalemate, for Abu Bakr could not be dislodged but when victorious was unable to leave the capital and pursue his enemy; with Muhammad, on the other hand, were ranged 'all the amirs, maliks, troops (*hasham*), retainers (*khadam*) and subjects (*ra'aya*) of the empire'.⁷⁰ Abu Bakr's strength lay in his possession of the capital and the elephantry and in the allegiance of his grandfather's slaves.⁷¹ Muhammad, who recognized them as the principal obstacle to his success, ordered his adherents in the provinces to arrest and kill all the old sultan's slaves on 19 Ramadan 791/11 September 1389.⁷² This mass execution testifies to the widespread support for Muhammad among the military class outside the Delhi complex. Tughluq Shah had exiled Ghalib Khan, the son

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 136-7.

^{67c} Afif, 415.

⁶⁸ *TMS*, 139. ^c Afif, 440.

⁶⁹ 'Note on a gold coin bearing the name of Prince Firuz Shah Zafar, son of Firuz Shah of Dihh', *JASB* 40 (1871), 160. Thomas, 300. But both authors assume incorrectly that the prince named is the old sultan's son Zafar and that this issue of 791 was therefore posthumous. Cf. also *CMSD*, 191-4 (nos. 771-779A), 223-4.

⁷⁰ *TMS*, 148.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 146. Bihamadkhani, fols. 421b, 422a (tr. Zaki, 30, 31).

⁷² *TMS*, 146; for the massacre, see 147.

and successor of Malik Qabul 'Qur'an-khwan', and deprived him of Samana; but his own nominee as muqta' was killed in Safar 791/February 1389 by the *amiran-i sada* of that territory, who invited in Muhammad, and Ghalib Khan was restored.⁷³ The commanders who joined Muhammad with their forces for his various attacks on Delhi included the muqta's of Multan and Bihar, the sons of the governors of Qinnawj and Awadh, the Ma'in and Bhatti chiefs who held iqta's in the eastern Panjab, *muqaddams* from the hills (presumably the Qarachil foothills) and rais and ranas from Etawa.⁷⁴ Support for Abu Bakr is found only in Alwar, where he could count on the Meo chieftain Bahadur Nahir.⁷⁵ In Gujarat the na'ib, the Firuz Shahl slave Malik Mufarrij Sultani, had in 789/1387 killed Sikandar Khan, newly arrived as governor on Muhammad's behalf, and had been recognized by Tughluq Shah as governor with the style of Rasti Khan; but whether he transferred his allegiance to Abu Bakr is unknown.⁷⁶

It is unclear why in Ramadan 792/August 1390 a split emerged within the slaves' ranks, and a group of them, headed by Islam Khan Mubashshir-i Chap Sultani, invited in Muhammad. The fact that the prince's own party included Firuz Shahi slaves - Malik Sarwar Sultani, the *shihna* of Delhi, whom Muhammad had made wazir with the style of Khwaja Jahan, appears throughout as his loyal adherent⁷⁷ - may help to explain the readiness of certain of the slaves in Abu Bakr's camp to give him possession of the capital. Bihamadkhani, moreover, says that Malik Shahin Sultani, entitled 'Imad al-Mulk, the former commander of Firtiz Shah's *pilkhana*, had been driven from the city by the amirs responsible for the overtures to Muhammad,⁷⁸ suggesting that the change of allegiance may have been connected with rivalry between Islam Khan and 'Imad al-Mulk. Once securely in possession of the elephantry, however, and

possibly after offering a guarantee to his new ally Islam Khan, Muhammad had all the slaves expelled from Delhi or put to death.⁷⁹ In 794/1392 Khwaja Jahan Sarwar, whom Islam Khan had replaced as wazir, trumped up charges against his rival; and despite his services in the final engagement with Abu Bakr, Islam Khan was executed.⁸⁰ We still hear occasionally of Firuz Shahl

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 140, 145; for Ghalib Khan restored in Samana, *ibid.*, 147, 156. His genealogy is given in Bihamadkhani, fol. 431b (tr. Zaki, 45).

⁷⁴ *TMS*, 145, 146-7.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 146, 149, 151; he had supported Tughluq Shah also (*ibid.*, 142). Bihamadkhani, fols. 423a, 426 (tr. Zaki, 32, 35).

⁷⁶ *TMS*, 138; also 142 for Tughluq Shah's recognition.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 146, 147, 152-3. Bihamadkhani, fol. 421b (tr. Zaki, 30). °Afif, 338, says that he was in charge of Firuz Shah's jewel-house (*jawdhir-khana*).

⁷⁸ *TMS*, 148, 149-50. Bihamadkhani, fols. 421a, 423a (tr. Zaki, 29, 32). For Shahl, see also °Afif, 338.

⁷⁹ *TMS*, 149-50. Bihamadkhani, fol. 425b, saying that the sultan °*ahd-u payman ba-tajdid dar award* with Islam Khan (tr. Zaki, 34).

⁸⁰ *TMS*, 152-3. Bihamadkhani, fol. 430b (tr. Zaki, 44), gives a briefer account of the plot, but does not mention Khwaja Jahan's role.

slaves thereafter;⁸¹ but Muhammad's accession marks the destruction of this highly volatile element as a force capable of making and unmaking sultans.

According to Bihamadkhani, Muhammad's triumph brought about peace and repose.⁸² Abu Bakr, expelled from Delhi, fled to Alwar, where his uncle's forces defeated him in Muharram of the following year/December 1390; he shortly died as a prisoner at Amroha. The sultan also acted quickly to restore his authority in Gujarat, where in Safar 794/January 1392 the hostile Mufarrij (Rasti Khan) was defeated and killed by Muhammad's appointee, Zafar Khan Wajih al-Mulk.⁸³ But Bihamadkhani's encomium can only have applied to the capital and the more westerly provinces, since the sultan had to spend the rest of his reign fighting Hindu chieftains in Alwar and the Doab.

Loss of territory to the infidel

'Thanks to the contest among the Muslims for the sovereignty,' says Sirhindi, 'the infidels of Hindustan gained in strength, refrained from paying the jizya and the kharaj and plundered the Muslim townships (*qasabat*).⁸⁴ As we have seen, the old sultan's last years had not been free of disturbances, but Hindu princes appear to have asserted themselves more vigorously in the wake of Muhammad's expulsion from Delhi in 789/ 1387. There are signs of a struggle with the local Hindus around Nagawr in that year and again in 791/1389, when the na'ib of the *shiqq* of Nagawr and Jalor was killed.⁸⁵ We are more fully informed about conditions in the southern Doab, as in Etawa for instance, and the territories south of the Yamuna which would later form the independent principality of Kalpi. In Etawa, Uddharan and Sumer, who had supported Muhammad, returned home and rose in revolt following Tughluq Shah's accession, inflicting a heavy defeat on Malik Mahmud, who now governed the *shiqq* of Firuzpur in succession to his father, the wazir Firuz Khan b. Taj al-Din Turk. Tughluqpur was surrendered to the enemy, and the towns of Chandawar, Bhonga'un and Rewa, among others, all fell into the hands of Hindu princes. For the moment, Malik Mahmud was able to do no more than occupy Kalpi, which he renamed Muhammadabad, in 792/1390 and to make it his headquarters.⁸⁶

In 794/1391-2 Sultan Muhammad took the field against the enemy in

⁸¹ *TMS*, 160. Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Iahdad, II, 64/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 310a, however, seems to apply the term (wrongly) to Mallu Iqbal Khan and his associates.

⁸² Bihamadkhani, fol. 424b (tr. Zaki, 33).

⁸³ Harawi, III, 83, 84-5. Misra, 141-2, citing the *Tabaqat-i Mahmud-Shahi* and the *Mir'at-i Sikandar*, respectively fifteenth- and sixteenth-century chronicles of Gujarat.

⁸⁴ *TMS*, 147.

⁸⁵ *ARIE* (1975-6), 163 (D188). *ARIE* (1969-70), 93 (D167).

⁸⁶ These events are described only by Bihamadkhani, fols. 418b-419b (read RYWH for RTWH), 436b-437a (tr. Zaki, 26-7, 54).

Etawa, where Uddharan and Sumer had sacked Balaram. Having razed Etawa to the ground, the sultan moved back across the Ganges and chastised the Hindus of Qinnawj and Dalmaw, building a fortress at Jalesar, which he renamed Muhammadabad. In Alwar Bahadur Nahir, who had consistently sided with Muhammad Shah's enemies, continued to defy him and had to be driven from Kotla; in the west, the Khokhar chief Shaikha rebelled and sacked Lahore in 796/1394, and a punitive expedition was in preparation under Muhammad Shah's son Humayun Khan when the sultan died.⁸⁷

The second civil war

Muhammad did not long enjoy the throne for which he had mounted such a determined struggle, dying on 17 Rabi I 796/20 January 1394.⁸⁸ Humayun Khan, who succeeded him as 'Ala' al-Din Sikandar Shah, followed him to the grave on 5 Jumada 1/8 March, and a younger son was thereupon proclaimed sultan as Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah. The new monarch was to prove little more than a cipher. There is a suggestion that his enthronement commanded scant support, for the wazir Khwaja Jahan Sarwar had to persuade the amirs whose territories lay to the west, like Ghalib Khan of Samana and Rai Kamal al-Din Ma'in, not to leave Delhi without pledging their allegiance.⁸⁹ But in Rajab 796/May 1394 Khwaja Jahan was sent east with an army, twenty elephants and the title of Sultan al-Sharq, and entrusted with the territories 'from Qinnawj to Bihar', so that he might clear the region of recalcitrant Hindu chieftains.⁹⁰ He set up his headquarters at Jaunpur and never returned to Delhi. Power at court was disputed among a number of war-lords, notably Muhammad (Tatar Khan), son of Wajih al-Mulk Zafar Khan the governor of Gujarat, and a group whom Bihamad-khani calls Muhammad Shah's more important slaves (*bandagan-i kibar*), notably Muqarrab al-Mulk (styled Muqarrab Khan), 'Abd al-Rashid Sultani (entitled Sa'adat Khan) and Mallu (later Iqbal Khan). Sa'adat Khan was ousted by a conspiracy in which Mallu was implicated, and took refuge with Tatar Khan. Having lost possession of the sultan, Tatar Khan's party in Muharram 797/October 1394 enthroned at Firuzabad a younger brother of Tughluq Shah II as Nasir al-Din Nusrat Shah.⁹¹ There were now once more two rival sultans, each with his own capital

⁸⁷ *TMS*, 154.

⁸⁸ For the second civil war, see generally HN, 623-5; Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 452-60; Lal, *Twilight*, 8-12.

⁸⁹ *TMS*, 156.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 156-7. His career is traced in Mian Muhammad Saeed, *The Sharqi Sultanate of Jaunpur* (Karachi, 1972), 20-35.

⁹¹ *TMS*, 158-9. Bihamadkhani, fols. 432b-433a (tr. Zaki, 47-8), alone refers to Mallu and the others as slaves of Muhammad Shah; he does not mention the conspiracy against Sa'adat Khan, and gives greater prominence to Tatar Khan's role than does Sirhindi. Nusrat Shah's

city and military establishment and each a puppet in the hands of powerful grandees. This situation persisted for three years, with fighting between the two sides an almost daily occurrence. According to Sirhindi, Mahmud Shah's party controlled only Old Delhi and Siri. At Firuzabad, Nusrat Shah and Tatar Khan commanded the allegiance of the Doab, together with Sonpat, Panipat, Jhajhar and Rohtak.⁹² The omission of any of the Sultanate's other territories demonstrates how little impact events at the centre now had on the governors of major provinces, although coins and inscriptions continued to indicate a nominal allegiance: thus Mahmud Shah was recognized in the regions controlled by Khwaja Jahan, whereas Zafar Khan in Gujarat acknowledged Nusrat Shah.⁹³

When recounting Temur's invasion a few years later, the Timurid chronicler Sharaf al-Din Yazdi was under the impression that Mallu and his brother Sarang Khan, since Mahmud Shah's accession governor of Deopapur, were the real masters of his empire;⁹⁴ and Professor Hambly has shown how the partnership sought to dominate the Sultanate from two distinct bases, Sarang Khan in the Panjab and Mallu Iqbal Khan at Delhi.⁹⁵ From Deopapur Sarang Khan had embarked in 798/1395-6 on a sustained effort to bring the neighbouring territories under his own control (and hence, very indirectly, under that of Mahmud Shah). Shaikha was defeated, and Lahore reoccupied.⁹⁶ For a time Sarang Khan also held Multan; the muqta^c, Khidr Khan, was taken prisoner but later escaped. But when Sarang Khan attacked Samana, Ghalib Khan appealed to Tatar Khan, who in Muharram 800/October 1397 defeated Sarang Khan and drove him back to Multan, reinstating his protege in Samana.⁹⁷ In Dhu'l-Qa^cda/October-November 1398 Mallu, who had meanwhile briefly declared for Nusrat Shah only to seize control of his elephants and had then put himself at the head of the rival group by the elimination of Muqarrab Khan, moved against Tatar Khan's base at Panipat, which he captured. Tatar Khan, weakened by the desertion of prominent supporters, retired to his father in Gujarat.⁹⁸ Mallu Iqbal Khan was thus left in undisputed control of both

laqab appears as Shams al-Din in an inscription of 797/1395: Desai, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 37-8.

⁹² *TMS*, 159-61. Bihamadkhani, fol. 433 (tr. Zaki, 48).

⁹³ Desai, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 34-8. Sayyid Yusuf Kamal Bukhari, 'Inscriptions from Maner', *EIAPS* (1951-2), 15-16.

⁹⁴ Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Iahdad, II, 14-15/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 296a (duplicated at 301a). For Sarang Khan's appointment, see *TMS*, 156.

⁹⁵ Gavin R. G. Hambly, 'Twilight of Tughluqid Delhi', in Frykenberg (ed.), *Delhi through the ages*, 47-56.

⁹⁶ *TMS*, 157-8.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 161-2. Khidr Khan's capture is mentioned only by Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Iahdad, II, 175 (omitted in Urunbaev edn, fol. 341a).

⁹⁸ *TMS*, 163-5. Bihamadkhani, fols. 433b-434b (tr. Zaki, 49-50). Fadl-Allah Balkhi as Mallu's lieutenant in 801/1398: Ghiyath al-Din Yazdi, tr. Semenov, 121; Shami, *ZN*, I, 191; Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Iahdad, II, 116/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 324b. *TMS*, 160, earlier lists him among Nusrat Shah's adherents.

capitals, Delhi and Firuzabad, and of Sultan Mahmud Shah. The chronology of his various acts of duplicity suggests that he was attempting to shore up his position in reaction to the elimination of his brother Sarang Khan at Multan by Temur's forces (p. 313 below). Only a few weeks later, however, Mallu in turn was effectively swept away by Temur."

The north-west frontier and Temur's invasion

The sources depict Firuz Shah's reign as relatively free of Mongol attacks.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, they

appear still to have been a regular occurrence. Barani mentions just two minor inroads in the period of six years before he ceased writing.¹⁰¹ One took place in the neighbourhood of the Sodra river (the Chenab), while the other, into Gujarat, which was checked partly by the sultan's troops and in part by the *muqaddams* of the region, may have been connected with the encouragement given to the Mongols by the Samma prince Banbhina, about which Ibn Mahru complains.¹⁰² Sirhindi tells us briefly that towards the end of 759/1358 the Mongols invaded the Deopapur territory but withdrew on the advance of the sultan's forces under Malik Qabul ('Qur'an-khwan').¹⁰³ The *Sirat*, lastly, claims that the Mongols were in the habit of advancing to the Beah and harassing the villages, but refers to a defeat inflicted on them by the army of Delhi in the year of Firuz Shah's Nagarkot campaign (i.e. c. 767/1365-6).¹⁰⁴ The sultan was sufficiently anxious about the Mongol frontier to transfer there from the east Nasir al-Mulk Malik Mardan Dawlat, because he allegedly had no one else of the calibre necessary to deal with the Mongol danger.¹⁰⁵

More than this we are not told; nor are the attacks we know of easily linked up with events in the Chaghadayid territories. Here the death in 759/1358 of Muhammad b. Tughluq's ally, the Qara'unas noyan Qazaghan, had inaugurated a lengthy period of strife among the clan leaders and provoked two brief interventions in Transoxiana by the eastern Chaghadayid khan, Tughluq Temur. Temur, a member of the Turco-Mongol clan of the Barlas, collaborated for a time against the invaders with Qazaghan's grandson Husayn; but the allies shortly fell out, and in 771/1369-70 Temur vanquished Husayn and replaced him as the real ruler of the western Chaghadayid ulus.¹⁰⁶ The effects of these upheavals were felt in the Indian

⁹⁹ Hambly, 'Twilight', 50-1, similarly proposes that the activities of Mallu and Sarang Khan were closely connected. But I am not convinced by his suggestion that Sarang Khan's move against Samana was part of a plan to join forces with his brother in order better to resist the imminent invasion of Pir Muhammad. Sirhindi's chronology makes it clear that Sarang Khan was eliminated before Mallu embarked upon his complicated intrigues between the two rival sultans.¹⁰⁰ c Afif, 321.

¹⁰¹ *TFS*, 601.

¹⁰² *IM*, 101; and see also 230.

¹⁰³ *TMS*, 127. Qur'an-khwan subsequently became muqta^c of Samana (p. 187 above).

¹⁰⁴ *SFS*, 285-6.

¹⁰⁵ *TMS*, 133: the context suggests the 1370s.

¹⁰⁶ Beatrice Forbes Manz, 'The ulus Chaghatay before and after Temur's rise to power: the

borderlands as well as in Transoxiana. In 763/1361-2 Tughluq Temur's army is said to have plundered the territory as far as the Hindu Kush.¹⁰⁷ Qazaghan's sons had fled to Kabul and Ghazna on their father's murder, and the region seems to have served as the power-base of Husayn, who was active there in 761/1360 and later, with Temur's aid, recovered Kabul from his enemies.¹⁰⁸ We have seen (pp. 224, 228-9) how Mongol amirs sought refuge across the Indus during the early years of the century; and commanders who lost out in these fresh conflicts likewise turned towards India, as Husayn at one point contemplated doing and as his sons did following his overthrow in 771/1369-70.¹⁰⁹ But our Indian sources supply too little detail to enable us to make any connections with the few Mongol inroads they record.

Once Temur had supplanted Husayn as *de facto* ruler of the western half of Chaghadai's ulus, it was vital for him to absorb the energies of the tribes in external campaigns; and this was also a means of denying a refuge outside the ulus to dissident noyans.¹¹⁰ But Temur, who was not of Chinggisid blood and who ruled the ulus through a puppet khan (actually chosen from the line of Ogodei), appears to have seen it as his task to reconstitute Chinggis Khan's empire, though largely in the form of protectorates under Chaghadayid overlordship.¹¹¹ With this in view, he launched attacks on the Kartid kingdom of Herat, whose 'Tajik' ruler had displayed the effrontery to assume the style of sultan (p. 235 above); on the various other powers that had sprung up amid the ruins of the Ilkhanate; and on the Golden Horde.¹¹² Although the justification given for his invasion of India towards the end of the century was religious and couched in

terms of the spread of Islam, it can only have been a facade: the most that can be said on this count is that the aim was perhaps to punish Muslim rulers for permitting such licence to their vast numbers of Hindu subjects and servitors.¹¹³

According to Bihamadkham, Temur and Firuz Shah had corresponded, and it may be for this reason that Muhammad b. Firuz at one point thought

transformation from tribal confederation to army of conquest', *CAJ21* (1983), 86-95, and her *Rise and rule*, 41-57.

¹⁰⁷ Shami, *ZN*, I, 18-19. Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Ilahdad, I, 59/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 100a. P. Jackson, Tughluk Temiir', *Enc.Isl²*.

¹⁰⁸ Natanzi, 197. Shami, *ZN*, I, 51. Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Ilahdad, I, 48, 175/ed. Urunbaev, fols. 97a, 130b.

¹⁰⁹ Shami, *ZN*, I, 31. Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Ilahdad, I, 71, 206/ed. Urunbaev, fols. 103a, 139a.

¹¹⁰ Manz, 'Ulus Chaghatay', 98.

¹¹¹ Hans Robert Roemer, 'Timur in Iran', in P. Jackson and L. Lockhart (eds.), *The Cambridge history of Iran*, VI. *The Timurid and Safavid periods* (Cambridge, 1986), 52, 57, 72.

¹¹² For these campaigns, see *ibid.*, 46-73; Tilman Nagel, *Timur der Eroberer und die islamische Welt des späten Mittelalters* (Munich, 1993), 377-86; a brief survey in Manz, *Rise and rule*, 67-73.

¹¹³ See, e.g., Ghiyath al-Din Yazdi, *Ruz-Nama*, tr. Semenov, 60; ShamI, *ZN*, I, 170; Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Ilahdad, II, 15/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 296a.

of abandoning the struggle against Abu Bakr Shah and seeking Temur's assistance; he had actually set out for Samarqand with a small group of followers when he was invited to come to Delhi and take the throne.¹¹⁴ Although the journey to Transoxiana proved unnecessary, it is possible that some message had been despatched to Samarqand in advance. But in all likelihood Temur needed no invitation to intervene in the chaos within the Delhi Sultanate, which presented him with an ideal opportunity for plunder.¹¹⁵

Temur's grandson Pir Muhammad, who governed much of present-day Afghanistan from Kabul, crossed the Indus in Rabi I 800/November-December 1397 and defeated the troops sent to relieve Uchch by Sarang Khan, who was then himself forced to surrender Multan in Ramadan/June 1398. Pir Muhammad established his headquarters in the city.¹¹⁶ Temur arrived in the Multan region in mid Safar 801/late in October. Sending his main force by way of Deopalpur and Samana, he marched via Bhatner and Sarsati, putting both strongholds to the sack, before rejoining the rest of his troops on the banks of the Ghaggar. On 7 Rabi II 801/16 December 1398 he did battle with Mallu Iqbal Khan and Mahmud Shah in the plain outside the capital. Although the Indian army put up a brave fight, it was routed. The sultan and Mallu withdrew into the city, and shortly fled, Mallu into the Doab and Mahmud Shah to Gujarat, while the khutba in Delhi was read in the name of Temur's nominal sovereign, the Ogodeyid Mahmud Khan.¹¹⁷ The amnesty granted to the citizens of Delhi meant nothing once Temur's troops were inside the city and disorders broke out: the sack began on 9 Rabi 11/18 December and lasted for some days. After campaigning east of the Yamuna, where he stormed Mirat (which had successfully withstood Tarmashirin seventy years previously) and launched an unsuccessful attack on the fortress of Hardwar, Temur finally withdrew westwards through the foothills, attacking Jammu en route (middle of Jumada II/late February 1399).¹¹⁸ For all his posturings, his invasion had enveloped Muslim amir and Hindu chief alike in a common destruction. According to Bihamadkhani, Sarang Khan had been put to death; Bahadur Nahir, who had submitted to him after the sack of Delhi, may have been put in chains, and the Khokhar chief Shaikha, who had acted as guide to the invaders, was arrested with his family during the conqueror's return march.¹¹⁹

It may well be asked what enabled Temur to succeed - to defeat the army of the Sultanate and to

capture its capital - where his Chaghadayid

¹¹⁴ Bihamadkhani, fols. 422b-423a (tr. Zaki, 32); for Firuz Shah and Temur, see fol. 442b (tr. Zaki, 59-60).

¹¹⁵ The view of Roemer, 'Timur in Iran', 70.

¹¹⁶ *TMS*, 162-3.

¹¹⁷ Shami, *ZN*, I, 192; and see Woods, 'Rise of Timurid historiography', 104-5.

¹¹⁸ For a detailed survey of the Indian campaign, see Lal, *Twilight*, 16-40.

¹¹⁹ Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Ilaḥdad, II, 127-8/ed. Urunbaev, fols. 327b-328a. *TMS*, 166-7. Bihamadkhani, fol. 307a (tr. Zaki, 93).

predecessors had failed. The reasons are manifold. One was that the conqueror had at his disposal resources of revenue and manpower that had not been available to Chaghadayid princes like Qutluḡ Qoḡa and Tarmashirin, since his campaigns in Persia and against the Golden Horde had won for him tribute and contingents of troops from areas that had lain outside Chaghadayid's ulus earlier in the century; he had also welded the Chaghadayid tribal forces into a far more formidable war-machine.¹²⁰ But it is still more important to register the sharp decline that had occurred in the military establishment of the Delhi Sultanate under Firuz Shah and his successors.

The decline in the Sultanate's resources

Timurid authors - by no means inclined, we can be sure, to minimize the opposition that their hero vanquished outside Delhi - set the army with which Mahmud Shah and Mallu met him at 10,000 horsemen, 20,000 foot and 120 elephants.¹²¹ These numbers constitute a pitiful force compared with those that had accompanied Firuz Shah on campaign. For his two invasions of Bengal, that sultan had been able to raise armies of 80,000 or 90,000 horsemen and 450 elephants;¹²² for his Thatta expedition, 90,000 horse and 480 elephants.¹²³ ^cAfif, probably indebted for these figures to his father, who worked in the *diwan-i wizarat*, tells us at another juncture that the sultan possessed a total of 80,000 horsemen excluding his slaves.¹²⁴ Yet even such statistics as these are a pale reflection of the numbers on the muster-roll under 'Ala' al-Din Khalji or in the early years of Muhammad b. Tughluq.

Blame for the unimpressive military establishment by the time of Temur's invasion cannot all be heaped upon Firuz Shah. The drop in the number of elephants in all probability reflects the fact that those animals formerly despatched to the Delhi Sultan as tribute from Bengal and Jajnagar were now being sent instead to Khwaja Jahan at Jawnpur.¹²⁵ Even where decline can be traced to his era, it would be foolish to disregard circumstances over which Firuz Shah had no control. Security from external attack brings its own penalty, as ^cAfif recognized, in a deterioration in the quality of the military.¹²⁶ In this process the decline in the incidence of Mongol attacks

¹²⁰ Manz, *Rise and rule*, chapters 4-5.

¹²¹ Ghiyath al-Din Yazdi, *Ruz-Nama*, tr. Semenov, 115. Shami, *ZN*, I, 189. Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Ilaḥdad, II, 100/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 320b, gives 40,000 foot, and does not at this stage specify the number of elephants. But later we are told that 120 were captured: ed. Ilaḥdad, II, 118/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 325a.

¹²² ^cAfif, 144; but for the first expedition, cf. 115 (three divisions of 30,000 horse each), and Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 123-4.

¹²³ ^cAfif, 197, 200.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 298. For ^cAfif's father, see *ibid.*, 197. Digby, *War-horse*, 24-5.

¹²⁵ *TMS*, 157. Digby, *War-horse*, 64, 76-7.

¹²⁶ c Afif, 23.

would no doubt have played a part. Nor should we discount extraneous factors operating on the supply of warhorses. At the time of Ibn Battuta's travels, the lands of the Golden Horde had exported fine mounts in droves of around 6000; but their availability would almost certainly have been considerably reduced by the struggles among numerous rival Jochid khans since 759/1358.¹²⁷ It is significant that no Sultanate coins later than Firuz Shah's reign have been found in hoards from Russia.¹²⁸

To what extent can the decline in military effectiveness be related to economic conditions? The reputation Firuz Shah's reign acquired for widespread prosperity (above, pp. 169-70) seems to have been derived from two closely related circumstances: a restoration of agrarian productivity following the death of Muhammad b. Tughluq, and a fall in the price of grain and many other commodities. As far as the first is concerned, Firuz Shah's personal efforts to promote cultivation are well known. The several canals that he caused to be excavated transformed traditional areas of pasture into flourishing agricultural land.¹²⁹ c Afif devotes space especially to the two canals that irrigated the territory of the sultan's new foundation of Hisar Firuza, making a spring crop possible for the first time in addition to the autumn crops that had traditionally been harvested in the region.¹³⁰ Steps were also taken to bring waste land under the plough and to restore the settlements that were attached to pious foundations like the tombs of shaykhs and past sultans.¹³¹ A hundred thousand *bighas* of waste land were made over to *faqirs* and the needy.¹³²

Yet the agrarian recovery does not seem to have brought in its wake a revival of the military strength that had characterized the first decade of Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign; and two reasons appear to have been a reduction in the government's revenues, and an increase in expenditure on building works and for charitable purposes. There is some evidence that by this time the land-tax (*kharaj*) had been reduced to 20 - or even 10 - per cent.¹³³ In c. 759/1358, moreover, on the basis of a tour of the empire by Husam al-Din Junaydi, the gross revenue-demand was fixed at six *krors* and seventy-five *laks* (67,500,000) of *tangas*, and it remained at that level throughout, with the result that the government failed to benefit from enhanced production in the provinces.¹³⁴ c Afif was told, too, that the

¹²⁷ On the horse trade, see IB, II, 372-4 (tr. Gibb, 478-9); Digby, *War-horse*, 35-6.

¹²⁸ Digby, 'Currency system', 100; A. A. Bykov, 'Finds of Indian medieval coins in east Europe', *JNSI* 21 (1965), 151-5.

¹²⁹ *TFS*, 566, 567-71. *SFS*, 74-5, 161ff., 216-17.

¹³⁰ c Afif, 127-8.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 130, 332-3.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 179: for the correct reading of this sentence, see Hodivala, *Studies*, II, 129-30.

¹³³ Riazul Islam, 'Some aspects of the economy of northern South Asia during the fourteenth century', *JCA* 11, part 2 (1988), 9 and n.21 (citing Mutahhar). But cf. c Afif, 484, *yaklba-dah*.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 94, saying that Junaydi toured the empire for six years; at 296 the figure given is six *krors* and eighty-five *laks*. Riazul Islam, 'Some aspects', 17-18.

abolition of uncanonical taxes in 777/1375-6 cost Firuz Shah thirty *laks* (3,000,000) of *tangas*.¹³⁵ At the same time, the sultan is said to have set aside a total of 3,600,000 *tangas* for the 'ulama', shaykhs and holy men.¹³⁶ A letter of Ibn Mahru provides some insight into conditions in the Multan province, probably within a few years of Firuz Shah's accession. Answering the criticism, among others, that he had been assigning unproductive land by way of pensions and allowances, Ibn Mahru draws attention to the fact

that the abolition of *mukus* under Muhammad b. Tughluq, and Firuz Shah's failure to reinstate them, has reduced the sultan's revenue; and points at the same time to Firuz Shah's generosity in allocating an unprecedentedly high sum of 300,000 *tangas* to the payment of pensions and gifts.¹³⁷

Ibn Mahru's letter throws into sharp relief another problem confronting the government. The value of stipends and pensions that had been fixed in kind at a time of high grain prices had been severely reduced when those prices fell - from as much as eighty *jitals* to a mere eight *jitals* per *mann*, if Ibn Mahru's figures are reliable. Even without the sultan's partiality for sayyids, shaykhs and other deserving causes, it would therefore have been deemed necessary to raise the grain-price equivalent of such grants in order to protect the recipients against hardship.¹³⁸ On the other hand, the sharp inflation of other prices consequent upon Muhammad's debasement of the currency had not gone into reverse, so that the government was confronted with a much higher bill for the purchase of essential war-material. The price of horses, for instance, appears to have risen six- to eightfold since the time of Ala'al-Din Khalji.¹³⁹

Thus the sums available for expenditure on the military had undergone a reduction on several counts. It was perhaps for this reason that Firuz Shah - at an early date, since it is mentioned by Barani - had reverted to the policy of paying the regular troops in assignments of land; and °Afif may be referring to this when he claims that the sultan gave away his whole empire in iqta^cs.¹⁴⁰ The soldiers in question he terms *wajhdars*, as opposed to those (*ghayr-wajhis*) who received pay either in cash or in drafts (*barat*) on provincial revenue. °Afif, commenting on °Ala' al-Din Khalji's refusal to follow such a practice on the grounds that it created entrenched local interests, gives it as his own opinion that nevertheless no ill effects could be detected during the forty years of Firuz Shah's reign.¹⁴¹ Yet short-term problems can certainly be discerned. One distinction between the two types of trooper was that the *wajhdars* were expected to provide their own

¹³⁵ °Afif, 378-9.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 179. *TFS*, 559, refers simply to an increase in the sum disbursed on pensions.

¹³⁷ *IM*, 79-80.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹³⁹ Digby, *War-horse*, 37-40.

¹⁴⁰ °Afif, 94-5, 279. *TFS*, 553.

¹⁴¹ °Afif, 96. On the two different types of trooper, see also *ibid.*, 193-4, 296; Hodivala. *Studies*, I, 321-2.

mounts, which put them at a disadvantage as compared to the *ghayr-wajhis* and caused no little hardship among them at the time of the sultan's retreat from Thatta to Gujarat, when most of the horses had been lost: their assignments being far away, it was necessary to advance them loans from the treasury.¹⁴² But there were also unwelcome longer-term effects. Troopers presenting their drafts in the iqta^cs, °Afif tells us, received only half the sum to which they were entitled. In these circumstances, many of them were prepared to sell their drafts in Delhi for one-third of the total payment due, thus sparing themselves the effort and expense of travelling to the iqta^c. A brisk traffic thus developed in the drafts for soldiers' pay, and many persons became wealthy by buying drafts at one-third of the nominal value and receiving in the locality fifty per cent.¹⁴³

At the same time as the introduction of pay through assignments, the sultan had also enacted another measure permitting the *wajhdar* to transmit his establishment (*istiqamat*) to his son or son-in-law: failing them, it should pass to his slave or to some kinsman; and in the absence of these, lastly, to his womenfolk (*°awrat*).¹⁴⁴ The undesirable consequences of such a provision from the military vantage-point are obvious. The complaint made to the sultan by Malik Ishaq, son of the "arid Bashir °Imad al-Mulk, that many of the troops had grown too old for service, echoes Barani's account of Balaban's attempt to change

the state of affairs in the *hawali* and the Doab soon after his accession (see p. 95). Firuz Shah ordered that any soldier incapable of fulfilling his duties should provide a substitute (*wakil*).¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the object of the sultan's system may well have been to encourage exploitation of the land by giving each family a permanent stake in the particular area allotted to it. The letter of Ibn Mahru cited above advocates giving, as pay or pensions, a combination of cultivated and waste land.¹⁴⁶ This would certainly have been in keeping with the sultan's personal interest in extending cultivation.

But whatever the case, the number of Mahmud Shah's troops in 1398 must also give some idea of the toll taken of the sultans' resources first by decades of mismanagement and then by some years of internal conflict. In the early years of Firuz Shah's reign, Barani had commented on the new sultan's indulgence towards the military.¹⁴⁷ Afif would be more outspoken, describing how Firuz Shah turned a blind eye to the presentation of substandard horses and weapons at the annual review and retailing an anecdote about the sultan's own efforts to help a trooper who had neglected to appear on time.¹⁴⁸ Detailed evidence is regrettably meagre; but we are left with the impression that the Sultanate's military establishment had been run down. This trend can only have been accentuated by the internal strife and

¹⁴² c Afif, 220-1.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 296-7.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 96. The mention of women precludes the rendering of *istiqamat* as 'rank'.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 302-3.

¹⁴⁶ *IM*, 79-80.

¹⁴⁷ *TFS*, 553. ¹⁴⁸ c Afif, 298-302.

regional rebellion that characterized the years following the old sultan's death. Afif writes in lyrical terms about the flourishing condition of the Doab under Firuz Shah;¹⁴⁹ but within a few years much of the province had been devastated by the campaigns of Hindu rais and rival Tughluqid princes.

The successor states

Sirhindi dates the emergence of autonomous provincial rulers from the time of the second civil war, when, he claims, 'the amirs and maliks of the empire were independent sovereigns and would appropriate the revenue and the produce themselves'.¹⁵⁰ The process had in fact begun well before this, in the reign of Firuz Shah, with the creation of an independent principality in Khandesh in 782/1380 under Malik Raja, of whom we know little.¹⁵¹ It is a striking fact that apart from Malik Raja and with the qualified exception of the creator of the Kalpi polity, Mahmud b. Firuz Khan, whose family had initially supported Tughluq Shah II, the founders of the provincial dynasties¹⁵² - Khidr Khan at Multan, Zafar Khan Wajih al-Mulk in Gujarat, 'Amid Shah (Dilawar Khan) in Malwa, Shams Khan Awhadi at Bhayana and Khwaja Jahan Sarwar at Jawnpur - were all originally nominees or supporters of Sultan Muhammad Shah b. Firuz.¹⁵³ Even Mahmud b. Firuz Khan must have made his peace with Muhammad Shah, who at the time of his visit to the region in 794/1391-2 had conferred on him the iqta^c of Mahoba in addition to the entire *shiqq* of Firuzpur which he already held.¹⁵⁴ Bihamadkhani goes so far as to equate the emergence of the new kingdoms with an act of administrative convenience by Muhammad Shah, a formal division of his territories into large administrative units following his triumph over Abu Bakr.¹⁵⁵ The chronology of Malik Mahmud's career alone suggests that we can take this story *cum grano salis*.

Khidr Khan at Multan is a special case. As we have seen, he had lost control of his province to Sarang Khan, and doubtless no longer felt any loyalty - if he ever had done - to Sultan Mahmud Shah, who was a puppet of Sarang Khan's brother Mallu. Escaping from Sarang Khan's hands, he had fled to Bhayana, and from there he made his way to Timur's encampment and offered his submission. Sirhindi's claim that Timur bestowed Delhi upon him is surely apocryphal, an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 295.

¹⁵⁰ *TMS*, 160-1.

¹⁵¹ P. Hardy, 'Farukids', *Enc. Isl.*².

¹⁵² They are mostly listed in *TMS*, 168-9.

¹⁵³ All referred to by Bihamadkhani, fols. 416a, 421b-422a, 426b (tr. Zaki, 19, 30, 36), except Shams Khan, for whom see *TMS*, 147. Khidr Khan had also been an adherent of Muhammad Shah, *ibid.*, 146, 147.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 152. Bihamadkhani, fols. 429b-430a (tr. Zaki, 42-3).

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, fols. 426b, 429 (tr. Zaki, 36, 42). He may have been the source of the similar version in Harawi, III, 288.

the Sayyid dynasty, for whom he was writing and who acknowledged Timurid overlordship, by means of the conqueror's *imprimatur*. His statement that Temur confirmed Khidr Khan as governor of Multan and Deopapur, however, we have no reason to doubt.¹⁵⁶ In view of Khidr Khan's allegiance, these territories had ceased to form part of the Delhi Sultanate.

Otherwise, however, the new rulers did not represent men who had come to power by any formal act of rebellion. Khwaja Jahan Sarwar, wazir successively to Muhammad Shah and to Mahmud Shah and viceroy to the latter throughout the eastern regions, is perhaps the most obvious case of a loyalist who found autonomy thrust upon him. It is noteworthy, too, how hesitant these provincial governors were to proclaim their own sovereignty and to repudiate the authority of the sultan in Delhi. At no time did Khwaja Jahan assume the style of sultan; it was not until his death in 802/ 1399 (and therefore after the sack of Delhi) that his adopted son and successor at Jawnpur took the title of Sultan Mubarak Shah, thereby provoking an abortive campaign by Mallu Iqbal Khan from Delhi.¹⁵⁷ In Gujarat Zafar Khan b. Wajih al-Mulk, despite Bihamadkham's statement to the contrary, displayed a reluctance to adopt the royal title which is all the more surprising in one who had acknowledged Nusrat Shah and whose son Tatar Khan had been that sultan's wazir. This would presumably explain Zafar Khan's embarrassment when Nusrat Shah's rival Mahmud Shah appeared in Gujarat a year or so later, following Temur's invasion; the fugitive sultan seems to have obtained no assistance and to have left for Malwa.¹⁵⁸ In 806/1404 Zafar Khan, whom an inscription of that year styles merely 'wazir', was briefly displaced by his ambitious son Tatar Khan, who had designs on Delhi and adopted the title of Sultan Nasir al-Din Muhammad Shah. But even after Tatar Khan's death and his own restoration two months later, Zafar Khan still called himself muqta^c of Gujarat; he did not take the title of sultan until 810/1407.¹⁵⁹ It has been claimed that Dilawar Khan did so in 804/1401-2, after Mahmud Shah's visit to Malwa, but the only evidence for this appears to be an inscription of 807/1405; the

¹⁵⁶ *TMS*, 166-7. Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Iahdad, II, 175 (abridged in Urunbaev edn, fol. 341a), refers only to the government of Multan.

¹⁵⁷ *TMS*, 169. Harawi, III, 274. Saeed, *Sharqi Sultanate*, 32-3, says that around the time of Temur's invasion he assumed the style of *Atabeg al-A^czam* and had the khutba read in his own name; but Bihamadkhani, the source cited, does not support him. Cf. also Nizami, in *HN*, 713.

¹⁵⁸ Bihamadkhani, fol. 427b (tr. Zaki, 38). *TMS*, 166, 170. Harawi, III, 89. Sikandar 'Manjhu', 20 (tr. Bayley, 79-80). Lai, *Twilight*, 47.

¹⁵⁹ G. H. Yazdani, 'Seven new inscriptions from Baroda State', *EIM (1939-40)*, 2-3. Z. A. Desai, 'Inscriptions of the Gujarat Sultans', *EIAPS* (1963), 6-10; *idem*, 'Khalji and Tughluq inscriptions from Gujarat', 32-3, 38-40. *TMS*, 172. Harawi, III, 90-3, implying he took the royal title after Tatar Khan's death. Sikandar 'Manjhu', 21-5 (tr. Bayley, 80, 81, 83-4). Misra, *Muslimpower*, 152-6.

evidence for the assumption of the royal title by his successor Hushang Shah is much stronger.¹⁶⁰

The eventual assumption of sovereign status by Mahmud b. Firuz Khan, the founder of the principality of Kalpi who reigned as Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah, is a matter concerning which the local chronicler, Bihamadkhani, is disarmingly confused. At one point he alleges that the Delhi Sultan Mahmud Shah b. Muhammad sent Mahmud b. Firuz Khan a chatr and a durbash, together with the title of sultan. Slightly later, Mahmud is said to have established himself at Kalpi following the death of Mahmud Shah - an impossible feat, since he died in 813/1410-11 and the Delhi Sultan survived for another two years. With Bihamadkhani's statement immediately below, that Mahmud adopted the insignia of sovereignty in the wake of Temur's invasion, we are doubtless as near to the truth as we shall get.¹⁶¹

Temur's assault on Delhi had been decisive. The artisans and other skilled workers who had helped to beautify Firuz Shah's residences had been carried off to adorn the invader's headquarters at Samarqand.¹⁶² Many of the city's other inhabitants had fled elsewhere for safety and had not returned. Certainly, Bihamadkhani gives the impression that the security and prosperity of Kalpi were greatly enhanced by the influx of refugees from Delhi in the wake of its sack by the Chaghadayid Mongols.¹⁶³ The collapse of the Delhi Sultanate was as much a matter of the death-blow to the capital city and its region as of the secession of most of its remaining provinces.

¹⁶⁰ U. N. Day, *Medieval Malwa: a political and cultural history, 1401-1562* (Delhi, 1965), 21; HN, 898, 899. For the inscription, see *EIM* (1909-10), 11-12, summarized by Day, 435. For Hushang, see *ibid.*, 25.

¹⁶¹ Bihamadkhani, fol. 436 (tr. Zaki, 52, 53); and see also fol. 412b (tr. 15). For the death of Mahmud Shah of Kalpi, see *ibid.*, fol. 445b (tr. 62).

¹⁶² Ghiyath al-Din Yazdi, *Ruz-Nama*, tr. Semenov, 124-5. Yazdi, *ZN*, ed. Iahdad, II, 124/ed. Urunbaev, fol. 326b. For other towns sacked, see Verma, *Dynamics of urban life*, 65-6.

¹⁶³ Bihamadkhani, fols. 436b, 442b-443a (tr. Zaki, 53, 59-60). On the Kalpi polity, see generally Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, 'Kalpi in the 15th century', *IC* 61 (1987), part 3, 90-120.

Epilogue (c. 1400-1526)

The end of the Tughluqids

During the decade following Temur's attack, the Sultanate reverted to being simply one of a number of competing powers in the northern half of the subcontinent, as Firuz Shah's empire split into several states. For three years after Temur's onslaught, there was not even a sultan in Delhi. Nusrat Shah, who returned from the Doab to take up residence at Firuzabad in Rajab 801/March-April 1399, was defeated by Malm Iqbal Khan and obliged to flee into the Meo territory, where he died. Mallu then established his headquarters at Siri, from where he is said to have brought back under control 'the *shiqq* of the Doab and the iqta's of the *hawdli*. But although he routed Sumer and his allies near Patiyali in 803/1401, he was unable to recover Gwaliyor from the successor of the Tomara chief Virasinha, who had seized it during the chaos of Temur's onslaught.² For a time Mallu was able to rule through Mahmud Shah, whom he persuaded to rejoin him; but the sultan grew suspicious of him during a campaign against Jawnpur and established himself at Qinnawj. He returned to Delhi only after Mallu's death in battle with Khidr Khan in 808/1405, and maintained a shadowy authority there until his own death in 815/1412. After the short reign of the leading amir Dawlat Khan, Khidr Khan finally obtained possession of Delhi.

The Sayyid and Lodi dynasties

The rulers of the so-called Sayyid (817-855/1414-1451) and Lodi (855-932/ 1451-1526) dynasties³ presided over an empire that was a mere shadow of its former self and which continued to fragment. The truncated Sultanate was surrounded, and sometimes threatened, by Muslim rivals like

Jawnpur,

¹ *TMS*, 167-8.

² *Ibid.*, 169-70, 171-2.

³ For these dynasties, see generally K. A. Nizami, 'Sayyids', *Enc. Isl.*²; *idem*, 'The Saiyids (1414-51)', in *HN*, 630-63; *idem*, 'The Lodis (1451-1526)', *ibid.*, 664-709; S. M. Imamuddin, 'Lodis', *Enc. Isl.*; Lal, *Twilight*.

Gujarat, Malwa and Bengal, and by renascent Hindu principalities in Mewar, Alwar and the Doab. On occasions Delhi itself was menaced by invaders from one of the rival Muslim kingdoms, as it was by the sultan of Malwa in 844/1440 and by the sultan of Jawnpur in 810/1407, in 856/1452, in c. 1466 and in 883/1479, just before the final overthrow of the Jawnpur Sultanate by Bahlul Lodi. Caliphal diplomas from Cairo were now despatched to other Muslim monarchs in the subcontinent.⁴

The title 'Sayyids' applied to the dynasty of Khidr Khan (817-24/ 1414-21) is based on the descent from the Prophet ascribed to them on inadequate grounds by Sirhindi. At no time did Khidr Khan assume sovereign status, preferring the title *Rayat-i Ala* ('exalted standard'). As befitted a ruler who owed his office to Temur, he paid tribute to the conqueror's youngest son Shah Rukh, who now dominated the eastern Islamic world from his capital at Herat, and was sent in exchange a robe of honour and a banner. And although Sirhindi salutes Khidr Khan's son and successor Mubarak Shah (824-837/1421-1434) as sultan,⁵ we know that he too received from Herat a robe and a chatr.⁶ Sirhindi is silent on these contacts, and the Sayyids' coinage did not bear Shah Rukh's name, comprising simply updated Tughluqid issues. We should know nothing of the allegiance of the rulers of Delhi were it not for Bihamadkhani, who assures us that Shah Rukh's orders had been received in Delhi for almost forty years and that the current ruler, Mubarak's nephew Muhammad Shah (837-849/ 1434-45), was still obedient to him at the time of writing.⁷ The subservience of Khidr Khan and his successors did not guarantee the Delhi Sultanate freedom from Mongol attacks. Shaykh ^cAli, who governed Kabul on behalf of Shah Rukh's son, profited from the Sayyids' difficulties to invade India on a number of occasions, briefly occupying Lahore in 836/1432-3.

Shah Rukh's influence in the subcontinent seems to have been extensive. Bihamadkhani, who includes verses in praise of that monarch's sovereignty (*saltanat*) and refers to him as 'the seal of kings' (*khatam al-muluk*),⁸ claims that Sultan Hushang Shah of Malwa appealed to him for assistance against an invasion from Gujarat; while a Timurid source depicts the sultan of Bengal likewise seeking aid from Herat against Jawnpur.⁹ This overlordship in all likelihood lapsed with the onset of civil war following Shah Rukh's death in 850/1447 and the emergence of the threat to the Timurids from the Turkmens in western Persia.¹⁰ But when Temur's descendant Babur

⁴ Otto Spies, 'Ein Investiturschreiben des abbasidischen Kalifen in Kairo an einen indischen Konig', in S. M. Abdullah (ed.), *Professor Muhammad Shaft^c presentation volume* (Lahore. 1955), 241-53.

⁵ *TMS*, 193.

⁶ Bihamadkhani, fols. 311b-312a (tr. Zaki, 95).

⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 312a (tr. Zaki, 95).

⁸ *Ibid.*, fols. 312b-313a (not in Zaki's tr.).

⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 312b (tr. Zaki, 96). ^cAbd al-Razzaq Samarqandi, *Matla al-Sa^cdayn*, ed. M. Shaifi (Lahore, 1941-9, 2 vols.), II, 782-3, cited in *HN*, 719.

¹⁰ See H. R. Roemer, 'The successors of Timur', in Jackson and Lockhart (eds.), *Cambridge history of Iran*, VI, 105ff.

launched his five invasions of India from Kabul early in the sixteenth century, he was reviving the claims of his forebears to sovereignty east of the Indus, although the conquest of Delhi itself became his objective only with time.¹¹

The early fifteenth-century sultans were barely able to impose their authority either on their own *muqta's* or on local Hindu princes. Multan, once Khidr Khan's power-base, seceded in 847/1443 under Shaykh Yusuf Qurayshi, a descendant of Shaykh Baha' al-Din Zakariyya, who was subsequently supplanted by the Afghan dynasty of the Langahs. Sirhindi's survey of the first decades of the Sayyid dynasty amounts to little more than a tedious litany of campaigns against the Khokhars, the Meos, the *muqaddams* of Katehr, the Chawhans of Etawa and the Tomaras of Gwaliyor, designed to raise 'revenue' in the form of tribute payments. The sultanate of Delhi consisted of little more than the territories immediately surrounding the capital itself, the *hawali* as they had long been known. One contemporary was immortalized by a sixteenth-century chronicler described the sway of the last Sayyid ruler, 'Ala' al-Din 'Alam Shah (*shah-i 'alam*, 'world-king'), as extending from Delhi to Palam.¹²

In pursuit of his designs on Delhi, Khidr Khan had recruited considerable numbers of Afghan chiefs and their retainers. Already in his reign the Lodi chieftain Sultan Shah (later styled Islam Khan), who had killed Mallu Iqbal Khan, held Sirhind; he fell in 834/1431 fighting against a Timurid invading force. During the 1440s Afghan nobles became the real power in the Sultanate. Islam Khan's nephew and successor at Sirhind, Bahlul Lodi, who had been granted Lahore and Deopaltir in return for assistance against the invading Malwa forces, went on to occupy most of the Panjab and made two attempts on Delhi. 'Alam Shah abandoned the capital for Bada'un in 852/1448, and three years later Bahlul entered the city and was enthroned as sultan.

The Lodi era witnessed something of a revival. A protracted duel with Jawnpur ended with its annexation (884/1479); the region was later conferred on Sultan Bahlul's younger son Barbak Shah; the last Sharqi sultan fled into Bihar. Here he maintained himself until his expulsion and the annexation of that territory by Bahlul's son Sikandar Shah (894-923/ 1489-517), who had earlier removed his brother Barbak from Jawnpur. Under Sikandar significant gains were also made to the south. The Awhadls, who had continued to rule Bhayana under the overlordship of Delhi, were finally ousted in 898/1492, when the place was subjected to a nominee of the sultan. Narwar was wrested from the prince of Gwaliyor in 914/1508 and Chanderi from the sultanate of Malwa in 921/1515; and in

¹¹ *Babur-Nama*, tr. Beveridge, II, 377, 380, 382, 478.

¹² Ahmad Yadgar, *Ta'rikh-i Shahi* or *Ta'rikh-i Salatin-i Afaghina*, ed. M. Hidayat Hosain, BI (Calcutta, 1939), 5, cited in Lal, *Twilight*, 124 n.64.

915/1509 Nagawr became subordinate to Delhi. Sikandar's son and successor, Ibrahim (923-32/1517-26) succeeded in the conquest of Gwaliyor, which had eluded his father, but lost Chanderi and Nagawr to the Hindu princes of Mewar and Marwar respectively. It is symptomatic of the sultans' preoccupation with the subjection of Alwar, Gwaliyor and Bhayana that Sikandar had in 911/1505 removed his residence from Delhi to Agra. But the corollary of this forward policy in the south was neglect of the vulnerable frontier in the Panjab.

The immigration of Afghan chiefs and their followers continued apace under the first two Lodis, particularly when Bahlul, confronted by the threat from Jawnpur, sought to enhance his military strength by inviting in tribesmen from the Roh clans.¹³ The position of the Afghan chiefs, and one or two non-Afghan clans from the north-west with whom they shared power, was considerably stronger than that of their precursors during the fourteenth century: it is noteworthy that the sultan around this time lost his long-cherished monopoly of the elephantry.¹⁴ Bahlul ruled merely *as primus inter pares*. Sikandar, whose ambitions were more autocratic, consolidated his position gradually and with tact; but Ibrahim from the outset showed himself to be uncompromising in his designs to curb the power of the older nobility and to build up an elite upon which he could rely.¹⁵ His arbitrary actions against leading figures eventually provoked the secession of Bihar under a rival, who seized the territory as far west as Qinnawj,¹⁶ and an invitation from Dawlat Khan Lodi, governor of the Panjab, to the Timurid prince Babur to embark on his

last two invasions of India. In the fourth expedition, Lahore was occupied (930/1524), and in the fifth Babur conquered the Delhi Sultanate. On 8 Rajab 932/20 April 1526, at Panipat, Ibrahim's superior numbers were outclassed by Babur's artillery, and he fell in the fighting. Although the expulsion of Babur's son Humayun, and the temporary establishment of a new Afghan-ruled polity by Shir Shah in 947/ 1540, has some claim to be regarded as a recreation of the Delhi Sultanate, the engagement at Panipat marks the beginning of the Mughal empire.

Babur is keen to contrast his own victory over the ruler of most of northern India with the triumphs of the earlier conquerors, Mahmud of Ghazna and Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad of Ghur, whose opponents had been smaller fry. In his opinion, Ibrahim's avarice was to blame for the fact that his army stood at not more than 100,000 troops when he might have mustered twice or three times as many.¹⁷ But this may not do justice to the

¹³ *Ta'rikh-i Shir-Shahi*, cited in HN, 679-80.

¹⁴ HN, 665. For the position of the Afghans in the Lodi Sultanate, see Iqtidar Husain Siddiqi-'The composition of the nobility under the Lodi Sultans', *MIM4* (1977), 10-66.

¹⁵ For the relations of the Lodi sultans with their nobles, see generally Iqtidar Husain Siddiqi. *Some aspects of Afghan despotism in India* (Aligarh, 1969), chapters 1 -2.

¹⁶ *Babur-Nama*, tr. Beveridge, 523.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 470, 480; see also his comment on the wealth of India in gold and silver, *ibid.*, 518, 519.

absence of aid from the Lodi sultan's rebellious eastern provinces and a more widespread alienation on the part of his army which is mentioned by a later source.¹⁸ It is also possible that Babur over-estimated his enemy's wealth. The discontinuance of silver and gold coinage under the Sayyid and Lodi sultans and the employment of baser metals such as billon and copper testify to the economic weakness of the fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Sultanate, which had forfeited control of much of its land revenue and no longer enjoyed access to the enormous sums gained in plunder or in tribute during the Khaljl and Tughluqid eras.

¹⁸ Ahmad Yadgar, *Ta'rikh-i Shahi*, 96.

APPENDIX I

Juzjani's use of the word 'Turk'

Sometimes Juzjani employs the word 'Turk' as a general ethnicon, as when we read of the khan (or khaqans) of 'the Turks': *TN*, I, 230, 231 (tr. 84, 85); cf. also I, 281 (tr. 194), for 'the cap of the Turks'. In its broadest sense, it could even embrace for Juzjani, as for other Muslim authors, the non-Turkish Qara-Khitans and Mongols, as *ibid.*, II, 94, 98 (tr. 900, 935). He also refers to the inhabitants of the regions lying to the north and north-east of Lakhnawti, against whom Muhammad b. Bakhtiyar headed his disastrous invasion, as 'Turks': *ibid.*, I, 429 and n.4 (tr. 566, 567). The reason seems to be that their facial features were thought to resemble those of the Turks: *ibid.*, I, 427 (tr. 560); *IB*, IV, 216 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 869).

But there is also evidence that for Juzjani the word 'Turk' denoted a Turkish ghulam. The clearest indication of this is that in his section on the last Ghaznawid Sultan he employs the phrase 'Turk and free' (*atrak-u ahrdr*): *TN*, I, 243 (Raverty's tr., 114, does not quite bring out the sense). At other points the context usually suggests that the Turkish slave guards of, say, the Ghaznawids are in question: *ibid.*, I, 234 (tr. 95, 97); also I, 230, 235, 236, 250, 251, 258, 286, 314 (tr. 83-4, 98, 100, 129, 131, 149, 180, 204-5, 282). By contrast, the word 'Turk' is applied to nomadic Turkish groups far more sparingly. Juzjani employs the term 'Turk' for only one free Turkish chieftain, the founder of the dynasty of the Khwarazmshahs (although in reality he too was a ghulam): *TN*, I, 297 (tr. 233). When the Turkish nomads

of the steppe are not called specifically Seljiiks or Ghuzz, they are referred to as 'Turkmen' (e.g., II, 94), a designation applied, for instance, to Seljuk himself: *ibid.*, I, 213 (*turkdn* to read *turkmanan*, as in BL ms., fol. 93a), 245 (tr. 45, 116). *Turkmen* seems to be used by the twelfth-century writer Marwazi to denote Turkish nomads who had accepted Islam: *Tabai al-Hayawan*, partial edn and tr. V. Minorsky, *Sharaf al-Zaman Tahir Marvazi on China, the Turks and India* (London, 1942), Ar. text 18, tr. 29 (and notes at 94-5). But cf. I. Kafesoglu, 'A propos du nom Turkmen'. *Oriens II* (1958), 146-50.

APPENDIX II

Qilich Khan Mas^cud b. 'Ala' al-Din Jani

The widespread confusion regarding this important noble of the middle of the thirteenth century is due to the vagaries of the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* manuscript tradition and of the two printed editions by Nassau Lees and by Habibi. Thus 'Qilich' sometimes occurs as 'Qutlugh', causing Nizami to identify him with Balaban's great enemy Qutlugh Khan (HN, 262, 271-2); Nigam, 41, 198-9, 203, similarly confuses the two men. The same form Qutlugh is also adopted by Aziz Ahmad, *Political history*, 245, 246, 258, although he distinguishes Mas^cud-i Jani from Qutlugh Khan. Qilich Khan's full name can be determined from *TN*, I, 476 (tr. 673), where he is listed among the maliks of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah as Malik Jalal al-Din Qilich Khan-i Malik Jani (text reads *XLJ*; BL ms., fol. 188b, here has 'Toghril' in error), and I, 495 (tr. 712), where he is called Malik Jalal al-Din Mas^cud Shah-i Malik Jani. At II, 35 (as in BL ms., fol. 208a), he is called 'Qutlugh Khan son of Malik Jani' (see also Raverty's tr., 769). At II, 78 (as in BL ms., fol. 223), however, he appears as Qilich (QLJ) Khan (cf. Raverty's tentative 'Qutlugh [Qulij]' at 848-9). The title is from Tu. *qilich*, 'sword': Sauvaget, 'Noms et surnoms', no. 178.

APPENDIX III

Qara'unas and Neguderis

I have throughout accepted the identification of the Qara'unas with the Neguderis made by Aubin ('L'ethnogenese', 84-5), and do not intend to devote further space to the origins of this grouping. Our Indian sources never refer to Neguderis, but they do occasionally employ the term Qara'unas. The following examples are from two authors writing in the fourteenth century. In his account of the death of Balaban's son Muhammad in battle with the Mongols in 683/1285, 'Isami says that the prince was killed by a Qara'una horseman. The word is misread in Usha's edition, 179, 180, as *fuzuna* (defined in his glossary as 'a soldier not present at review and not entered on the muster-roll'), but the correct form is found in the otherwise inferior text edited by Husain (Agra, [1938], 174, 175). Amir Khusraw too employs the term of the Mongol warrior who was briefly his captor following the overthrow of Muhammad b. Balaban (*GK*, IOL ms. 412, fol. 78b, with HRWNH in error; correct spelling in Bada'uni, I, 153). And in describing the punishment meted out to Mongols captured during the invasion by Iqbal, Kopek and Taibu in c. 1306, he says (*KF*, 46), 'And through the mingling of Qara'una and Mongol, there was seen in every fortress the junction of Saturn and Mars.'

There are several word-plays in this sentence, which hinges on the double meaning of *burj* as 'tower' and 'sign of the Zodiac'. 'Qara'una' could be read also as *qaruna*, 'soul', and 'Mughal' as *maghal*, 'sleep'. It is possible, lastly, that in 'Saturn', used by Indian Muslim writers to denote the infidel Hindu, we have an allusion to the mixed Mongol-Indian descent of the Qara'unas - assuming, of course, that Marco Polo's definition (*guasmil*. 'half-breeds') is reliable (Aubin, 'L'ethnogenese', 66-9); but this is a matter of conjecture.

Together with the evidence of IB, III, 201 (tr. Gibb, 649), who heard from Shaykh Rukn al-Din of Multan that the Qara'unas were 'Turks' who 'dwelt in the mountains between Sind and the Turks [i.e. Transoxiana and Turkestan]', these examples suggest that the term Qara'unas was widely current in Muslim India and that the term Neguderis was used only by the Mongols themselves and by authors writing in Mongol Persia.

APPENDIX IV

°Ayn al-Mulk Multani and °Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru

Some confusion has arisen between °Ayn al-Mulk Multani, who conquered Malwa for 'Ala' al-Din Khaljl, and °Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru, who governed Multan under Muhammad b. Tughluq and Firuz Shah successively and whose correspondence has come down to us. For the equation of the two men, see °Abdu'l Wali, 254-5; 'Abdur Rashid's introduction to *IM*, Iff.; Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, 340; Husain, *Tughluq dynasty*, 80-1, 87, etc., and index; Nigam, 13, 18, 79, 82, 88, 158-9, 171, 173, 174, 179 (though distinguishing them in the index!); Nizami, *On history and historians*, 211-16, esp. 212 n.1, and in *Supplement to Elliot and Dowson's History of India*, III, 64-5; Conermann, *Beschreibung Indiens*, 163-4. By contrast, B. P. Saksena, in HN, 615 n.67, and I. H. Siddiqui, '°Ayn al-Mulk Multani', *Enc. Isl², Supplement*, 104-5, make them two separate individuals.

°Ayn al-Mulk Ibn Mahru is known to have been an Indian: IB, III, 344 (tr. Gibb, 722). His patronymic, for which see *ibid.*, III, 342 (tr. 721), probably indicates that his father had been a convert to Islam. His name appears in fuller form twice in his correspondence. On the first occasion, the diploma appointing him to Multan calls him 'Malik al-Sharq wa'l-Wuzara' °Ayn al-Mulk °Ayn al-Dawla wa'l-Din ... °Abd-Allah-i Mahru' (*IM*, 12; cf. also *SFS*, 154, "Ayn al-Mulk °Ayn al-Din-i Mahru"). Later, the author refers to himself as "Abd-Allah-i Muhammad Sharaf, known as (*al-mad'u ba-*) °Ayn-i Mahru' (*IM*, 176). This appears to preclude his identification with °Ayn al-Mulk Multani, whose full name is given as °Ayn al-Mulk Shihab-i Taj Multani in *TMS*, 77, 87, and who is not heard of after Tughluq Shah's reign. In *Tughluq-Nama*, 67, this earlier °Ayn al-Mulk is made to claim Muslim ancestry as far back as ten generations (*ba-dah pusht*), which suggests that he belonged to an immigrant Muslim family. The 'Malik Nasir al-Din, son of °Ayn al-Mulk', who according to IB, IV, 45 (tr. Gibb and Beckingham, 793), died when taking part in an attack on Sindapur (Goa), would have been his son, since we are told that he lived at Ujjain.

APPENDIX V

The date of Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq Shah's death

Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq's death at Afghanpur and the accession of Muhammad have traditionally been placed by historians in 725, in accordance with the date given in *TFS*, 456, for the latter event and the month Rabi I of that year (February-March 1325) supplied for the Afghanpur episode by *TMS*, 96-1. But the sources are far from unanimous. °Isami-like Barani, a contemporary (though admittedly far from reliable as regards dates) - places Tughluq's death in 724 (*FS*, 421), and Husam Khan specifies the last day (*salkh*) of that year (*AHG*, III, 862). Our data on the duration of Tughluq's reign are similarly vague. °Afif, 41, puts it at four and a half years; Barani at one point gives 'four or five years' (*TFS*, 438), but more often puts it at 'four years and some months' (*ibid.*, 22, 445); in this he is followed by Sirhindi, although in one ms. *chand* is amended to *hasht* (*TMS*, 97 and n.1). But Baram's first recension, in this respect a hitherto untapped source, furnishes a more exact figure of 'four years and four months' (*TFS*¹, Bodleian ms., fol. 11a). Now Amir Khusraw dates Tughluq's accession on 1 Sha'ban 720/6 September 1320 (*Tughluq-Nama*, 135), and the figure in *TFS*¹ would put his death somewhere in Dhu'l-Hijja 724 - in other words, at the very end of the year, as indicated by Husam Khan. This conclusion is supported by a *farman* of Muhammad b. Tughluq, dated 14 Dhu'l-Hijja 724/2 Dec. 1324, in which he is clearly the ruling sultan and his father is not mentioned (Nizami, 'Some documents', 308-9). It is also very probable that an inscription on Firuz Shah's column at Fathabad, in which Tughluq's death is dated Rajab 725 and Muhammad's accession on 1 Sha'ban is in error by a whole year, given that this same epigraph sets the sultan's reign at four years and two months (i.e. middle of 720-late 724): for the text, see Shokoohy, *Haryana I*, 21 and Pis. 28a, 29b-e; and cf. review by Jackson, *JRAS* (1990), 171-2.

We further possess an inscription of Muhammad, as sultan, from Kanbhaya dated 18 Muharram 725/4 January 1325: this was edited by Husain ('Six inscriptions', 29-33), who goes to great lengths to prove that this date fell within Tughluq's reign and that it therefore applies to the commencement of the building, which must have been completed several

months later. An inscription from Batihagarh, north-west of Damoh, admittedly bears the date 725

and names Tughluq as the reigning sultan (Verma, 'Inscriptions from the Central Museum, Nagpur', 111-12). Nevertheless, since no month is given, it possibly belongs to the beginning of the year. The balance of the evidence seems to be that the sultan died at the very end of 724, and I have accordingly adopted this date.

APPENDIX VI

The ancestry of Tughluq Shah II

Tughluq Shah II is everywhere called the son of Fath Khan. Although both Bihamadkhani, fol. 416a (tr. Zaki, 19), and *TMS*, 140, also call him Firuz Shah's grandson, it seems that this is an error. He was in reality the old sultan's great-grandson, and the conventional genealogy of the later Tugh-luqids (e.g. in Haig, *Cambridge history of India*, III, 189, 692; Banerjee, *History of Firuz Shah*, 47; Lai, *Twilight*, 2) stands in need of emendation. Firuz Shah had four sons, Firuz Khan (known as *shahzada-yi buzurg*, 'the great prince'), Zafar Khan, Muhammad Khan (the future sultan) and Shadi Khan, as listed in *TFS*, BL ms., fol. 260b (the phrase that follows in the printed text, 527, is corrupt and omits the two lastnamed princes), and in Bihamadkhani, fol. 416b (tr. Zaki, 20). Fath Khan is explicitly referred to as Firuz Khan's son both by Bihamadkhani (*ibid.*) and in *TFS*, 527 (the phrase *a'ni sultan muhammad* is a later interpolation, applying to Muhammad Khan, and has become displaced); cf. also 'Afif, 65, where Fath Khan is said to have been born in Firuz Khan's house. Since his birth occurred in 752/1351 (*TMS*, 122), Fath Khan could easily have had a young son by the time of his death - the sources comment on Tughluq Shah's youth: Bihamadkhani, fols. 418a, 419b (tr. Zaki, 25, 27); *TMS*, 142. It has helped to confuse matters that Fath Khan was in fact virtually a year older than his uncle Muhammad, for whose birth, on 3 Jumada I 753/17 June 1352, see *TMS*, 123.

Glossary

akhurbegl amir-i akhur intendant of the stables

<i>amir-hajib</i>	military chamberlain
<i>amir-i dad</i>	military justiciar
<i>amir-i majlis</i>	intendant of the private assembly
<i>amir-i sada</i>	commander of a unit of 100
<i>amir-i shikar</i>	intendant of the hunt
<i>'arid</i>	muster-master
<i>Barbeg</i>	= <i>amir-hdjib</i>
<i>Band</i>	intelligence officer; spy
<i>chashnigir</i>	cupbearer
<i>Chart</i>	ceremonial parasol
<i>chawdhuri</i>	Hindu chief/official in charge of a district
<i>Dadbeg</i>	= <i>amir-i dad</i>
<i>dhimma</i>	status of <i>dhimmi</i>
<i>dhimmis</i>	'Protected peoples' living under Islamic rule
<i>diwan-i wizarat</i>	imperial revenue ministry
<i>durbash</i>	ceremonial baton
<i>farrash</i>	palace attendant (literally 'carpet-spreader')
<i>fath-nama</i>	victory despatch
<i>ghayr-wajhis</i>	troops paid other than by assignments of land (see pp. 316-17)
<i>ghulam</i>	slave
<i>Hajib</i>	chamberlain
<i>Hawali</i>	territory in the environs of Delhi
<i>in 'am</i>	(revenue grant) exempt from service

<i>Insha</i>	correspondence; the art of prose composition
<i>iqta^c</i>	transferable revenue assignment in lieu of salary
<i>Jizya</i>	capitation tax imposed on non-Muslims
<i>karkhana</i>	manufactory, workshop
<i>khalisa</i>	crown lands
<i>khanaqah</i>	sufi hospice
<i>kharaj</i>	land-tax; tribute; (more generally) revenue
<i>kharitadar</i>	keeper of the purse
<i>khass-hdjib</i>	privy chamberlain
<i>khutlkhoh</i>	(Hindu) headman
<i>kotwal</i>	Castellan
<i>kror</i>	100 <i>laks</i> , i.e. 10 million
<i>kuroh</i>	approximately 2 miles
<i>lak</i>	100,000
<i>mawas</i>	(Hindu) territory inaccessible to Muslim attack (see p. 125)
<i>mawlazada</i>	son of a freed slave
<i>muhrdar</i>	keeper of the seal
<i>muhtasib</i>	overseer of public morality; inspector of the markets
<i>Mucus</i>	taxes not sanctioned by the Sharfa
<i>muqaddam</i>	(Hindu) chief
<i>Muqta'</i>	holder of an <i>iqta^c</i>
<i>mushrif-i mamalik</i>	accountant-general of imperial revenue
<i>mustawfi-yi mamdlik</i>	auditor-general
<i>mutasararif</i>	(provincial) revenue-collector
<i>na'ib [-i]</i>	viceroy; (deputy-)
<i>na'ib-i ^card</i>	deputy muster-master
<i>nawbat</i>	band playing outside royal or noble residence as a mark of honour
<i>Noyan</i>	(Mongol) commander
<i>Paik</i>	(Hindu) infantryman
<i>pilkhana</i>	elephant-stable
<i>qadi-yi lashgar</i>	judge of the army
<i>quriltai</i>	(Mongol) assembly of princes and generals
<i>Sadi</i>	hundred (administrative division)
<i>Sdh</i>	Hindu banker/moneylender
<i>sar-i chatrddr</i>	chief parasol-bearer
<i>sar-i dawatdar</i>	chief inkwell-holder
<i>sar-i jandar</i>	commander of the sultan's guards or executioners
<i>sar-i sildhdar</i>	chief armour-bearer
<i>shihna</i>	governor; (Mongol) resident at the court of a subject ruler
<i>shihna-yi bargah</i>	intendant of the audience-hall
<i>shihna-yi manda</i>	intendant of the markets
<i>shihna-yi pil</i>	intendant of the elephantry
<i>Shiqq</i>	administrative division
<i>sildhddr</i>	armour-bearer
<i>talwaraltawandi</i>	(Hindu) territory or encampment
<i>Tumen</i>	(Mongol) military unit of 10,000
<i>Ulus</i>	complex of people, livestock and grazing grounds allotted

<i>wajhdars</i>	to a prince of the Mongol imperial dynasty regular troops paid in assignments of land (see pp. 316-17)
<i>wakil-i dar</i>	comptroller of the household
<i>wall</i>	governor

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